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The Wonderland of share valuation

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SHARE VALUATION<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Wonderland</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>share</strong> <strong>valuation</strong><br />

20 TAXADVISER – August 2009


SHARE VALUATION<br />

By 2003, the government had<br />

tired <strong>of</strong> what it perceived as<br />

large-scale tax avoidance by<br />

means <strong>of</strong> low-value <strong>share</strong>s and options<br />

made available to employees, a<br />

position it resolved to change when it<br />

enacted the wide ranging provisions <strong>of</strong><br />

FA 2003, Sch 22, including what is<br />

now Part 7 <strong>of</strong> ITEPA 2003. I cannot<br />

comment on the tax implications, but<br />

as someone who specialises in the<br />

<strong>valuation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>share</strong>s for purposes that<br />

include employment-related securities,<br />

it seems to me that, as Alice in<br />

<strong>Wonderland</strong> might have put it, these<br />

days one doesn’t know what is and<br />

what isn’t.<br />

<strong>The</strong> previous <strong>valuation</strong> rules had<br />

been with us for many years, and were<br />

reasonably well understood. Employees<br />

Salmon, Patrick v Burrows, and Ede v<br />

Wilson and Cornwall, 2 and depended on<br />

what the <strong>share</strong>s were worth to the<br />

actual recipient rather than some<br />

anonymous acquirer, which meant that<br />

personal characteristics, and<br />

information actually known by the<br />

recipient, were to be taken into<br />

account.<br />

Occasionally, the different <strong>valuation</strong><br />

approaches would produce different<br />

results. In one case where <strong>share</strong>s were<br />

issued to both shop-floor workers and<br />

management, a higher value applied to<br />

the management <strong>share</strong>s because they<br />

were aware <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fer for the company,<br />

while most members <strong>of</strong> the workforce<br />

were not. In most cases, however, there<br />

would be very little, if any, difference in<br />

value, whichever basis applied, but<br />

on principles consistent with the<br />

requirements <strong>of</strong> ICTA, s. 19, the<br />

so-called ‘normal rules charge’, and<br />

Weight v Salmon etc remain in force.<br />

Part 7 <strong>of</strong> ITEPA deals with<br />

‘Employment Income: Income and<br />

Exemptions relating to Securities’,<br />

which would seem to comprise a ‘pr<strong>of</strong>it<br />

or incidental benefit <strong>of</strong> any kind<br />

obtained by the employee if it is money<br />

or money’s worth’ referred to in<br />

s. 62(2) above, and includes<br />

employment-related securities. Section<br />

421 in Part 7, Chapter 1 clearly states<br />

that in Chapters 1-5 <strong>of</strong> Part 7, ‘market<br />

value’ has the same meaning as it has<br />

for the purposes <strong>of</strong> Part 8 <strong>of</strong> the TCGA,<br />

ie, TCGA, s. 272. <strong>The</strong>refore, it would<br />

seem that, while employee <strong>share</strong>s are<br />

valued under s. 62 on the money’s<br />

David Bowes examines some <strong>of</strong> the <strong>valuation</strong> issues that have emerged as<br />

a consequence <strong>of</strong> the changes to the employee <strong>share</strong>s regime<br />

who received rights or interests in<br />

<strong>share</strong>s, usually options, would pay<br />

income tax on the ‘market value’ <strong>of</strong> the<br />

underlying <strong>share</strong>s, defined by what is<br />

now TCGA 1992, s. 272, less any price<br />

paid. Market value envisages a sale in<br />

the open market between hypothetical,<br />

willing, anonymous, parties. While<br />

rights and restrictions contained in the<br />

relevant company’s articles <strong>of</strong><br />

association would be taken into<br />

account, <strong>share</strong>holders’ agreements or<br />

other personal or collateral agreements<br />

were ignored. 1 In general terms, for<br />

minority holdings <strong>of</strong> such <strong>share</strong>s, the<br />

information to be taken into account in<br />

the <strong>valuation</strong> is published information<br />

only.<br />

If employees actually received <strong>share</strong>s<br />

by reason <strong>of</strong> their employment, the<br />

Schedule E charge to tax arose under<br />

TA 1988, s. 19 and s. 131. Market value<br />

was nowhere mentioned in the<br />

legislation, and any tax was due on the<br />

difference between the ‘money’s worth’<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>share</strong>s, and what the employee<br />

paid for them, if less. Money’s worth<br />

was determined in accordance with the<br />

decisions in cases such as Weight v<br />

most importantly, there was relative<br />

certainty as to which one would apply,<br />

and what the consequences would be<br />

in <strong>valuation</strong> terms.<br />

ITEPA 2003 – plus c’est la<br />

même chose<br />

FA 2003, Sch 22 changed all that.<br />

Income tax is now chargeable under<br />

ITEPA 2003, s. 6 on employment<br />

income, stated in s. 7 to include<br />

‘earnings’ within ITEPA, Part 3, Chapter<br />

1, which in fact comprises only one<br />

section, s. 62, and which purports to<br />

explain what is meant by earnings ‘in<br />

the employment income Parts’,<br />

presumably Parts 2-7 <strong>of</strong> ITEPA. Such<br />

‘earnings’ include ‘any gratuity or other<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>it or incidental benefit <strong>of</strong> any kind<br />

