Icebreaker Replacement - The Columbia Group

The Time Is Now
Icebreaker Replacement Must Move
Forward to Overcome Capability Shortfalls
November 2012

About the Author
Rick Wharton is a retired Coast Guard officer and engineer with 20
years of experience in operation, maintenance and logistics support of
a wide variety of Coast Guard ships and boats, including a tour as the
first Platform Manager for high- and medium-endurance cutters at the
Coast Guard Engineering Logistics Center (now a part of the Surface
Forces Logistics Center). Following his retirement from the USCG
Yard in Baltimore, he supported the Coast Guard Deepwater program
before joining The Columbia Group in 2009. He currently serves as Director
of Operations of The Columbia Group’s Rosenblatt Ship Design
Division.

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Introduction
January 6, 2012: On the Bering Sea 250
miles south of Nome, Alaska, the Coast
Guard Cutter Healy breaks the ice near
the tanker vessel Renda after it became
stopped in ice, so the Renda could
resume its voyage. (Photo courtesy of
U.S. Coast Guard.)
n this publication, two years ago, a case was made for the increasing need of new polar
Iicebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard. The article concluded that “The time has already
passed when the U.S. should have started the long process of acquiring two new vessels to
replace the Polar Class.” This echoed the 2007 conclusion by the National Research Council
that the United States should “immediately” begin the design and construction of two new
polar icebreakers, and the later 2008 statement by then Coast Guard Commandant Admiral
Thad Allen that the Coast Guard was “at a crisis point” on a decision to build new icebreakers.
Since that time, ongoing disagreement between congressional appropriators and the
Obama Administration over the best course to maintain the nation’s icebreaking capability
has led to continuing delays in funding any new acquisition program to begin the replacement
of the polar icebreakers.
Over the last two years, several developments have occurred that reinforce the urgency for
the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain or even expand their capabilities in the Arctic. Most significantly,
the area of the arctic that remains ice-covered has continued to decrease steadily,
with 2012 set to be the smallest percentage of ice coverage since 1979 when records began.
(See Figure 1 on next page.) With increased access to artic waters comes a corresponding
increase in activity for shipping, resource exploration / extraction, and tourism. The most
visible sign of this phenomenon over the past several months has been Shell’s efforts to
develop exploratory wells in areas that were previously largely ice-covered. While technical
challenges and an abundance of caution prevented the completion of these wells this year,
efforts will continue next season to establish these wells and begin tapping the oil and gas
resources beneath the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.
Despite this activity increase, the only two heavy icebreakers in the U. S. inventory, the Polar
Star and the Polar Sea, remain non-operational. Other than a privately-owned medium
icebreaker leased by the National Science Foundation, the USCGC Healy (WAGB – 20) remains
the only operational U.S. Icebreaker. While the Healy possesses significant capability
to support scientific research, unlike the Polar Star and Polar Sea, Healy is not capable of
heavy icebreaking as is required, for example, for break-in and resupply of McMurdo station
in Antarctica. Instead, recent heavy icebreaking requirements have been met by leasing foreign
icebreakers from Sweden or Russia. Some of the limitations of the Healy were demonstrated
during the January 2012 break-in to Nome to deliver fuel oil in conjunction with an
ice-capable Russian oil tanker. While the mission was ultimately successful, the day-by-day
concerns over whether Healy would be able to continue would not have been an issue had a
heavy icebreaker been available.
Capability Gaps
In 2011, the Coast Guard provided to Congress the “High Latitude Study Mission Analysis
Report.” This report presented a broad look not just at icebreaking, but at all Coast Guard
missions in the Polar Regions. The study identified capability gaps (inabilities to fully
perform the mission) in the Coast Guard’s performance of most of its statutory missions in
the Arctic and Antarctic. The most significant shortcomings were in the areas of: Defense
Readiness; Ice Operations; Marine Environmental Protection; and Ports, Waterways
and Coastal Security. The study concluded that to meet its statutory missions, the
Coast Guard needed three heavy and three medium icebreakers. Further, if the Coast

