Ningi Raids and Slavery in Nineteenth Century Sokoto Caliphate

SLAVERY AND ABOLITION
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Volume 2 Number 2 September 1981
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Tuareg Slavery and the Slave Trade Priscilla Elle n Starrett 83
~in gi Raids and Slave ry in Nineteenth
Centu ry Sokoto Ca liphate Adell Patton, Jr. 114
Slavery: Annual Bibliographical
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Ningi Raids and Slavery in
Nineteenth Century Sakata Caliphate
Adell Patton, Jr. *
\,INGI RAIDS AND SLAVERY
1J5
Introduction
Ningi territory is located in (he eastern region of Nigerian Hausaland at the
nonhernmost end of [he Jos Plateau massif. From remote rimes into the
nineteenth century numerous small scale patrilineal and heterogenous
societies scaled into this frontier region; these societies consisted of the
Butawa, Ningaw3, Chamaw3, Basaw3, Warjawa, Sirawa and Pa 'awa. By
1846 the population movements into this region occupied the major
escarpments. Dissident Kana Hausa mallamai (religious practitioners and
teachers) scttled the area last j organized the acephalous non-Muslim mountaineer
societies ima revolt against the Sakata Caliphate ; and founded the
Ningi Chi efdom ca. 1847. The N ingi resisted successfull y the emirates of
Bauchi, Kano, Zazzau, and many others. This paper highlights the Ning:
raiding strategy agai nst the imposition of Soko[Q rule in the nineteentl:
cenrury. '
Pre-chiefdom era and Kano Imperialism
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In the pre-chiefdom era, most of [he stateless societies were the target o!
slave raiders. Mixed success marked th e military strategy of the mountaineers
against centralized forces. With the help of smiths, who made iroa
equipmem, provisioning of war materiels became available. And based OIl
observations of plateau ecology, it is possible to extrapolate the reconstruction
of military s trategy, which was to set camp in the vicinity of the
mountaineers. In a procedural manner, envoys were sem in the first Sla e­
with tribute demands usually [or slaves needed in a variety of capacities. 1;'
the mountaineers deci ded (Q yield to the demands, there was no wa r bur K
the cont rary, once the Tsafi chiefs and elders made the decision to fight , t.he
hill guerilla contingems met the oncoming mixed forces with showerinE
arrows, rocks, and other items of weaponry at the edge of the hills, Wh
these materiels ran out, the hill warriors then retreated to the successi,"-:­
wave of hills with pursuing enemy forces where they repeated the strategy
Walls of rock served as barriers against enemy penetration, and pebble:..
hun the unshod horses' hoofs. Once the plains cavalrymen climbed dowt.
the hills against oncoming boulders and arrows, they were at continui.
I Depanment of History. Howard Universi ty
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"INGI RAIDS AN D SLAVERY
116 SLAVER Y AND ABOLITIOK
117
disad vantage against the mountaineers. Wirh these facto rs in mind, cen·
tralizing in vading fo rces ofreo pu rsued a waiting st rategy jn effort s, to s ta~e
the people who would then come down in sub mission. Sometlmes (hu
slralegy worked and al olher limes il did not. The hill dwellers oflen localed
their granaries on isolated hill tops, and aged women and children were
hidden in hill va lleys some dislance away from the scenes of ballie.
Evid ence of warfare between the mountaineers and Kana imperialism
app eared as far back as the founeenth and early fi fteenth cemuries. Ya ji wa~
lhe eleventh Sarki who reigned during the years AD 1349-1385. In efforts ar
consolidation he moved his capital about and reigned at Bunu for twO
,
years
. .
in Rano. Yaji moved later to Kur which brought him in close contact WILD
[he Warjawa ("Worjawa lO ) and other transhumant m o untai~ ee r s. :h~
probable acquisilion of horses by Yaji may have lurned th e llde agalns;:
dwellers of dual ecology for he made war wilh Warji and remamed lhere fo:
some time. In time the praise song about the eleventh Sarki yielded clues (g
the growing power of Kano against the mountai n societies: "Yaj i, conqueror
of the rocky heigh (s , scattered hos ts, lord of the ~ own ." Th e . s ~hjuga
tion of Santolo opened the way for continual cont::tc t With t~e~e sOCletla
south westerly of Kana. However J the prowess of these SOCIeti eS causcG
innovalion in K ano armor. K anajeji , th e lhineenth Sarkl AD 1390-1410
was the first Hausa chief to introduce "Lifi di" or gild ed armor to prOlect the:
horses iron helmels and flexible coals of armor lO prolecl the bod y. H~
made innova " tions because of heavy losses suffered in the war agalO . St tG= .­
Butaw3 (U mbaw ). It is said that Kanaje ji returned aga in to make wr
against the Butawa but wi thout success. N ot given to defea t., he came
BelU and stayed for two years, and being unabl e to till the soil , he star \"
oUl the people, and lhey agreed lO his demands of 1,000 male and I ,
female slaves plus children . Kanajeji granled a lOlal peace when lhey ga'%
anolher 2,000 slaves. This sizable d emographic loss from th e BUlawa ranb
caused considerable structural weaknesses."! . . ..
The strategy of uncoordinated frontier raiders aga inst mountalO ~oc l ellO
contrasted vividl y with raids of centralized states in efforts to ob tam sla\"C5
and booty, Stanhope White provides an i nt er es ~ing accou ~ t about •
effect iveness of this general strategy for reconstruction. T he ral ~e rs campa:.
with their horses some distance away from the planned area of ptllage on tht
previous nighr for the dawn attack. A contingent with horses arri ved at dK.
fOO L-hill shorlly before dawn . Then, rhe foolmen moved forward =
surrounded as many of the lowest situated houses as possible; the horsemen
who were lefl behind, would come charging forward al d ay break •
carr; away capti ves and cover the retreat. The perfec tion of thi s pla.n oft!:!
failed because of a barking dog or a sleepless man and before lhey IOV

118
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION
NINGI RAIDS AND SLAVERY 119
the case of the non-Muslim population of Ningi is not entirely clear.
H owever I oral versions of the mountaineers hold that the Caliphate applied
the "spoils of war" policy 10 them . To the contrary , from their point of
view, they defined this idiomatically as Kila KWQlIdo, a process of being
forced to do an undesired ac(. Zazzau lore described it as Bani-Balli . The
Pa'awa say that they left Bauchi because the Emir Ya'qub used to send his
retainers (fadawa) to raid their homes and enslave members of their
fa milies; cattle and animals were also spoils in these raids. Boys wefe often
required t Q com e [Q Bauchi and repair the wa ll s of the city. There is a
consensus all over N ingi today that Kila Kwando was a reality in the period
under stu dy .!~
In 185 5 , forexamplc, Dr Eduard Vogel was in Bauchi and witnessed the
exploitative practices, which supports the oral tradition. In a long letter, Dr
Vogel described the system of catching slaves. The non-Muslims affected
resided in the frontier regions of Bauchi and Zazzau, and located their
villages on lOp of the highest rocks. With a large military force the Sultan
occupied the fields in the va lleys; his horses trampled the green harvest; and
in fear of star vation, the inhabitanrs sent down the number of boys
demanded . Within three weeks, two hundred slaves in excellent conditior:
went to Sokoro for sa le. Since the Butawa ofDua agreed to tribute demands.
Kifa Kwa"do did not affect them. '"
Although future research may lead to the contrary, presently one is
without success in attempting to establish a chronology for slave raid5
against the Ningi. This difficulty may be due to the widespread use of slave;
in the economic Structure of Kano and the d irection of the export trade_
These con:)iderati ons explai n in part why K oelle's linguisti c inventory of
1849 in Sierra Leone contains no refere nces to n arrations of slaves from
Ningi and does not provide clues to thc timing of the raids. ll It must not bt:
ruled out that Ningi slaves were present but K oelle did not interview the.lll­
In Hausaland clan leaders or princes gained power through the control r1.
the trade in captives during the course of the nineteenth cemury, whicia
came to form a sizable investment. Slaves performed various functions,U
and according to Barth, they al most equaled the free popularion in K ano. r :
The Kano aristocracy employed some slaves as domestics; o thers worked in
the agricultural estates,ld two of which were between K ano and Ning:t ~
Lajawal ( Easr oLK ano near Gaya), Nafara (East of Kano near Dutse) ani
Gurjiya (South of Kano) ;15 still more slaves went as p resents to marrie.:
d aughters, wives, sons or less fortunate relations; and others were
exchanged for financial considerations.
During the course of the century, the inflation of the cowrie currency rose
to a point which made for difficult transport as a medium of trade. Captives
were highly valued and by being mobile they carried other items; in thi>
role, they served as multiple currencies. III Barth noted the difficulty t!:
determining the number of slaves exported in the slave-trade but h=
observed that small caravans carried the largest number to Borno and Nupe
rather than 10 Ghat and F ezzan." But the successful Ning i rebellion cut off
the supply of slaves from that region which had figured so prominently in
lspects of increased internal revenue to rhe Caliphate .
Resistance aod P olitical Change
In ca. ] 847 the rise of the Ningi predatory state altered the existing tributary
relationships among the mountain people and Cali p hate. Changes in politi.
""I scale brought more people into a closer relationship. In the absence of
abundant natural resources for possible control by the mallamai , cleavages
m status and wealth were slow to emerge, and the indigenous hierarchy of
;ijffu sed roles offered the mallamai new opportunities for leadership.
