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57<br />

<strong>ALI</strong>-<strong>ABA</strong> <strong>Course</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Study</strong><br />

<strong>Commercial</strong> <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> <strong>Defaults</strong>, Workouts & Reorganizations<br />

April 20 - 22, 2006<br />

Hilton Head Island, South Carolina<br />

<strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> <strong>Defaults</strong> Investigation Check List and Issue Summary<br />

for Lender's Counsel (Annotated)<br />

By<br />

Marvin Garfinkel<br />

Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen LLP<br />

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania<br />

Updated by<br />

Diana C. Liu<br />

Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen LLP<br />

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania<br />

© Copyright 1996 - 2002 Marvin Garfinkel. All rights reserved.


58<br />

REAL ESTATE DEFAULTS<br />

INVESTIGATION CHECK LIST AND<br />

ISSUE SUMMARY FOR LENDER'S COUNSEL (ANNOTATED) 1<br />

TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />

PAGE<br />

0.0...................................................................................................................Immediate Attention<br />

0.1 Collateral<br />

0.1.1 Primary Collateral<br />

0.1.2 Ancillary Collateral<br />

0.2 Conflicts Issues<br />

0.3 Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit<br />

0.4 Guarantees - Third Party Liability<br />

0.5 Notice Requirements<br />

0.6 File Assembly<br />

0.7 Environmental Risks<br />

0.8 Rent Assignment - Tenant Issues<br />

0.9 Information To Be Requested from Borrower<br />

0.10 Personal Liability<br />

0.11 Estoppel - Nondisturbance & Attornment<br />

0.12 Related Projects<br />

0.13 Lender's Past Experience with Borrower<br />

0.14 Participation Issues<br />

0.15 Existence <strong>of</strong> Default<br />

0.16 Wrap-Around Mortgages - Calculation <strong>of</strong> Deficiency<br />

0.17 Debt Assignment Notice<br />

0.18 Interim Advances from the Mortgage Lender<br />

0.19 Mortgagee in Possession and Receivership Issues<br />

0.20 Escrows<br />

0.21 Transfer Taxes on Foreclosure<br />

1.0 Parties<br />

1.1 Owner <strong>of</strong> Property<br />

1.2 Secured Creditors<br />

1.3 Unsecured Creditors<br />

1.4 Recorded and Potential Mechanics' Lien Claims<br />

1 This checklist is regularly updated by the author Marvin Garfinkel to reflect his own experience and that <strong>of</strong> users <strong>of</strong><br />

this checklist. Comments are therefore solicited since this document is continuously being revised. At any time there<br />

may be incomplete references and footnotes, un<strong>of</strong>ficial citations that should be superseded with <strong>of</strong>ficial citations, etc.<br />

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1.5 Other Lenders and Participants<br />

1.6 Title Insurer<br />

1.7. Closing Attorneys<br />

1.8 Bonding Company<br />

1.9 Casualty and Property Loss Insurance Carriers <strong>of</strong> Borrower<br />

1.10 Tenants<br />

1.11 Guarantors<br />

1.12 Any F.D.I.C. or RTC<br />

1.13 Partners, Shareholders, Directors, and Officers <strong>of</strong> Owner<br />

1.13.1 Corporate Veil Piercing<br />

1.14 Lessors<br />

1.15 Appraisers<br />

2.0 Public Record Searches<br />

2.1 Title Reports and U.C.C. Searches<br />

2.2 Partnership and Other Entity Filings<br />

3.0 Document Assembly and Examination<br />

3.1 Mortgages, Deeds <strong>of</strong> Trust and Loan Agreements<br />

3.2 Notes and Other Evidences <strong>of</strong> Indebtedness<br />

3.3 Guarantees and Surety Documents<br />

3.4 Legal and Any Other Closing Opinions<br />

3.5 Closing Attorneys Summary <strong>of</strong> Transaction<br />

3.6 Construction Documents<br />

3.6.1 Cost To Complete Estimates<br />

3.6.2 Construction Quality<br />

3.6.3 Assignment <strong>of</strong> Construction Document<br />

3.6.4 Lien Priority Issues<br />

3.6.5 Claims to Unpaid Proceeds and Retainage Under Construction<br />

Contract<br />

3.7 Permits, Governmental Licenses and Approvals, Zoning, Subdivision,<br />

Environmental and Other Land Use Documentation.<br />

3.8 Title Insurance Policy and Marked Up Title Report or Commitment.<br />

3.8.1 Review<br />

3.8.2 Liability Theories<br />

3.8.3 Rights <strong>of</strong> Parties in Possession<br />

3.9 Leases and Lease Related Documents.<br />

3.9.1 Generally<br />

3.9.2 Application <strong>of</strong> Rents<br />

3.9.3 Sublease Issues<br />

3.9.4 Lease Assignment Issues.<br />

3.9.5 Collateral Rent Assignment<br />

3.10 Notice and Other Procedural Requirements<br />

3.11 Assembly <strong>of</strong> Client's Document<br />

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3.12 Partially or Wholly Unfunded Loan Commitments<br />

3.13 Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit.<br />

3.13.1 Considerations<br />

3.13.2 Non-Documentary Conditions<br />

3.13.3 Subrogation<br />

3.13.4 Independence Doctrine.<br />

3.13.5 Fraud in the Transaction<br />

3.13.6 Injunction Proceedings<br />

3.14 U.C.C. Security Documents, Perfection<br />

3.15 Jury Waiver Provisions<br />

3.16 Casualty and Liability Insurance Policies, Certificates, Mortgagee<br />

Endorsements<br />

3.17 Prior Workout, Interim Forbearance and Collateral Enhancement<br />

Arrangement Documents<br />

3.18 Subordination Agreements.<br />

3.19 Document Modification and Alteration<br />

4.0 Status <strong>of</strong> Property<br />

4.1 Physical Condition<br />

4.2 Property Income<br />

4.2.1 Leases<br />

4.2.2 Other Possible Sources <strong>of</strong> Income<br />

4.2.3 Security Deposits<br />

4.2.4 Earnest Money Deposits<br />

4.2.5 Limited Partners and Shareholders <strong>of</strong> Debtor Entity<br />

4.3 Costs and Expenses<br />

4.3.1 Operating Expenses<br />

4.3.2 Possible Third Party Claims<br />

4.3.3 Deferred Maintenance<br />

4.3.4 Major Repairs<br />

4.4 Project Valuation<br />

4.4.1 Review Closing Appraisal and Compare with Current<br />

or Recent Appraisal<br />

4.4.2 Review Original Market Analysis<br />

4.5 Construction Loan Evaluation<br />

4.6 Reciprocal Easement Agreements<br />

4.7 Environmental Concerns<br />

4.7.1 Contamination - Hazardous or Toxic Substances - Clean<br />

Up Liability - CIRCLA Issues<br />

4.7.2 Coastal Regulations<br />

4.7.3 Wetlands Issues<br />

4.7.4 Asbestos<br />

4.7.5 Lender's Right to Enter Upon Property and Conduct<br />

Tests<br />

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5.0..........................................................................................................Review <strong>of</strong> Applicable Law<br />

5.1 <strong>Real</strong>ization Procedures<br />

5.2 Right <strong>of</strong> Redemption and Deficiency Judgment Limitations<br />

5.3 Yield Maintenance Provisions, Prepayment Charles, Default Interest<br />

and Liquidated Damages<br />

5.4 Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA")<br />

5.5 Statutes Limiting Alleged Oral Modification <strong>of</strong> Loan Commitment<br />

5.6 Multi-State Collateral<br />

5.7 Partnership Issues<br />

5.7.1 Direct Action by Creditor Against General Partners<br />

5.8 Additional Advances to Protect Collateral<br />

5.9 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.<br />

5.10 Right to Financial Privacy Act<br />

5.11 Drug Forfeiture Laws<br />

5.12 Foreclosing Partnership Interests<br />

5.13 D'Oench Duhne, Langley, Federal Holder in Due <strong>Course</strong> Doctrine<br />

5.14 Waiver<br />

5.15 Lien Priority Issues<br />

5.15.1 Future Advances<br />

5.15.2 Equitable Subordination<br />

5.15.3 Erroneous Pay<strong>of</strong>fs <strong>of</strong> Prior Lien<br />

5.15.4 Revival <strong>of</strong> Junior Liens<br />

5.15.5 Purchase Money Mortgage States<br />

5.16 Jury Trial Waivers<br />

5.17 Choice <strong>of</strong> Forum and <strong>of</strong> Law Provisions <strong>of</strong> Loan Documents<br />

5.18 Participation in Co-Lending Arrangements<br />

5.18.1 Lead Lender's Standard <strong>of</strong> Care<br />

5.18.2 Implied Covenant <strong>of</strong> Good Faith and Fair Dealing<br />

5.18.3 Conflict <strong>of</strong> Interest<br />

5.18.4 Applicability <strong>of</strong> Security Laws<br />

5.19 Clogging Equity <strong>of</strong> Redemption -- Equitable Mortgages<br />

5.20 Rent Assignments.<br />

5.21 FIRREA Claim Procedure<br />

5.22 Amount Due Issues<br />

5.22.1 Late Charges<br />

5.22.2 Prepayment Premium<br />

5.23 Marshalling<br />

5.24 "Fixtures" v. Personalty<br />

5.25 Waste<br />

5.26 Fraudulent Transfers<br />

5.26.1 "Upstream" and "Cross-Stream" Financing<br />

5.26.2 Collapsing a Transaction<br />

5.26.3 The Granting <strong>of</strong> a Lien for an Antecedent Debt May be a<br />

Fraudulent Transfer<br />

5.27 Recharacterization<br />

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5.28 Default Interest<br />

5.29 Unconscionability<br />

6.0 Deficiencies in Documentation<br />

7.0.....................................Lender Liability Claims, Statutory, Public Policy and Other Issues<br />

7.1 Theories <strong>of</strong> Lender Liability<br />

7.1.1 Contractual Rights <strong>of</strong> Borrower - Loan Commitments<br />

7.1.2 Negligent Misrepresentation<br />

7.1.3 Duress. Business Compulsion<br />

7.1.4 Breach <strong>of</strong> Implied Covenant <strong>of</strong> Good Faith and Fair<br />

Dealing<br />

7.1.5 Recharacterization <strong>of</strong> Transaction<br />

7.1.6 Fraud and False Lender Representations<br />

7.1.7 Regulatory or Statutory Violations by Lender<br />

7.1.8 Damage to Borrower During Period <strong>of</strong> Control <strong>of</strong><br />

Borrower by Lender<br />

7.1.9 Collateral Inducements and Undertakings<br />

7.1.10 Prima Facie Tort<br />

7.1.11 Negligent Loan Administration<br />

7.1.12 Tortious Interference with Contact or Prospective<br />

Economic Advantage<br />

7.1.13 Breach <strong>of</strong> Oral Commitment To Lend or To Forestall<br />

Resort to Default Remedies<br />

7.1.14 Breach <strong>of</strong> Fiduciary Duty<br />

7.1.15 Unjust Enrichment<br />

7.1.16 Loan Prohibited by Borrower's Partnership or<br />

Corporate Governing Documents<br />

7.1.17 "Demand" Instrument Containing Acceleration<br />

Provisions<br />

7.3 Review <strong>of</strong> Lender's Files, Memoranda and Correspondence<br />

7.4 Alleged <strong>Course</strong> <strong>of</strong> Dealing Modifications<br />

7.5 Breach <strong>of</strong> an Oral Commitment<br />

7.6 Fraudulent Transfers<br />

7.7 Usury<br />

7.8 Personal Exemptions<br />

7.9 Waiver as Defense to Lender Liability Claims<br />

7.10 Lender Liability Claim Defenses<br />

7.10.1 Borrower's Breach <strong>of</strong> Implied Promise Not to Make<br />

Lender Liability Claim in Bad Faith<br />

7.11 Arbitration Provisions<br />

7.12 Jury Trial Waivers<br />

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8.0 Relevant Bankruptcy Considerations<br />