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Guard was to meet its statutory missions, and maintain a continuous presence in the Polar
Regions in support of the 2010 Naval Operations Concept, it would require six heavy and
four medium icebreakers. This could be reduced to four heavy and two medium icebreakers
through multiple crewing and strategic homeporting.
Figure 1: Artic Sea Ice Extent 2007-2012, area of the ocean with at least 15% sea
ice. From the National Snow and Ice Data Center.
In the summer of 2012, the Coast Guard began Arctic
Shield 2012, a four-month exercise designed to evaluate
the service’s ability to carry out its statutory missions
in the arctic using high- and medium-endurance
cutters (WHEC, WMEC), buoy tenders (WLB),
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and an interconnecting
C4ISR network. The exercise includes maritime safety
and security, pollution response, outreach to indigenous
communities, and joint operations with NORTH-
COM. While the exercise represents a significant step
in a coordinated approach to arctic domain awareness,
it has some significant limitations. WHECs and
WMECs are not ice-strengthened and cannot operate
safely in areas where even free-floating ice may be encountered.
WLBs are capable of light icebreaking, but
being designed for only 21 days underway endurance
they are not capable of long patrols far from their bases
in southern Alaska. Ice-capable cruise ships and icestrengthened
drilling platforms such as Shell’s Sakhalin
2, which enable operation in arctic areas throughout
much of the year, will mean increased activity during
periods when only an icebreaker can provide the onscene
presence necessary for the Coast Guard to carry
out its missions.
Territorial Claims
As the arctic ice recedes and additional areas of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding seas are
navigable throughout a greater part of the year, territorial claims in the region have become
an increasingly high-profile discussion. Five nations border the arctic, including the U.S.,
Denmark (via Greenland), and Norway, with Canada and Russia having the greatest Arctic
coastlines. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratifying
countries may assert claims for exclusive rights to resources on and below the seabed of
their extended continental shelves. This often extends well beyond the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone. When the area surrounding the Arctic Ocean was ice-covered all or most of
the year, it was impractical to recover the resources on the extended continental shelf. With
larger areas ice-free for longer periods of time, these territorial claims have taken on a greater
importance. Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark have all taken steps to establish claims
on the arctic continental shelf.
In August 2012, the icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon) made the first passage by a Chinese
ship of the arctic Northern Sea Route. While China has no territorial claims in the arctic,
this heightened interest in arctic exploration by one more industrialized nation further illustrates
the need for the U.S. to be capable of maintaining an extended presence in the region.
Leasing of one or more heavy icebreakers has been advocated in various forums as a potential
stop-gap measure to meet the immediate U.S. need. Maintaining a national presence is one
mission where this may not be a viable alternative. In August, Coast Guard Commandant
ADM Robert Papp acknowledged that the Coast Guard has looked at the business case for

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leased icebreakers as a short-term solution, but there are legal uncertainties associated with
law enforcement and defense operations involving a ship that is not a sovereign military
vessel.
Aerial view of Shell’s platform at Sakhalin
2 in Russia’s far east.
Increased Arctic Tourism
Increasing availability of open water has also brought an increase in tourism to the arctic.
Some of this increase preceded the most significant reductions in sea ice, and instead
resulted from the prevalence of ice-strengthened cruise ships being built to meet increasing
demand for recreational access to the arctic. In 2006 alone, the number of arctic cruise
ships operating out of Canada doubled from 11 to 22. A natural consequence of this kind
of growth in the number of cruise ships in the arctic is a similar increase in emergency
incidents, to which the Coast Guard may be expected to respond. In the 18 years between
1972 and 2000, there were 11 reported groundings of cruise ships in the arctic region. From
2000 to 2009 – nine years – there were 16 reported groundings, an increase of nearly 300%
per year. With more arctic ports accessible for greater periods of time, these figures can
logically be expected to continue to increase. Unlike many popular cruise destinations such
as the Caribbean, distances in the arctic make it difficult for land-based rotary-wing aircraft
to reach many of the areas where assistance may be required, so the presence of a platform
such as a helicopter-equipped ice-capable ship can be essential to a timely response to an
emergency.
No Quick Solution
The Polar Star (WAGB-10) is currently undergoing a four-year major renovation and is
scheduled to re-enter service in 2013. Even following the renovation, its service life is only
expected to be extended to 2020. The Polar Sea (WAGB-11) has been in caretaker status
(i.e. non-operating condition with limited preservation) since 2010, and was going to be cannibalized
for parts and then scrapped until recent legislation stipulated that it be retained at
least until a strategy for replacement is established. With no current program for replacement
of the heavy icebreakers underway, it is already very late to begin the process for
acquisition of new polar icebreakers with the expectation of having an operational ship to
replace the Polar Star in 2020.
Further complicating the long timeline for acquisition is the fact that no existing U.S. shipyard
has built a heavy icebreaker. Specialized capabilities for forming and joining the highstrength
cold-resistant steel required for an icebreaker hull would need to be introduced and
developed before a U.S. yard could undertake the construction. Several European countries,
notably Finland, have well-established yards building icebreakers for other countries including
Russia, which has its own icebreaker-capable yards as well. One solution to reduce the
learning curve for U.S. builders might be to purchase an icebreaker hull built in Europe and
complete the outfitting at a yard in the U.S..
Another possible way to increase the Coast Guard’s arctic capabilities would be to construct
an ice-strengthened variant of the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), which is programmatically
several years ahead of any possible new icebreaker. While it would not be capable
of heavy icebreaking, it could operate in open water in the vicinity of ice where current
high endurance cutters (WHECs) and medium endurance cutters (WMECs) cannot. The
OPC request for proposal has recently been released with no requirements for ice capability.
Even so, introducing requirements for an ice-capable variant early in the program, say
after the second or third hull, would likely still be several years ahead of a new icebreaker
acquired from the ground up. No matter the approach it is critical that the U.S. Coast Guard
receive the support it requires now to begin acquiring new polar ice breakers so that it can
meet its mission to “protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic interests […] in
any maritime region as required to support national security” including the arctic.