_\lthough dissident Muslims later joined them from adjacent emirates,
llong with o ther outcasts and soldiers of fortune, they did so only after the
~·enture's success on the frontier was evideD(. Any opportunities Ihar arose
ere by·products of changes in Caliphate administration and Islamic ideol­
:gy.
The resistance against the Caliphate lOok on a variety of forms and stages:
Hausa mal/arnoi at Tsakuwa vis-a-vis the K ano Emirate; H ausa mallamai in
~ueat and vis-a-vis the m ountaineers of Ningi and the united effort of the
::.:cple led by the mallamai vis-a-vis Bauchi Emirate and in self-defensc. As
tters turned Out, two types of resistance developed: resistance to aggreslion
and , further ) resistance to established rule. In Ningi resistance to
- koto, the Hausa mallamai were outside the Community of Islam and in
«'lhodox terminology, th ey were apostates. lfI However, th e mallamai themselves
did not reject Islam, and rhey continued to perform their religious
~ ligations even in resistance.
The mallamai experienced a number of internal and external changes
_mng their efforts at consolidation in Ningi, and questions of survival and
selection of leadership in the developing tradition of resistance to em pire
acrupied them . Several wars and numerOus incursions followed in the
ermath of reorganization against Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The
Ciliphate's concern about these raids was shown by its united retaliatory
.&:tion against Ningi. A reconstruction of some Ningi raids reflects changing
Q"ategy and military innovation in the growth of offices . The far flung
rnetration of the forays indicates the role of external alliances with lllgi,
E>d Ningi leaders' increased confidence.
The strategy of the Ningi raiding style began during the reign of Malam
u bakar 'Dan Maje (1855- 1870). His predecessors - Malam Hamza ca.
'-17-1 849 and Malam Ahmadu ca. 1850-1 855 - made forays into Bauchi
Emirate but these incursions lacked frequency and intensity. But ' Dan
je raided far and wid e, and became famous for these raids. F or the
'iiJ"I,Uegy of the Ningi r aiders was never to strike the same place con­

120 SLAV ERY AN D ABOLITION
:-lING! RAIDS AND SLA VER Y 121
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122 SLAVER Y AN D ABOLITION :-;INGI RAIDS AND SLA VERY
123
and in order to resist 'Dan Maje's demands, rhey may have traded rods with
the surrounding population - for use as weapons against them. In response
the Hausa smelters sought refuge in nearby Badico in 1864 , and remained
unlillhe British took over their tin indusu-y during the twentieth cenmry.
Much of Robens' account is supponed by the oral traditions. "
During the reign of Abdullahi ( 1856- 1870) ofZazzau, 'Dan Maje pillaged
the vassal district of Lere. This area lying between Bauchi and Zazzau
contained a number of old and new settlements. Gunn identifies at least
fourteen distinct groups li ving in Lere and Kauru Districts, and disputants
of various kinds of both Zazzau and Kana emirates often resenJed in this
frontier zone. 'Dan Maje sacked ' Dan AI-haji and took many slaves from the
Kauru mountainous area. Abdullahi's early reign was a favorab le time for
attacking Lere in the East. Zazzau garrisons were probably redeployed to
southern Zaria. Abu Kwakwa ( 1851- 1877) of Abuja carried out numerous
incursions against trade caravans and caplUred many slaves. Abdullahi
responded to 'Dan Maje's repeated anacks by levying more taxes in Zazzau
in order to support additional troops in the Lere region . It is not known
whether 'Dan Maje confronted the Lere garrison , but it appears likely that
he divened his raiding activities elsewhere.:l: 1
In ca. 1860 ' Dan Maje conquered the Warjawa in Ningi. Warji land lay
along the raiding rOUle. Since the Warjawa were so close to the Ningi
moumainous cluster, 'Dan Maje wondered why the Warjawa paid tribute (0
Kano and not to him . He probably dem anded that the tribute to Kano be
discontinued, and when the Warjawa refused , 'Dan Maje allacked and
conquered them. For the first time since the ar ri val of Kana mal/amai the
Warjawa entered the Ningi fold, but not totally. Tributary allowance
remained the basis of N iugi -Warji relations. The War;i people never
stopped paying tribute to Kano. While this dual relationship wou ld bring
down the gauntlet of Kano against Warji and 'Dan Maje later, 'Dan Maje
had in Warji now a useful ally en route to Katagum.'M
Katagum had long endured hostile relations with Hadejia , especially
since Buhari's (ca. 1848-1863) revolt against Sokoto, and much of its
anention was directed toward the Hadejia-Machina frontier . Katagum was
further plagued by changing deposition of princes in the southern fiefdoms
of Shira, Chinade, and Yaiyu . The Jafunawa (Fulani) revolted and a special
peace selliement had to be made. The Emirate suffered also from demographic
displacements because of primitive raids by Buhari's lieutenants
during the reign ofKadr(c. 185 1-63). ' Dan Maje, thus, raided Shira and the
surrounding towns during an unstable era in Katagum's history , and this
may have prevented united action against him. The riverain savanna ecology
of Hadejia, Jema'are, Katagum, and Misau emirates is favorable (0
canle grazlng. 'Dan Maje probably seized numerouS call ie in the raids. t5
Emir Mohammed Saleh b. Mohammed Manga of Misau (ca. 186 1-1886)
documents furth er the Ningi presence in (his territory in a long Arabic leller
to Emir Ibrahim. Bauchi-Misau relations extend as far back as to the
foundation of Misau. Fulata Borno seuled Misau, and the Caliph Bello
181 7-1836) granted them extra-territorial concessions in tax collection
from [he Fula[a Barno grazing in Bauchi. Gombe also ca me LO be linked
with Bauchi and Misau. This explains the continuous exchange of Correspondence
between these emirates. Saleh's leuer does nO( mention the
specific name of the Ningi leader, but since larer Ningi leaders were
remembered in these parts, it is possible that this group ofralders was led by
'Dan Maje who was less known . Saleh wrote to inform Ibrahim about the
·'Devils from the hills" who had raided the land of Shira. Apparently, they
crossed over into Misau's territory and captured seventy people. When the
news of this episode reached Saleh, he mustered his forces and rode to the
scene of the raid. Not finding the mountaineers present, he followed their
acks until night fall and finally located their camp at Chufi (or Chafai,
Chifi) . Misau forces refrained from allacking them that night and waited
.uuil morning . But while they prepared for attack, the mountaineers
departed either during the night or at dawn. Misau forces followed their
cracks again for a long distance, and once they were discovered, Saleh
:outed the mountaineers. Misau took horses, captured fifty men, including
.a few Muslims , and presumably freed the Misau captives. Misa u's non­
_\luslim captives were Warjawa, and it appears that the defeat of the raiders
took place in the viciruty of Warji land. Saleh arrived at a town called
.\lalaguya in the midst of Warji, but he realized that the distance between
rus forces and the source of water waS too great. The horses had weakened;
tlms, he moved hi s forces from Malaguya and headed for a water SOurce
toward Misau. It appears that 'Dan Maje and the Warji people regrouped in
der to regain booty and kinsmen. They pursued the Misau forces and
were defeated for the second time. According to Emir Saleh:
We rose against them and my soldiers wrought great slaughter
amongst them and they did not follow us after that. So we returned
home safely laden with magnificence. And this is what I am writing to
you Ibrahim about. Peace.:l S
Subsequently) 'Dan Maje made forays deep into Kano territory. Gira, the

124
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION
selves up. They returned for battle two years later at Raman - west of the
Kana River - and Aliyu, a leading Kana warrior, was killed along with
many others. After these battles, some Rano inhabitants took refuge at
Bunkure. The inhabitants of Fulungu, Mashaura, and Gwunki villages
returned only periodically to their farms. Seeing that it was impossible to
live in dispersed villages with safety, the Jalurawa built Gurjiya surrounded
by moat and wall; the town was never sacked. The people of Gabo village
were not so fortunate. Ningi captured women and children. Some Gobo
people later traveled to Ningi and ransomed their relatives with payments of
ten bags of cowries per head. 29
In 1868 'Dan Maje plundered the Dutse estate. Sulimanu was the Fulani
chief at this time. According to the oral tradition, he had a premonition
about his death. He killed an ox in preparation, and gathered his family.
Addressing them as orphans, he requested that each member come before
him, Sulimanu gave them meat for the last time, He rode away for battle,
and Sulimanu's premonition came true in [he battle at Fajewa in Sumaila,
He was killed along with the Madakin Kano Ismailu and other members of
leading Kano families. This was one ofKano's most disastrous defeats at the
hand of N ingi. 30
Emir Abdullahi (1855-1882) of Kano was determined to bring the predatory
activities of the mountaineers to a halt. Abdullahi's acquaintance
with the Hausa mallamai stemmed from Tsakuwa, for they had led a tax
revolt in his fief as Galadima of Kano Emirate. The raiding success of Ningi
and other resistance states against Kano may have been related to Abdullahi's
centralizing administrative policy, He deposed many of his leading
subordinates and replaced them with palace slaves (cucanawa), If the
deposed officials did not ally outright with marauding bands, they may have
acquiesced in Abdullahi's dominance in matters of military concern.31 This
may explain in part why Abdullahi assumed an enormous role in military
matters, and this eagerness was demonstrated against Ningi, The Kana
Chronicle maintains that Abdullahi invaded the center of the Ningi mountains
at Kuluki of the Butawa (Umbatu). Two special camps were later built
at Takai and Keffin Bako for war against Ningi. And Abdullahi lived for
two years at Keffin Bako warring against 'Dan Maje.32
The Warjawa also came under attack. Abdullahi learned of their secret
alliance with 'Dan Maje and of his intrigues among them against Kano and
adjacent emirates. In Islamic theory and practice the Warjawa had broken
the trust arrangement (aman) between them and Kano, In preparation for
war the Warjawa of Gimati, Gabaya, and Gagana usually met at the sacred
hill ofPachar Gila Tlura. On this occasion the confederation decided against
dissolving their alliance with 'Dan Maje and prepared for war against Kano.
