Review Incident Shin.. - authority for electricity regulation, oman

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16.30h on 28 August, it can be concluded that a lot of time (about 14 hours) was lost by not having spare parts available close to the site. Moreover, the time of finding the fault could have been shortened by having the right equipment in place for estimating the fault location more correctly. Compared to the previous item this issue is limited but we believe that a reduction in the search time of 2.5 hours could have been achieved. Finally, OETC had enough people on-site but this was partly because MJEC offered OETC assistance. Although we support the assistance provided from one company to another, it has to be noted that in this case it was done on an ad-hoc basis and therefore not planned. This means that OETC was fortunate in this instance to get this support from MJEC but we would caution against relying on this kind of support in future. 2.3. System Operation The system is operated from the Load Dispatch Center (LDC) of OETC in the Muscat area. This LDC is equipped with a modern SCADA system 8 . This means that the operators can see the status of switches and measurements on their screens and operate circuit breakers and disconnecting switches. Earthing switches were not controllable from the control center at the time of the incident 9 . We have received a set of procedures from the control center. Relevant procedures include ‘OETC Procedures during Abnormal Operating Conditions’ and ‘Restoration of the Power System following a complete or partial “Black-out”’. Unfortunately the set of procedures is not yet complete. Since it is recognized (see section 2.1) that a single outage in the line Wadi Jizzi to Shinas could lead to a complete outage of the Shinas area (up to 65 MW) for a considerable period, we would have expected that plans would have been in place to deal with a permanent outage in this non-(n-1) compliant line 10 . However, this was not the case. 8 ABB Spider system 9 We learned that originally the earthing switches were controllable from the SCADA. However, because of safety reasons it was decided to only operate earthing switches locally. Although there are also reasons why earthing switches should be operated remotely, this approach is not unusual in transmission networks. 10 And probably other non-(n-1) compliant lines. However, this is not part of this review. Review Incident Shinas August 2007 10 09.10.2007 vs. 2 (final)
One set of procedures is about training for control center staff. These procedures include a road map for training, plans for training and a content list for training, including training for emergency situations. However, training has not started yet. This appears to be due to a lack of manpower for system operation. This means that control center staff were not adequately trained for this kind of event. However, as we point out later, in this incident this did not significantly affect the duration of the interruption. 2.4. Emergency organization In case of an emergency, it is the practice within OETC that the Head of Maintenance will be the high-level coordinator. He will contact the manager of transmission and maintain contact with the operation engineer. The Load Dispatch center communicates with the directly connected customers and with the control centers of the distribution companies. Distribution companies deal with their customers. OETC does not have a complete set of defined System Normalisation procedures and System incident procedures in place as required by the Grid Code of Oman (OC 7, Contingency Planning Code, version 1.000). The consequence of that is that OETC relies completely on experience and ad-hoc measures. Review Incident Shinas August 2007 11 09.10.2007 vs. 2 (final)
Page 1 and 2: Review Incident Shinas area 27-29 A
Page 3 and 4: necessary safety measures such as l
Page 5 and 6: 1. INTRODUCTION On 27 August 2007,
Page 7 and 8: We were told that the investment in
Page 9: contract with Civil Co (we have onl
Page 13 and 14: crucial for the LDC staff to be bac
Page 15 and 16: 4.3. Spare parts Since spares were
Page 17 and 18: 4.6. Incident center As discussed i
Page 19 and 20: 5. CONCLUSIONS Based on the review

Review Incident Shin.. - authority for electricity regulation, oman

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