8.1 Recharacterization<br />

8.1.1 Purported Leases<br />

8.1.2 Purported Financing Arrangement<br />

8.1.3 Title Insurance<br />

8.2 Rent Assignment<br />

8.3 Preferences<br />

8.3.1 Generally<br />

8.3.2 Triangular Preference - DePrizio - Reversed by 1994<br />

Act<br />

8.3.3 Standing<br />

8.3.4 Payment to Unperfected Secured Creditor<br />

8.4 Stays<br />

8.5 Reciprocal Easement Agreements<br />

8.6 Fraudulent Transfer Issues<br />

8.7 Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> Bankruptcy Oriented Prepetition Workout<br />

Agreements by Debtor<br />

8.8 Plan Approval, "Cram-Down" Possibility, Absolute Priority Rule,<br />

New Value Exception<br />

8.8.1 Undersecured Lender<br />

8.8.2 Requirements<br />

8.8.3 "Artificial Impairment\<br />

8.8.4 Purchase <strong>of</strong> Trade Claims by Secured Creditor<br />

8.9 Collection <strong>of</strong> Interest, Costs and Fees by Secured Creditor<br />

8.9.1 §502(b)(2) Unmatured Interest<br />

8.9.2 506(b) Fees and Costs <strong>of</strong> Collection (State v. Federal Standard)<br />

8.10 "Pre-Bankruptcy Planning" By Debtor<br />

8.10.1 Foreign Situs Trusts<br />

8.11 Bad Faith Chapter Filing - Two Party Disputes - New Debtor<br />

Syndrome<br />

8.12 Entry into Possession by Mortgagee<br />

8.13 Single Asset Case Issues<br />

8.13.1 Bad Faith Filing<br />

8.13.2 Absolute Priority Rule<br />

8.13.3 Classification <strong>of</strong> Claim Issues<br />

8.13.4 "Single Asset <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong>" Provisions <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Bankruptcy Code<br />

8.14 Third Party Releases Plan Provisions<br />

8.15 Landlord's Rent Claim<br />

8.15.1 Rent Recovery Cap<br />

8.15.2 Post Petition Rent<br />

8.16 Post-petition Credit - Bankruptcy Code Section 364<br />

8.17 "Strong Arm Clause" Section 544(a) - Trustee's Avoiding Power<br />

8.18 Valuation Issues<br />

8.19 § 363 Free and Clear Sale <strong>of</strong> Asset <strong>of</strong> Debtor Subject To Lender's<br />

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Lien<br />

8.20 Discharge Issues<br />

8.21 Equitable Subordination<br />

8.22 Successor Liability<br />

8.23 Bar Dates<br />

8.23.1 Bank<br />

8.24 Section 365 Rejection <strong>of</strong> Leases and Executory Agreements<br />

8.24.1 Rejection by Debtor Lessee<br />

8.24.2 Rejection by Debtor Lessor<br />

8.24.3 Assumption<br />

8.24.4 REA - CC&Rs<br />

8.25 Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit<br />

8.26 Ipso Facto Clauses<br />

8.27 Partnership Issues<br />

8.28 Substantive Consolidation<br />

9.0........................................................................... Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> Assignment <strong>of</strong> Future Rents<br />

9.1 Generally<br />

9.2 Notices to Tenant <strong>of</strong> Rent Assignment<br />

9.3 Hotel Receipts<br />

10.0........................................................... Review <strong>of</strong> Condominium and P.U.D. Documentation<br />

10.1 Declarant's Rights<br />

10.2 Mortgagee Provisions<br />

10.3 Association Financial Statements<br />

10.4 Association Activities<br />

10.5 Developer Assessments<br />

10.6 Association's Director Liability<br />

10.7 Timeshare Issues<br />

11.0............................................................................................... Borrower's Tax Circumstances<br />

11.1 Issue<br />

12.0.........................................................................................................................Advice to Client<br />

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REAL ESTATE DEFAULTS<br />

INVESTIGATION CHECK LIST FOR LENDER'S COUNSEL<br />

(ANNOTATED) 2<br />

By Marvin Garfinkel<br />

NOTE:<br />

A separate Investigation Check List should be prepared for each material<br />

real estate parcel.<br />

0.0 Immediate Attention<br />

0.1 Collateral<br />

0.1.1 Primary Collateral - List mortgages, notes 3 , personal property<br />

security interests, securities provided by parties other than the debtor,<br />

letters <strong>of</strong> credit, guarantees, pledges, cash collateral accounts and any other<br />

primary collateral.<br />

0.1.2 Ancillary Collateral - List ancillary collateral including rent and<br />

lease assignments, security agreements, assignments <strong>of</strong> management and<br />

construction related documents, hotel license, liquor licenses, escrow<br />

accounts, franchise and management agreements and related<br />

nondisturbance and recognition agreements, comfort letters, partnership<br />

interests 4 , etc.<br />

0.2 Conflicts Issues - Seek to determine identity <strong>of</strong> principals <strong>of</strong> borrower,<br />

parties to any syndication, other lenders that may be impacted by the<br />

various possible outcomes, lessees, other lien holders, significant creditors<br />

<strong>of</strong> borrower, and others that may be impacted by outcome <strong>of</strong> default. It is<br />

important that this be done at the earliest possible occasion as the<br />

identification <strong>of</strong> a conflict later in the case may prove very costly to the<br />

2 This checklist is regularly updated by the author to reflect his own experience and that <strong>of</strong> users <strong>of</strong> this checklist.<br />

Comments are therefore solicited since this document is continuously being revised. At any time there may be<br />

incomplete references and footnotes, un<strong>of</strong>ficial citations that should be superseded with <strong>of</strong>ficial citations, etc. Reference<br />

to "Dunaway Text" is to Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong> Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark Boardman Collaghan 1985-1997) which<br />

includes a copy <strong>of</strong> this Check List updated from time to time.<br />

3 Is note recourse or exculpated - if exculpated what are exceptions to the exculpation<br />

4 If a lender holds a lien on the ownership interests in borrower it may discourage initiation by the borrower <strong>of</strong> Chapter<br />

Proceedings. Such security interest may be based on guarantees by partners <strong>of</strong> borrower <strong>of</strong> the borrower's obligation to<br />

the lender with such guarantee collateralized by a lien on the partner's interest in the borrower. See U.C.C. §8-321 and<br />

definitions <strong>of</strong> "Security", "Certificated Security" and "Uncertificated Security" at U.C.C. §8-102. Under U.C.C. §8-321<br />

no filling is required to perfect a security interest in a "Security" as defined at U.C.C. §8-102. Under U.C.C. §8-313 the<br />

Security Interest in an Uncertified Security is perfected by registration with the issuer. Thus if a partnership interest is<br />

for purposes <strong>of</strong> the U.C.C. a "Security" the Security interest is perfected by notice or registration with the partnership<br />

otherwise Article 9 applies and a U.C.C. 1 is probably appropriate. If in doubt (as is usually the case) both approaches<br />

are usually followed. See item 5.11 below on foreclosing partnership interests.<br />

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client and possibly ultimately to the lawyer both in terms <strong>of</strong> client<br />

retention, disgorgement <strong>of</strong> fees received and recovery <strong>of</strong> accrued fees.<br />

0.3 Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit - List letters <strong>of</strong> credit, if any, location <strong>of</strong> originals,<br />

expiration dates and specific documentation required for presentation.<br />

Calendar dates. See discussion at 3.13 below.<br />

0.4 Guarantees - Third Party Liability 5 -<br />

0.4.1 List guarantees, expiration dates, notice requirements, possible<br />

limitations on liability or enforcement there<strong>of</strong> or other activity<br />

that may be basis <strong>of</strong> guarantor defenses. Are there any<br />

limitations upon guarantor's liability Consider nature <strong>of</strong> each<br />

guarantee -is it primary or is it limited to deficiencies or limited<br />

in some other manner<br />

0.4.2 Will a release <strong>of</strong> collateral or release or compromise <strong>of</strong> the<br />

liability <strong>of</strong> the principal debtor or others that are also secondarily<br />

liable impact upon enforceability <strong>of</strong> the guarantees 6<br />

0.4.3 Are there any ambiguities such as limitation <strong>of</strong> guarantor's<br />

liability to "top one million dollars". 7<br />

0.4.4 Consider strategy to realize on each guarantee and possible<br />

application <strong>of</strong> deficiency judgment statutes. 8 Seek to secure<br />

current financial statement <strong>of</strong> each guarantor. Are the guarantees<br />

secured If so, in what manner Is security adequate Is it<br />

5 See discussion at item 3.3 below.<br />

6 See Agribank, FCB v. Whitlock, 251 Ill. App. 3d 299, 621 N.E. 2d 967 (Ill App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1993). Appeal<br />

Denied, 154 Ill. 2d 557, 631 N.E. 2d 705 (1994). See also See Stumpf v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, No. 02-CA-1254 (5th<br />

Cir. Apr. 29, 2003) where the lender's release <strong>of</strong> funds in debtor in possession account at the request <strong>of</strong> the<br />

bankruptcy trustee instead <strong>of</strong> petitioning bankruptcy court to <strong>of</strong>fset debt against debtor's accounts in lender's<br />

possession resulted in an impairment <strong>of</strong> security held for the principal obligation and operated to extinguish the<br />

obligations <strong>of</strong> the surety.<br />

7 This common and ambiguous limitation has at least four possible meanings. In the context <strong>of</strong> a ten million dollar<br />

loan these are (1) the guarantee is limited to one million dollars and that limit is reduced on a dollar for dollar basis<br />

for principal paydowns. (2) The guarantee is only for any deficiency and further subject to the limit provided for by<br />

(1) above. (3) A deficiency guarantee limited to one million dollars. (4) A primary guarantee <strong>of</strong> one million dollars<br />

with the guarantor being reimbursed if the actual realization by the lender exceeds nine million dollars ($9,000,000)<br />

upon sale <strong>of</strong> the collateral.<br />

8 See discussion at item 5.2 below and Annotation, Mortgages: Effect Upon Obligation <strong>of</strong> Guarantor or Surety <strong>of</strong><br />

Statute For Forbidding or Restricting Deficiency Judgment, 49 A.L.R. 3d 554 (1973).<br />

2<br />

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available Is it feasible in context <strong>of</strong> a restructuring <strong>of</strong> the debt<br />

to achieve additional collateral to backup the guarantees 9<br />

0.4.5 Consider possibility <strong>of</strong> "piercing the corporate veil," especially<br />

<strong>of</strong> subjecting to personal liability the shareholders, directors and<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> any corporate general partners or managing members<br />

<strong>of</strong> an L.L.C.<br />

0.4.6 Are defense waivers complete and effective. 10<br />

0.5 Notice Requirements - Prepare schedule <strong>of</strong> notice and grace periods for<br />

specific remedies and list entities and persons who must be notified and<br />

those persons who possibly should be notified. Have client confirm<br />

whether it has any change <strong>of</strong> address notices or other indications that<br />

addresses <strong>of</strong> persons to be notified may have changed. Is the required<br />

notice a prerequisite to declaration <strong>of</strong> default or does it merely afford the<br />

borrower an opportunity to reinstate 11<br />

0.6 File Assembly - Determine location <strong>of</strong> all possibly relevant files.<br />

Determine whether any <strong>of</strong> client's personnel maintain informal or<br />