Their granaries were placed upon isolated hill tops, and the women, children
and old men were hidden in distant hill caves. The Warji drummers
and musicians began to play continuously the song of war until all warriors
'lING! RAIDS AND SLAVERY
reached a state of frenzy, and they all marched to meet Abdullahi at Sir or
Sinfa. Abdullahi slaughtered about 400 Warjawa and took many into slavery
back to Kano. He returned and repeated these attacks and again many
captives were taken. Warjawa women are famous for their beauty and were,
therefore, of special interest to pillagers, Warji women found mobility in
marriage and concubinage to various echelons of the Kano Emirate. Slaves
from Warji were numerous in Kana, After a series of repeated defeats the
\J:larji confederation asked Abdullahi to restore [he peace (aman) unde; the
.:onditions of discontinuing the tributary alliance and trading with 'Dan
.\laje. The peace was granted.: l :)
But the war between Ningi and Kano went on. 'Dan Maje attacked
Takai. Yusufu, Abdullahi's son, was in command. They fought a hard
battle at Dubaiya. But Yusufu's soldiers deserted him, and 'Dan Maje slew
some of them and captured others.
By the late ca. 1860s Abdullahi stepped up the offensive against Ningi
through united action and penetrated once more far into Ningi territory,
Surrounded with war captains of unusual fighting expertise, Abdullahi
engaged 'Dan Maje in war at Woso. The battle took place as the evening
\\·aned. Since the mountaineers fought a losing battle, 'Dan Maje was saved
from capture and a certain death by both retreat and the fading sunset. In
efforts to defeat 'Dan Maje, Abdullahi stayed at Falali for three years.
Several emirs of the surrounding emirates rendered military aid. They
attempted to encircle 'Dan Maje, but he avoided confrontations with
them. The Caliphate forces stayed at Babaldu, Tiffi, Bunga, Fagam, Sirfa,
and Darazo but 'Dan Maje did not come out to fight. The encampments at
Babaldu, Fagam and Darazo suggest emirates' effort to secure the trading
.:aravans from 'Dan Maje's assaults. He probably also seized in bulk tribute
en route to Sokoto from Adamawa and Bauchi. In order to weaken 'Dan
.\laje's control over the mountaineers, Kano received permission - presum­
.:bly from the Amir al-Muminin - to destroy their farms rather than to wage
'....ar against them. The horses were allowed to feed on the unharvested crops
:-or forty days and that which could not be eaten was burned. After having
:.pent a long time away, Abdullahi and his troops returned to Kano,3~
The Caliphate'S united action was successful against 'Dan Maje, for he
::urned southward away from the powerful eastern emirates. By about 1869
·Dan Maje attempted an attack upon the ribat of Kafin Madaki during the
time of Abdulkadiri 1(1858-1897). The Fulani had numerous supplies,
cattle, and grain inside the walls of this ribat. The fact that Rauta was the
most strongly fortified of the ribats, may account for the selection of the
'.l,'eaker Kafin Madaki. An oral version describes the strategy of 'Dan Maje
un one such occasion. The wells and other drinking facilities were located
outside the walls on the eastern side of Kafin Madaki. People of [he
surrounding forest also used this drinking facility. 'Dan Maje's forces
settled in hiding at the drinking area between the forest people and the rib at ,
125

126
'>tNGI RAIDS AND SLAVERY
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION
127
They waited to intercept those coming for water, and hoped to Iu.re others
into alarm who would come outside in the search, The strategy faIled. The
Madaki saw 'Dan Maje moving under a nearby tree, and ordered the doors
closed and allowed no one to go outside. 'Dan Maje's lieutenants came
directly to the town wall and tore away a few of the logs preparing to enter.
But one of the Madaki)s servants covered the hole with part of his body,
However, the Madaki realized that this expediency would not suffice;
hence he ordered his men to bring dried thatch which was set on fire and
throw~ blazing from the top of the wall down on 'Dan Maje's people. They
moved quickly away and angrily departed. The people from the surroun~~
ing forest came out of hiding with their animals, weakened and starved

128 SLAVERY AND ABOLITION :\INGI RAIDS AND SLAVERY
129
discontinuance of the raids or through a negotiated peace (aman ) . This was a
trend that the office holder might not wish 10 incur. It is important to keep
this in mind for later developments. In time Dan Yaya came lO be powerful,
iudeed , by virtue of holding this office.
Slaves also held offices. Mohammed Yayo, who was a slave seized in a raid
at Maganni in Kano, headed the office ofmaga-yaki. This office grew out of
the need for surveillance and scouting in pre-raid strategy. Although 'Dan
Maje made numerous forays, Haruna increased the raids, and much of the
success of these raids was without doubt due to this office. The scouring
repons of the maga-yaki came directly to the barde, and much of the annual
tribute destined for SokolO fell into the barde hands. During the reign oi
'Dan Maje, a small boy called Idi was caught in one of the raids. Idi grew up
in the palace and later held the office ofshamaki. Shamaki Idi was in charge
of all the palace slaves, who were numerouS in Haruna's time, and this office
was influential in later power politics. Slaves did the maintenance work~
some farming and served in the Haruna's large army. ~ o
The Raids and Changing Strategy
Haruna Karami also changed the raiding strategy remarkably. In 'Dan
Maje's time mostly isolated vi llages and un garrisoned fiefs were raided. The
mountaineers usually raided together as a single unit. In contrast the growth
and consolidation of offices suggest greater pillaging scope and latitude:
especially during Haruna's reign. He attacked large towns and sent mountaineers
to raid in different directions simultaneously in the early 1870s . ..I!
For example, H aruna gave Abduraman of Burra a separate raiding con tingen
t. The B u tawa made forays as far as Anchau in eastern Z azzau. Since the
hills and mountains are their natural habitat, they stood a better chance of
being successful against the hill dwellers of the Kauru. Also going it alone,
the sarkin yaki Malaika destroyed Zuntu in Zazzau and took numerom
slaves. Malaika also attempted incursions against Gimba and Turawa but
the inhabitants drove him away. He went on to Faki, near Zozo, and seized
cattle and donkeys before going back to N ingi. Malaika returned to ZOla
again, but the people were prepared and fought a winning battle agains[
him . Haruna allowed Dan Yaya to attack and burn DUlsin Gari, a town
belonging to the sarkin yaki of Kano. Cattle, slaves and about forty-five
horses were taken. By engaging the eastern emirates on several fronts~
Haruna kept them guessing about his moves.
Haruna learned from the fate of 'Dan Maje and avoided being trapped in
the mountainous Jos complex. Instead of raiding Bauchi territory by way of
the ribals, Haruna went to the eastern side ofBauchi toward Gombe Emirate
and circled around Bauchi's backside. He took numerouS goods and slaves
at Bulun on one such occasion. Groom reports that Haruna destroyed
Kundun Habe in Bauchi, and during this time Haruna was challenged by
Csman chiroma of Bauchi. The forces met, but the Bauchi forces scattered.
The chiroma was left alone, and faced the Ningi warriors by himself. His
~splay of courage brought no challengers from Haruna's forces who
~eparted wi th the chiroma in full control of the battleground.
Emirate vigilance reJaxed somewhat during the emirs' and their officials'
L'lIlual trips to Sokoto. Haruna took advantage of this between 1876 and
1878. During the second reign of Abdullah b. Hammada ( 1873-1 878) of
Z.azzau , Uthman, the son of Abdullahi b. commander of the army, wrote a
!etter to the Abdullahi b. Gidado, the Waziri of Sokoto ( l876-l881). Uth­
:nan had returned from Sokoto and found the people of Zazzau in a fearful
crate. He wrote that a battle had taken place between his people and the
"tyrant of Ningi," Haruna. From Farada to Saye Haruna had come and
captured many people; killed numerous others; and destroyed their prop­
!1"ty. Remember that eastern Zazzau was fortified against Ningi incursions
":uring 'Dan Maje's time, and in spite of being garrisoned Haruna still made
::Jrays into the area. 42
The Galadima Yusufu of Kano (1860-1877) inflicted a major defeat upon
:.lacuna in the later l870s. Takai (ribal) was Yusufu's headquarters, and he
cd it as a base LO organize counter-raids against N ingi. Kano's overall
«rategy of containing Ningi was formulated from Takai. 4 :t Both Groom's
..::-al account and the Ka7w Chronicle concur on the confrontation at Kasuan
Jambo. Haruna suffered a humiliating defeat. Most of the mountaineers ran
nrny, and Yusufu captured nearly 900 less fortunate men along with some
~ rses. Haruna fled to Ningi and stayed in seclusion for the remainder of the
year. It is said that he made two fleeting raids into Kana the following year,
lDd in revenge for previous losses he engaged in ruthless slaughter. Perhaps
Clough time had elapsed for full recovery, and Haruna made overtures for
;:nce (aman ).44 This was the origin of diplomatic relations between Ningi
.lnd Sokoto.
