November 2012 - Indian Airforce

Continued from page 13
maintaining training frequency at that time?
The Recovery Director who cleared the
different heights, started losing SA when the
formation changed over to training frequency
and it emerged that the route being followed by
the formation varied from the flight plan available
with the SU.
The RD did not inform GCA that the formation
was maintaining higher height and was on the
training frequency (not in contact with SU).
The RD did not react despite convergence
of the 5 tracks (four military & one civil) which
could be seen on the scope. At least at this stage
the GCA controller should have been cautioned
about the heights being maintained by the
formation. She had got engrossed in handling
other local flying.
The GCA controller also had the five tracks
converging on his scope. The civil ac was in RT
contact with him. He too did not react.
The formation did not give ‘Ops Normal’ call
at the stipulated intervals (which could have
brought them in contact with the RD) and instead
continued maintaining training frequency.
Lessons Learnt
There are valuable lessons to be learnt by all
involved to prevent a similar incident in future.
Some of these are:
Training. All mistakes committed in the
incident are old and relate to training of all
functionaries in the chain. Everybody’s training
failed and the day was saved by technology -
the Al Radar and TCAS worked. Things might
have been different if the fighters were without
transponder equipment or Al radar.
Aircrew. Sortie planning, profile changes
related to environment changes, SOP (ATS
crossing), avionics exploitation (one RT set on
listening watch, the other for training) etc - in the
hurry to get airborne; much was left unattended.
Launch Base. Training of ADSOs at Base
Ops Room, briefing of outstation crew, GCA
involvement, detailed scrutiny of detachment
flying programme etc; launch bases need to be
serious about these, for these are known areas
where communication ‘gaps’ take place - and
here too they did.
SU. Training of RD and ADSOs, how to
maintain SA being the agency equipped with the
largest picture, how/when to raise alarm and ask
for more help etc.
Policy. Is there a requirement for a separate
control (of civil traffic) with the SU, like the ‘alpha’
control in some sectors, now that the civil traffic
has increased, sortie profiles of fighter ac have
become complicated and cover larger areas?
Unified control will also help M&l functions at the
SU.
Conclusion
The incident, without causing anybody any
harm, brought out many lessons for all agencies
conducting/supporting flying operations.
Providence brought these lessons to this unit
on its first working day (probably the first detail)
and set us off in the right direction. Care needs
to be taken to ensure that the lessons are revised
periodically and our guard remains up, to prevent
any such incident in future.
- Gp Capt KVS Nair
INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 N o v e m b e r Aerospace Safety 17