"working files" or keep notes or other data on personal computer media.<br />

0.7 Environmental Risks 12 - Review all environmental reports in file. If<br />

foreclosure or entry into possession by lender is a real possibility<br />

consider securing an update on existing reports. 13 Determine whether an<br />

environmental agency review is required in the particular jurisdiction<br />

prior to foreclosure.<br />

0.8 Rent Assignment - Tenant Issues - Do the rent assignments permit the<br />

lender to direct the tenants to pay future rent to it whether or not there<br />

has been a default on the loan Is there a need to make “choate”<br />

"inchoate", "unvested" or "unperfected" rent assignments 14 Do<br />

9 See Discussion <strong>of</strong> upstream and sidestream guarantees at items 3.3 and 5.2.6 below<br />

10 See §15 <strong>of</strong> the Restatement Third, Suretyship. Suretyship Status - defenses <strong>of</strong> Secondary Obligor against<br />

Obligee.<br />

11 This may be important in a variety <strong>of</strong> settings, especially in those cases in which the lender would be adversely<br />

impacted by a Chapter 11 filing prior to its being able to exercise remedies to protect its right to rents. See item 9.0<br />

below.<br />

12 See Discussion at item 4.7 below.<br />

13 Because <strong>of</strong> lead time that may be required and the impact that an unanticipated environmental problem may have<br />

on the lender's strategy the procuring <strong>of</strong> appropriate environmental reports should be considered as soon as feasible.<br />

14 See discussion at Item 9.0 below. This activity may be referred to as "vesting" or even, although probably<br />

3<br />

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documents impose a trust on rents received by borrower and not used<br />

first to pay taxes, insurance, debt service and reasonable operating<br />

expenses or subject borrower or its principals to personal liability for the<br />

same Are there any tenant security deposits and under whose control<br />

0.9 Information To Be Requested from Borrower - Current financial<br />

statement <strong>of</strong> borrower and guarantors, cash flow statement <strong>of</strong> Borrower,<br />

recent income tax returns, rent rolls, copies <strong>of</strong> current leases, receivables<br />

and schedules for time share and lot sale projects.<br />

0.10 Personal Liability - Explore various basis <strong>of</strong> asserting possible<br />

personal liability if loan is non recourse or with a limited liability entity.<br />

Possible trust fund theories, piercing corporate veil, acts within<br />

exculpation exceptions such as rent diversions after default.<br />

0.11 Estoppel - Nondisturbance & Attornment - Review tenant estoppels<br />

and non disturbances and attornment agreements. Have tenants agreed<br />

to pay rent directly to the lender following notice from the lender <strong>of</strong><br />

default<br />

0.12 Related Projects - Are there related projects - any cross<br />

collateralization -status <strong>of</strong> other projects - any related contingent<br />

obligations <strong>of</strong> Borrower.<br />

0.13 Lender's Past Experience with Borrower - Any previous defaults on<br />

this or other loans Any business interrelationships - (Common<br />

directorships, etc.) Has borrower been on any lender committees Any<br />

possible breach <strong>of</strong> applicable anti-tying statutes<br />

0.14 Participation Issues - If this is a participated loan immediately consider<br />

the relative right <strong>of</strong> lead vs. participating lenders. Who must agree to<br />

what and who must be notified <strong>of</strong> what 15<br />

0.15 Existence <strong>of</strong> Default. Review interrelationship <strong>of</strong> documents - Has a<br />

"Default" or "Event <strong>of</strong> Default" actually occurred Is the default language<br />

and nomenclature consistent throughout the various documents Is notice<br />

required Are there cure periods What is required under the<br />

circumstances for the borrower or a guarantor to "commence" to cure, if<br />

that is relevant Are defaults sufficiently material to warrant exercise <strong>of</strong><br />

all remedies or <strong>of</strong> specified remedies 16 If the loan documents provide<br />

incorrectly as "perfection". The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code have reduced the significance <strong>of</strong> the<br />

issue.<br />

15 See Discussion at item 5.18 below.<br />

16 Late payment alone may not be adequate to warrant foreclosure. See Sahadi v. Continental Illinois National Bank &<br />

Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1983)<br />

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both for payment on demand and acceleration upon default, courts are split<br />

on whether the right to accelerate is subject to good faith limitations. 17<br />

0.16 Wrap-Around Mortgages - Calculation <strong>of</strong> Deficiency. This issue must<br />

be considered in depth prior to commencing foreclosure proceedings on a<br />

wrap-around mortgage. Determine whether in the particular jurisdiction<br />

the sale price on foreclosure is credited against the outstanding balance <strong>of</strong><br />

the wrap-around note (including underlying debt) or only against the<br />

amount <strong>of</strong> the debt exceeding the underlying debt. 18<br />

0.17 Debt Assignment Notice. Has borrower been notified <strong>of</strong> assignment In<br />

most jurisdictions an assignee is charged with any good faith payment by a<br />

debtor to the assignor prior to receipt by the debtor <strong>of</strong> notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />

assignment.<br />

0.18 Interim Advances from the Mortgage Lender. If it may be advisable<br />

for the mortgage lender to make interim advances to the borrower pending<br />

a refinancing or a workout and if the mortgage lender is willing to make<br />

such advances will the amount <strong>of</strong> such advances be added to the lender's<br />

lien position or is it feasible for the lender to secure a first lien position for<br />

such advances 19<br />

0.19 Mortgagee in Possession and Receivership Issues. Are there any<br />

provisions in the documents that will effectively expand local law as to<br />

rights and protections afforded to the mortgage lender if it enters into<br />

possession or to such lender and a receiver if a receiver is appointed on<br />

application <strong>of</strong> lender<br />

0.20 Escrows. Consider application <strong>of</strong> automatic stay to any attempt to realize<br />

on escrows. 20<br />

0.21 Transfer Taxes on Foreclosure. Will the transfer <strong>of</strong> title on foreclosure<br />

trigger any transfer taxes. If so, are there any approaches available to<br />

avoid or reduce such impact especially if there may be a double impart.<br />

1.0 Parties<br />

17 See item 7.1.4 below.<br />

18 Id., and See Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W. 2d 580 (Tex. 1989) and Lee v. Key West<br />

Towers, Inc., 783 S.W. 2d 586 (Tex 1989).<br />

19 See discussion at items 3.12 and 5.7 below. See also, §27.05 “Future Advances Clauses” in Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong><br />

Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1985-1997. Hereafter referred to as the "Dunaway Text."<br />

20 See T.B. Byrne, Escrows and Bankruptcy, 48 Bus. Lawyer 761, 786 (1993).<br />

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For each party indicate to extent known the names <strong>of</strong> principals and other responsible<br />

persons and <strong>of</strong> contact persons with positions held; the type <strong>of</strong> entity (general partnership,<br />

limited partnership, corporation, land trust, individual ownership, co-tenants). For each<br />

entity and person, indicate proper name, and if known address and telephone number, fax<br />

number and name and details for each attorney representing such person or entity.<br />

Reconfirm lack <strong>of</strong> conflicts after identifying all <strong>of</strong> the parties in interest.<br />

1.1 Owner <strong>of</strong> Property<br />

Consider structure. For instance, if the borrower is a partnership, who are the<br />

general and limited partners Are there any layered or multi-tier entities<br />

involved Is there any pending litigation involving the debtor 21<br />

1.2 Secured Creditors<br />

Is there a possibility <strong>of</strong> a marshalling claim by junior lenders<br />

1.3 Unsecured Creditors<br />

Seek to determine amount owed. In any workout arrangement seek to require<br />

general creditors to be kept current since the existence <strong>of</strong> a substantial general<br />

creditor class may adversely impact on ability <strong>of</strong> a secured creditor to lift<br />

automatic stay and may increase possibility <strong>of</strong> a successful cram down.<br />

1.4 Recorded and Potential Mechanics' Lien Claims<br />

Review local law and title policy to determine whether there is any real possibility<br />

<strong>of</strong> mechanics' liens that might prime our client's mortgage. If so review divestment<br />

statute if there is one or local case law.<br />

1.5 Other Lenders and Participants<br />

Are there other lenders to the same borrower or to other entities with common<br />

guarantors Consider possibility <strong>of</strong> a joint workout strategy and possible conflict<br />

problems. Is there need for a joint defense and common defense agreement in<br />

regard to client-attorney and work product privileges Consider impact <strong>of</strong> any<br />

modification <strong>of</strong> loan documents upon priority position <strong>of</strong> subordinate lien<br />

holders. 22<br />

21 The existence <strong>of</strong> a significant number <strong>of</strong> pending law suits against the borrower is usually a significant adverse<br />

factor to effectuate a workout since a significant creditor can usually frustrate a workout and will <strong>of</strong>ten be able to<br />

secure benefits not warranted by the relative or record priorities <strong>of</strong> the parties.<br />

22 In some jurisdictions a modification <strong>of</strong> the obligation (or in some cases, the security) may be treated as a "novation"<br />

and thus result in the priority <strong>of</strong> the mortgage lien being reestablished as <strong>of</strong> the date the restructuring becomes effective.<br />

See title insurance discussion at 1.6.<br />

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1.6 Title Insurer<br />

Consider possibility <strong>of</strong> claims against title insurer. 23 If there is to be a forbearance<br />

or reinstatement arrangement it is desirable to have the title insurer either endorse<br />

the existing policy to confirm that notwithstanding the reinstatement or<br />

forbearance arrangement the title insurance remains in place or down date the<br />

policy. 24 It is important that there be a full disclosure <strong>of</strong> all pertinent<br />

circumstances to the title insurer if such title insurer is to issue any such<br />

endorsement. In most jurisdictions this is particularly so if additional advances<br />

are to be made after a default.<br />

1.7. Closing Attorneys<br />

Indicate party represented by each.<br />

1.8 Bonding Company 25<br />

1.9 Casualty and Property Loss Insurance Carriers <strong>of</strong> Borrower.<br />

1.10 Tenants. See discussion at item 3.9 below as to protecting existence <strong>of</strong><br />

advantageous leases and terminating adverse leases.<br />

1.11 Guarantors. 26<br />

1.12 Any F.D.I.C. or RTC Relationships to Loan.<br />

1.13 Partners, Shareholders, Directors, and Officers <strong>of</strong> Owner<br />

1.13.1 Corporate Veil Piercing<br />

Although courts have held that a proper purpose <strong>of</strong> incorporation is to<br />

permit shareholders to limit their liability for the corporation's obligations<br />

to their contribution, an abuse <strong>of</strong> the corporate shield or its use to commit<br />

fraud or for an other improper purpose may subject all or certain<br />

shareholders to personal liability. 27<br />

23 See discussion at Item 3.8 below.<br />

24 See discussion at Item 5.14 in regard to lien priority <strong>of</strong> additional advances.<br />

25 See generally, Chapter 27A Dunaway Text, “Liability <strong>of</strong> Bonding Companies” .<br />

26 See items 0.4 above and 3.3 below.<br />

27 See Beale v. Kappa Alpha Order, 192 Va. 382, 64 S.E.2d 789, 796 (1951). The veil may be lifted in extraordinary<br />

cases. Among the factors considered by courts are whether corporate formalities were observed, whether the corporation<br />

was treated as a mere instrumentality, domination or control or inadequate capitalization. These factors alone are generally<br />

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1.14 Lessors<br />

1.14.1 Consider liability <strong>of</strong> a lessee that has assigned a lease to a party that later,<br />

as a debtor in a chapter proceeding, rejects the lease under §365 <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Bankruptcy Code. 28<br />