The Islamic institution of peace (aman) came into being through time. It
~. a stated pledge of security granting protection (Scripturary or polytheist,
J harb ) to the non-Muslim upon request. With the cessation of war, the
~ hi is secured (musw'min). The aman is granted for less than one year; if
:;te harbi request more time, he must agree to pay the poll tax and enter into
:5e status ofdhimmi. An official aman can be given either by the Imam or his
:epresentatives through truce (muhadana or muwada~a) or by individual
.Mus lim s.4~ AI-Mawardi stated that a woman, a free man, and even a slave
:3n all grant an unofficial aman, but the role of the slave in aman has
fImitations. He must have received authorization to fight in jihad before
",joying full privileges of granting aman. One who profits from granting
~ n is declared an enemy.41l
The procedure for granting aman is that the harbi must first req uest it.
Once the intention is known, the harbi merely has to make a sign or say a
oord in any language and aman is granted. If the believer did not intend to

130 SLAVER Y AND ABOLITION
give an amGll bur by inferenceaman is underslOod" G1natl is valid. The Q1~all
is usually granted with conditions attached. HaTh,. messengers that carned
requests for amall to (he Imam were allowed to enter in(od~r al-/ slam under
diplomatic immunity. Without proper letters of credentials, messengers
wert: li i:lble to be killed ..
n
Through [he institution of amall, Haruna made
peace with Sokoto.
True [0 [he style ofNingi hislOry, the peace did not last long. Apparently,
the mountaineers broke the peace (ci aman) between 1874 and 1878. The
request [or peace was renewed again at Kana. During the years 1877·l878,
the Amir al-Muminin Mu'adh ( 1877 -1 881 ) wrote the Emir Ibrahim that the
"tyrant of the hills" Har una had dispatched his messe ngers to Abdullahl at
Kana requesting amaTl , but Abdullahi had driven them away. The messenge
rs had returned 10 him a second time , which imp~ie s tha~ Haruna ma~
have suffered a severe defeat on the frontier. On this occaSIOn Abdullahi
sent Ningi's letter to Sokoto. l\1u 'adh agreed to the peace on condition thai
the mountaineers desist from fighting Muslims in the East , West, South,
and North. 48 This indicates that Ningi had taken on all of the eastern
Emirates a( one time or the other.
This lette r fill s signjficant gaps in Ningi-Sokoto relations and several
inferences of practical importance can be drawn. First, (he reason for
addressing the Kano letters to the Waziri of Sokoto was that most of the
eastern emirates were in his charge..~9 The letters further suggest that
diplomatic efforts were made to settle the.pr~blem ofNingi w.ith the high~st
authority within the Calirhate. The Nmgl fima was not J~ st a co.nOlct
between Kana , Zazzau, and Bauchi, but involved the Caliphate llself.
Further, when Ningi messengers failed directly with Kana) they well[ to
Sakata. It would appear that they were recogn~z ed as an a.utono~~us pow~r
by the Amir al-Muminin because he dealt with them dlfeclly. Sokoto s
grant of peace to Ningi implied neither implicitly nor explIcitly the state of
equality. Numelin sho.ws that po~erful pre-colon~~1 s.tates oftcn emered
into ncgotiations of varIOUS types with weaker ones. Finally). alt~oug~ ~ot
stated in the correspondence) Sokato's negotiared peace carried Implicnly
the resumption of normal trade relations and sanctioned the respect for safe
routes of trade.!I:t
Ci Aman; Major Escalation of War Against the Eastern Emirates
Malam Haruna Karami took advantage of changing relations within several
of the emirates and broke the peace at the end of the 1870s. ln l878 Zalzau
was immersed in conflicts between the rotating families of diverse ethnIC
origins over succession .. 5 :l Bauchi endured a devast.a~ing civi l war i~~ 188lo
Kana changed emirs in 1882 and numerous depOSItIOns followed . Katagum's
lack of military vigilance in the western Shira District made for easy
XING! RAIDS AND SLAVERY
;rcy.!)~ The mountaineers had recovered during the prevailing intervals of
peace from their numerous defeats by Caliphate forces.
Zazzau adminis tration was marred by internal s truggle. In 1878 Emir
5ambo distributed key offices to dynastic ri vals, and sought to maximize his
.).wn power through the creation of new units under his control. He invested
:wo offices to his client Suleimanu, which placed him in charge of the
.::apital. Since Suleimanu did not have other backing, Sambo thought that he
'iiIOQu ld have full control over both of Suleimanu's titles, the sarki11 ruwa and
galadima. The combined power of these offices was enormous indeed.
Unfortunately, Sambo soon discovered that he could not make appoint­
:::Dents or dismissals without his new galadima's consent . Through bargains
ith the Emir and the transferral of officers' fiefs to his domain. Suleimanu
made the Emir increasingly dependent upon him. Even the capi tal became
:tis lief. Suleimanu watched carefully the Emir's attempts to whittle away
- power. According to M. G. Smith, Suleimanu wasofHausa descent, and
rltis factor voided any ethnic commitment to Fulani rule. Conditions were
iivorable for the seizure of power. Suleimanu realized that the Fulani of
Zaria and nearby emirates would unite against him, but he could expect
JOIIle help from foreign allies. He recruited Ningi. Suleimanu and Haruna
.::ad something to gain in the overthrow of Sambo. Suleimanu would

achieve the main objective was a disappointment, and Haruna took revengt
by devastating the area surrounding Zaria City. It is believed that he put
5,000 of Sambo's subjects into slavery or execution. The royal Bornawi
suffered heavily. Haruna enslaved nine children of the Madaki Anu. Roya.
families later ransomed their slaves probably in cowries, and others of Iesser
nobility with substantial means followed suit. 59
This episode had broad ramifications for the history of Zazzau and its.
foreign participants. Sokoto looked unfavorably upon Zazzau's administra-.
tion. The military weakness of Zazzau encouraged the resistance state 02
Maradi to invade its northern districts. A buja pillaged the caravan rou tes i:..
the South. Ningi incursions continued to the somh and center of Zazza
reaching Kacia, 'Dan Alhaji, Soba, Dutsen Wai, and Makarfi. 60
Haruna led the mountaineers in forays against Bauchi during the e:;rir
1880s and met defeat at Inki!. The galadima and madaki of Bauchi kill«l
several of his men, captured horses, and took numerous spoils. Not to beoutdone
Haruna returned to battle and destroyed the small towns of GUbl_
Durum,'and Sammo. During the interregnum of investiture at Sokoto, in.
1881 Bauchi was without an Emir. Haruna's forces made camp at the
Shad~wanka hill just outside the site of the later British government statim:.
in Bauchi City. Haruna almost encircled the palace walls, but Bauchi held
up inside and refused to come out to fight. Not being strong enough to sack
[he [own Haruna went elsewhere. In 1914 J. F. Fi[zpa[rick observed [hat I
ridge of s~ones crossing the road from the government state t~ Bauchi City ~
right angles might well have been the remains of a wall bUllt by Haruna-t
forces. III
Haruna invaded Rano District during the installation of Emir
Muhammed Bello of Kana in 1882. His forces pillaged [he Bono village ar:aped with his life, and Haruna seized the standard flag presented to him
1
::;- the Caliph as a prize of war. This was a day of disaster for Katagum. 6 .
The emirates united against Ningi, and even Borno pitched in. Since
!l!runa had seized [he [rib ute [0 Soko[o, the Caliph excused Haji from the
:cnual trip. Borno and the surrounding emirates sent fresh horses, armor,
.&!!d gowns to Katagum officials in efforts to replace losses. Sometime later
!l..! ji enlisted the support of emirs from Hadejia and Jema'are in a gigantic
dort in retaliation. But to their dismay, Haruna defeated them again just
lith of Shira. The emirate's forces fell into disarray during the ensuing
y irmishes, and only the intervention by yenman Chinade saved Haji and
=:tn from capture or death, for they had fallen into an ambush. 64
Despite the fact (hat Haruna had won major victories, he sought peace
.:man) with [he Kana Emir Muhammed Bello c. 1883. Bello wrote a lener,
-.:ruch now appears incomplete, to the Amir al-Muminin 'Umar b. 'Ali
1881-1891). He had made an earlier request for permission to invade the
-unbelievers of the mountains" in retaliation, and thanked Caliph 'Umar
3lr his letter granting Kano permission. The Caliph also wished them
tory. But just as Kano was preparing to call its commander of the army,
~ messenger of Haruna arrived at the court. Bello writes that: "He
~eaded with us to beg the Amir a1 Mu'minin to conclude a compact and a
~venant aman with him, Haruna, all his life." Further, Bello explained
~ :at Haruna had gone to Kano representatives in the vicinity of Ningi
2.rritory and asked them to request a messenger from Kano to negotiate
"trith him. Kano refused Haruna's request and insisted that if Haruna
~ ted peace he would have to come to them. During this particular
'~asion, Haruna did just that, and the peace was granted. 65
But the reasons why Haruna requested this aman are not entirely clear.
