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12Facilitating Ongoing Civil Justice Review and Reform

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In Harris v Caladine <strong>Justice</strong> Toohey noted that:<br />

Jurisdiction is the authority which a court has to decide the range of matters that can<br />

be litigated before it; in the exercise of that jurisdiction a court has powers expressly<br />

or impliedly conferred by the legislation governing the court <strong>and</strong> ‘such powers as are<br />

incidental <strong>and</strong> necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction or the powers so conferred’ 20<br />

Challenges to the rule-making power<br />

In Ousley v R the High Court had occasion to consider the general principles of the rule-making power<br />

in the context of a challenge to a Victorian rule prescribing the form of warrants. 21 <strong>Justice</strong> McHugh<br />

summarised the principles as follows: 22<br />

A rule made under rule-making powers is invalid if it is ’altogether outside the province’ 23<br />

of the court as a rule-making authority or is ’patently or absurdly irrelevant’ 24 to the rulemaking<br />

power. In less extreme cases, a rule will be invalid where it is not ‘capable of being<br />

considered to be reasonably proportionate to the pursuit of the enabling purpose’. 25 In<br />

Williams v Melbourne Corp, 26 Dixon J expressed the test for invalidity as being whether<br />

the rule goes ’beyond any restraint which could be reasonably adopted‘ for the prescribed<br />

purpose.<br />

Section 25(1)(f)(i) of the Supreme Court Act <strong>and</strong> s 50 of the Interpretation Act enable<br />

bodies such as the Supreme Court of Victoria to ensure their efficient operation by<br />

providing means for the regulation of ’practice <strong>and</strong> procedure‘, a term which has been<br />

expressed to denote: 27<br />

the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from<br />

the law which gives or defines the right, <strong>and</strong> which by means of the proceeding<br />

the court is to administer the machinery as distinguished from its product.<br />

In Clel<strong>and</strong> v Boynes, 28 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia approved<br />

the following description of ’practice <strong>and</strong> procedure‘ given by Falconbridge in his work,<br />

Conflict of Laws: 29<br />

Broadly speaking, it is customary in the conflict of laws to characterise as<br />

procedural such matters as forms of action, parties to an action, venue, rules<br />

of practice <strong>and</strong> pleading, proof of facts, admissibility of evidence, rebuttable<br />

presumptions <strong>and</strong> burdens of proof; <strong>and</strong> it has been suggested that the line<br />

between substance <strong>and</strong> procedure should be drawn on the basis of the general<br />

distinction between procedural rules which concern methods of presenting to<br />

a court the operative facts upon which legal relations depend, <strong>and</strong> substantive<br />

rules which concern the legal effect of those facts after they have been<br />

established.<br />

The members of the High Court who considered the scope of the rule-making power found that<br />

section 25(1)(f) only authorises the court to make rules for judicial acts. As the issue of a warrant is<br />

an administrative act, section 25(1)(f) could not support the rule prescribing the form of the warrant.<br />

However, section 50 of the Interpretation of Legislation of Act ‘encompasses administrative as well as<br />

judicial functions’ <strong>and</strong> is ‘sufficient authority’ for the court to prescribe the form of the warrant. 30<br />

The scope of the Supreme Court’s rule-making power was further considered following the adoption<br />

of new class action procedures by that court in 1999. 31 The Supreme Court introduced rules mirroring<br />

the Federal Court’s class action procedures contained in the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).<br />

These class action procedures allowed the court to assess damages in the aggregate. The relevant<br />

provision 32 was challenged in Schutt Flying Academy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia (Ltd). A<br />

majority of the Court of Appeal held that the rules were valid <strong>and</strong> could have been made pursuant to<br />

section 25(1)(a) (which empowers the court to make rules with respect to any matter dealt with in any<br />

rules of court in force on 1 January 1987), or the more general provision, section 25(1)(f)(i).<br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Ormiston (with whom <strong>Justice</strong>s Phillips <strong>and</strong> Charles agreed) characterised the rules in dispute as<br />