1.15 Appraisers<br />

A real estate appraiser may be liable for negligent misrepresentation to a thirdparty<br />

purchaser <strong>of</strong> a mortgage. 29<br />

2.0 Public Record Searches<br />

2.1 Title Reports and U.C.C. Searches<br />

Order title reports, U.C.C., and other pertinent public record searches for debtor,<br />

collateral and guarantors.<br />

2.2 Partnership and Other Entity Filings<br />

If considered relevant, check partnership and other entity filings to determine if all<br />

requisite filings have been made and if there were any unreported transfers <strong>of</strong><br />

entity interests. This information may be relevant in uncovering breaches <strong>of</strong><br />

warranties and covenants and may lead to approaches to piercing corporate and<br />

limited partner liability veils.<br />

3.0 Document Assembly and Examination<br />

The immediate objective is to evaluate rights and remedies <strong>of</strong> the parties against known<br />

and developing circumstances and to seek to identify deficiencies in documentation that<br />

might be corrected in the course <strong>of</strong> any workout documentation. Possible basis <strong>of</strong> delay<br />

in realization to be considered. Objective is to evaluate each parties' vulnerability under<br />

various scenarios.<br />

held not to be sufficient to support piercing <strong>of</strong> the veil. Generally the corporate veil will be pierced if the corporation is "a<br />

device or sham used to disguised wrongs obscure fraud, or conceal crimes." See Cheatkem, 360 S.E.2d (get cite),<br />

Perpetual <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Services, Inc., v. Michaelson Properties, Inc. 974 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. Va. 1992). Corporate veil was<br />

pierced under Missouri law where substantial purchases were made by insolvent store operator on brink <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy in<br />

Fleming Companies v. Rich 1997 W.L. 610053 (E.D. Mo.)<br />

28 Bond St. Assocs. v. TJX Cos. (In re Ames Dept. Stores), 148 B.R. 756 (Bankr S.D.N.Y. 1993) the court held that<br />

rejection is a breach <strong>of</strong> lease, not a termination and that pursuant to a specific provision <strong>of</strong> the lease the tenant<br />

assignor remains liable.<br />

29 Soderberg v. Mekinney, 52 Cal Rptr 635 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1966).<br />

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3.1 Mortgages, Deeds <strong>of</strong> Trust and Loan Agreements<br />

3.1.1 Consider available default remedies, notice requirements, crosscollateralization,<br />

cross default provisions, possible personal liability for<br />

physical or economic waste, application <strong>of</strong> debtor protection jurisprudence<br />

and statutes, possible choice <strong>of</strong> law and other conflicts issues especially in<br />

multi-state transactions.<br />

3.1.2 Compare legal descriptions against survey. If feasible have loan <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />

that made loan review survey to be sure that the property covered by the<br />

mortgage is the entire property intended by the lender to be the security for<br />

the loan.<br />

3.1.3 Consider ability <strong>of</strong> lender to rely on document based discretionary right -<br />

is there local law or have courts <strong>of</strong> the jurisdiction held that there exists an<br />

implied obligation to act in good faith in exercise <strong>of</strong> remedies and<br />

administration <strong>of</strong> loan 30<br />

3.1.4 Review document provisions and local law as to ability and procedure for<br />

lender to enter into possession <strong>of</strong> property or secure appointment <strong>of</strong> a<br />

receiver. This may be advantageous to "perfect", "vest" or "make choate"<br />

the right <strong>of</strong> the lender to future rents. 31<br />

3.1.5 Consider nature <strong>of</strong> obligation that is secured by the lien <strong>of</strong> the mortgage<br />

and the priority <strong>of</strong> such lien as to each component <strong>of</strong> such obligation. If<br />

there is a "Dragnet Clause." 32 Does the priority <strong>of</strong> the later advances run<br />

from the recording <strong>of</strong> the mortgage or the date <strong>of</strong> the advance.<br />

3.1.6 Consider whether the language <strong>of</strong> the mortgage document actually<br />

implements the apparent intention <strong>of</strong> the parties. 33<br />

3.2 Notes and Other Evidences <strong>of</strong> Indebtedness<br />

30 See discussion at Item 7.1.4 below.<br />

31 See discussion at item 9.0.<br />

32 A Dragnet Clause" extends the obligation secured by the lien <strong>of</strong> mortgage to all obligations (related and unrelated) <strong>of</strong><br />

the mortgagor to the mortgagee. See G. Nelson and D. Whitman, <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Finance Law §12.8 (3d ed. 1994). They<br />

are generally enforceable. See In re Cara Corp., 148 B.R. 779 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa. 1992). However, the courts tend to<br />

construe them narrowly against the mortgagee. See Nelson id.<br />

33 In Balch v. Leader Federal Bank for Savings, 315 Ark 444, 446, 868 S.W. 2d 47 (Ark. 1993) the court held that<br />

language in a lease and separate subordination certificate that the net ground lease is "subject and subordinate to the lien<br />

<strong>of</strong>" a first mortgage did not make the lessor's fee interest in the land subject to the later first mortgage, but merely<br />

subordinated to the later mortgage the interest <strong>of</strong> the fee owner in the lease <strong>of</strong> which it was the lessor. The relevant<br />

paragraph <strong>of</strong> the lease was captioned "Mortgage <strong>of</strong> the Fee".<br />

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3.2.1 Confirm computation <strong>of</strong> actual amount owing;<br />

3.2.2 Determine extent <strong>of</strong> defaults - monetary and nonmonetary -<br />

3.2.3 What cure or notice periods are applicable. Have default notices been<br />

given<br />

3.2.4 Review prepayment and other premium provisions and yield maintenance<br />

provisions, if any. Consider possible treatment <strong>of</strong> yield maintenance<br />

provisions as unenforceable liquidated damage provisions. 34 Will<br />

prepayment premiums be collectable under applicable law if debt is<br />

accelerated 35<br />

3.2.5 Review default provisions; specifically consider interrelationship <strong>of</strong><br />

default provisions among various loan documents. Any inconsistencies <strong>of</strong><br />

terminology: are terms such as "breach", "default" and "event <strong>of</strong> default"<br />

adequately defined Do notice and opportunity to cure provisions<br />

dovetail<br />

3.2.6 Check signature and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> execution; if powers <strong>of</strong> attorney are<br />

used, are they effective<br />

3.2.7 Consider any usury issues.<br />

3.2.8 If provision is made for interest accruals consider possible applicability <strong>of</strong><br />

§502(b)(2) <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code regarding "unmatured interest." 36<br />

3.2.9 Defenses, <strong>of</strong>fsets - was the loan fully disbursed<br />

3.2.10 Review nonwaiver provisions <strong>of</strong> the note and mortgage. 37<br />

3.3 Guarantees and Surety Documents<br />

34 See Fisher, Make-Whole Prepayment Premiums Under Attack, 45 Bus. Lawyer 15 (Nov. 1989); In re Skyler Ridge, 80<br />

Bankr. 500 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987); In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). In McCae<br />

Management Corporation v. Merchants National Bank and Trust Company <strong>of</strong> Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 884 (Ind.Ct. App.<br />

1990) the Mid-America court sustained a yield maintenance fee required by the lender without any authority in the loan<br />

documents as a condition to permitting prepayment <strong>of</strong> a note that specifically prohibited prepayment.<br />

35 See Matter <strong>of</strong> LHD <strong>Real</strong>ty Corp., 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir 1984); American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn <strong>of</strong> Madison v. Mid-<br />

America Service Corp. 329 N.W. 2d 124 (S.D. 1983).<br />

36 See item 8.9 below.<br />

37 See discussion at item 5.14.<br />

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3.3.1 Are guarantor's liabilities primary or secondary<br />

3.3.2 What notice must be given to guarantors<br />

3.3.3 Are there any time limits on guarantor's liability. 38<br />

3.3.4 If only part <strong>of</strong> debt is guaranteed is there any problem in regard to<br />

application <strong>of</strong> collateral For instance, if only interest is guaranteed,<br />

should proceeds be applied against principal or interest 39 Does the<br />

guarantor's obligation under an "interest only" guarantee continue after<br />

realization on collateral 40 Is the guarantor entitled to a credit for the<br />

value <strong>of</strong> the mortgaged property See §5.2.3 below.<br />

3.3.5 Are there any "upstream" or "sidestream" guarantee or collateral<br />

problems A typical "upstream" guarantee is a guarantee by a subsidiary<br />

<strong>of</strong> an obligation <strong>of</strong> a parent. A variation is a guarantee by a corporation or<br />

partnership <strong>of</strong> an obligation <strong>of</strong> a shareholder or partner. A "sidestream"<br />

guarantee is in guarantee by in entity <strong>of</strong> an obligation <strong>of</strong> other entity under<br />

common control. A further variation is the upstreaming or sidestreaming<br />

<strong>of</strong> collateral. That is the use <strong>of</strong> an entity's assets to collateralize the<br />

obligations <strong>of</strong> the shareholder, partner or entity under common control.<br />

This devise is <strong>of</strong>ten used to collateralize the acquisition obligation,<br />

especially where it is sought to avoid transfer tax or other taxes or transfer<br />

limitations in leases or mortgages by transferring a real estate owning<br />

entity rather than the real estate asset itself. 41<br />

3.3.6 Consider any applicable deficiency judgment law - statutory or common<br />

law 42<br />

38 In Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v. Campcore, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 138 (1993), the court rejected the guarantor's<br />

assertion that lender's claim was time-barred, holding that the six-year statute <strong>of</strong> limitations for breach <strong>of</strong> contract<br />

actions accrued on the date that the lender elected to exercise the acceleration clause under the note (which was<br />

payable in installments, as opposed to a demand note) and not on the date upon which the election to accelerate<br />

was based (i.e., the date the first installment payment was missed). The Phoenix case was followed by Breeden v.<br />

Erie Island Resort & Marina (In re Bennett Funding Group), No. 03-MC-06 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003) where the<br />

borrower asserted that the statute <strong>of</strong> limitations had run on the lender's claim.<br />

39 See discussion at item 0.4 above. See Barnett, Limited Guarantees: Variations, Limitations and Lamentations;<br />

Banking L.J. 244 (May 1987).<br />

40 If so, is the interest base reduced by the amount <strong>of</strong> the realization or might the realization be applied first against<br />

interest if, under the loan documents, payments are to be so applied<br />

41 See the discussion <strong>of</strong> fraudulent conveyances at item 8.6 below.<br />

42 See discussion at item 5.2 below. See Chapter 14 <strong>of</strong> Dunaway Text “Confirmation <strong>of</strong> Sale and Deficiency<br />

Judgments” .<br />

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3.3.7 Consider possible application <strong>of</strong> any guarantor defenses 43 and the<br />

adequacy <strong>of</strong> any waivers. 44 Defenses that may be available to guarantors<br />

include (1) impairment by lender <strong>of</strong> collateral; (2) disposition <strong>of</strong> collateral<br />

in commercially unreasonable manner 45 and (3) failure <strong>of</strong> guarantee<br />

documents to satisfy the applicable statute <strong>of</strong> fraud requirements. 46<br />

3.3.8 Allegations <strong>of</strong> oral modification <strong>of</strong> guarantees will be sustained in most<br />

jurisdictions even where the guarantee contains a prohibition against oral<br />

modification and in several cases even where the alleged oral modification<br />

was not supported by additional consideration. 47<br />

In many, if not nearly all jurisdictions, absent an applicable statute, 48 an<br />

agreement prohibiting non-written modification may be modified by a<br />

subsequent oral agreement, especially if the parties' conduct clearly shows<br />

an intent to waive the requirement that amendments be in writing." 49 In<br />

43 See §15 Restatement Third, Suretyship.<br />

44 In National Westminster Bank N.J. v. Lomker, 277 N.J. Super. 491, 649 A.2d 1328 (N.J. Super.Ct. App. Div. 1994),<br />

the defense <strong>of</strong> a bad faith impairment <strong>of</strong> collateral was held not to have been waived by the waiver in the guarantee<br />

which the court considered not to be sufficiently specific.<br />

45 In First N.H. Mort. Corp. v. Greene, 139 N.H. 321, 653 A.2d 1076 (N.H. 1995) the court found that the obligation <strong>of</strong> a<br />

lender not to be affirmatively negligent could not be waived by the guarantor.<br />

