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autocratic, the comparison ends there. Sustained growth, employment and a five yearly
change in the leadership make the situation quite different to either North Africa or the
Middle East. However, China has its own issues over political stability, and the new CCP
leadership under Xi Jinping will need to determine a new direction. The choice of political
reform will have a huge effect well beyond China.
There are many reforming ideas; some advocate a ‘federalist possibility,’ 34 a loosening of
the centrally planned socio-economic system, with authority devolved to the provinces,
along with tangible demarcation of power within the Executive. This approach is unlikely to
find support because central control is judged vital to stability. The term democratisation is
used widely, and whilst much is made of the current grass roots village electoral system,
this process is not used more generally nor is there any plan to widen representative
democracy. The reality is at the national level, only approved delegates are selected to the
unicameral National People’s Congress (NPC) from the provinces. 35 Similarly, at the next
level up, the NPC only approves the pre-ordained State Council and the Politburo.
Therefore, the Party and the Party leadership are uniquely powerful and any sense of
political reform will be gradual, and follow extensive experimentation. An example is in
Chongqing, a mega city in the new province of Sichuan and Chongqing. The influential
Party academic, Mr Fang Ning, cites experimentation in deliberate polling in this city. This
involves the random selection of sample elements of the population, involving them in a
consultation process with experts, before asking them to vote on a single issue –
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‘democratic heart to heart.’ Whilst this polling is carefully scripted and certainly not a free
choice - it is the start of an engagement process.
The problem is that there are no other models for political evolution or reform offered by
the CCP. The Constitution is limited to phrases about a one hundred year socialist journey.
The key part, the destination of the journey, is not clear. Eruptions like Tiananmen Square
(1989), are not be tolerated, however the volume of discussion throughout the country is on
the rise. The CCP are adept at using all the instruments of the state to keep the situation
under control, however the conditions have a dynamism of their own - it is very difficult to
predict the outcome.
Moving to consider the other elements of the Executive, the most important is the power
of law making. The accepted norm is individual freedom is based on the rule of law not the
rule by law. In China rule by law, is the norm, with rules, regulation and laws principally
empowering the state over the individual. An evolution to a different constitutional model
would need a transition to the rule of law. Pei makes the point for complex political reform
and a need for the introduction the rule of law: ‘remove the political monopoly of the
authoritarian regime, the ineffective monitoring and policing of the State agent’s and the
absence of rule of law.’ 37 However, real and substantive change is not evident. This can
be characterized by a Chinese White Paper on, ‘The rule of Law,’ 38 published in 2008. The
paper explained a consultative process, for making laws, however the weakness is the
consultation and approval is only within the Party, and is not representative. The text of the
White Paper says, ‘this democratic process, focusing on full consultation before a bill is
submitted for final voting, displays a distinctive feature of the system of the National
34 Jae Ho Chung Charting China’s Future (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 81.
35 EIU Country Report China (Dec 10), 41.
36 Leonard, What Does China Think, 71.
37 Pei, China’s Trapped Transition – Limits of Developmental Autocracy, 207.
38 Chinese Gov White Paper, ‘China’s Efforts in Promoting the Rule of Law,’ Beijing, Feb (2008),
http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-08/17/content_24165.htm. (accessed 20 Jun 2011).
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