ENGINEERING - Royal Australian Navy

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N A VY E N G I N E E R I N G B U L L E TI N FE B R U A RY 2 0 02 1 5 Re a d i n e s s Ships can be made ready and rapidly deployed for a contingency. Some recent examples include our response to border protection issues and the War Against Terrorism. Being on scene early can help prevent escalation and prevent widening of a conflict. From an engineering perspective we contribute to every step of making ships ‘ready’. This begins at the maintenance planning stage and is an inherently engineering biased activity. Readiness from an engineering perspective includes the maintenance period, harbour and sea trials, personnel qualification training, work up and operational readiness evaluations. From there, readiness is maintained through an ongoing commitment to m a i n tenance, system perfo rm a n c e and defect re c t i fi c a t i o n . It has taken a significant engineering effort to prepar e HMA Ships KANIMBLA, SYDNEY and ADELAIDE for their deployment to the Gulf. Engineering effort has been expended to prepare, install, test, modify and accept equipment unique to that particular operation. It has taken engineering effort to train the people and prepare systems to ensure that they per form to specification for the duration of the deployment. Ac c e s s Warships leave no footprint in the water and so can operate over 70% of the ear th’s surface without violating a countries national space. This provides government with a wide range of options in terms of diplomatic presence, without actually having people on the ground. Engineering effort is critical to the RAN’s ability to have a presence in or near an area of strategic interest. The reliability and performance of engineering If we understand Maritime Doctrine, then we as engineers are better able to see the value of the contribution we are making toward the delivery of combat power in the Australian maritime context. propulsion plant, water making facilities and power generation equipment, allow the ship t o stay at sea for long periods. Communications and sensor systems allow the Command to gather intelligence, communicate with higher authorities and receive direction from a long distance. F l e x i b i l i t y Warships are immediately responsive to government direction in a subtle way. They can simply ‘be there’ as a presence, such as when HMAS DARWIN deployed off the coas t of East Timor, long before any decision was made to commit land forces. Warships can be deployed and withdrawn at will. High capacity communications now permit a high deg ree of responsiveness to parent Commands and the Government. Flexibility is dependent on the reliability of engineering systems. Unreliable systems would greatly reduce the range of options available. For example, a major failure of a warship propulsion system in the area of strategic interest may cause extreme political embarrassment. Ad a p ta b i l i t y Warships can transition from peacetime state to the highest degree of battle readiness without giving any external indication of their increased readiness. Organising warships into task groups allows defence against higher level threats and the ability to apply a higher level of stress to others. Engineering systems underpin battle readiness. The engineering team has already achieved a high level of readiness to leave the wharf safely, weapons systems and higher order responses to battle damage are tested during o p e rational readiness eva l u a t i o n s . Engineers then maintain that level of readiness for the duration of the ship’s operation. Re a ch Reach is defined as the distance from homeport at which operations may be carried out. Warships carry much of their logistic suppor t with them, allowing them to conduct sustained operations. This can be enhanced by the use of replenishment vessels. The arrest of illegal fishing vessels in the Southern Ocean in 1997 and 1998 is a good example of ‘reach’. The design of engineering systems allows for a wide range of operations in dif ferent environments. The effect of those environments on engineering systems must be appreciated. For example, the effect of sea water temperature on engineering systems is very dif ferent in the Gulf than in the Southern Ocean. The role of engineers is to understand the impact that different environments have on propulsion and weapons systems. Fuel economy is also a factor in
1 6 N AVY E N G I N E E R I N G B U L LE T I N F E B R U A RY 2 0 0 2 BELOW RESILIENCE: CREWS ARE TRAINED TO CONTROL AND ALLEVIATE THE EFFECTS OF DAMAGE determining reach. At the tactical level, this might cause the engineer to provide advice to the Command in respect of the most economical arrangement of plant and machinery. Poise and Pe rs i ste n c e Most warships are almost wholly self contained and can operate without recourse to the shore for periods of weeks or even months. Frigates operating in support of border protection to the north are routinely spending more than 60 days at sea. The poise and p e rs i stence of wa rships is ve ry useful for gove rnments atte mp t i n g to re s o lve complex and ambiguous situations such as m a ritime border pro tection issues. Poise and pers i stence can be enhanced when te chnical skills and logistic support are ava i l a b l e to repair equipment in the area of o p e rations. This poses inte re st i n g qu e stions. Do we need to have the skills onboard or can we have a centre of expertise available to the maintainer from ashore? Is it not possible to design a wa rs h i p w i th adequ a te redundancy to a l l ow it to gra c e f u l ly degrade ove r the period of the mission? M a ritime Doctrine poses issues that may cause engineers to seek d i ffe rent ways to opera te and m a i n tain engineering syste m s . Re s i l i e n c e Warships are resilient. They are designed and their crews are trained to control and alleviat e the effects of damage. All ships are characterised by a deg ree of redundancy in their equipment and manning. Even major defects or damage may not mean that a unit ceases to be able to make a contribution to the force as a whole. The MEO and WEEO and their teams have a key role in the management of action damage and the restoration of systems. Is this a valid role in the future though, given the destructive power of modern weapons? MARITIME DOCTRINE AND THE FUTURE OF ENG I N E E R I NG The elements of Maritime Doctrine do not change muc h with time. They are as applicable now, as they were in the time of Nelson. We have simply adapted them to better understand the reason for our Navy’s being in an Australian context. This brief perusal of the elements of Maritime Doctrine shows that there is a close linkage between engineering activity and each of the doctrinal elements. This is not surprising as engineering underpins and supports all of the Navy’s operational activity. This is useful for engineers, as like the providers of domestic power, water and telephones, we are apt to be ta ken for gra n te d in the minds of war planners and Commanders. Maritime Doctrine provides an adequate framework that links engineers to the reasons why we have a Navy. The future of engineering is dynamic. Environmental and legislative issues, personnel attitudes and expectations; all impact on the way we employ technology. As surely as paddles gave way to sail, gas turbines will give way to all electric drives; and missiles will give way to high-energy weapons. People may disappear from ships altogether, to be replaced by a shoreside (or spacebased) technical support centre. CO NC LU S I O N An understanding of Maritime Doctrine provides a fundamental guide to engineers, as the principles of Maritime Doctrine are unlikely to change at the same pace as technology. Engineers have a vital role to play, now and in the future in the support of RAN activity. Maritime Doctrine, therefore, provides engineers with a reminder of their contribution today and a touchstone for adapting to the changes of the future. About the author CAPT Field joined the RAN as a Cadet Midshipman at the RANC and is a graduate of UNSW with Bachelor s and Masters degrees. He has served in a variety of shore and sea appointments and has completed both the RANSC and JSSC. CAPT Field was the MEO of HMAS DARWIN and ADELAIDE and is af fectionately known as the father of FCIMS for which he seeks understanding and forgiveness. He has served in the Maritime Command for nearly three years, first as the Fleet Marine Engineer Officer and now as Chief Staff Officer Engineering. References 1. As engineers this might mean working with foreign sourced equipment, accepting limitations on spares and training, limited sources of knowledge and expertise. It may also drive us to greater ingenuity and a closer relationship to Australian industry to maximise use of limited resources.
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ENGINEERING - Royal Australian Navy

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