46 See Reyes v. Admin <strong>of</strong> U.S. Small Business Admin., 1995 W.L. 46380 (D.D.C. 1995)(not reported in F. Supp.) (14<br />

million dollar guarantee is not enforceable because it did not contain essential terms as required by Texas statute.)<br />

47 In Beal Bank S.S.B. v. Krock, 187 F.3d 621 (1 st Cir. Mass. 1998) (Unpublished Table Decision), (reported in full at<br />

201 F.3d 426 (1st Cir. Mass. 2000)), the First Circuit affirmed the district court determination that under Massachusetts<br />

law an agreement that bars subsequent oral modification may be modified by a subsequent oral agreement. Allan<br />

Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.6 (2d Ed. 1990) ; L.W. Severance & Sons, Inc. v. Angley, 332 Mass. 432, 125 N.E. 2d.<br />

415, 420 (Mass 1955); Cambridgeport Savings Bank v. Boersner, 413 Mass 432, 597 N.E.2d 1017 , 1022 (Mass<br />

1992) ; Wagner v. Graziano Construction Co., 390 Pa 445, 136 A.2d 82, 83 (Pa 1957) the court stated that “The<br />

most INSERT AA<br />

48 California Civil Code § 1698(c) provides that "[u]nless the contract otherwise expressly provides, a contract in<br />

writing may be modified by an oral agreement supported by new consideration." See Conley v. Matthes ,56 Cal.<br />

App. 4th 1453, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 526 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1997). Although a New York statute enforces no oral<br />

modification clauses and prohibits oral modification when the original written agreement provides that modifications<br />

must be in writing and signed, 48 even in New York, there are exceptions in two circumstances--where there has been<br />

(1) partial performance, or (2) reliance if the subsequent performance or reliance is "unequivocally referable to the<br />

modification." Towers Charter & Marine Corp. v. Cadillac Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 516, 522.<br />

49 Tadros v. Kuzmak, 277 Ill. App.3d 301, 213 Ill. Dec. 905, 660 N.E. 2d 162, 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995),<br />

Appeal Denied 166 Ill. 2d 541, 664 N.E. 2d 642 (1996). See Wagner v. Graziano Const. Co., 390 Pa. 445, 136<br />

A.2d 82, 83 (1957). ("The most ironclad written contract can always be cut into by the acetylene torch <strong>of</strong> parol<br />

modification supported by adequate pro<strong>of</strong>.... The hand that pens a writing may not gag the mouths <strong>of</strong> the assenting<br />

parties."). A. W. Wendell & Sons, Inc. v. Qazi, 254 Ill. App. 3d 97, 193 Ill. Dec. 247, 626 N.E. 2d 280, 287 (Ill.<br />

App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1993), Appeal Denied 156 Ill. 2d 555, 638 N.E. 2d 1112 (1994); E. A. Cox Co. v. Road Savers<br />

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those jurisdictions that permit oral modification notwithstanding a no oral<br />

modification clause, the standard for permitting admission <strong>of</strong> the alleged<br />

oral modifications varies. It is important that a draftsperson consider on a<br />

jurisdiction to jurisdiction basis possible approaches to better<br />

“bulletpro<strong>of</strong>” such a provision. Since the issue <strong>of</strong> whether an integrated<br />

document was in fact orally modified is one <strong>of</strong> fact, a lender has good<br />

reason in a contested loan document enforcement proceeding to seek to<br />

avoid such an issue from reaching a jury. 50 One relevant consideration<br />

may be whether the parties acted in a manner consistent with a claim <strong>of</strong><br />

oral modification. Lenders should consider seeking to establish early in<br />

workout negotiations whether it is likely that a borrower may assert a<br />

claim <strong>of</strong> oral modification and if it appears that such a claim may be<br />

asserted determine whether there is any credibility to such claim and if it is<br />

clear to the lender that there was not in fact any such modification the<br />

lender must be sure not to act in an ambiguous manner that might be used<br />

by the borrower <strong>of</strong> evidence that the lender acted as if there was in fact<br />

such a modification.<br />

A so-called "zipper" clause combines integration and no oral modification<br />

clauses. It is intended to foreclose claims <strong>of</strong> any representations outside<br />

the written contract aside from those made in another written document<br />

executed by the parties simultaneously with or subsequent to the subject<br />

document. 51 In those jurisdictions that permit modification<br />

notwithstanding a non-oral modification clause in the subject document,<br />

the standard for permitting admission <strong>of</strong> an alleged oral modification<br />

varies.<br />

Oral Modification may be prohibited by a Statute <strong>of</strong> Frauds, if<br />

applicable. 52<br />

Int'l Corp., 271 Ill. App. 3d 144, 207 Ill. Dec. 815, 648 N.E. 2d 271, 277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). See New England<br />

Factors v. Genstil, 322 Mass. 36, 76 N.E. 2d 151, 154 (Mass. 1947) (holding that the parole evidence rule does not<br />

apply "where the terms <strong>of</strong> a written agreement have been modified by subsequent oral agreement"). L.W. Severance<br />

& Sons, Inc. v. Angley, 332 Mass. 432, 125 N.E. 2d 415, 420 (Mass. 1955). Cambridgeport Sav. Bank v .Boersner,<br />

413 Mass. 432, 597 N.E. 2d 1017, 1022 (1992) cf. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.6 (2d Ed. 1990). "the<br />

evidence <strong>of</strong> a subsequent oral modification must be <strong>of</strong> sufficient force to overcome and presumption and the<br />

integrated and complete agreement, which requires written consent to modification, expresses the intent <strong>of</strong> the<br />

parties." See Boersner, 597 N.E. 2d at 1022 n. 10.<br />

50 See discussion <strong>of</strong> waiver <strong>of</strong> jury trial at Item 3.15 and 5.16 below.<br />

51 See, Pace v. Honolulu Disposal Serv., Inc., 227 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. Haw. 2000).<br />

52 See Tex. Bus. & Com. § 26.01 which requires that the original contract be in writing, and the oral modification<br />

does not alter the character or value <strong>of</strong> the consideration. See Horner v. Bourland, 724 F.2d 1142, 1148 (5th Cir.<br />

Tex. 1984) (interpreting Texas law and collecting cases).<br />

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California Civil Code § 1698(c) provides that "[u]nless the contract<br />

otherwise expressly provides, a contract in writing may be modified by an<br />

oral agreement supported by new consideration." 53<br />

3.3.8 If the spouse <strong>of</strong> a principal <strong>of</strong> the Borrower has joined in a guarantee<br />

consider application <strong>of</strong> the Fair Credit Opportunity Act 54<br />

3.3.9 Develop information on financial condition <strong>of</strong> guarantors.<br />

3.3.10 Review choice <strong>of</strong> law and venue provisions <strong>of</strong> guarantee and confirm law<br />

<strong>of</strong> controlling jurisdiction.<br />

3.3.11 §365(e) <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code 55 has been held not to protect guarantor<br />

from liability conditioned on bankruptcy <strong>of</strong> mortgagor. 56<br />

3.3.12 Consider possible right <strong>of</strong> a guarantor under Sections 9.207(i), 102(3), 9-<br />

504(3) and 9-507 <strong>of</strong> the UCC. 57<br />

3.4 Legal and Any Other Closing Opinions<br />

The opinions <strong>of</strong> the debtor's closing counsel <strong>of</strong>tentimes focus attention on<br />

documentation deficiencies, and possible limitations on enforceability <strong>of</strong><br />

document provisions. This preliminary review <strong>of</strong> the opinions <strong>of</strong> closing counsel<br />

is generally not for the purpose <strong>of</strong> focusing on possible attorney liability but rather<br />

for the purpose <strong>of</strong> possibly identifying issues and defenses. 58<br />

53 See Conley v. Matthes, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 518, 526 (Cal.Ct.App.1997).<br />

54 15 U.S.C. §1691(b) - See discussion at items 5.4 and 7.1.7(1) below.<br />

55 See Item 8.24 below.<br />

56 First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven <strong>Real</strong>ty Ass., 223 A.D. 2d 618, 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y.App.Div. 2nd Dept.<br />

1996). App. Dis. 88 N.Y. 2d 963, 670 N.E. 2d 1347, 647 N.Y.S. 2d 715 (1996).<br />

57 See Morris v. Shawmut Bank, 1997 WL 772920 (Conn Super 1997)<br />

58 An interesting real estate workout case is Hetos Investments, Ltd. v. Kurtin, 2003 WL 21498918 (Cal. App. June<br />

30, 2003) in which the California Appeals Court, as a matter <strong>of</strong> law, denied the lender's motion to have the<br />

attorney for the borrower disqualified on the ground that an attorney who prepared the note cannot later challenge<br />

its validity - the lender alleged violation <strong>of</strong> ethical rules and the appearance <strong>of</strong> impropriety for giving advice<br />

inconsistent with usury laws. Here, the borrower's counsel had been instructed by the lender to prepare the note at<br />

the borrower's expense, there was no legal opinion issued by borrower's counsel at closing and the borrower<br />

subsequently sued (using the same attorney) alleging the note to be usurious. The California court noted that the<br />

lender and not the borrower was violating usury laws and stated that "[w]hile it may be awkward for [attorney],<br />

having prepared the promissory note, to turn around and argue in a court <strong>of</strong> law that one <strong>of</strong> its provisions violates<br />

the usury laws, it is not apparent how it could affect the outcome <strong>of</strong> the proceedings whether the usury argument is<br />

made by attorney's firm or by replacement counsel following attorney's disqualification." Query whether the<br />

outcome would have been different had the borrower's attorney issued an opinion at closing. What ethical issues<br />

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3.5 Closing Attorneys Summary <strong>of</strong> Transaction<br />

This can be a valuable document for fresh counsel attempting to understand the<br />

parameters <strong>of</strong> the transaction and its relationship to other transactions. It is also<br />

useful to understand the closing attorney's view <strong>of</strong> the transaction. Since the<br />

significance <strong>of</strong> ancillary documents is <strong>of</strong>ten not immediately apparent, a review <strong>of</strong><br />

this summary may lead to additional collateral or other circumstances that are not<br />

immediately obvious from the closing binder.<br />

3.6 Construction Documents<br />

3.6.1 Cost To Complete Estimates<br />

If there is any construction <strong>of</strong> substance in progress a rough estimate<br />

should be made <strong>of</strong> the probable cost <strong>of</strong> completion. If completion may be<br />

divided into phases, each <strong>of</strong> which will produce incremental income, the<br />

construction costs should be estimated both on a phase by phase approach<br />

and also on an overall project approach.<br />

3.6.2 Construction Quality<br />

Determination should also be made as to the quality <strong>of</strong> construction and its<br />

conformity to plans and specifications and contract requirements and<br />

whether there may be claims for construction defects.<br />

3.6.3 Assignment <strong>of</strong> Construction Document<br />

Consider whether there was an assignment to the lender <strong>of</strong> construction<br />

related contracts and whether or not the work is completed under such<br />

contracts. The lender may succeed to certain or all <strong>of</strong> the rights <strong>of</strong> the<br />

borrower against the contractors and possibly the subcontractors for<br />

defective or incomplete construction and against design pr<strong>of</strong>essionals for<br />

inadequate construction documents or possibly even grossly erroneous cost<br />

estimating.<br />

3.6.4 Lien Priority Issues<br />

Application <strong>of</strong> Obligatory Advance Doctrine. Is there an applicable state<br />

statute 59<br />

might there be<br />

59 See discussion at Item 5.8.<br />

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3.6.5 Claims to Unpaid Proceeds and Retainage Under Construction<br />