The mountaineers had achieved major victories on all fronts, and Haruna
iCOmmanded an army of over 4,000 horsemen. But Haruna suffered recur­
Z"oIIg pains from an earlier wound received at Kufi in Bauchi near Gombe,
.cd this may have prompted him to seek peace. His inability to continue
:;riding in the absence of a peace meant that the overall leadership would fall
someone else. The barde Dan Yaya often expressed his interest in
:leComing leader of Ningi and thought that Haruna was expendable. Duels
.:..;ntered on displays of manliness took place on several occasions between
±e two of them, and it is said that Haruna always won. From this it appears
Cat Haruna did not want the leadership to fall to Dan Yaya, and, realizing
- at his final days were near, probably instructed his powerful and loyal
aamaki on just who his successor was to be. On the other hand, the peace
llso preserved the territoriality of Ningi, for Haruna's intelligence system
or.aga-yaki) no doubt informed him about Kano's intention to invade
S ingi. Because no one had been successful in achieving this objective did
~ [ mean that the good omen would remain favorable to Ningi, especially

134
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION
under ailing leadership. Dan Yaya contested {he peace, and went out on
individual forays of his own. 66
Reigns of 'Dan Maje and Haruna and Changing P atterns of Econ omic
Growth
Since the year of their arrival among the mountai n peopJe ca. 1847 , the
Tsakuwa mal/arnat and their offspring were always in a minority. They
survived the local and united efforts by the Caliphate to suppress them, and
each leader contributed something of an intangible and tangible nature for
the continuance ofa raiding power. From the initial settlement onward , the
mountain people supplied the mallamai with fo od , and once the chiefdom',
foundation was completed in 'Dan Maje's and H aruna's time, annual
tribute from the people came atthe end ofRamada" or Salla. The mallamai
did not farm themselves and administrative offices were not initially based
on fiefs. "Warring was their farming" (yaki nomarsu ) as the saying goes
among Ningi informants - and they might have added "except during the
hot season." It was not militarily sound to raid too far from dependable
sources of water beca use of the requirements of the horses. 6i
The raiding character of the mo untaineers required, therefore, food and
manpower to sus tain it. Elsewhere in Africa concerning a similar society it
was observed [hat actual raiding brought booty and threatened raiding
brought tribu[e." This is app licable to the Ningi case. Ningi did not raid
every community but, in fear of being raided, some people gave them what
they wanted. Fatalities were high as the fate ofNingi leaders suggests, and
the warrior ranks could not be filled by natural increase. The maLlamal
increased their numbers through external pillaging, and in Zazzau, especially
, when one includes the forays of other resistance states, this prohibited
the rise ofrigid and caste-like stratification. 69 In Ningi, slave women
ca me ro be wives and concubines of warriors and produced children. Tht
exchange system of marriage implied women scarcity, and men would join
the warriors to obtain women. Through the absorption of slaves and unransomed
captives, the mallamai further increased their ranks. The administration
could not expect to feed the expanded number of people from internal
and external tribute, nor would threat for tribute alone sufftce.
Changing attitudes toward innovation produced economjc development.
New grain crops supplemented Acha, and land was cleared in Ari and on the
present si te of N ingi Town . Slaves worked these estates from [he time of
' Dan Maje{ca. 1855-1870) [0 the end of the nineteenth century. In time [h.
few administrative offices became inextricably linked to these developing
estates as fiefs. More significantly, when Sokoto's containment policy
worked more effecti vely to curtail the raids, the estates supported mallamai~
slaves, and clients, Patterns of sustained growth can be discerned, even
[hough raids continued. ' °
XING[ RAIDS AND SLAVERY
External alliances figured prominently in Ningi success. Much support
-came from dissident elements within emirates. SuJeimanu's alliance with
~ingi has been previously examined, but during the Bauchi civil war of
! 81 several elements ofBauchi's population ei ther joined Ningi or formed
l::t outside alliance. The Gerewa peopJe and other rural dissidents lived in
:.~e ribal areas. They revolted against the enormous demands of Bauchi
T hich were required to suppress the civil war, and they supported Halilu. A
.arge number of them emigrated to Ningi and other dissident areas such as
Duguri and Dass. After H alilu's execution, surviving Fulani supporters
iled Bauchi City and the majority of them massed at Zalanga and Zala. From
tilese quarters they formed an all iance with Ningi in efforts to maintain their
:lIdependence." An oral tradition states that Halilu in bid for the Bauchi
tlIrone had offered Haruna al l the districts of the Pa 'awa which included
ushi, Zanga, Zida, Lubai, Lamban Dutse, Kiti, Fifili, and Kalasu. 12
.\loreover, the Ningi government levied no taxes on its citizens, who paid
:n..Iy gaisuwa in the form of chickens, foodstuffs, rams and the like. When
3...xes came [Q be considered oppressive in K atagum, Gombe, Zazzau, and
Kano, some Fulani and other people came [ 0 Ningi. They colluded wi th the
~lngi intelligence system (maga yak;) and informed its members about
±lces both abundantly rich and poor . And occasionall y the Fulani traveled
..ihead of the magayaki as spies in search of places [Q raid. )a'O was one such
Fulani man who came from Dur ba in the Sumaila District of Kano during
Maruna's time. He joined the ranks of other Kano Fulani already in Ningi
mch as Dabo, Kure, Sarkin Riga Adamu, Bono Ardo Baya, and Ardo Siga.
.vdo Baya remained in charge of Ningi cattle into the 18905.'" Finally, the
~ ation of the cowrie currency made for an unstable monetary policy from
:!';.e 1850s onward. Since captives in raids became increasingly significant as
::zJi111tipJe currency in the Caliphate,74 I suspect that some FuJani princes
c:changed horses with Ningi for slaves, which certainly went against Cali­
;.hate policy. Thus, Ningi was able to sustain military innovation through
peration with the Fulani princes of the eastern emirates.
Malam Harnna Karimi: The Last Days ca. 1886
Malam Haruna Karimi died in the N ingi palace about 1886, the first of the
- -logi rulers to do so. He reigned for aboU( sixteen years and certainly no t
~re [han seventeen. His death was fOllowed by a struggle for power and
a dership. The consensus basis of the eleclOral council broke down. The
Rlccessionist dispute that followed split the Ningi chiefdom, and its impact,
hich is still being discussed, remains a basis for conflict a60ng the ruling
:unities.
The successiorust dispute of ca . 1886 sought to continue leadership
::ontrol in a single family line. This had worked up until this time. All
135

136
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION
~ING I RAIDS AND SLAVERY
137
previous leaders had shown courage in war. The non·Muslim mountaineers
made this leadership trait a prerequisite for their support. Gradual and
internal administrative growth brought new and powerful forces into play.
Malam Gajigi - a man of peace, not war - emerged as the new leader) and
continuing intrigue brought him down , and produced yet another leader
whose reign introduced a third new family into the ruling hierarchy.
Malam Usman Dan Yaya surfaced as the new leader in ca. 1890, and
broke the peace(ci aman) . He began raiding on several fronts. The southern
region of bOlh Hadejia and Katagum Emirates continued to be favorite
targets. Dan Yaya built a camp near a town called Itar , located close to Auyo
in Hadejia , and used it as a base for pillaging. He sacked Kayiel, Sugudi,
Gireti, Gabati, and Zigam in Katagum . In Kano, he raided Abdullahi,
Garu, Kuka, and Yayari, where he killed Tukur the chief. Many slaves were
taken at Kangiri near Birnin Kudu. He also attacked Gwaram and numerous
other rownsin Kana. In Bauchi at Kafin MadakiMalam Na Tando went
to Ningi and made a deal with D an Yaya. Tando promised to inform him
about the most appropriate time to attack Kafin Madaki. By chance the
Madaki received a warning in lime and closed the doors. The mountaineers
were thus unsuccessful in their attempt. T ando- the plotmaker - was found
and executed by Bauchi officials. Other raids took place in this vicinity but
it appears that no further direct attacks took place against Kafin Madaki.
While Dan Yaya was away, one Fulani attendant in charge of Dan Yaya's
cattle attempted 10 steal a sizable number during the southward grazing
drive. His imentions became known to Dan Yaya, who seized and killed
him on the spot and returned the cattle to Ningi.7:'
Tactical Innovation in Warfare and Dan Yaya's Arnan
The introduction of firearms technology into the Caliphate restricted the
range of raids. Before the disseminat ion of firearms, Joseph P. Smaldone
states, cavalry constitu ted the main shock force in Central Sudanese armies .
and in the battle order Commanders assigned to it the first forward position.
The remainder of the tripartite formation consisted ofinfantry and a reserve
guard in the rear. This formation underwent change when the expanding
musketeer forces increasingly demonstrated their effectiveness in the main
shock position. Contingents of gunmen moved from the center of the
formation to the front as supporting units; in open bauie, they fired volleys
at long range. The new echelon developed into infantry) cavalry, and
reserve. This tactical innovation made for maximum usc of infantry,
equipped with guns.
Although this innovation required some adjustments in the existing
formation , it certainly posed additional problems to states and raidinr
powers without firearms, such as Ningi. In Zazzau, Emir Uthman Yero
(1888-1897) received a supply of firearms from Lokoja, and, after training
~aves in the use of these weapons, he employed some of them as detachments
in ea stern Zazzau. 7fl M .G. Smith mentions how Yero terrified the
population with his loyal musketeers ('yan bindiga)," but his detachments
ilso scared Dan Yaya, who discontinued the earlier deep penetrations into
Zazzau. James Morrison states that Ningi stOpped pillaging the Chokobo
lDd Limoro people at Kwandon Nkaya after 1890." By the 1890s jf not
refore , North African merchants with their enormous financial resources
~d international commercial contacts imported firearms to Kano.79
Where emirates acquired firearms but kept their slave detachments near
:he palace for royal protection, Ningi was not seriously challenged by
..:.avalry operating under the traditional mode of warfare. But these new
uquisitions minimized the N ingi threat agains t others, despite the fact that
Dan Ya ya continued to terrify the surrounding Kano villagers. Numerous
~ornplaints came to Emir Muhammed Bello demanding that something be
done about D an Yaya.