obtained by the employee if it is<br />

money or money’s worth’ in<br />

accordance with Chapter 1, Part 3.<br />

Money’s worth is defined by s. 62(3) as<br />

something either ‘<strong>of</strong> direct monetary<br />

value to the employee, or capable <strong>of</strong><br />

being converted into money or<br />

something <strong>of</strong> direct monetary value to<br />

the employee’. That suggests that the<br />

basic income tax charge seems to arise<br />

worth basis, as is the position with<br />

other non-monetary assets, they also<br />

confusingly fall within the s. 272 basis<br />

because <strong>of</strong> the requirements <strong>of</strong> Part 7.<br />

ITEPA 2003 – plus ça change<br />

Part 7 disconcertingly creates this<br />

previously unknown asset – the<br />

‘restricted’ security or interest in<br />

securities (s. 423) – and also seems to<br />

require determination <strong>of</strong> its value under<br />

s. 272. Restrictions on <strong>share</strong>s are<br />

something that valuers have been very<br />

familiar with for as long as private<br />

companies have existed. After all, many<br />

companies subject their <strong>share</strong>s to them<br />

in their Articles <strong>of</strong> Association.<br />

However, in Part 7, if as a result <strong>of</strong> the<br />

restrictions the value is less than it<br />

would be but for them, all restrictions,<br />

whether the subject <strong>of</strong> any contract,<br />

agreement, arrangement or condition,<br />

have to be taken into account in<br />

valuing these restricted <strong>share</strong>s. Despite<br />

the fact that, in determining the<br />

market value <strong>of</strong> restricted securities, s.<br />

421 prescribes the market-value basis,<br />

that brings into the equation all<br />

limitations imposed by the personal<br />

TAXADVISER – August 2009 21


SHARE VALUATION<br />

SAV seems to have found a solution to the problem<br />

created by this very complicated piece <strong>of</strong> legislation<br />

and collateral agreements referred to in<br />

the third paragraph above, which are<br />

normally excluded from consideration<br />

under s. 272.<br />

ITEPA 2003 – down the<br />

rabbit hole<br />

So the question is – are we valuing<br />

under s. 62 or s. 272? It appears that<br />

Shares and Assets Valuation <strong>of</strong> HMRC<br />

(SAV) think we are under s. 272 because<br />

in effect they have told us so. In<br />

response to FAQ1(K), namely, ‘Market<br />

value is now based on the CGT<br />

definition. Does this mean that personal<br />

restrictions on the <strong>share</strong> no longer have<br />

to be taken into account in arriving at its<br />

value?’ HMRC said: ‘No. Even where<br />

there is, for example, a restriction on<br />

sale, the <strong>share</strong>s must be valued as if that<br />

restriction would still apply to their<br />

hypothetical purchaser. It is the asset (as<br />

it is) that is being valued, not some<br />

other unrestricted asset.’ <strong>The</strong><br />

hypothetical purchaser does not exist<br />

except for <strong>valuation</strong>s under s. 272, so<br />

seemingly we are valuing on the basis <strong>of</strong><br />

a sale to a hypothetical purchaser who<br />

may have to submit to personal<br />

restrictions imposed on someone else.<br />

To add to the confusion, in order to<br />

obtain CGT treatment <strong>of</strong> any future<br />

disposal proceeds, <strong>share</strong>holders can<br />

elect under s. 431, resulting in tax being<br />

paid when the <strong>share</strong>s are acquired on<br />

the value presuming that the restrictions<br />

do not apply – the unrestricted market<br />

value (UMV). As s. 431 is within Part 7,<br />

and clear reference is made thereto on<br />

that section, it seems that s. 272 must<br />

also apply in determining UMV. We<br />

therefore have the almost completely<br />

contradictory positions, namely that for<br />

restricted <strong>share</strong>s under s. 272 we have<br />

regard to otherwise irrelevant<br />

restrictions, in arriving at what is<br />

somewhat erroneously described as<br />

actual market value (AMV), and for<br />

UMV, also under s. 272, we completely<br />

disregard the existence <strong>of</strong> any<br />

restrictions at all.<br />

And what, in the meantime,<br />

happened to the money’s worth<br />

<strong>valuation</strong> test in s. 62, seemingly<br />

usurped by market value in Part 7? <strong>The</strong><br />

reports <strong>of</strong> its death seem to have been<br />

greatly exaggerated. <strong>The</strong> Share Schemes<br />

Manual at 70210 states that ‘normally<br />

the money’s worth and the market value<br />

per TCGA92/s. 272 will be the same.<br />

Where market value exceeds money’s<br />

worth value there can be an additional<br />

charge under Chapter 3C on the<br />

excess’. <strong>The</strong> Shares Valuation Manual at<br />

109030 states that: ‘In practice most<br />

employers and employees elect out <strong>of</strong><br />

the money’s worth basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>valuation</strong> for<br />

