GhubrahIncidentInves.. - authority for electricity regulation, oman
GhubrahIncidentInves.. - authority for electricity regulation, oman
GhubrahIncidentInves.. - authority for electricity regulation, oman
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Report Number: R 8991<br />
Issue: 1.1<br />
Executive Summary<br />
A serious incident occurred at Al Ghubrah Power and Desalination Plant, Muscat, on<br />
9 th May 2006, which resulted in fatal injuries to two Sogex employees whilst<br />
per<strong>for</strong>ming maintenance activities on the Phase 3 ‘D’ Hypochlorite storage cylinder.<br />
Following the incident the AER requested Advantica to visit the site of the incident to<br />
carry out a site inspection and to conduct an evaluation of the probable cause of the<br />
incident.<br />
The Advantica visit took place on 10 th May 2006. A verbal debriefing was conducted<br />
at the AER offices with the Executive Director, and a document was prepared <strong>for</strong><br />
issue to all sites following the initial site survey and inspections, which stated that no<br />
further work should be carried out on the Hypochlorite cylinders. The timetable <strong>for</strong><br />
the issue of this report was also discussed during the debriefing.<br />
The principle cause of the incident at Al Ghubrah was a systemic failure of the<br />
Permit to Work (PTW) system. ‘Hot’ work involving the use of electrical tools to<br />
repair a section of the cylinder structure was allowed to take place under a<br />
work order which referenced a ‘cold’ PTW. The ‘cold’ permit had been raised<br />
previously to cover painting activities, and stated that no isolations, draining or<br />
venting were required. The subsequent cylinder repair work should have been the<br />
subject of a proper Risk Assessment which would have identified the need <strong>for</strong> the<br />
work to be carried out under a ‘hot’ PTW with suitable gas detection and other safety<br />
precautions, including necessary isolations and proper venting. The source of<br />
ignition was in all probability the use of an electric drill (not fit <strong>for</strong> purpose - drill<br />
brushes causing sparks in hazardous area, electrical connections badly made etc.)<br />
in proximity to ‘D’ cylinder vent (not isolated and in service at the time).<br />
There were no job-specific fire precautions (i.e. Portable fire extinguishers) in<br />
place.<br />
A new rigorous PTW system is required urgently <strong>for</strong> the Al Ghubrah site. Risk<br />
Assessments should be carried out prior to all activities. The safety<br />
department should be involved at all stages of an activity.<br />
Scaffolding construction and inspection standards should be reviewed as soon as<br />
possible. Although not a direct contributory factor to the incident, the poor standards<br />
observed could be a danger to health and safety in their own right.<br />
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