Download - Royal Australian Navy

2. The Conceptual Foundations of
Keystone Naval Doctrine
When compared to the sheer volume of land-focused strategic theories that have been
advanced over the years, maritime strategic theories are relatively sparse. Indeed, the
first written theories of modern maritime strategy were not published until the latter
part of the nineteenth century and the evolution of maritime strategic theory is largely
the story of a small group of prominent theorists. 1 Of these theories, several are worthy
of brief discussion because they feature prominently in the keystone doctrines of the
Commonwealth navies studied.
Key earlier conceptual developments are ‘command of the sea’, ‘sea control’, ‘sea
denial’ and ‘maritime power projection’. The first concept, command of the sea, exists
where one state (or a group of allied states) has naval superiority to the extent that an
opponent simply cannot use the sea at all. 2 Generally, it is accepted that command of
the sea is brought about by the total destruction of the enemy’s naval forces, although
as Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 notes, command of the sea is difficult
to achieve in the modern environment owing to asymmetric threats and technology
such as mines, torpedoes, aircraft, submarines and long-range missiles. 3
As a result of this situation, sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection are
arguably more useful concepts in the contemporary world. The difference between sea
control and sea denial is subtle. Sea control is obtained when a state has a monopoly
over the use of an area of the sea for a period of time, whereas sea denial is obtained
by denying an enemy state use of an area of the sea for a period of time. 4 Maritime
power projection refers to the ability of navies to influence events ashore through the
application of combat power, either directly (such as by naval gunfire directed against
targets ashore) or through the amphibious insertion of land forces. 5
How each of these concepts fits within the scope of activities undertaken by the navies
studied in this paper is perhaps best explained by two more recent theorists. The first
of these theorists is Ken Booth, whose discussion of the roles of navies is fundamental
in explaining the spectrum of activities undertaken by modern navies, including those
studied. 6 His model (see Figure 1) divides naval tasks into three categories centred
on the use of the sea:
• Diplomatic.
• Policing.
• Military.