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The Canadian navy
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13. Douglas L Bland, Canada’s National Defence: volume I - Defence Policy, School of Political
Studies, Queens University (Kingston), 1997, pp. 281-2; Department of National Defence,
1994 White Paper on Defence, Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Ottawa, 1994.
14. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 31 May 2007 with two
senior Canadian navy officers (records on file with author)
15. Interview 31 May 2007.
16. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 25 August 2008 with a
senior Canadian navy officer, supplemented by email correspondence received on 18 March
2009 (records on file with author).
17. The Canadian navy was the only navy studied to have released its doctrine before the RN,
and within only two months of the US Navy. While the RN did not release a keystone doctrine
manual until 1995, the US Navy had released its own keystone manual in March 1994. See
Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, US Navy Doctrine
Command, Washington DC, March 1994; Royal Navy, BR 1806: The Fundamentals of British
Maritime Doctrine (1st edn), Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1995.
18. Reading the Canadian navy’s The Naval Vision and the US Navy’s Naval Warfare in conjunction,
what stands out the most is that the latter was more abstract and theoretical throughout.
This may be because its target audience was not politicians. Instead, its aim was to explain
how the US Navy worked in a joint environment, and its target audience was the US Navy
itself, along with the other branches of the US armed forces. John B Hattendorf (ed), US Naval
Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Papers no. 27, Naval War College Press,
Newport, September 2006.
19. For example, see P Richard Moller, ‘The Dangers of Doctrine’ in, Maritime Security Working
Paper no. 5, Dalhousie University, Halifax, December 1996, pp. 57-71.
20. Canadian Forces, CFJP-01 Canadian Military Doctrine, Canadian Forces Experimentation
Centre, Ottawa, 2009, p. 1.1.
21. This assertion is based on a series of interviews conducted with Canadian naval officers in
May/June 2007 and July/August 2008 (records of all interviews on file with author).
22. Information obtained during an interview conducted by the author on 31 May 2007 with two
senior Canadian navy officers (records on file with author). Likewise, The Naval Vision was not
mentioned in the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy, although
this document did echo some of the discussion within The Naval Vision. Report of the Special
Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy, Security in a Changing World, Parliamentary
Publications Directorate, Ottawa, 25 October 1994.
23. Department of National Defence, 1994 White Paper on Defence, pp. 46-47.
24. RE Bush, ‘The Victoria-class Submarine Program’, Canadian Naval Review, vol. 1, no. 2,
summer 2005, p. 4.
25. Maritime Command, Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada, Canada Communications
Group, Ottawa, 1997.
26. Peter T Haydon, ‘The Chicoutimi Accident: Lessons Learned and Not Learned’, Canadian
Military Journal, vol. 6, no. 3 autumn 2005, pp. 17-8, supplemented by information obtained
during an interview conducted by the author on 31 July 2008 with a senior Canadian navy
officer (records on file with author).
27. Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada
(1987 Defence White Paper), Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Ottawa, 1987, pp.
52-5; Haydon, ‘The Chicoutimi Accident’, p. 18.