Russia's impact on global security: Russia's arms trade ... - Saferworld

Proposed areas of inquiry for Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry
Russia’s <strong>impact</strong> on global security: Russia’s arms trade
A. Summary
1. This briefing draws on a recent Saferworld report on small arms proliferation,
transparency and implementing responsible arms export controls in Russia
(1). The report is intended to help spark debate and further research on small
arms in Russia, but also raises concerns relevant for this inquiry, including the
export of Russian small arms and light weapons (SALW) to Algeria, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, India, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen as part of an effort to expand
<strong>Russia's</strong> export markets in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America.
2. Russia is the second largest arms producer and exporter in the world. It is
also one of the world's largest SALW producers and one of the most active
countries on the world SALW market. It continues to export a broad range of
SALW types and models. Increases in Russia’s military and internal security
budgets and spending could signal an increase in SALW production and trade.
3. There are major concerns about the quality and implementation of Russia’s
arms transfer controls. Russian Government does not apply criteria-based
approach in its decisions on licensing arms exports, such as that enshrined in
the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. There are concerns that human
rights and the humanitarian situation in recipient countries are not given
priority in licensing exports, despite Russia’s existing obligations under
international law (including international treaties) and commitments to a
variety of international, multilateral and regional initiatives.
4. Public information concerning Russian production and trade of armaments,
especially SALW, is also often difficult to obtain, inaccurate or shrouded in
excessive secrecy. The problem is compounded by the fact that the Russian
Government is subject to limited or no pressure from the general public, as
well as its own parliament, to become more ‘transparent.
5. The UK Government is one of the co-authors of the UN General Assembly
resolution on the international arms trade treaty (ATT). The resolution won
support from 153 UN member states. However, Russia was amongst 24
countries that abstained, so it will be important for the UK Government to
consider how to promote international arms controls and the ATT with Russia.

B. Key Questions for the Inquiry
• What efforts are underway to promote effective arms transfer
controls in Russia
• How can the UK Government support efforts towards greater
transparency and accountability of Russia’s arms trade
• What efforts have been made to engage Russian decision makers on
the benefits of increased public transparency, for example, through
the publication of detailed annual reports on arms exports
• What measures is the UK Government taking to encourage Russia to
support the ATT
C. The value of Russian small arms and light weapons
exports
6. Saferworld has collected a range of estimates for Russian SALW exports for
the period 2000–2005 from a number of reputable experts on Russian arms
exports. Based on these figures, Russian SALW exports are estimated to be
worth somewhere between US$60–200 million per year.
7. It is very difficult to discern SALW trade patterns from the very partial data
that is available in open source materials. However, using Rosoboronexport’s
official Russian arms export figures, and the assumption that Russian SALW
exports constitute somewhere between 2–5% of total arms exports, a range
of US$73–300 million per year has been calculated for average annual
Russian SALW exports for the period 2000–2005. However, these figures are
still very rough estimates as SALW exports may not constantly fall between
2–5 percent of all Russian conventional arms exports.
8. The publication of comprehensive, detailed and clearly structured information
on national arms exports controls is key to ensuring the highest possible
levels of transparency and accountability. Similarly to the practice of other
major arms manufacturing and exporting countries, Russia should produce
annual reports on its arms exports and imports, which, at a minimum, should
contain details of what arms and dual-use goods are exported and where to.
D. Small arms and light weapons exports: destinations
9. More important than the volume of Russian SALW production and exports is
the destination of those exports. While arms exports patterns have
traditionally been used to identify a particular country’s allies and enemies –
i.e. based upon to whom they will and will not sell – since the Yelsin era, it
has been assumed that the Russian Government has had few qualms about
selling arms to any state that seeks to purchase them, as long as they are not
subject to an UN arms embargo.
10. The Putin era has been characterised by attempts to reduce the number of, or
‘integrate,’ enterprises producing arms in Russia. There has also been a
reduction in the number of state enterprises that are legally permitted to
engage in the international trade in arms. From 1 March 2007,
Rosoboronexport is now the only company with the right to engage in foreign
trade of military goods.

11. Rosoboronexport has reportedly been providing credits to Russian defence
companies to enable them to begin production on export orders. For example,
one such company, Izhmash, required credit from Rosoboronexport to be able
to start serial production of AK assault rifles for a recent Venezuelan order.
Rosoboronexport officials also plays a key role in the marketing of Russian
arms to overseas clients by displaying their wares at a large number of
domestic and international arms fairs.
12. There are specific concerns about recent efforts by Rosoboronexport to
expand Russia’s export markets in a number of ‘unsafe’ destinations in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Moreover, Russian portable anti-tank
and surface-to-air missile systems and projectiles are reportedly being sought
by a large number of developing countries.
13. Some Russian analysts have acknowledged that several recipients of Russian
arms are regarded as ‘undesirable arms recipients’ in other parts of the world,
with Algeria, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen
recognised as significant but ‘awkward’ markets.
14. Saferworld’s recent research finds that established markets for major
conventional weapons systems, such as India, have purchased SALW from
other suppliers in recent years. However, Rosoboronexport has attempted to
seize a share of not only India’s SALW market, but also the broader South
East Asian market as a whole. LW transfers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand
and Vietnam have been recently reported.
15. Saferworld shares Amnesty International’s concern that Russia, a permanent
member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, has allegedly broken the
embargo on supply of arms to all parties in the conflict in Darfur. Amnesty
International’s recent report, Sudan: Arming the perpetrators of grave abuses
in Darfur (2), indicates that Russia is a major supplier of armaments to Sudan
and produced evidence that some of these weapons are being used in Darfur.
The Russian Government has however denied these allegations.
16. American and Israeli concerns have also been voiced on a number of
occasions with regard to Russian SALW transfers to Iran and Syria. Russian
SALW sales to Syria have been a particular cause of concern for these states,
due to suspicions that Syria is diverting arms to Hezbollah forces in Lebanon.
In 2005 and 2006, Israeli officials reportedly presented evidence that Russian
anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) had
been diverted from Syria to Hezbollah. The Russian Government’s October
2006 resolution on post-shipment verification, which requires a follow up
check by the exporter that the goods were received and used as intended in
the receiving country, is thought to have been directly linked to these
accusations.
E. Licensed production of Russian small arms and light
weapons
17. The legacy of Soviet technology transfers can still be seen in the large number
of former Warsaw Pact and developing countries that have production facilities
and assault rifle models that are merely copies of the AK assault rifle. Russia
has AK licensed production arrangements with Hungary, Israel, Turkey,
Kazakhstan, India and France and was in talks on licensed production