Contract.<br />

State law will determine whether or not earned but unpaid construction<br />

consideration and retainage are assets <strong>of</strong> a debtor in a Bankruptcy Code<br />

proceeding. 60 Payments held by the federal government as owner <strong>of</strong> a<br />

construction project do not become part <strong>of</strong> the bankruptcy estate and, as a<br />

result, may be available to a bonding company or other claimants such as<br />

subcontractors. 61 Language <strong>of</strong> contracts may determine relative rights <strong>of</strong><br />

the parties to undisbursed contract proceeds. 62<br />

3.7 Permits, Governmental Licenses and Approvals, Zoning, Subdivision,<br />

Environmental and Other Land Use Documentation.<br />

Review documents and opinion letters to be sure the mortgaged property is zoned<br />

for current intended use and that the current or intended use is authorized as<br />

required by local law. A mortgagee's taking title by a foreclosure or deed in lieu<br />

there<strong>of</strong> to improperly permitted property may subject the lender or its personnel to<br />

civil or in some cases to criminal proceedings.<br />

3.8 Title Insurance Policy and Marked Up Title Report or Commitment. 63<br />

3.8.1 Review<br />

Was policy actually issued Is the policy as issued consistent with marked<br />

up report Any special endorsements Compare title policy descriptions<br />

with closing documents. Compare a current title report with the policy<br />

issued for closing.<br />

3.8.2 Liability Theories<br />

It has been held that a title insurer may be held liable for failure to disclose<br />

a title defect <strong>of</strong> which it has knowledge even if the defect is <strong>of</strong> the type<br />

excluded by the terms <strong>of</strong> the policy. 64<br />

60 Universal Bonding Ins. Co. v. Gittens & Sprinkle Enterprises,. Inc., 960 F.2d 366 (3rd Cir. N.J. 1992); Mullins v.<br />

Burtch, 249 B.R. 360 (D. Del. 2000) Criticized at 368 although it is followed in part at 371.<br />

61 Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co., 371 US 132 (1962). 9 L.Ed 2d 190, 83 S.Ct., 232. See also, North Am.<br />

Speciality Ins. Co. v. Chichester Sch. Dist., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10745 (E.D. Pa. 2000), Ins. Co. v. United States,<br />

243 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed.Cir. 2001).<br />

62 See In re Modular Structures, Inc., 27 F.3d 72 (3rd Cir. N.J.1994); Pics No. 94-0899; Stevlee Factors, Inc. v. State,<br />

136 N.J.Super 461, 346 A.2d 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975).<br />

63 See discussion also at Item 1.6.<br />

64 Crawford v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 585 So.2d 952 (Ct. <strong>of</strong> App. 1st Dist. 1991).<br />

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3.8.3 Rights <strong>of</strong> Parties in Possession<br />

A lender will be generally charged with that which it would have<br />

discovered had it made reasonable inquiry <strong>of</strong> any parties in possession. 65<br />

3.9 Leases and Lease Related Documents.<br />

3.9.1 Generally<br />

Review copies <strong>of</strong> leases in possession <strong>of</strong> lender and seek to secure leases<br />

<strong>of</strong> material tenants not in possession <strong>of</strong> lender. Secure rent roll and seek to<br />

confirm that it is current, possibly by inspection <strong>of</strong> property. Review<br />

estoppel certificates and attornment and nondisturbance agreement to seek<br />

to determine whether, in the event <strong>of</strong> foreclosure the tenant has basis to<br />

contend that the lease has terminated and it has no continuing obligation. 66<br />

Determine the obligations the landlord has under each lease. In the case<br />

<strong>of</strong> construction loans it may involve substantial tenant improvements to be<br />

paid for by the landlord which may have to be funded by the lender after<br />

foreclosure.<br />

3.9.2 Application <strong>of</strong> Rents.<br />

Determine whether under any document signed by the tenant such tenant is<br />

required to pay rents directly to the lender upon receipt <strong>of</strong> lender's notice<br />

<strong>of</strong> owner's default. See discussion at 9.0 below on effectiveness after<br />

bankruptcy <strong>of</strong> future rent assignments and discussion at 8.6.4 as to<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> certain lease terminations on assignment being fraudulent<br />

transfers.<br />

3.9.3 Sublease Issues.<br />

Is there a lessor's nondisturbance undertaking under which the sublessee<br />

has a contractual right to a new direct lease with the prime lessor in the<br />

event <strong>of</strong> rejection <strong>of</strong> the prime lease by debtor sublessor. A rejection does<br />

not terminate a Lease. It does constitute a default. Consider possible<br />

claim by sublessee against sandwich lessor (prime lessee - sublessor)<br />

where prime lessor is debtor in reorganization proceeding.<br />

65 See Claflin v. <strong>Commercial</strong> State Bank <strong>of</strong> Two Harbors, 487 N.W. 2d 242 (Minn App. 1992).<br />

66 Under the Statute <strong>of</strong> Ann which has been received into the law in many jurisdictions where a lease precedes the<br />

mortgage the tenant is obligated to pay rent to the foreclosing mortgagee after transfer <strong>of</strong> title. In many jurisdictions,<br />

absent an attornment agreement, a tenant under a lease that is made after the mortgage is recorded is not required to pay<br />

rent to the new owner after the foreclosure and may vacate the premises unless it has made at least one payment to the<br />

new owner, in which case it may have constructively attorned to the new owner.<br />

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3.9.4 Lease Assignment Issues.<br />

Consider issues arising from rejection in a bankruptcy code proceeding <strong>of</strong><br />

lease by assignee debtor. These include claim against assignor and ability<br />

<strong>of</strong> assignor to do something other than pay the lost rent to the landlord.<br />

3.9.5 Collateral Rent Assignment.<br />

See §5.20 below.<br />

3.10 Notice and Other Procedural Requirements.<br />

Examine licensor and franchisor nondisturbance and recognition agreement where<br />

collateral includes hotel, fast food restaurant, etc. to determine the specifics <strong>of</strong><br />

notice and other procedural requirements and lender's rights and procedures.<br />

3.11 Assembly <strong>of</strong> Client's Document<br />

3.11.1 If the closing binder consists <strong>of</strong> copies <strong>of</strong> executed documents compare the<br />

documents in the binder with the actual executed documents, if available.<br />

Determine if client's personnel maintain "working" or other personnel files. If so<br />

review these files for possible basis <strong>of</strong> debtor claims or defenses. 67 Also check<br />

copies <strong>of</strong> computer mail that may be retained in lender' computer system or PC<br />

hard disks or on storage disks including any notes, files and backup disks on<br />

which old items may not have been deleted. 68<br />

3.12 Partially or Wholly Unfunded Loan Commitments.<br />

Review to determine if a reasonable basis exists for lender to avoid funding. Be<br />

careful <strong>of</strong> lender liability claims if funding is stopped. If the lender does make<br />

additional advances, will it be entitled to its lien priority for funds so advanced. 69<br />

Is there an appropriate future advance statute Is it necessary in order for the<br />

lender to secure priority over liens subordinate to initial mortgage that the<br />

advances be "obligatory"<br />

67 See item 7.0 below<br />

68 "Documents" for discovery purposes under current practice may include all written, recorded, or graphic materials <strong>of</strong><br />

any kind including memoranda, reports, studies, contracts, letters, telegrams, diaries, meeting minutes, pamphlets,<br />

handwritten notes, charts, tabulations, records <strong>of</strong> telephone conversations, maps, photographs, tapes, slides, and any<br />

information, including data and s<strong>of</strong>tware, stored in or accessible through any computer or other information retrieval<br />

system, together with all instructions and other materials necessary to use or interpret such documents.<br />

69 See discussion at item 5.8 below and statutory note on future advances at Restatement <strong>of</strong> the Law <strong>of</strong> Property-Security<br />

(Mortgages) 57, Tentative Draft No. 1 (March 22, 1991).<br />

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Will the purpose <strong>of</strong> the proposed advance come within authorizing language <strong>of</strong><br />

the mortgage or deed <strong>of</strong> trust and does applicable law enforce such provisions<br />

Will any part <strong>of</strong> such advance be used to pay wages <strong>of</strong> employees <strong>of</strong> the<br />

borrower. 70<br />

3.13 Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit.<br />

3.13.1 Considerations.<br />

Consider:<br />

(1) What is the solvency and credit rating <strong>of</strong> issuing<br />

institution<br />

(2) Is the letter <strong>of</strong> credit is clean or documentary 71<br />

(3) What is the possibility <strong>of</strong> requiring borrower to replace a<br />

letter <strong>of</strong> credit with a better quality obligation if issuing<br />

institution has been or may be liquidated or taken over by<br />

the R.T.C. or F.D.I.C. or does not have a top credit rating<br />

(4) Is there is any realistic possibility <strong>of</strong> presentation or<br />

payment being enjoined by account party 72<br />

(5) Has the L/C been transferred 73 or the proceeds assigned 74<br />

70 Under 26 U.S.C. 3505 a party that controls the payment <strong>of</strong> wages is obligated to insure that withholding taxes are<br />

paid with respect to such wages. Under 31 U.S.C. 3713 a person who fails to recognize a U.S. Government priority<br />

claim may be held liable to the extent any payments are made other then in accordance with applicable priority rules<br />

and to the detriment <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Government.<br />

71 A "clean" letter <strong>of</strong> credit requires only a draft for presentment. A documentary letter <strong>of</strong> credit conditions payment<br />

upon presentation <strong>of</strong> specified documents. A "standby" letter <strong>of</strong> credit is an adaptation <strong>of</strong> a mercantile letter <strong>of</strong> credit<br />

used as collateral in a real estate loan transaction or other non mercantile transactions. See discussion in Baker v.<br />

National Boulevard Bank <strong>of</strong> Chicago 399 F.Supp. 1021, 1024. (N.D. Ill. 1975) Itek Corp. v. First National Bank <strong>of</strong><br />

Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. Mass. 1984).<br />

72 The "Account party" is the individual on whose application the issuer has issued the letter <strong>of</strong> credit and the party that<br />

will be liable over to the issuer upon a draw on the Letter <strong>of</strong> Credit. The UCC refers to this person as the "Applicant" or<br />

"Customer." See discussion at items 3.13.4, 3.13.5 and 3.13.6 below.<br />

73 An assignment <strong>of</strong> proceeds <strong>of</strong> an L/C to a mortgage lender is accomplished by an acknowledgement <strong>of</strong> the issuer<br />

that the assignee is entitled to all or a portion <strong>of</strong> the proceeds (see UCC § 5-114(c). See revised UCC § § 9-107, 9-<br />

312(b)(2) and 9-314(a) and (b).<br />

74 A transferee is entitled to act as if it were the beneficiary and draw on the L/C in accordance with its terms. To<br />

be transferable, the L/C must on its face so specify. The applicable customs and practices may limit the beneficiary<br />

to a single transfer unless the L/C provides otherwise on its face.<br />

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3.13.2 Non-Documentary Conditions.<br />

The proposed revision <strong>of</strong> U.C.C. Article 5 broadens the definition <strong>of</strong><br />

"Document" to include "other record, statement or representation <strong>of</strong> fact"<br />

to recognize the use <strong>of</strong> letters <strong>of</strong> credit other than in trade related<br />

transactions. Non-documentary conditions must be disregarded by the<br />

issuer.<br />

3.13.3 Subrogation.<br />

Section 5-117 <strong>of</strong> the revisions to U.C.C. Article 5 as proposed in June<br />

1995 subrogates an issuer that honors a presentation to the rights <strong>of</strong> the<br />

beneficiary as if such issuer were a secondary obligor <strong>of</strong> the underlying<br />

obligation. 75 This section endorses the holding in Tudor Development<br />

Group, Inc. v. U.S.F.&G. 76<br />

3.13.4 Independence Doctrine. 77<br />

The basic principal <strong>of</strong> letter <strong>of</strong> credit law is the so called "Independence<br />