Muhammed Bello knew that Dan Yay a had contempt for him. Once
iuring the time when Haruna had requested a peace, Dan Yaya had
.anacked Bello's messengers at Ningi; this had not only created a rift
'between Haruna and Dan Yaya, but was in violation of diplomatic immun­
.ty which Ningi messengers o brained during their sojourns in Kano and
5oI

138 SLAVERY AND ABOLITION NINGI RAIDS AND SLAVERY
139
Duru but wo uld not do so wilhout Bello's explicit permission. Dan Yaya
was arremp(ing lO set up a frontier post uf defense in Kana. s l Bello was nm
gullible, and dictated to Dan Yaya instead the conditions for the peace. It
requ ired that D an Yaya discontinue fighting with anyone residing to the
south-east and west of Ningi, such as Gombc, Misau , Karagum , Dilara,
Shira, Hadejia, and Zazzau. Bello explained that emirates other than Kana
were included because "all Muslims are allies alike." Before a final decision
could be made, he reminded Dan Yaya that he must inform the Amir
al-Muminin, Caliph 'Umar b. 'Ali (1881-1891), and obtain his approval.
Bello warned that without the Caliph's approval the request for peace was
not acceptable; furthermore, in any case, he told Dan Yaya that the raids of
aggression mu st be discontinued . 82
Dan Ya ya replied to Bello. And his su rviving letter in Arabic indicates his
understanding ofthe va1idicy of pacts in diplomatic relations. Its clarity can
be illustrated by examining the full text below:
From the Khalifa the agent ofNingi, Usman Dan Yaya, son ofMalam
H aruna Baba, best greetings, good will and respect 10 the Sultan of ·
Kano, Muhammed Bello, son of the late Ibrahim Dabo.
Your letter has reached us and we have read it and understood what
is in it completely. And as fo r me, I ask peace ofyou, peace between uS
and vou ,. for peace aman is in the hands of God and HI·s Prophet
-
meaning, you cannot avoid making peace because it is God's will. And
if there is recognition of justice between us, send to us one of your
servants of whom you approve, and I will make the covenant with him
for this aman , which will not be broken if God wills. This is the extent
of my desire. This is all . Peace.'"
Obviously D an Yaya was not sincere in this request for peace and neither
was Bello. But Dan Yaya's request indicates an imerest in N ingi's territorial
survival under new unfavorab le circumstances.
The Caliph 'Umaru acknowledged Bello's letter and expressed sat isfaction
with Dan Yaya's request for peace. He told Bello to inform Dan
Yaya that he consented to the peace agreement, to send him gifts, and to
make the stay of Dan Yaya's messengers in Kana a pleasant one. Kano's
hospitality apparently surprised the Ningi messengers. They thanked Emir
Bello and took the numerous gifts to Dan Yaya. Until Bello's reign ended in
1893, no additional wars berween Ningi and Kano occurred nor presumably,
based on the conditions of the pact, with the surrounding emirates
either. ri4
But when Bello died in 1893 , a dispute over succession erupted into a civil
war that involved Ningi. Caliph ' Abd ai-Rahman appointed Tukur, the son
of Bello, to the emirship, which angered the sonS of Abdullahi b. Ibrahim
(1855- 1882). They left Kano for Takai_with Yusufu as a rival claimant to the
throne. Yusufu's large suppOrt included the sympathetic Arab merchants in
Kano, who equipped him with swords and arms, and such anti-Sokoto
states as Damagaran, Gumel, and Ningi . According to Adamu Fika J
Yusufu, a Fulani prince, sent Shehu Usman (Emir 191 2- 1926) to negotiate
an all ia nce with Ningi. Since Shehu Usman's mother was a Warji woman,
Yusufu no doubt thought that the negotiations wou ld run more smoothly,
for the mountaineers remembered his wars against them asgaladima under
Abdullahi. In return for military support, Shehu Usman promised Dan
I Yaya a sizable amount of the war booty85 but apparently guns were not
offered to Ningi. In efforts 10 maintain parity with the surrounding emi­
rates, Dan Yaya presumably as ked for them but was unsuccessful.
Dan Yaya realized, however, that Yusufu's forces had guns when he
joined them at Takai. Apparently, neither ally trusted the other. An oral
version at Takai recollects how Dan Yaya tame even dUrlng the rainy season
and used to attack them without warning; he often waited until the men
went out to farm before ei ther raiding. their unprotected villages in search of
Fulani women or seizing the men On the farms. But this time the conditions
were different . When Dan Yaya settled at Lunari, a small village located
just to the east ofTakai, Y usufu slaughtered cows and rams in honor of D an
Yaya's, which delighted the latter. Festivities went on during the pre paration
for attack against Tukur, and all appeared in order until one of Dan
Yaya's praise singers (marok.) composed a song. It suggested to Dan Yaya
that Yusufu was not to be trusted, and that the mountaineers should break
camp. Dan Yaya heeded the praise singer's apprehension, and when the
Yusufu forces awoke, they discovered that Ningi forces had already
departed during the early dawn.
Dan Yaya went on a raiding rampage through Sumaila District. Being a
ft!rti le district, a series of roads and trails linked the productiv e villages.
~ ingi followed the lesser used ones in their surprise attacks. Dan Yaya
burned the small villages of Mung u, U ngu war Kuka , and U nguwar Mu sa.
He seized women and animals, and he made forays against Sarina, and went
on to Huggu , 10 Unguwar Busau , to Fajewa , and Tarmo. The raiding
venture proved a success, and he returned to Ningi. 86 But change in the
emirship of K ano brought aggressive challenge to Ningi's survival.
Ningi as Nemesis to Emir Ali b. Abdullahi of Kano
The Kano civil war ended in 1894 and a warrior emir came to power. Before
Yusufu died at Garko in July 1894 , he told his slaves and principal supporters
to give full suppOrt 10 his thirty-six year old brother Aliyu, who
immediately took up the fight against Emir Tukur. Aliyu's forces showed
unflinching strength against Tukur's forces, and Tukur fled to Katsina
after his expulsion from the capital. In August 1894, Aliyu entered Kano
City, and marched against Tukur at the town of T afashiya, where Tukur
was slain in March 1895. Circumstances forced rhe Amir al- Muminin to

140
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION
recognize Aliyu as the new Emir ( 1894-1903) . As had his father, Abdullahi
( 1855 -1 882), Aliyu stayed on the battlefield and for Ningi this meant
trouble, for he renewed the policy of his father ."
Aliyu took defensive measures against Ningi and made attacks on several
occasions. He built a number of interlinking towns to guard the Kana
border. While Dando was rebuilt, he founded Magami , Siti, Kwajali,
Sansanni, Kanawa, and Kawo Gumbas. These towns were never captured,
which illustrates their success in defending against Ningi." In about 1895,
Aliyu allowedSarkin Gaya D ila to go against Dan Yaya. The two forces met
at Garwa in the Ningi vicinity, and along with the defeat of the Kano forces,
Dan Yaya sJew Dila. In order to avenge Dila's death, Aliyu took perSonal
charge of his forces and with boldness he invaded N ingi. Aliyu burned the
granaries on the K afin Dan Yaya eState. Shortly after taking office Dan
Yaya had developed this estate by clearing a large tract of land for the
purpose of growing food. In that this sizable land tenure change in Ningi
used slave labor , this estate appears to be a replica on a smaller scale of the
plantation structure in the Caliphate. (The K afin Dan Yaya estate became
the si te of the present day Ningi Town in 1934 - the present capital of Ningi
in the new Bauchi state.)I4' This innovation was apparently in response (0
the defense measures that Sokoto took against Ningi. In the course of the
late nineteenth century the Caliphate built armed camps or ribats , intensified
urbanization in southern Kana and northern Zaria, and relocated
freemen and slaves into walled settlements for protection . But as soon as the
alarm was sounded that the raiders were coming, the slaves were often
evacuated; at least the Karo plantation followed this practice. 90
Now in Ningi, Aliyu made repeated attempts to bring havoc to Dan
Yaya's estate, and the two forces clashed at Tiffi, where Turaki Bello,
Aliyu's son, died in battle. In anger , Ali yu went on to destroy the crops and
invaded Warji . He marched into the Lulu hills, where families took refuge,
and captured women and children before returning to Kano. 9 1
The Rev. Charles H . Robinson was in Kano from December 1894 to
March 1895 during some ofAliyu's expeditions against Ningi . He observed
that one thousand slaves were brought to the Kano market during one of
these raids. When Aliyu refused Robinson and his entourage privileges of
bu ying food in the Kano market, they decided to move beyond his influence.
Ro binson marched for four days before reaching what appea rs to be
Ningi territory. He noted that Aliyu had just completed a raid fo r slaves in
the district, and destroyed the food supply" Robinson'S account supports
the evidence for the number of Kano Emirate raids against Ningi cited in
the praise song of Dan Yaya :
Let us ca ll upon Dan Yaya! ... the ant hill , the hump ofthe farm when
scattered over the land , ant hill s give fertility to the soil ; he who is
courageous; he that belongs to Haruna Baba father and sarkin yak.
~IN G I
RAIDS AND SLAVERY
under 'Dan Maj e fca. 1855-1870]; he that had talisman fo r war [a type
of medicine placed around the arm for protection]. In each village that
he approached, there would be no morning prayers, nor cooked food
nor remains of the previous night ... ant hill, hump of the farm!
