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Magellan Final Report - Office of Science - U.S. Department of Energy

Magellan Final Report - Office of Science - U.S. Department of Energy

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<strong>Magellan</strong> <strong>Final</strong> <strong>Report</strong><br />

The set <strong>of</strong> controls set out in the FedRAMP document are designated for low and medium baselines. For<br />

the current control baseline, we have a low impact cloud system. Since the focus <strong>of</strong> the FedRAMP document<br />

was on consumers <strong>of</strong> cloud resources rather than producers, we needed to digest the contents <strong>of</strong> the document<br />

from an alternate perspective. As well, since institutional responses to individual control entities are driven<br />

by local requirements, needs, and philosophy, any sort <strong>of</strong> detailed response is well outside the scope <strong>of</strong> this<br />

document. However, at a minimum, the following steps should be taken.<br />

1. A “user” should be a uniquely identifiable entity (such as a user account) where a complete Access<br />

Control, Audit and Accountability process can take place, and who then is granted the right to launch<br />

a VM within their own system context.<br />

2. For pre-vetted instances (where the user is not granted root access), site security controls must be<br />

applied for sections Access Controls (AC), Audit and Accountability (AU), and Identification and<br />

Authentication (IA ) from the NIST 800-53 publication.<br />

3. For non-vetted images, or where the users will be granted root access, active scanning and analysis is<br />

required.<br />

In the same way that the technical aspects <strong>of</strong> computer security are evolving for cloud computing<br />

providers, identifying how this new technology will fit into the current sets <strong>of</strong> security controls remains<br />

an area for exploration.<br />

8.3 Recommended Further Work<br />

There are a number <strong>of</strong> areas that we feel should be addressed to advance the state <strong>of</strong> security on a cloudbased<br />

system like <strong>Magellan</strong>. While many tools and techniques used with typical large multiuser systems can<br />

be applied to cloud-based systems, these tools and techniques would evolve more rapidly through tighter<br />

integration into the cloud-stack s<strong>of</strong>tware.<br />

Further Security Control Automation. Some work was done during the project to integrate the cloud<br />

s<strong>of</strong>tware with automated security systems. Additional work is required in this area. With the dynamic nature<br />

<strong>of</strong> cloud systems, the security controls must evolve to be similarly dynamic and flexible. The integration <strong>of</strong><br />

security policy tools directly into the cloud control s<strong>of</strong>tware would be ideal, as it would allow enforcement <strong>of</strong> a<br />

site’s security policies while the user worked instead <strong>of</strong> being applied after the fact by systems that monitor<br />

for changes. This would also enhance the responsiveness <strong>of</strong> the system. Security setting modifications<br />

could be requested by the user, checked against a site’s policies, and implemented or denied, all in a single<br />

integrated operation.<br />

Enhanced Forensic Capabilities. Due to the ephemeral nature <strong>of</strong> cloud resources, performing forensic<br />

analysis on these virtualized systems is fraught with many challenges, both technical and legal. When<br />

there is a need to analyze a physical system involved in a security incident or crime, the system is usually<br />

taken into evidence. Its storage devices are copied and verified, and those files are then analyzed. The<br />

practice <strong>of</strong> computer forensics is well established, and evidence produced through this analysis is accepted<br />

in courts worldwide. Virtualized systems provide a new twist for computer investigators. Should the need<br />

arise to collect evidence from a virtualized system, the methods and practices are not as clear-cut. Can<br />

the investigator capture an image <strong>of</strong> the virtual disk associated with a given resource, or must they analyze<br />

the physical hardware that underlies the infrastructure Depending on the size <strong>of</strong> the cloud itself and the<br />

underlying s<strong>of</strong>tware, the answer to this question could have widespread effects on the cloud system. If a<br />

portion <strong>of</strong> the physical system must be removed for processing, the resources <strong>of</strong> the cloud could be diminished<br />

significantly. On the other hand, if an investigator captures and analyzes only the virtual disk associated<br />

with a given virtual system, will that satisfy the court Or will the opposing attorneys be able to raise<br />

enough doubt about the evidence in the judge or jury that it may be thrown out<br />

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