Doctrine" that the letter <strong>of</strong> credit transaction is intended to be independent<br />

<strong>of</strong> the underlying transaction with respect to which the letter <strong>of</strong> credit has<br />

been issued. 78<br />

3.13.5 Fraud in the Transaction.<br />

Courts are not consistent as to whether particular circumstances amount to<br />

fraud such that a court may enjoin presentment or honoring <strong>of</strong> a letter <strong>of</strong><br />

credit. 79 Sections §5-114 <strong>of</strong> the U.C.C. 80 is considered to be a codification<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Stzejn case "Fraud in the Transaction" exception in providing that<br />

75 See Restatement <strong>of</strong> the Law Third, Suretyship §1 (1995).<br />

76 968 F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. Pa. 1992).<br />

77 See Note, The Independence Rule in Standby Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit, 52 Univ. <strong>of</strong> Chicago L.R. 218 (1985).<br />

78 In the classic case <strong>of</strong> Stzejn v Henry Schroeder Banking Corp., 177 Misc 719, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631 (N.Y. Sup., 1941)<br />

an exception was carved out <strong>of</strong> the common law rule <strong>of</strong> absolute independence <strong>of</strong> the credit and underlying transaction<br />

by holding that the issuer is not required to honor the beneficiaries demand for payment if there has been "fraud in the<br />

transaction". In that case the fraud was in the beneficiary shipping junk under a bill <strong>of</strong> lading for bristles. Article 5 <strong>of</strong><br />

the Uniform <strong>Commercial</strong> Code deals with Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit.<br />

79 For references to cases that have permitted an injunction on various grounds see Grounds Air Transfer v. Westgate<br />

Airlines, 899 F.2d 1269, 1273 (1st Cir. 1990).<br />

80 See footnote immediately above.<br />

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the issuer must honor the draft unless the documents don't conform with<br />

the warranties provided for by UCC §7-507, the documents are forged or<br />

fraudulent or "there is fraud in the transaction" and that a bank may honor<br />

a letter <strong>of</strong> credit despite notification by the customer <strong>of</strong> fraud, forgery or<br />

other defect not apparent on the face <strong>of</strong> the instrument, but a court <strong>of</strong><br />

appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor 81<br />

3.13.6 Injunction Proceedings.<br />

Courts have generally applied the same standards to attempts to enjoin a<br />

beneficiary from presenting a letter <strong>of</strong> credit that they have applied to<br />

attempts to enjoin an issuer from funding the letter <strong>of</strong> credit. 82<br />

3.14 U.C.C. Security Documents, Perfection.<br />

3.14.1 Check evidence <strong>of</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> U.C.C. 1's or other perfection documents-is<br />

there any particularly valuable non-real estate U.C.C. type collateral such<br />

as franchises, licenses and management agreements, etc.<br />

3.14.2 Perfection <strong>of</strong> U.C.C. Security Interests. Determine proper filing place.<br />

This will usually be the state capital and possibly also locale <strong>of</strong> debtor's or<br />

executive <strong>of</strong>fice. 83 This may not be in the same state or locality as the<br />

project site.<br />

3.14.3 In case <strong>of</strong> time-share and lot sale projects, consider whether lien <strong>of</strong> timeshare<br />

reservable paper itself has been properly perfected.<br />

3.15 Jury Waiver Provisions.<br />

3.15.1 Although jury waiver provisions are, absent applicable statutes, generally<br />

upheld in most jurisdiction's, local law and the directions <strong>of</strong> decisions<br />

must be reviewed if such waiver is considered significant in context. 84<br />

81 Although Section 5-114 does not purport to provide the standard to be applied in an action by the account party to<br />

enjoin the presentment by the beneficiary <strong>of</strong> the letter or credit, courts <strong>of</strong>ten apply the same fraud in the transaction<br />

standard to actions to enjoin presentment on the theory perhaps that it is an indirect attempt to achieve the same<br />

objective as a payment injunction. See J. Doland, The Law <strong>of</strong> Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit (1981).<br />

82 See Jupiter Orrington Corp. v. Zweifel, 127 Ill. App. 3rd 559, 469 N.E. 2d 590 (1984); Harris Corp. v.<br />

National Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1353-55 (11th Cir. 1982).<br />

83 See U.C.C. Sec. 9-103 (Perfection in Multi-state Transactions) and Sec. 9-401<br />

84 If the applicable law is not clear consider whether the waiver is bilateral and supported by consideration, who drafted<br />

the document, whether the waiver is prominently displayed in the document and not buried in small type, the relative<br />

bargaining position <strong>of</strong> the parties, whether existence or terms <strong>of</strong> the waiver were separately or specifically acknowledged<br />

by the waiving party and the existence <strong>of</strong> informed consent to the waiver by the waving party.<br />

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Determine whether the jury trial waiver <strong>of</strong> a loan agreement may extend to<br />

enforcement <strong>of</strong> other loan documents. 85 The 4th Circuit in Leasing<br />

Service Corp. v. Crane, 86 placed the burden on the party seeking to enforce<br />

waiver to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, while in<br />

K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 87 the burden is on the party opposing<br />

enforcement <strong>of</strong> the jury trial waiver.<br />

3.16 Casualty and Liability Insurance Policies, Certificates, Mortgagee<br />

Endorsements.<br />

If property is or may become vacant, check vacancy provisions <strong>of</strong> policies - does<br />

coverage continue notwithstanding vacancy; is any notice required Are there any<br />

Change <strong>of</strong> Risk clauses.<br />

3.17 Prior Workout, Interim Forbearance and Collateral Enhancement<br />

Arrangement Documents.<br />

These documents may consist not only <strong>of</strong> those used to fully document prior<br />

restructuring with the current lender <strong>of</strong> this or other loans with the same borrower<br />

or an affiliate <strong>of</strong> such borrower, but may also consist, for instance, <strong>of</strong><br />

communications from a loan <strong>of</strong>ficer or <strong>of</strong> documents confirming interim<br />

forbearance arrangements or even memorandum in the lender's files <strong>of</strong> phone<br />

conversations and loan <strong>of</strong>ficer or asset manager originated inter<strong>of</strong>fice memoranda.<br />

The more formal documents will <strong>of</strong>ten contain wavers by the borrower <strong>of</strong> claims<br />

based on prior acts or omissions <strong>of</strong> the lender and that workout negotiations do<br />

not constitute a waiver <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the lender's rights under the loan documents. 88<br />

Economic duress may be an effective defense available to the borrower to resist<br />

enforcement <strong>of</strong> a waiver in workout documents. 89 Failure <strong>of</strong> the lender to make a<br />

85 In Hulsey v. West and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 966 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. Okla. 1992) the court, on the basis <strong>of</strong> the<br />

language <strong>of</strong> the waiver provision, would not extend a waiver in a corporation's loan agreement that was signed by the<br />

corporation's president to such individual's personal guarantee. The Georgia Supreme Court in Bank South, N.A. v.<br />

Howard, 264 Ga. 339, 444 S.E. 2d 799, 42 A.L.R. 5th 763 (Ga. 1994) refused to enforce a jury waiver in a guarantee<br />

holding that a pre-litigation waiver <strong>of</strong> jury trial cannot as a matter <strong>of</strong> law be sufficiently knowing and voluntary since the<br />

guarantor cannot prior to the institution <strong>of</strong> litigation be aware <strong>of</strong> the basis and circumstances <strong>of</strong> any future claim on the<br />

guarantee.<br />

86 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. N.C. 1986)<br />

87 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1985)<br />

88 In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Corporex Properties, Inc., 798 F.Supp. 423 (E.D. Ky 1992) the district court granted<br />

summary judgment on the basis <strong>of</strong> a nonwaiver provision <strong>of</strong> a pre-workout letter against a borrower's claim that the<br />

lender was obligated to continue with workout discussions.<br />

89 See Freedlander, Inc Mortg. People. v. NCNB Nat'l Bank <strong>of</strong> N.C., 706 F.Supp 1211 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd. 921 F.2d<br />

272 (4th Cir. Va. 1990).<br />

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full disclosure to the borrower may also be the basis <strong>of</strong> a defense to enforcement<br />

<strong>of</strong> a borrower waiver contained in workout documents. 90<br />

3.18 Subordination Agreements. 91<br />

3.18.1 Is the senior debt to which subordination applies and the junior debt that is<br />

subordinated clearly defined<br />

3.19 Document Modification and Alteration.<br />

4.0 Status <strong>of</strong> Property<br />

3.19.1 Undisclosed revision <strong>of</strong> documents prior to execution may constitute<br />

fraud. 92<br />

4.1 Physical Condition<br />

4.1.1 In a substantial situation consideration should be given to updating the pre<br />

closing inspection report or physical condition survey.<br />

4.1.2 Review <strong>of</strong> maintenance and operational contracts. Must obligations be<br />

assumed under existing contracts to achieve continuity <strong>of</strong> operations<br />

4.2 Property Income<br />

4.2.1 Leases<br />

(1) A spreadsheet may be prepared indicating anticipated income from<br />

existing executed leases. Differentiate between tenants in occupancy, and<br />

occupancies anticipated under executed leases. Consider broker<br />

commissions on lease collections and renewals.<br />

(2) Review leases advantageous to landlord such as those at or in<br />

excess <strong>of</strong> market value or leases in a competitive market to evaluate any<br />

tenant escape clauses or other outs and seek to relate to them.<br />

(3) Lease being negotiated - consider probability <strong>of</strong> the negotiations<br />

resulting in additional tenants entering into occupancy.<br />

90 See Parrish v. United Bank <strong>of</strong> Ariz, 164 Ariz 18, 790 P.2d 304 (Ariz Ct. App 1990).<br />

91 See Nassberg, What to Watch for in Drafting Subordination Agreements, 32 Prac. Lawyer 73 (April 1986).<br />

92 See Fairfax Sav. F.S.B. v. Ellerin, 94 Md. App. 685, 619 A.2d 141 (1993) aff. in part and vacated in part was<br />

remanded 337 Md. 701, 652 A.2d 117 (1995); See Fairfax Sav. Fund v. Weinberg and Green, 112 Md. App. 587, 685<br />

A.2d 1189 (1996).<br />

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(4) Evaluate liabilities <strong>of</strong> the landlord under leases to which lender<br />

may succeed as a successor to the landlord - borrower. These may include<br />

unpaid tenant allowances, lease inducements including moving expenses<br />

and prior space lease assumptions and buyouts.<br />

(5) Determine if any free rent periods will burden the projected income<br />

flow.<br />

(6) In residential leases, the lender may as a practical matter have to<br />

reestablish escrow accounts for tenants if the borrower depleted these<br />

funds. Consider possible claims by tenants under state unfair trade<br />

practices procedures. In addition, unless there is an escrow tenants may<br />

have no inducement to leave premises in proper condition upon<br />

termination <strong>of</strong> lease or to pay last month's rent.<br />

(7) Review Estoppels and Subordination, Attornment and<br />

Nondisturbance Agreements. Are tenants obligated to pay rents directly to<br />

the lender on notice <strong>of</strong> borrower's default from lender How are such<br />

provisions phrased Is there any provision for lender or borrower<br />

indemnification to tenants in the event <strong>of</strong> an improper claim by lender<br />

Does the indemnification go beyond repayment <strong>of</strong> any amount paid to<br />

lender but ultimately determined to belong to the borrower<br />

4.2.2 Other Possible Sources <strong>of</strong> Income<br />

(1) Insurance Recoveries - Review mortgage clauses and assignments<br />

<strong>of</strong> proceeds. Do leases require proceeds to be used for reconstruction<br />