Wandara, the cow that became a bull by force [In war strategy , he
deceives the enemy; people thought that he was coming in one direction
but to their surprise he appears someplace else] ... Dan Yaya
even his enemy would not call him a coward! The father of Shaho and
Dada [powerful slaves of Dan Yaya] ... twice the Emir of Kano
[Aliyu] came [1895, 1898] but he could not win and left the Ningawa
alone.
Praise Song of Malam Usman Dan Yaya
by the Ningi Palace Musicians, Sarkin Jauge"
Aliyu did indeed invade Ningi again in 1898. 114 He mad e camp near the
Kojelli River at the base of Dutsin Jerige. The Butawa of Burra were on the
~ert, and as he marched toward them the next morning, they ran into the
lUlls at Kurmi. Aliyu entered Burra; killed two blind men left behind; and
burned the town. Meanwhile , Majiri , {he BUla leader, mobilized his people
Dn the hills surrounding Burra and prepared for attack. Realizing how
effective the guerrill a tactics of the mountaineers cou ld be} Aliyu com­
:nanded his troops to retreat. The Kana forces made camp some distance
i way during the evening, and to th eir surprise, the Butawa ran down from
me hills and routed them. The Kanawa fled the scene in haste, and left
~ hind many horses, camels, and men. Dan Yaya arrived the next morning }
vnly too late to help Majiri; but, when he took the camels and the best horses
m d returned to Ningi, the Buta people became ex tremely angry. The
people pressured Majiri in to sending a message to Dan Yaya stating that
lhey severed their allegiance to him. Dan Yaya acted quickly because he
realized that Burra was an indispensable ally to him. He sent conciliatory
messages and fony cows to the Buta people in effons to bring them back
eto the N ingi fold . The stratagem worked, and resolved the crisis.
But the sporadic encounters with Kana continued . On one of these
:xcasions, Aliyu tricked Dan Yaya by acting as if he were going to invade
Burra again ; Dan Yaya deployed his forces quickly to Burra; but Ali yu,
instead, invaded Ningi from the North. He stopped his forces in the vicinity
~fTiffi, only to discover that the Pa 'awa had poisoned the water . The Kana
:orces headed for Warji . Raiding and counter-raiding fo r slaves went on
intermittently between Ningi and the surround ing emirates until the comillg
of British rule in 1902."
141

142 SLAVERY AND ABOLITIOK
" I:-.IGI RAIDS AND SLAVERY
143
NO TES
I. The research for lhis paper was funded by lhe Foreign Area Research Program from July
1972 \0 January 1974 in nonhern Nigeria, and based on my dissertation: "The Ningi
Chiefdom and the Afril.:an Fronlier : Mountaineers and Resistance to Lhe Sok()(o
Cal iphate, ca. 1800·1908" (Ph .D . Thesis, Universil), of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975), and
expressed hence forth as Pauon , Thesis. I express lhe usual disclaimer.
2. Si r H . R. Paimer, S udanese Memoirs ( London : Cass, 1967), pp. l04 , 106-7.
3. Stanhope \'(Ihite, Descent f rom Ihe Hills ( Llmdon : Fred Murray 1963), pr.35-36; Malam
Yahaya, Age 95 , irHerviewed at Ningi To wn on July 27 , 1973 (Tape No.9); Malar&
Mohammadu Muht3f1 , Age 49, interviewed 31 Zaria Ci ty on 10 June 1973 (Tape No. 9).
4 . C. N. Ubah , "The Polit ical and Economic Administration of Kana , 1900-1940" ( Ph .D.
Thesis, Universit y of Ibadan , 1973), p.SS.
5. Qur'an , S. XXIV , 32, 33 ; The Encyclopedia of 1$/0," , 1960 , ed. s.\'. " Abd."
6. Paul E. Love joy, "Plantations In The Economy of The SokOlo Caliphate;' Joumol of
African History , XIX , 3 (1 978): 346; Lovejoy, " The Charac(eristics of Caliphate (Islamic
West Africa)," The American Hisumcal Revie-..v, 84, S ( December 1979): 1271,1277.
7. Lovejoy,]IlH ( 1978), 343-4 , 347 ; Lovejoy, IlHR (1979) , 1277 .
8. Lovejoy,JAH (1978); 34R-9.
9. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in tM Law of Islam (Ballimore : Johns Hopkins Press.
1955), pp .46-7, 53, 56, 59; Sarkin Yakubu Turawa Tiffi, et aI , interviewed at Tiffi on 3
December 1973 (T ape No. 26) ; Madakin Kudu (Bawa Bu), Age 83, interviewed at Ningi
Town on 7 Augusl 1973 (Tape No. 14) ; M. G. Smilh , Government In Z a:=:=au /800-/950
( London : Oxford University, 1960), pp.74 , 1S4, 157, 164 .
10. P. A. BenlOn, The Longuaget and PeaplesofBomu: Belnga CQlIeclion a/the U'lntingso/P.A .
8em01l ( London: (ass, 1968), p. 2S4 ;Sarkin Dua, Age 62 , interviewed at N ingiT own on I
Seplember ]973 (Tape No. 28).
11. See E. M . Chilver and P. M. Kaherry , NOles on ,he Precolonial HIStory and Ethnography of
the Bome,uJa Grassfields ( Buea : West Cameroon Archives , 1966) j Revd S. W . Kodlc,
Polyglolla A/ricana ( London: 1854) ; and Philip D . Curtin ,Atlanc1cSIave Trade( Madison:
University nf Wi sconsin Press), 1969, p.255.
12. Murray La st>"Aspecls of AdministraliolJ and Dissent in Hausaland, 1880-1968 ," A/ n·ca.
XL, 4 ( 1970) ,348.
13. Heinrich Barth) Travels and DIScoveries in North and Central A/n'ca 184 9-1955 , Vol.
(London : Cass, 1965), p.Sl7.
14. C. N . lI bah (Ph .D. Thesis), 1'.55.
IS. Fi eld NOles ( 1973), Ningi.
16. Lasl.A/nca ( 1970) : 348 .
17 . Barth, Travell , p . 5 15.
IS . Pallon , Thesis, p.S7.
19 . Pauon, Thesis, p. 196. Map is adapted from Love joy, JAH 1978 : 345 .
20. Smith, GO'Vernme,u in Zatzou, pp.S2 , 10 1, 170, 177 , un, 185-7, 190 for references It'
Ningi. 1 also discussed Ningi-Zazzau rclarions with Ihe aulhor.
21. EncyclopedtO 0/ Islam , 1913 ed., s.v. "Djadwal"; Malam Muhammad Mai T samiya
(Ningi), Sfar Cole,uJar of Divination (ca. 1860) i Field Notes (1973), Ningi.
22. Trevor RobertS, " Report on Tin-Smelting al Lirue-N Delma," S.N .P. 7. 2863/1918,
NAK ; S.N. Payton, "Ningi District Re-organization of Report on Ningi," 141 , SI4 "1 ,"
NAK/l935; Bawa Bu (Tape No. 26).
23 . A. W. Groom , "Reponon Ningi District June ISth to August 18th 1910," S.N.P . 76137,
NAK; Drummond-Hay, " Lere District Assessment Report," Zarpmf 1820 (1 )/1929:
NAK; Smith, Govcrnmelll In Zazzau , r. 170; Harold Gunn, Pagan Peoples uf lhe Cemral
Area 0/ Norfhem Nlgen'QPari Xl! (London: IAI , 1956), pp.3i , 48.
14 . A. W . Groom, " Report on Ningi District June 18th to August 18th 1910 ."
I S. Malam Dikko, Ton'kh Muassas Bauehi Yaqub al-Awwal , Arabic MS .; Victor N . Low.
Three NIgerian Emirates: A Study in Oral HistOry (Evanston: North-western Unive rsity,
1972), rr. I33, 136·140, 182·5.
:.,. Arewa Hous7Collec(ion , K ad~na , Arabie Mss. Uncatalogued . Professor AbduJlahi Smith
u'3.n s l~ted thISle ner fo r the Wnter . For ~ allehi-Misanties see Abubakar Yaya Aliyu , "The
E s ta~il s hm enl and Development of Errurale Government in Bauchi - 180S- J903" (Ph 0
TheSIS, Ahmadu BeUo Unive rsilY, 1973). . .
- A. W. Groom, "Repo ~t on Ningi Distriet June 18th to August 18th 19 10."
!t~ Adamu M oh~~ed FIIut, "The Political and Economic Re.Orientalion ofKanoEmirate
Northern NIgeria c. 1882- 1940" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London 1973) p. 52:
A .W : Groom, "ReiX)f( on Ningi District June 18(h to August ISlh 1910." ' ,
- DI st rict Note Boc:>k,.Rano (Nasarawa Local Government Division, Military Governor's
0f!1. ce , Kana); DIStrict NOie Book, Tudlln Wada(Nasarawa Local Governmenl Division
Military Governor's Office , Kano).
:'l . District NOie Book , Dutse District ( Nasarawa Local Government Division, Military
Governor's Office, Kano).
!I Fika (Ph.D . Thesis), pp. 52 , 99.
Lt Palmer, S udanese M l!11UJirs . p. 130.
;]. ;alm ~r.' S ua'anese Mem.OI·rs , p. 1~O; Ta(p,id al-Akhbar, Mss. 97/53 , 95/56; Katanga-Warji
, Musloans of u;e WafJ3Wa playmg ~anou s types of songs), ime rviewed al Katanga-Warji
on. IS MaY,, 19/3 ( Tape No.8, SIde A) ; and Sarkin Baima, Age 85, interviewed at
Halma-War!! ( Tape No. 4 , Sid e A).