a full UMV. Where the UMV is seemingly<br />

less than the money’s worth value, the<br />

case should be referred for advice.’ <strong>The</strong><br />

implication <strong>of</strong> that seems to be that the<br />

money’s worth basis takes precedence,<br />

unless the market value, namely the<br />

alternative one that ignores all<br />

restrictions, is greater.<br />

Curiouser and curiouser<br />

If all restrictions are to be regarded,<br />

including personal ones, perhaps that<br />

could only really be achieved using the<br />

money’s worth basis. It would follow<br />

that this basis might apply for the AMV<br />

<strong>of</strong> restricted <strong>share</strong>s, notwithstanding<br />

the apparent application <strong>of</strong> the s. 272<br />

value instead, although some<br />

illogicalities might then arise. While the<br />

legislation is aimed at restrictions, the<br />

money’s worth basis also embraces<br />

<strong>share</strong>holders’ rights. If the particular<br />

recipient had inside information<br />

relating to the company’s future<br />

prospects, for example, that could<br />

result in the restricted <strong>share</strong>s being<br />

worth more than on a s. 272 basis,<br />

surely not what was intended.<br />

According to the Share Schemes<br />

Manual 220020, the position is as<br />

follows: ‘<strong>The</strong> charge on acquisition <strong>of</strong><br />

securities is still <strong>of</strong>ten the money’s worth<br />

charge under ITEPA, s. 62, unless an<br />

election under s. 431 is made for the<br />

unrestricted market value to apply…..<br />

Where restricted securities are involved,<br />

the unrestricted market value will usually<br />

be higher than the money’s worth or<br />

CGT values, which take account <strong>of</strong> the<br />

restrictions.’<br />

As already stated, normally the<br />

money’s worth and the market value will<br />

be the same, but according once more<br />

to the Share Schemes Manual at 20510,<br />

where they differ, any additional value<br />

over and above the money’s worth value<br />

is chargeable under Chapter 3C <strong>of</strong> Part<br />

7, which is concerned with securities<br />

acquired for less than market value, and<br />

is a sweeping-up provision. Accordingly,<br />

most other provisions take priority over<br />

it, including a money’s worth charge,<br />

unless the amount charged under<br />

Chapter 3C would be greater than that<br />

charged under any <strong>of</strong> those provisions,<br />

in which case the excess is chargeable<br />

under Chapter 3C.<br />

Through the keyhole<br />

As stated at the outset, before ITEPA, we<br />

seem to have had two <strong>valuation</strong> bases.<br />

<strong>The</strong> money’s worth basis applied only<br />

for Schedule E. Market value, whether<br />

under s. 272 or s. 160 for IHT, applied<br />

for everything else. Notwithstanding the<br />

references in ITEPA Part 7 to market<br />

value, as understood for almost all other<br />

tax purposes it does not seem to apply<br />

for employment purposes. Instead,<br />

there now seem to be two new assets,<br />

unrestricted <strong>share</strong>s to be valued<br />

ignoring all restrictions whatsoever, and<br />

restricted ones that are valued subject<br />

to all possible ones.<br />

At least SAV seems to have found a<br />

solution to the problems created by this<br />

very complicated piece <strong>of</strong> legislation.<br />

Given the potential difficulties in valuing<br />

the fictional AMV, their solution has<br />

become one <strong>of</strong> using normal rules while<br />

paying heed to all the restrictions, thus<br />

arriving at a heavily discounted figure<br />

for AMV with which valuers would be<br />

reasonably comfortable, and adding a<br />

small premium thereto in order to arrive<br />

at UMV.<br />

A solution that is arguably certainly<br />

not beyond criticism in pure <strong>valuation</strong><br />

terms, it represents a pragmatic solution,<br />

preferable to the Mad Hatter’s tea party<br />

that it once threatened to become.<br />

David Bowes is a chartered tax adviser.<br />

He is a partner in Bruce Sutherland &<br />

Co, the <strong>share</strong> <strong>valuation</strong> specialists, and<br />

can be contacted at david.bowes@<br />

bruce-sutherland.com; 01608 651091<br />

1. A-G v Jameson [1905] 2 IR 218, IRC v<br />

Crossman 15 ATC 94, HL, Lynall, Re,<br />

50 ATC 347, HL, and others<br />

2. Weight v Salmon 14 ATC 47, HL,<br />

Patrick (Inspector <strong>of</strong> Taxes) v Burrows<br />

(1954) 35 TC 138, Ede v Wilson and<br />

Cornwall [1945] 1 All ER 367<br />

22 TAXADVISER – August 2009

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