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Diplomatic History of the OFA
I do not know of a better example of cooperation between the US and the EU
on a serious security and diplomatic matter than the effort reaching the Ohrid
Agreement.
Leotard and I did not operate in isolation, however. Interventions by Solana
and Robertson were very important at delicate points in the negotiations that
summer.
I must also recognize the work of Pieter Feith, the NATO diplomat who
negotiated the cease fire and amnesty agreements with the NLA in the field.
Leotard and I had no charter to engage the NLA directly in the peace talks, and
the work by Feith was critical to bringing the NLA into the final agreement.
In the first days after arriving, I came to several conclusions:
- President Trajkovski wanted a peaceful, negotiated settlement;
- Some senior leaders in government wanted NATO to use force against the
NLA. If that was not possible, they wanted US and European governments
to sanction use of force by the Macedonian police and military in a full scale
assault on the insurgents and their base of support. I was convinced that US
and European support for a military solution to the situation was not
possible.
I felt that my first task was to make the government and parties understand
the potential consequences of a war. While the government could have achieved a
temporary military success against the NLA, extensive violence would have
triggered a much broader and more vicious insurgency that potentially would
have destroyed Macedonia as it exists today.
The negotiations in July and August of 2001 were passionate, difficult and
involved many parties with differing views and interests. At several points, I
feared the negotiations would fail; however, President Trajkovski and others did
the right thing in the end and completed the agreement.
The Ohrid Agreement is not perfect—negotiations under the threat of war
are rarely perfect—and implementation has not been without issues as well.
Overall, however, the Ohrid Agreement has held up well as a model for ethnic
relationships in Macedonia and elsewhere. The two great principles of Ohrid—
respect for the cultural identity of everyone and the equal rights of every citizen
without regard to ethnic background—remain valid today. I congratulate those
who reached this agreement for their wisdom and commitment to peace and the
stability of their country.
The Ohrid Agreement gave Macedonia a chance in 2001 to avoid destructive
divisions and to develop as a democracy.
Now, it is up to today’s leaders to take the opportunity Ohrid gave and move
the country forward further and faster to NATO and EU membership.
Thank you for your attention.
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