Taqy>4 al-Ilkhbar, Ms s. 97/53 , 95/54,97/55,97/56 , 97/57.
15 . Alhaji Abubakar Gatba and Malam Ibrahim HaJilu ) interviewed at Katin Madaki on
~ SePtembe~ 30 ( Tap ~ No. 21 ); Alhaii Abubakar Garba , Tarikin Kafin Madaki .
]II!!. Ma lam Dlkko, Tankh Muassas Bauchi Yaqub aJ-A wwal; Malam Yahaya (Field NOles
Bure~ ucracy ) ; James Morri son, Personal Communications, 10 April 1974 .
Alha~~ Abubakar Carba and Malam Ibrahim Halilu (Tape No. 21 ) Sides A and B).
.. ;'\Ihall Abubakar Garba and Ma lam Ibr.thim Halilu (Tape No. 21); Imam Mahmud
~\1l1ha~d } Ton,kh,umam Bauchi, p.l78; Alkali Ningi (Salihu Maj, Turare), Age 62 ,
trllervlewed at N mgl T own on 26 September 1973 (Tape No. 16, Side B).
Ad.ell :anon, JI' .., ..~he ~ame Ningi and Developing Pre-Colonial Citizenship: A 'Non­
Tnbal Perspecuve In Nmeteenth Century Hausaland ," Afrika Und Ubersee LXII 4
; 1979) ,241-5 1. ' ,
Patton, Thesis, p.2 19 .
Patlon , Thesis, pp.219-20.
J-
"!2
Comma~der of.the army ~th m a n ., ~on of tile Emir ofZakzak, Abdullahi ( 1873-78) to Amlr
al-masalih wa ll aI-na sa Ih ( Wazln of Sokoto) Abdukadiri (1874-1 886) b . Gidado, ca.
1873-1 878 , NAK , Zarprof vol. I, Outward Corresrondence , p.17.
~. Fika (Ph .D. Thesis), p. I 14 .
...:
Palmer,S udant'se Ml!11UJirs , pp. 130-13 1; A. W. Groom, "Repon on N ingi District June 18
to August 18, 19 10."
Khadduri, War and Peace, p.163 .
Ali b . Muhammad al-Mawardi, us SWillS Gouvernememau.x an notes par E. Fagnan
~ Alg e r : A. Jourdan, 191 5). '
Khadduri, War and Peace, pp. 165-6.
Amir al-Muminin Mu'adh of Sokoto (1877-1881) (0 Emir Bauchi IbraJlim ( 1847- 1878)
Arewa House, Kaduna, Arabic MSS Uncatalogued.
'
Mu.rray Last, !he .SakOtO Caliphau (London : Longmans, 1967), pp. 145-149.
I diSCUSsed thIS with Professors M. A. Alhajj and Abd ullahi Smith, Abdullahi Bayero
College, Kano , and Arewa House , Kaduna, respectively.
Numelin, Th e Beginnings 0/ Diplomacy, pp. 127-9.
Khadduri, War and Peace, pp.168-9.
Smith, Governmellt in ZazUlu, pp. 178-88 .
C. N. Ubah , " Kano Emirate in (he 19th Century: A Study of Political Developments"
U..1.A. Thesis, University of Ghana, 1965), p.82.
Victor Low, Three Nigmoll Emirates: A Study ill Oral History (Evan ston : Northwestern
Universily, 1972), pp. 185-S .
Smith , Governmenl in ZazZQu. , pp. 180-3.
Smi th , Guvcrnmetll in ZazZlJu., p. 183.
Malam Mohammadu Muhlari , Age 49, interviewed at Zaria City on 10 June 1973 (Tape

144 SLAVERY AND ABOLITIOK
No.7. Side B); for l ifa, see Rev. G . P. Bargery. A Howa-English Dictionary and Englislt.
HOllsa Vocabulary ( London: Oxford Uni versit y, 1934) , p. SOD.
59. Smith , Govtmme711 in Zazzau, pp. 18S·7.
60. Smilh ,GlnItmmenl in Zazzau , pp. 183, 18S;Malam Ibrahim Steven Audu, Tan"kin /sawa.
6 1. Alh aii Abubakar Garba . et. al . (T ape No. 21 , Side A) ; A. W. Groom, " Repan on Ningi
Dislricc" ' j J. F . J . Fitzpatrick, ., Assessment Repon on the Ningi District," S.N.r . 1011
11 69/431,191 8 NAK.
62. Dislrict Note Book. Rano (Nasarawa Local Government Division , Military Governor'!
O[fic.:e).
63. Low, Three Nigerian E mirates, pp.187-188; ] . M. Fremantle. " Hisro ry of the regie&
compri sing the Kalagum Division of K ano Province," Jou rnal of African Society. X-X!
( 19 11-12) ; 4J4 .
64 . Low, Three Nlgenan Emiraus, p . 188.
65. Suhan Muhanuned Bello b. Suhan Ibrahim 10 Amir al-M uminin (the Sultan of SOkOl0, tbs:
Commander-of-Iht: Faithful) Umar b. Caliph 'Ali (188 1. 189 1), Kanoprof Vol. J Ourwatd
Correspondence, NAK, p. 58.
66. Field Notes (Karuba and Sonoma) 6 December 1973; Akali Ningi (SaJihu Mai Turart
Age 62 , ioter viewed at Ningi Town on 12 September 1973 (Tape No. 17, Side A); MalaA
(Tape No, I).
67. Field Notes (Ningi) , 2 May 1973 ; Field Notcs (Karuba and Sonoma), 7 December 191
68. F or a useful anaJysis of this process see Dennis DaJe Cordell, "The Awlad Suiayman
Libya and Chad: A Study of Raiding and Power in the Chad Basin in the Nineteenth
Cenlury" (M .A. Thesis, Universi ty ofWisconsin, 1972), pp. 70-90. For Bushman raider't
character and rype see John B. Wright, Bushman Raiders 0/ the Drakensberge /840-/8
(Pietermaritlburg: UniversilY of Natal, 197 1), pp.24-46.
69. Smith, GfYr.Jmltnelll in Zazzau , p.82.
70. Field Notes (Karuba and Sonoma), 7 Dcceruber 1973 . For redislribution process ~
Creighton Gabel,Ana/ysu oJ Prehimmc ECtmomicPallerns (New York : Holt , Rjnehart aDo!
Winslon , 1%7), pp.56-9.
71. Abubakar Yaya Ali yu , " The Civil War in Bauchi, ca. 188 1-2 ," S ava rIno , 2, 2 ( Decembe
197 3) ; 192-3 , 197.
72. Alhaji Abu bakar Garba , C/. al. (Tape No. 21 ).
73. Field Notes (Bureaucracy), 25 July 1973.
74. Paul Lovejoy, "Interregional Monetary Flows in th e Pre-coloniaJ T rade of Nigeria/
JAH , XV, 4 (1974) ; 577-8.
75. A. W . Groom, "Repon on Ningi Distriet June 18th to Augusl IS, 1910."
76. Joseph P. Smaldone, "Firearms in the Central Sud an : A Revolution," JAH, XIII,
(1972),595 , 597.
77. Smilh, GO'V~nlln Zazzall , pp. 190- 1.
78. James Morrison, Personal Communica lion, 10 Apr il 1974.
79. Fika (Ph .D . Thesis), p. 117.
80. C.N. Ubah (M.A. Thesis), pp.84·S.
8 1. Ubah (M.A. Thesis), p.86.
82 . Sir Richard Palmer, Palmer Papers Oos Plateau Museum), pp. 7-8.
83. Malam Usman Dan Yaya ( 1890- 1902), son of Malam Haruna Baba to Sultan Muharnm
BeUo, son of the late Ibrahim Dabo ( 1883·1 89 1), ca. 189 1, Bauprof, Out wa rd Correspoodence,
Vol. 1, p.65, NAK.
84. Palmer, Palmer Papers, pp.7-8.
85. Fika (Ph .D . Thesis), p.117.
86. Malam Yusufu Abdulla hi Takai, Age 82 , M. Aliyu Hanua Takai, Age 73 , M. Abdullalt.
Ad amu Waki li , Age 37 , interviewed at Taka) on 2 December 1973 (Tape No. 26 , Side A
It is interesting to nOte thai this rradition is aJ so fou nd in a coloniaJ document of 1924
F. M. Noad, " Kana Emirale, Sumaila District Re-A!ise5srueOl Repon ," S.N.P. 9
603/1924 .
87. Ubah, " Kana Enurate in the 19th Cemury: A Stud y of Polit ical Developments," pp.
16, 123.
88. Noad , " Kano Emiralt:, Sumaila DislriCl Re· Assessment Repon ."
89. Patton, Thesis, p. 225 .
"INGT RAIDS AND SL AVER Y 145
Ill. Love joy,AHR ( 1979); 128 5.
1. Ubah (M.A. TheSIS), p. l l3. AI Ka(anga-Warji. I .....eOlIO Lulu and observed the hiding
places during encouOlers with Aliyu.
92. Rev . Charles H. Robinson, "The Hausa T erritories," The GeographicalJenmral , VIII , 3
(September 1892): 205,208.
ra. Pallon , Thesis, pp. 256-7.
Ubah (M.A. Thesis), p. 124 .
Panon , Thesis, pp. 271·2.