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Hume's General Rules - Serjeantson

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<strong>Serjeantson</strong>-24<br />

of human understanding the venerable distinction between natural and moral<br />

philosophy. This refusal is implicit in the Treatise in the example of the man in the<br />

iron cage; it is made explicit in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding when<br />

Hume states that natural and moral arguments are ‘of the same nature, and derived<br />

from the same principles.’ 76<br />

‘The chief business of philosophers’<br />

Hume never lost his conviction that philosophers were distinguished from the ‘vulgar’<br />

by their ability to subsume the circumstantial multiplicity of experience within<br />

effective general rules. 77 He did restrain his desire to provide a formal account of this<br />

procedure, however, as can be seen when we turn to consider the role of rules and<br />

circumstance in the two Enquiries. Hume advertised the Enquiry Concerning Human<br />

Understanding (1748), as containing ‘most of the principles, and reasonings’ of the<br />

Treatise. The part of this Enquiry that corresponds most closely to the account of<br />

‘general rules’ in the Treatise (1.3.13) is a footnote in section five attacking the<br />

conventional distinction made between ‘reason’ and ‘experience’. Here Hume<br />

explains that all the sciences--whether natural, moral, or political--‘will be found to<br />

terminate, at last, in some general principle or conclusion, for which we can assign no<br />

reason but observation and experience’, and he goes on to equate these principles with<br />

‘general and just maxims’. 78<br />

76 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 69.<br />

77 Here I am in agreement with Hearn, ‘<strong>General</strong> rules in Hume’s Treatise’, p. 406, who notes that ‘a<br />

natural tendency requiring correction by general rules […] can be said to represent one of the basic<br />

ingredients in Hume’s account of human nature and experience.’ It follows that I dissent from the<br />

conclusion of Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development, p. 192, that the later Hume decided that ‘the<br />

student of nature has more to learn from history than from the experimental method’; Hume did not<br />

regard the two as contradictory.<br />

78 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 1, 37-38 n. 8.

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