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Magellan Final Report - Office of Science - U.S. Department of Energy

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<strong>Magellan</strong> <strong>Final</strong> <strong>Report</strong><br />

Aside from legal questions, a survey <strong>of</strong> existing forensic tools for virtual systems should be made, and any<br />

gaps identified and plans made to address them. There may be some benefit to building forensic capture and<br />

analysis capabilities directly into the cloud s<strong>of</strong>tware. This could speed response time during an incident and<br />

also provide vendors in the computer forensic space a way to integrate their tools with the cloud s<strong>of</strong>tware.<br />

Improved Logging and Auditing Capabilities. A definite challenge the teams experienced while running<br />

the cloud testbeds was the lack <strong>of</strong> sufficiently detailed logs that could be used for auditing and reporting<br />

purposes. Calculating individual and project usage was difficult and required development <strong>of</strong> specialized tools<br />

to gather data from disparate sources and attempt to combine it to generate usage reports. This disjointed<br />

logging can also hamper security analysis and audits by needlessly complicating the required effort to review<br />

a system’s usage. It is our recommendation that some effort be made to consolidate and focus the log records<br />

<strong>of</strong> cloud systems to ensure they provide the necessary detail needed for not only troubleshooting but also<br />

regular auditing activities.<br />

Improved User Authentication and Role-Based Access Control. Depending on the s<strong>of</strong>tware used<br />

to implement a cloud system, there are varying degrees <strong>of</strong> role-based access control available. Eucalyptus<br />

had very limited options for user roles and resource allocation. OpenStack options for role-based access<br />

controls were more advanced, and there was even basic resource management available to prevent a small<br />

number <strong>of</strong> users from utilizing too many resources. In order to meet DOE requirements, these features<br />

would need to be greatly expanded and enhanced beyond their current state. The ability to define roles and<br />

even delegate role assignment to project leads could allow more flexibility for the system users while making<br />

sure that security policies were being met. By formalizing roles and building them into the cloud system,<br />

auditing users and access would be greatly simplified. The addition <strong>of</strong> a “billing system” that tracked usage<br />

<strong>of</strong> resources among different users and projects accurately and automatically could allow for more advanced<br />

scheduling <strong>of</strong> resources beyond the current simplistic model, where resources are either available immediately<br />

or not at all.<br />

User authentication also needs improvement. The current model <strong>of</strong> authenticating users via certificate<br />

is usable, but is inflexible, for instance, it does not provide a way to incorporate two-factor authentication.<br />

There are workarounds that can address this issue for systems that might require it today, but more integrated<br />

options should be explored in this space. Perhaps storing the cloud authentication certificates on smart cards<br />

could be a possible solution. The s<strong>of</strong>tware would need to be modified to make use <strong>of</strong> alternative authentication<br />

methods, and testing would show which methods are most effective and flexible for end users.<br />

Assessment <strong>of</strong> Public Cloud Infrastructures. As we have mentioned earlier, our work centered on<br />

evaluating operating a cloud computing infrastructure for scientific workloads. Our assumptions and conclusions<br />

should be considered in this context. While we did discuss public cloud infrastructures and how<br />

they compared to the <strong>Magellan</strong> cloud testbed, serious evaluation <strong>of</strong> those systems was not undertaken. Even<br />

though assessment <strong>of</strong> public cloud infrastructures was not in the scope <strong>of</strong> this project, we believe they should<br />

be evaluated and compared to privately run cloud systems to better understand the costs and challenges<br />

associated with those types <strong>of</strong> systems.<br />

8.4 Summary<br />

Securing a cloud system has many parallels to securing large multi-user clusters. Of course there are some<br />

unique challenges, but our experiences suggest that these could be met if significant effort were spent on<br />

the system design, enhancing the existing tools, and building some key capabilities that do not exist today.<br />

Our work indicates that the risks <strong>of</strong> allowing users full reign over their virtual machines is not as onerous a<br />

problem as it first appears. Much <strong>of</strong> the risk involves user error, which might be mitigated by introducing<br />

a high-quality user interface that simplifies management tasks. Overall, the cloud systems we worked with<br />

did not reveal any security hurdles that were considered intractable.<br />

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