Ethiopia - OCHANet

3.2.5 Resource mobilisation
112. Almost one third of $822 million raised in 2011
(the second largest total in the last decade) 42 came
in March. This compares to resources raised predominantly
in July and August for Somalia and Kenya.
113. This was an undoubted success for the system
and only tells part of the story since PSNP (for example)
does not feature in the humanitarian envelope
and food aid requirements are calculated months
in advance of delivery.
114. In responses to this evaluation there was
a strong consensus that donors had been both
fast and innovative in their response to the Ethiopia
emergency in 2011. USAID, the largest donor, has
supported some two thirds of the food needs
in recent years, by far the largest humanitarian
resource input.
Fig 12: humanitarian funding to Ethiopia
115. This, and USAID’s careful planning, is hugely
significant since they do not need to wait for
an ‘official’ signal to respond, but can anticipate
and to some degree pre-empt need. This was
also the case with the second largest donor, UK
Department for International Development (DFID),
who contributed to the Humanitarian Response
Fund (HRF) in January and are a major supporter
of the PSNP.
116. While initial funding might have been early in approval, it is also the case the major tranches
were released only with the revised HRD in July 2011 together with international media interest in the
famine and Somalia and the refugees from that crisis. Some donors found it difficult to commit large
amounts of funding in the absence of an appeal. DFID made a major contribution to WFP in July,
allowing them to use their forward purchase facility and arguably safeguard the food aid pipeline.
117. Inevitably some sectors were better funded than others. Food was well funded, as was nutrition
and water. Other sectors, such as help for livestock and livelihoods, were not as well funded
despite these being people’s number one concern in interviews for this evaluation, especially
in pastoral areas. This leads to the perennial discussion around value for money and the efficacy
of early intervention. Whilst evidence is notoriously difficult to secure for comparing methods
of intervention, it is interesting to note the cost of the PSNP against the cost of the emergency
operation in 2011 (US $270m for 7.2m people vs US $822m for 5m people).
42 Only 2008 had been larger, at US $1.2bn, and this was before the PSNP had gone to scale.
36