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Page 1 A Guide to the Procurement of Trusted Systems: An ... - csirt

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attitude should be "Show me, please" throughout <strong>the</strong> test effort. For <strong>the</strong><br />

internal TCB-provided security protection features, DoD 5200.28-STD<br />

requirements should be reviewed for testing each division/class. A team <strong>of</strong><br />

experts should be assembled <strong>to</strong> help test. Also, Chapter 5 <strong>of</strong> this document,<br />

"Security Test and Evaluation," should be reviewed.<br />

3.3.3.4 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT<br />

Configuration Management (CM) for TCB s<strong>of</strong>tware is only required for TCB<br />

Classes B2 and above. However, CM should be required for all acquisitions,<br />

whenever possible. CM is <strong>the</strong> only way <strong>to</strong> achieve a structured and<br />

disciplined approach <strong>to</strong> s<strong>of</strong>tware management, regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> TCB division/<br />

class. The situation is likely that some CM will be required in every program.<br />

The requirement extends <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> TCB s<strong>of</strong>tware by including a Statement <strong>of</strong> Work<br />

task. The Program Manager should also participate in <strong>the</strong> Configuration Control<br />

Board (CCB), which is <strong>the</strong> committee that reviews all changes <strong>to</strong> established<br />

baselines. Note that <strong>the</strong> documented procedures for control <strong>of</strong> changes do not<br />

need <strong>to</strong> be as extensive for <strong>the</strong> lower TCB division/classes (C1 through B1).<br />

Configuration control must extend <strong>to</strong> distribution, delivery, installation,<br />

Operation, and maintenance.<br />

3.3.3.5 AUDIT<br />

Auditing <strong>of</strong> security-relevant events is required for all TCB division/<br />

classes (C2 and above). The early identification <strong>of</strong> audit requirements and<br />

strategy is necessary <strong>to</strong> ensure that <strong>the</strong> accountability requirements are<br />

satisfied for <strong>the</strong> TCB division/class, and <strong>to</strong> ensure <strong>the</strong>y are included in <strong>the</strong><br />

TCB design. The NSA publication NCSC-TG-001,"A <strong>Guide</strong> To Understanding Audit In<br />

<strong>Trusted</strong> <strong>Systems</strong>," describes <strong>the</strong> specific audit requirements for each TCB<br />

division/class, including <strong>the</strong> events that must be audited and <strong>the</strong> specific<br />

information that must be recorded.<br />

3.3.3.6 PASSWORD GENERATION AND MANAGEMENT<br />

One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> major requirements <strong>of</strong> all TCB division/classes is accountability.<br />

The CSC-STD-002-85, "DoD Password Management <strong>Guide</strong>line," and NCSC-TG-017, "A<br />

<strong>Guide</strong> <strong>to</strong> Understanding Identification and Au<strong>the</strong>ntication," provide sound<br />

practices that will help satisfy <strong>the</strong> accountability requirement. Ensure<br />

accountability is included in all AIS RFP requirements. Also ensure <strong>the</strong><br />

information provided in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Trusted</strong> Facility Manual and Security Features<br />

User's <strong>Guide</strong> is consistent with <strong>the</strong> principles in this guideline.<br />

3.3.3.7 TCB IMPLEMENTATION CORRESPONDENCE<br />

The process <strong>of</strong> assuring that <strong>the</strong> TCB is "properly done" is called<br />

"correspondence." The technique used is <strong>to</strong> map <strong>the</strong> TCB design back <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

security policy model at <strong>the</strong> B1 and above levels. In addition, <strong>the</strong> TCB Class<br />

A1 requirement calls for mapping <strong>the</strong> TCB design down <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> TCB source code.<br />

3.3.4 CLASSIFIED SOFTWARE<br />

If any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> s<strong>of</strong>tware being developed is classified, be sure <strong>to</strong> check Block<br />

11c, Receipt and Generation <strong>of</strong> Classified Documents and O<strong>the</strong>r Material, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

DD Form 254, Contract Security Classification Specification. <strong>Trusted</strong><br />

<strong>Page</strong> 44

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