'THE GOVERNMENT'S ABSOLUTELY AWARE ... - Rail Professional

NEWS
LAMBRIGG SPARKS VERTICAL INTEGR
The section of the West Coast Main
Line damaged during the Lambrigg
derailment re-opened on 13 March,
writes Katie Silvester.
Almost a kilometre of track, 600
metres of powerlines and four signal
control boxes had to be replaced by
Network Rail engineers, more than
300 of whom worked on the line
during the two-week closure.
As the rail industry awaits the
results of the inquiry into the
Lambrigg derailment, questions
are already being asked as to how
such incidents can be avoided in
future. Since the Potters Bar
accident in 2002, after which
Network Rail brought track
maintenance in-house, its safety
record has been good.
But Virgin founder Richard
Branson has called for a debate on
whether train operators should
also take on the responsibility for
maintenance – a stance that would
be backed by the Conservative
party, which supports the idea of
vertical integration.
Others believe this would
compromise safety further. RMT
general secretary Bob Crow was
quick to respond to Branson’s
comments. ‘It is bad enough that
there are still contractors, subcontractors,
labour-only agencies
and one-man-and-a-trolley outfits
let loose on the tracks under
Network Rail,’ he said.
‘Trains and tracks should be
operated by the same
organisation, but that organisation
should be publicly owned and
controlled.’
RAIB queries Style 63s
The RAIB’s initial findings into the
immediate and underlying cause
of the Lambrigg derailment on 23
February have focused on the
stretcher bars and lock bar. The
RAIB investigation is still ongoing.
But there are other safety
concerns about points, dating
back to 2005, which Network Rail
has not yet fully addressed, writes
Paul Coleman.
In December 2005, the Rail
Safety & Standards Board
recommended that Network Rail
considers replacing all Style 63
points machines across the UK.
A Style 63 points motor,
manufactured by Westinghouse
Network Rail rebuilds the embankment using 22,000 tonnes of stone. More than 2,000 tonnes of ballast was needed for the tracks.
Rail Systems, controlled the
Lambrigg 2B points at the centre
of the RAIB’s Grayrigg
investigation.
Following the derailment of a
commuter train on points at
Leigham Junction in south
London on 27 May 2005, the
RSSB, in a formal inquiry report,
stated: ‘This and other Style 63
point machines were in a
potentially dangerous condition.’
The RSSB categorised the
13mph Leigham Junction
derailment as a ‘potentially higher
risk train accident’. The first coach
completely derailed at the points.
There were no injuries.
Compared to previous highspeed
rail accidents, however,
relatively few people were injured
or killed. Though one person
tragically died in the crash and a
handful of others were
hospitalised, the safety credentials
of the Pendolino have been
confirmed.
Many of the injuries seen in
The RSSB report, published in
December 2005, contained 10
recommendations to Network
Rail. The first stated that Network
Rail ‘consider the development of
a strategy for the gradual
replacement of Style 63 machines’.
The report said the underlying
cause of the derailment was
incorrect adjustment of contacts
on the points motor by a
technician who ‘was not rigorously
applying the relevant specification’
and who ‘did not have the correct
tools to undertake the work
correctly’.
The RSSB said it would track the
industry’s response. However, the
RSSB’s 2005 Annual Safety
Performance Report, published in
May 2006, stated that none of the
previous train crashes, caused by
passengers being thrown out of
windows or colliding with sharpedged
furniture, were avoided.
‘The Pendolino performed
brilliantly,’ said Branson. ‘We
transport many millions of
passengers and have spent a lot of
money on Pendolinos. If you are
going to have a massive accident, a
10 recommendations had been
completed.
An RSSB spokeswoman said
that since last May, four of the 10
recommendations remain open,
meaning Network Rail are still
working on them. The remaining
six have been satisfactorily
completed, including the first
recommendation to ‘consider… the
gradual replacement’ of Style 63
machines.
‘That recommendation has
been dealt with, it’s done in it’s
entirety, it’s closed,’ said the RSSB
spokeswoman.
She said that the Safety
Management Information System,
which records all safety-related
events, now states: ‘In areas that
are re-signalled, the machines are
© Network Rail
8 RAIL PROFESSIONAL : APRIL 2007