Jurisdictional statement - About Redistricting - Loyola Law School

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26 burden to the state to explain why a racially segregative purpose is not the effective cause of a districting scheme. That the “predominant factor” test does not preclude the Arlington Heights/Mt. Healthy framework is demonstrated by Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 916. Miller specifically reiterated the distinction between the legal consequences of proving the government was merely aware of racial consequences and the legal consequences of proving purposeful racial discrimination by citing Feeney’s observation that “‘discriminatory purpose’ … implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.” Id. (citing Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Observing that the “distinction between being aware of racial considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to make,” Miller emphasized the “plaintiffs’ burden” to establish the legislature’s discriminatory motive required either “circumstantial evidence” or “more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.” Id. This description of plaintiff’s burden specifically recognizes that “direct evidence going to legislative purpose” is distinct from, and goes far beyond, mere proof of governmental “awareness” of race. The latter cannot shift the burden to the government, but, under the Arlington Heights/Mt Healthy framework, the former must and does. This Court has repeatedly re-affirmed that the Arlington Heights/Mt. Healthy framework of shifting burdens governs proof of discriminatory purpose where a defendant has multiple
27 motives, some legitimate and some unconstitutional, for undertaking some action. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1985); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 n.26 (1979); see also Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (applying burdenshifting framework to Title VII claims). Lower courts have also repeatedly used this framework for mixedmotive cases alleging unconstitutional discrimination regarding voting rights. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1189 (11th Cir. 1999). The Shaw line of cases did not sweep away this longstanding equal protection framework for determining whether a governmental decision was caused by an unconstitutional purpose where the evidence suggests mixed motives. This framework demands that, when plaintiffs provide some substantial evidence that key governmental officials actively used racial classifications to pursue an agenda of racial segregation for ends other than compliance with the VRA, the government bears the burden of providing some explanation for how such a purpose was not the but-for cause of the state’s segregative action. The three-judge court ignored the Arlington Heights/Mt. Healthy framework, apparently because the three-judge court wrongly concluded the Shaw cases had somehow overridden that framework in the redistricting context. II. Plaintiffs have standing to offer proof that South Carolina intentionally segregated black voters systematically, on a statewide basis, including in election districts where plaintiffs did not themselves reside. The court below acknowledged the plaintiffs presented evidence that “strongly suggested that race was a factor in drawing many districts lines,” App.
Page 1 and 2: No. 11-___ IN THE Supreme Court of
Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENT
Page 5 and 6: v TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued Pag
Page 7 and 8: vii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page
Page 9 and 10: ix TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page 11 and 12: IN THE Supreme Court of the United
Page 13 and 14: 3 was twofold: (1) to minimize the
Page 15 and 16: 5 leaders explained these districts
Page 17 and 18: 7 55, governed South Carolina’s H
Page 19 and 20: 9 that had a lower BVAP percentage
Page 21 and 22: 11 position: as a matter of policy,
Page 23 and 24: 13 (R-Horry) shared this cold blood
Page 25 and 26: 15 testimony did not show that “r
Page 27 and 28: 17 lower court failed to recognize
Page 29 and 30: 19 danger was too great that partis
Page 31 and 32: 21 a generalized assertion of past
Page 33 and 34: 23 necessary to enforce the VRA con
Page 35: 25 “predominant factor” decisio
Page 39 and 40: 29 A. Hays’ standing doctrine is
Page 41 and 42: 31 B. Plaintiffs have standing to i
Page 43 and 44: 33 * * * In Georgia v. Ashcroft, th
Page 45 and 46: 35 sider evidence on a statewide ba
Page 47 and 48: APPENDIX
Page 49 and 50: 2a ———— Judge Duffy wrote t
Page 51 and 52: 4a 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, 42 U.S.
Page 53 and 54: 6a U.S. at 905. Race may be a facto
Page 55 and 56: 8a composition of their district wo
Page 57 and 58: 10a communities of interests, and i
Page 59 and 60: 12a Even granting Dr. McDonald the
Page 61 and 62: 14a ground other than race, see Sha
Page 63 and 64: 16a tricting process. All three of
Page 65 and 66: 18a the Subcommittee, as a whole. O
Page 67 and 68: 20a ment scheme has on the opportun
Page 69 and 70: 22a therefore cannot state a § 2 c
Page 71 and 72: 24a (quoting City of Mobile v. Bold
Page 73 and 74: 26a General Assembly acted with suc
Page 75 and 76: 28a elections. Id. Not a single whi
Page 77 and 78: 30a APPENDIX B THE UNITED STATES DI
Page 79 and 80: 32a APPENDIX C THE UNITED STATES DI
Page 81 and 82: 34a APPENDIX D THE UNITED STATES DI
Page 83 and 84: 36a seriously doubted, but neither
Page 85 and 86: 38a 10. When the Federal Court drew
Page 87 and 88:
40a 16. When the Federal Court drew
Page 89 and 90:
42a House District as adopted durin
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44a center located in the heart of
Page 93 and 94:
46a not able to attend the meeting,
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48a District 79 was 34 percent blac
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50a considered what they were doing
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52a African-American voters to a
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54a 1. I serve in the South Carolin
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56a gather for community events at
Page 105 and 106:
58a not able to attend the meeting,
Page 107 and 108:
60a District 79 was 34 percent blac
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62a considered what they were doing
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64a African-American voters to a
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66a Q. So all these items would be
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68a APPENDIX H Sellers - Direct * *
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70a district and had some dialogue
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72a talked about was race. That’s
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74a went to committee, regardless o
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76a know why these districts—we c
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78a [35] Q. If there is that correl
Page 127 and 128:
80a Q. So your understanding of Gin
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82a Q. All right. Thank you. When y
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84a administration—Mansfield’s
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86a would be contained in only thre
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88a preference, according to Dave W
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90a One of the group’s largest fe
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92a ble. Abrams says the new maps
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94a * * * Texas, a state not known
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96a Conservatives want to scrub thi
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98a “Every method that human inge
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100a United States Code Annotated T
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102a period which would otherwise r
Page 151:
House District BVAP (2000 census
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Jurisdictional statement - About Redistricting - Loyola Law School

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