Ningi Raids and Slavery in Nineteenth Century Sokoto Caliphate

More documents

Recommendations

Info

126 '>tNGI RAIDS AND SLAVERY SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 127 They waited to intercept those coming for water, and hoped to Iu.re others into alarm who would come outside in the search, The strategy faIled. The Madaki saw 'Dan Maje moving under a nearby tree, and ordered the doors closed and allowed no one to go outside. 'Dan Maje's lieutenants came directly to the town wall and tore away a few of the logs preparing to enter. But one of the Madaki)s servants covered the hole with part of his body, However, the Madaki realized that this expediency would not suffice; hence he ordered his men to bring dried thatch which was set on fire and throw~ blazing from the top of the wall down on 'Dan Maje's people. They moved quickly away and angrily departed. The people from the surroun~~ ing forest came out of hiding with their animals, weakened and starved
128 SLAVERY AND ABOLITION :\INGI RAIDS AND SLAVERY 129 discontinuance of the raids or through a negotiated peace (aman ) . This was a trend that the office holder might not wish 10 incur. It is important to keep this in mind for later developments. In time Dan Yaya came lO be powerful, iudeed , by virtue of holding this office. Slaves also held offices. Mohammed Yayo, who was a slave seized in a raid at Maganni in Kano, headed the office ofmaga-yaki. This office grew out of the need for surveillance and scouting in pre-raid strategy. Although 'Dan Maje made numerous forays, Haruna increased the raids, and much of the success of these raids was without doubt due to this office. The scouring repons of the maga-yaki came directly to the barde, and much of the annual tribute destined for SokolO fell into the barde hands. During the reign oi 'Dan Maje, a small boy called Idi was caught in one of the raids. Idi grew up in the palace and later held the office ofshamaki. Shamaki Idi was in charge of all the palace slaves, who were numerouS in Haruna's time, and this office was influential in later power politics. Slaves did the maintenance work~ some farming and served in the Haruna's large army. ~ o The Raids and Changing Strategy Haruna Karami also changed the raiding strategy remarkably. In 'Dan Maje's time mostly isolated vi llages and un garrisoned fiefs were raided. The mountaineers usually raided together as a single unit. In contrast the growth and consolidation of offices suggest greater pillaging scope and latitude: especially during Haruna's reign. He attacked large towns and sent mountaineers to raid in different directions simultaneously in the early 1870s . ..I! For example, H aruna gave Abduraman of Burra a separate raiding con tingen t. The B u tawa made forays as far as Anchau in eastern Z azzau. Since the hills and mountains are their natural habitat, they stood a better chance of being successful against the hill dwellers of the Kauru. Also going it alone, the sarkin yaki Malaika destroyed Zuntu in Zazzau and took numerom slaves. Malaika also attempted incursions against Gimba and Turawa but the inhabitants drove him away. He went on to Faki, near Zozo, and seized cattle and donkeys before going back to N ingi. Malaika returned to ZOla again, but the people were prepared and fought a winning battle agains[ him . Haruna allowed Dan Yaya to attack and burn DUlsin Gari, a town belonging to the sarkin yaki of Kano. Cattle, slaves and about forty-five horses were taken. By engaging the eastern emirates on several fronts~ Haruna kept them guessing about his moves. Haruna learned from the fate of 'Dan Maje and avoided being trapped in the mountainous Jos complex. Instead of raiding Bauchi territory by way of the ribals, Haruna went to the eastern side ofBauchi toward Gombe Emirate and circled around Bauchi's backside. He took numerouS goods and slaves at Bulun on one such occasion. Groom reports that Haruna destroyed Kundun Habe in Bauchi, and during this time Haruna was challenged by Csman chiroma of Bauchi. The forces met, but the Bauchi forces scattered. The chiroma was left alone, and faced the Ningi warriors by himself. His ~splay of courage brought no challengers from Haruna's forces who ~eparted wi th the chiroma in full control of the battleground. Emirate vigilance reJaxed somewhat during the emirs' and their officials' L'lIlual trips to Sokoto. Haruna took advantage of this between 1876 and 1878. During the second reign of Abdullah b. Hammada ( 1873-1 878) of Z.azzau , Uthman, the son of Abdullahi b. commander of the army, wrote a !etter to the Abdullahi b. Gidado, the Waziri of Sokoto ( l876-l881). Uth :nan had returned from Sokoto and found the people of Zazzau in a fearful crate. He wrote that a battle had taken place between his people and the "tyrant of Ningi," Haruna. From Farada to Saye Haruna had come and captured many people; killed numerous others; and destroyed their prop !1"ty. Remember that eastern Zazzau was fortified against Ningi incursions ":uring 'Dan Maje's time, and in spite of being garrisoned Haruna still made ::Jrays into the area. 42 The Galadima Yusufu of Kano (1860-1877) inflicted a major defeat upon :.lacuna in the later l870s. Takai (ribal) was Yusufu's headquarters, and he cd it as a base LO organize counter-raids against N ingi. Kano's overall «rategy of containing Ningi was formulated from Takai. 4 :t Both Groom's ..::-al account and the Ka7w Chronicle concur on the confrontation at Kasuan Jambo. Haruna suffered a humiliating defeat. Most of the mountaineers ran nrny, and Yusufu captured nearly 900 less fortunate men along with some ~ rses. Haruna fled to Ningi and stayed in seclusion for the remainder of the year. It is said that he made two fleeting raids into Kana the following year, lDd in revenge for previous losses he engaged in ruthless slaughter. Perhaps Clough time had elapsed for full recovery, and Haruna made overtures for ;:nce (aman ).44 This was the origin of diplomatic relations between Ningi .lnd Sokoto. The Islamic institution of peace (aman) came into being through time. It ~. a stated pledge of security granting protection (Scripturary or polytheist, J harb ) to the non-Muslim upon request. With the cessation of war, the ~ hi is secured (musw'min). The aman is granted for less than one year; if :;te harbi request more time, he must agree to pay the poll tax and enter into :5e status ofdhimmi. An official aman can be given either by the Imam or his :epresentatives through truce (muhadana or muwada~a) or by individual .Mus lim s.4~ AI-Mawardi stated that a woman, a free man, and even a slave :3n all grant an unofficial aman, but the role of the slave in aman has fImitations. He must have received authorization to fight in jihad before ",joying full privileges of granting aman. One who profits from granting ~ n is declared an enemy.41l The procedure for granting aman is that the harbi must first req uest it. Once the intention is known, the harbi merely has to make a sign or say a oord in any language and aman is granted. If the believer did not intend to
Page 1 and 2: SLAVERY AND ABOLITION A Journal of
Page 3 and 4: "INGI RAIDS AN D SLAVERY 116 SLAVER
Page 5 and 6: 120 SLAV ERY AN D ABOLITION :-lING!
Page 7: 124 SLAVERY AND ABOLITION selves up
Page 11 and 12: achieve the main objective was a di
Page 13 and 14: 136 SLAVERY AND ABOLITION ~ING I RA
Page 15 and 16: 140 SLAVERY AND ABOLITION recognize
Page 17: 144 SLAVERY AND ABOLITIOK No.7. Sid

Ningi Raids and Slavery in Nineteenth Century Sokoto Caliphate

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?