arrangements with China, Italy, the Czech Republic and a number of other
countries in 2006.
18. A licensed production agreement has also reportedly been concluded with
Myanmar, among others, though information surrounding such deals remains
difficult to obtain. It is also worth noting that there is reportedly a clause in
the contract for licensed production of AKs in Venezuela that explicitly calls for
Russian consent to be sought and successfully received before any
Venezuelan-produced AKs could be exported.
19. At the same time, Russia is a keen advocate of international arrangements,
controls and punishments for the unlicensed manufacture of arms, drawing
attention to the issue at various UN Programme of Action sessions and in
other international forums. However, as Saferworld’s report highlights, there
is mostly likely an economic rationale behind the Russian calls for stricter
controls on unlicensed production rather than motivations relating to the
spread of armaments worldwide (3).
20. The fact that more and more countries, including Russia, are increasingly
transferring technology, through licensed production or other arrangements,
to third countries, which often don't have very high standards of arms transfer
controls, shows that there is an increased global spread of armaments that
requires global control standards. If a country cannot guarantee compliance
with those standards, a licensed production deal to that country should never
be authorised. The ATT seeks to establish a set of legally-binding international
principles to govern this trade and curb the irresponsible transfer of weapons
and ammunition that serve to prolong and exacerbate violent conflict and
human rights violations, undermining development prospects.
F. Russia and the arms trade treaty
21. Russia is sceptical about the future of the ATT initiative and has on numerous
occasions cited, amongst others, a lack of information by governments
sponsoring the ATT initiative, procedural reasons, the hasty pace of the
process, and the challenges of fully implementing, monitoring and enforcing
such a Treaty for its decision to abstain during the UN vote. However,
Russian officials have also described Russia’s abstention from the UN vote as
a “positive signal” of Russia’s willingness to have a dialogue on the issue.
G. Conclusions
22. In democratic societies, transparency in governmental policies and practice is
a key feature for ensuring public oversight and government accountability.
This is particularly important in a sensitive area such as production and trade
in arms, where the country’s international image and reputation – as a
responsible arms producer and exporter – is at stake.
23. Greater transparency and openness in this sphere would give Russia
additional credit as a new democracy, increasingly bringing its practices into
line with those of its international peers. To this end, a number of
transparency measures have been identified that could assist Russian
policymakers and expert communities to carry out well-informed analyses of
the state of the Russian SALW industry, trade and potential markets, and also
demonstrate that Russia is an open and responsible arms supplier.

24. These include de-classifying enterprise data on SALW employment, profit,
sales and export figures; ensuring Russian SALW-producing enterprises
regularly publish comparable sets of data on sales, exports and customers and
providing the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database and the UN Register of
Conventional Arms with full, accurate and timely data on SALW transfers. In
addition, Russia should be encouraged to publish a regular report on the
value, volume and recipients of Russian conventional arms transfers, including
SALW.
25. Russia’s role as a leading arms exporter and international power means that
its support for improved common international standards in arms trade is
essential. Saferworld calls on the UK Government to work together with other
EU Governments to engage Russia in the process of setting and implementing
these international standards. As part of these efforts, the UK Government
should encourage and facilitate Russia’s participation in multilateral
discussions around the international ATT. There is scope and indeed a need to
intensify policy dialogue and information exchange on the ATT with Russia as
the country’s position will remain a strong factor in future developments of
the initiative.
ENDS
For further information, please contact:
Daniel Tyler, Advocacy and Policy Officer, Saferworld
Tel: +44 (0)207 324 4671; Mobile: +44 (0) 77066 526 748
(1) Small arms production in Russia, Saferworld, March 2007.
(2) Sudan: Arming the perpetrators of grave abuses in Darfur, Amnesty
International, May 2007.
(3) Small arms production in Russia, Saferworld, March 2007, p.39.
April 2007
Saferworld – 28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, UK | Registered Charity no
1043843 | Company limited by guarantee no 3015948 | Tel: +44 (0)20 7324 4646 |
Fax: +44 (0)20 7324 4647 | Email: general@saferworld.org.uk |
Web: www.saferworld.org.uk