‘rules of practice <strong>and</strong> procedure’, that is, ‘they prescribe the mode of proceeding by which a legal right<br />

is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines the right’. <strong>Justice</strong> Ormiston found<br />

that the new rules did not alter recognised existing legal principles, <strong>and</strong> further, any calculation of<br />

damages would not amount to a substantive alteration of the law.<br />

8 Supreme Court Act 1986 s 28, County<br />

Court Act 1958 s 87, Magistrates<br />

Court Act 1989 s 15.<br />

9 Supreme Court of Victoria, Annual<br />

Report 2004–05 (2006) 29; County<br />

Court of Victoria, Annual Report<br />

2005–06 (2007) 20, Magistrates’<br />

Court of Victoria, Annual Report<br />

2005–2006 (2007)16–17.<br />

10 See Supreme Court (2006) above n 9;<br />

Magistrates’ Court (2007) above n 9.<br />

11 Magistrates’ Court (2007) above n 9;<br />

<strong>and</strong> submission CP 55 (Magistrates’<br />

Court of Victoria).<br />

12 Submission CP 58 (Supreme Court of<br />

Victoria).<br />

13 Supreme Court Act 1986 s 27,<br />

Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 s 16(2).<br />

14 Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 s 13.<br />

15 Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 ss<br />

17, 15.<br />

16 Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 s 21.<br />

17 Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 s 26.<br />

18 Gittins v WHC Stacy <strong>and</strong> Son (1964) 82<br />

WN Pt 1 (NSW) 157.<br />

19 Australian Securities <strong>and</strong> Investments<br />

Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty<br />

Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559, 590 [64]<br />

(Gleeson CJ, Gaudron <strong>and</strong> Gummow<br />

JJ); Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR<br />

84, 136 (Toohey J). See also Batistatos<br />

v Roads <strong>and</strong> Traffic Authority of New<br />

South Wales (2006) 227 ALR 425<br />

[5} (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne<br />

<strong>and</strong> Crennan JJ). In that case the<br />

court noted that the phrase ‘inherent<br />

jurisdiction’ is a slippery one [5]. The<br />

case concerned abuse of process <strong>and</strong><br />

the ‘inherent jurisdiction’ of superior<br />

courts to stay proceedings.<br />

20 Australian Securities <strong>and</strong> Investments<br />

Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty<br />

Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559, 590 [64]<br />

(Gleeson CJ, Gaudron <strong>and</strong> Gummow<br />

JJ) quoting Parsons v Martin (1984) 5<br />

FCR 235, 241.<br />

21 Ousley v R (1997) 148 ALR 510.<br />

22 Ousley v R (1997) 148 ALR 510,<br />

542–3.<br />

23 Lynch v Brisbane City Council (1961)<br />

104 CLR 353, 365.<br />

24 Foster v Aloni [1951] VLR 481, 484.<br />

See also State Bank (SA) v Hellaby<br />

(1992) 59 SASR 304, 309.<br />

25 South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166<br />

CLR 161, 165.<br />

26 (1933) 49 CLR 142, 156.<br />

27 Poyser v Minors (1881) 7 QBD 329,<br />

333 (Lush LJ). See also Adam P<br />

Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip<br />

Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170,<br />

176–7; Commonwealth v Hospital<br />

Contribution Fund (1982) 150 CLR 49,<br />

75.<br />

28 (1978) 19 SASR 464.<br />

29 (1978) 19 SASR 464, 470.<br />

30 Ousley v R (1997) 192 CLR 69, 518<br />

(Toohey J), <strong>and</strong> 549 (Gummow J).<br />

31 Schutt Flying Academy (Australia) Pty<br />

Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia (Ltd) (2000) 1<br />

VR 545.<br />

32 O 18A. The provision allowing the court<br />

to award damages in an aggregate<br />

amount was based on s 33Z of the<br />

Federal Court Act 1976. This is now<br />

dealt with by s 33Z Supreme Court<br />

Act 1986. See Peter Cashman, Class<br />

Action Law <strong>and</strong> Practice (2007) 30–3.<br />

699

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