June 2012 - Indian Airforce

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well and he decided to clear the pilot for direct live, without the mandatory Safety Height Run first. Also, he did not establish visual contact with the aircraft anywhere on the circuit. This should have woken him up but events that had been set in motion probably were too fast for him to evoke a rational action. Even when the pilot called out that he was now rolling in live, the RSO did not react. A confident call, “You are clear live”, was ground. I, as the Flight Commander of the unit got an unwelcome call from the COO and he wanted to know whether any of our aircraft was still operating over the range. His very tone suggested that something was drastically wrong and soon the AOC and the COO descended on the dett. To everyone’s horror, it was quite obvious that a fighter had just dropped two live bombs bang in the middle of the army all that he transmitted. The next call from the pilot announced, “Bombs Gone, Switches Safe, returning to base”. But even after a minute, the RSO had not spotted any bomb impact on the Live Bombing Target (LBT) or anywhere in the range area. The natural thing then was to put down the binoculars and call up the pilot to cross check if bombs had indeed been released. On being confirmed in the positive, the RSO responded by transmitting, “Bombs not sighted, probably gross undershoot. You are clear to change over to the SU”. The range was closed thereafter and the pilot navigated safely back to his base, basking in the belief that the mission had finally been accomplished. The mission in fact had gone wrong completely. Things seemed to have settled down to routine for the pilot but all was not well on the ranges and naturally, the guys in the OG were furious. Fortunately, no one was hurt and there was no damage to any vehicle or structure. The next dignitary to arrive in the unit was the Air I from the Command Headquarters and I was told to get busy writing an Executive Report on the pilot. His fighter flying days were over, all because of one avoidable mistake that he failed to correct on time. It would be worth pondering over the following : The location of this particular range is such that many times picking up targets is difficult. The navigation to the range therefore has to be taken very seriously. In fact, the navigation to any destination has to be taken very seriously. Odd instances of inaccuracies 4 Aerospace Safety J u n e 2 0 1 2 INDIAN AIR FORCE
creeping in are understandable... but think...was there an excuse for the pilot not being able to find the range in broad daylight Fuel considerations notwithstanding, permission to go in for direct live for aircraft operating alone, must be granted only under exceptional and pre-briefed circumstances. What such exceptional circumstance are, need to be spelt out unambiguously and briefed properly. Since the LBT at this range or for that matter at any other heavy armament range would generally be obscured because of weapons used earlier, be aware of the other features on and around the range to help you identify the targets correctly. Once the decision to abort the mission had been taken, suddenly reverting and seeking permission for direct live was certainly not in order. The pilot was probably not comfortable with the idea of landing with two bombs under slung. Operating manuals do permit landing under such configuration, but don’t you think all operators should be aware of this Should the RSO have cleared the pilot for a direct live attack without the Safety Height Run Again a matter of practice but the pitfalls of doing so must be understood. Now for a dive bomb attack, there is no way that an aircraft in dive will not be visible to the RSO. Surely, if the visibility is that bad, won’t the better option be to close the range Having cornered the RSO into clearing him for a direct live attack, how about the pilot confirming with other features around, what he believed to be the LBT and that he indeed was going in for the correct target. During the entire episode, the RSO did not spot the aircraft. Worse still, he did not even hear it. Should this have forced him to do something other than what he eventually did The RSO did not intervene even when the aircraft confirmed rolling in live and he was yet to establish visual contact. He simply assumed that the pilot eventually had things under control and was going in for the correct target. The pilot too assumed the same and pressed on with the attack. Remember the old adage, ‘DO NOT ASSUME. It makes an ASS out of U and ME’. In this case, it certainly did and consequences could have been worse. Getting ‘Bombs Away’ is the sole desired culmination in such a live firing mission but please be sure, the bombs are aimed at the desired target and nowhere else. Live bombs are dangerous instruments with considerable destructive power. Therefore there can be no complacency in the manner they are released. When in doubt ... DO NOT PRESS THE TRIGGER. A large number of seemingly weird incidents happen at firing ranges everywhere. Some result in very unpleasant consequences for players involved and many times even for those who are caught unaware on the ground, for no fault of theirs. Sharing your experiences with the environment can certainly increase awareness and minimise chances of recurrence of such avoidable incidents. If you are in agreement with this, then please do get in touch with the ‘editor’ with your story without any delay as it is quite likely that someone else could enact something close to what you did and you could help him avert the same ! - Gp Capt (Retd) Rajesh Kumar Editor’s Comments : Inability to spot the range is a situation that many aircrew would have experienced. However, the lesson for all is to avoid the compulsion to believe that everything is fine, when it actually isn’t. Every tale may not have a happy ending! INDIAN AIR FORCE 2 0 1 2 J u n e Aerospace Safety 5
Page 4 and 5: Gp Capt (Retd) Rajesh Kumar 2 Aeros
Page 8 and 9: Wg Cdr Juhi Borgohain 6 Aerospace S
Page 10 and 11: World Health Organisation The WHO e
Page 12 and 13: Sqn Ldr R Kadyan Since the dawn of
Page 14 and 15: Sqn Ldr Binu Venugopal 12 Aerospace
Page 16 and 17: At present on our couriers flying o
Page 18 and 19: Flt Lt UB Singh 16 Aerospace Safety
Page 20 and 21: Flt Lt K Sharma Lessons Learnt in F
Page 22 and 23: Sqn Ldr NK Rath 20 Aerospace Safety
Page 24 and 25: Flt Lt Anoop SL 22 Aerospace Safety
Page 26 and 27: Sqn Ldr Vikram Chhibber It was Oct
Page 28 and 29: further enhancing the jovial atmosp
Page 30 and 31: Cdr Sunil Chungath Somebody asked m
Page 32 and 33: On 28 Oct 11, 786517-A Cpl P R Deor
Page 34 and 35: On 16 Nov 11, 913796-F Cpl TB Sriva
Page 36: 36 Aerospace Safety J u n e 2 0 1 2

June 2012 - Indian Airforce

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