Interview with David Baltimore - Caltech Oral Histories
Interview with David Baltimore - Caltech Oral Histories
Interview with David Baltimore - Caltech Oral Histories
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<strong>Baltimore</strong>-49<br />
BALTIMORE: Or maybe you could guess the consequences, and they were. I mean, for instance,<br />
putting an antibiotic-resistance gene into a pathogenic bacterium so that it would resist antibiotic<br />
treatment. That’s an obviously disastrous thing to do, and that’s the kind of thing that became<br />
doable. And then there were all of the fantasy things that might happen, because once you sort<br />
of let loose— We didn’t have any real experience <strong>with</strong> what these chimeric molecules could do,<br />
so anybody’s imagination was as good as everybody else’s imagination. And so they all began<br />
imagining strange and disastrous scenarios—autoimmune diseases—and you just name it, it was<br />
suggested. But I get ahead of the story. So, in ’73, the Gordon conference participants, many of<br />
them, wrote a letter to the National Academy of Sciences saying, “This is a wonderful new<br />
technology. It’s going to revolutionize biology. But we see a potential for danger here, and we<br />
think that there ought to be serious consideration of how to move forward <strong>with</strong> this technology.<br />
It shouldn’t just happen.”<br />
LIPPINCOTT: They wanted rules<br />
BALTIMORE: Well, if I remember correctly, it was pretty vague. Maxine Singer, one of the<br />
organizers of the Asilomar conference, was an old friend—she’s actually a Swarthmore graduate,<br />
although older than I am. She and Dieter Söll were the two co-chairs of that Gordon conference.<br />
They signed the letter to the National Academy. She contacted Paul Berg, who was her good<br />
friend—I don’t think he was at that meeting—and said, “We’ve got to do something to respond<br />
to this.” Now, Paul and I and others had been involved in an earlier Asilomar meeting, because<br />
there had been a similar kind of issue, around the safety of virus work; so we had held a meeting<br />
at Asilomar to talk about the safety of, particularly, cancer viruses and work on SV40. But that<br />
meeting was totally focused on lab-safety issues—whether you could get cancer in the lab and<br />
things of that sort. So there was a precedent. So they got in touch <strong>with</strong> me, and I said yes, I<br />
thought this was a real issue—I didn’t know anything about it. So I invited them and some other<br />
people, including Jim Watson, to come to a meeting at the cancer center at MIT—<br />
LIPPINCOTT: And this was ’74<br />
BALTIMORE: This was in April ’74. So they all came, and we agreed that we would publish a<br />
public letter saying, first of all, there should be a moratorium on certain kinds of experiments.