(2) For-Sale Assets Such as Condominium Units or Houses -<br />

Consider the ability <strong>of</strong> the lender to convey houses or condominium units<br />

to contract purchasers. Will the debtor's cooperation be required or<br />

helpful Do contract purchasers have outs Any change in market since<br />

the agreements were executed Any relevant notice requirements<br />

Evaluate obligations <strong>of</strong> Seller under existing unit or house sale<br />

agreements. Is it important for your client to be a successor declarant<br />

Who is in control <strong>of</strong> the Association 93<br />

(3) Recently Terminated Leases. Consider whether lease<br />

terminations may constitute fraudulent conveyances. Were any attempted<br />

terminations without the consent <strong>of</strong> the mortgagee valid as against the<br />

mortgagee to whom significant leases (rather the merely rents) were<br />

assigned What happened to any termination fees paid by the tenant<br />

93 See Van Atta, What Every Developer's Successor Should Know (part 1 and 2), The Practical <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Lawyer, 24<br />

(May 1990) (Vol. 6, No. 3).<br />

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4.2.3 Security Deposits - Determine location and amounts. Are they adequate<br />

If not, as a practical matter security deposits on residential leases may<br />

have to be reinstated by the lender after a foreclosure. Determine local<br />

practice in regard to the liability <strong>of</strong> a foreclosing lender for missing<br />

deposits.<br />

4.2.4 Earnest Money Deposits - Determine location, amounts conditions to<br />

disposition.<br />

4.2.5 Limited Partners and Shareholders <strong>of</strong> Debtor Entity. Does any entity<br />

or person other than the Debtor own or have an interest in any collateral<br />

that such other entity or person may seek to protect<br />

4.3 Costs and Expenses.<br />

4.3.1 Operating Expenses<br />

4.3.2 Possible Third Party Claims<br />

(1) Liens that may prime the mortgage. (review updated title policy -<br />

and compare with policy as <strong>of</strong> closing on loan).<br />

(2) Subordinate liens<br />

(3) Mechanics' lien claims<br />

(4) Unsecured liquidated claimants<br />

(5) Unsecured unliquidated or contingent claims<br />

(6) Mechanics' lien claims<br />

(7) Ground or Master Lessor - If collateral is a leasehold interest.<br />

(8) Obligations for pr<strong>of</strong>essional service and need <strong>of</strong> continuity <strong>of</strong> such<br />

services.<br />

(9) Payments required to assume continuity <strong>of</strong> services<br />

4.3.3 Deferred Maintenance<br />

4.3.4 Major Repairs - Including costs to conform with local codes - are there<br />

any upgrades <strong>of</strong> life safety systems required under the local codes upon a<br />

transfer <strong>of</strong> title or making <strong>of</strong> substantial improvements or repairs<br />

4.4 Project Valuation<br />

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4.4.1 Review Closing Appraisal and Compare with Current or Recent<br />

Appraisal - Consider basis <strong>of</strong> the variance, if any Are there any<br />

erroneous assumptions in the closing appraisal<br />

4.4.2 Review Original Market Analysis<br />

4.5 Construction Loan Evaluation - Determine state <strong>of</strong> completion. Have<br />

construction documents been assigned to lender What is the status <strong>of</strong> debtor's<br />

accounts with contractors and material supply people Do they have right to file<br />

lien claims Confirm status <strong>of</strong> permits, approvals, variances, land use<br />

proceedings.<br />

4.6 Reciprocal Easement Agreements - Review REAs if they are <strong>of</strong> value or a<br />

detriment to the mortgaged property. Consider the possibility <strong>of</strong> a rejection <strong>of</strong> any<br />

REAs in a bankruptcy code proceeding. See discussion at item 8.5 below.<br />

4.7 Environmental Concerns<br />

4.7.0 Possibly Relevant Federal Statutes include the following:<br />

(a)<br />

(b)<br />

(c)<br />

(d)<br />

(e)<br />

(f)<br />

(g)<br />

(h)<br />

(i)<br />

(j)<br />

(k)<br />

The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.;<br />

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq.;<br />

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended by the<br />

Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments <strong>of</strong> 1984, 42 U.S.C.<br />

§6901 et seq.;<br />

The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §300f et seq.;<br />

The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.;<br />

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.<br />

§136-136y;<br />

The Emergency Planning and Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.<br />

§11001 et seq.;<br />

The Environmental Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §4371 et<br />

seq.;<br />

The National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq.;<br />

The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §1451; and<br />

The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §1271 et seq.<br />

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4.7.1 Contamination - Hazardous or Toxic Substances - Clean Up Liability -<br />

CERCLA 94 Issues 95 - Superliens.<br />

(a) Conditions <strong>of</strong> particular concern to lenders include (1) hazardous<br />

substances, (2) petroleum substances, particularly leaking underground<br />

storage tanks ("LUST"), (3) polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCB's") and (4)<br />

asbestos. Liability may arise under federal and state statutes and also<br />

under common law principles <strong>of</strong> nuisance, trespass, negligence and strict<br />

liability.<br />

(b) Consider the impact <strong>of</strong> cases such as United States v. Maryland<br />

Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, (D. Md. 1986), 24 Env't Rep. Cas.<br />

(BNA) 1193, United States v. Mirabile, 1985 WL 97, 15 Envtl L. Rep.<br />

20,992, 20,995-96 (Envtl L. Inst.) (E. D. Pa 1985) The holding <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Mirabile court that for a lender to be liable for borrower's acts the Lender<br />

must be involved in the borrower's "day to day" operation has not been<br />

followed in cases such as United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d<br />

1550 (11th Cir 1990); reh'g denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. Ga. 1990) cert<br />

denied, 498 U.S. 1047, 112 L.Ed. 2d 772, 111 S.Ct. 752 (1991). 96<br />

(c) The EPA regulations issued on April 29, 1992 on the CERCLA<br />

§101 [42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A)] secured lender exemption (57 FR 18344)<br />

have been invalidated by the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals for the District <strong>of</strong> Columbia<br />

Circuit which held that the federal courts and not the EPA are the<br />

designated adjudicators <strong>of</strong> the scope <strong>of</strong> CERCLA liability. 97 The EPA and<br />

Department <strong>of</strong> Justice announced in 1995 their intention to apply the "<br />

Rule as guidance" in determining whether to bring enforcement actions. 98<br />

In September, 1996, Congress re-authorized CERCLA with the Asset<br />

94 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act <strong>of</strong> 1980, 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq.<br />

("CERCLA") as amended by 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA").<br />

95 CERCLA imposes liability for hazardous substance release from a site upon the following potentially responsible<br />

parties ("PRP's"): (1) present owner or operator <strong>of</strong> a generating site, (2) owner or operator <strong>of</strong> site at time <strong>of</strong> release and<br />

(3) persons who arrange for disposal or transport to site selected by such person.<br />

96 In Fleet the court seems to say that mere capacity to influence management <strong>of</strong> hazardous substances is sufficient<br />

to create liability, although in Fleet there may well have been sufficient affirmative acts by the lender to in fact<br />

exercise its capacity. In Bergsoe Metal Corporation v. The East Asiatic Corporation, Ltd., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.<br />

Or. 1990) the court held that more then mere capacity to influence is required to subject the lender to liability. See<br />

Environmental Hazards: A <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Lender's View, Mortgage Bankers Association <strong>of</strong> America, 1988. For later<br />

history, see 819 F.Supp. 1079, (S.D. Ga. 1993); 821 F.Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1993).<br />

97 Kelley v. E.P.A., 25 F.3d 1088 (C.A. D.C. 1994), Reher. Den. 306 U.S.App.D.C. 382 (C.A. D.C. 1994).<br />

98 60 Fed.Req. 63, 517 (1995).<br />

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99 42 USC §§9601(20)E),(F),(G)<br />

Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act <strong>of</strong><br />

1996, 99 which adopted much <strong>of</strong> the EPA Secured Creditor policy and<br />

minimized potential liability <strong>of</strong> fiduciaries, 100 who had previously been<br />

unprotected under the statute. 101<br />

(d) In U.S. v. McLamb 102 the court concluded that "the Safe Harbor<br />

Exceptions" applied to a mortgage that acquires the contaminated property<br />

through foreclosure <strong>of</strong> its mortgage. In Walterville Ind. v. Finance<br />

Authority <strong>of</strong> Maine 103 the First Circuit concluded that the Secured Creditor<br />

Exception applied to a sale-leaseback financer that held title at the time <strong>of</strong><br />

the contamination.<br />

(e) Many states have enacted their own versions <strong>of</strong> CERCLA,<br />

requiring cleanup <strong>of</strong> contaminated properties and most <strong>of</strong> these states have<br />

included lender exemption provisions like the federal statute. 104 Of<br />

special interest, however, are so-called “superliens” enabled by the state<br />

statutes, which allows the state to recoup cleanup costs via a lien placed on<br />

the contaminated property, which lien has priority over all pre-existing<br />

claims, even those <strong>of</strong> secured creditors. 105 The validity <strong>of</strong> the superliens<br />

has been upheld by state courts.<br />

4.7.2 Coastal Regulations<br />

4.7.3 Wetlands Issues. Not limited to coastlines, property on bodies <strong>of</strong> water,<br />

tidal lands, swamps, marshes, etc. Consider possibility that lands<br />

apparently dry most <strong>of</strong> the year may be saturated during a wet season.<br />

Applicable statutes include Rivers and Harbors Act <strong>of</strong> 1899, 1033 U.S.C.<br />

§403, Federal Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) Pub. L. 92-500, 86<br />

Stat. 816 See 33 C.F.R. 323-330 106 . Delineation errors may be expensive<br />

100 42 USC §§9607(n)<br />

101 See, for example, City <strong>of</strong> Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co., 816 F. Supp. 564 (Az 1993); see also Monarch<br />

Tile, Inc. v. City <strong>of</strong> Fiorano, 212 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. Ala. 2000), for discussion <strong>of</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> statute on Fleet<br />

Factors.<br />

102 5 F3d 69, at 72 (4th Cir 1993).<br />

103 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir 1993).<br />

104 See, for example, New Jersey and Pennsylvania statutes, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g6 and 35 P.S. §6020103,<br />

respectively.<br />

105 See, for example, New Jersey’s statute at N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11(f).<br />

106 See U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), Bailey v. U.S. Army Corp. Of Engineers, 647<br />

F.Supp. 44 (D.Idaho 1986).<br />

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to cure or mitigate and construction within wetlands due to erroneous<br />

delineation may result in substantial fines and remediation costs.<br />

Enforcement may be on local, state and federal levels. 107<br />

4.7.4 Asbestos, Lead Paint and Radon<br />

4.7.5 Lender's Right to Enter Upon Property and Conduct Tests. Even if<br />

not specifically authorized by the loan documents a lender may be entitled<br />

to so enter on the basis <strong>of</strong> a general authorization in the loan documents<br />

for the lender to make repairs, alterations and improvements to protect the<br />

security. 108<br />

5.0 Review <strong>of</strong> Applicable Law<br />

5.1 <strong>Real</strong>ization Procedures. Consider judicial v non-judicial approaches to realizing<br />

or acquiring the collateral. Is there any statutory or case law establishing the right<br />

<strong>of</strong> debtor to notices and to cure periods. Many states, especially in the west, have<br />

a "one-action" rule that limits a creditor to one form <strong>of</strong> action for recovery <strong>of</strong> a<br />

debt. 109<br />

5.2 Right <strong>of</strong> Redemption and Deficiency Judgment Limitations.<br />

5.2.1 See also item 5.6 below on multistate collateral. Review any applicable<br />

deficiency judgment statute, rules or common law.<br />

5.2.2 Among the deficiency statutes are those <strong>of</strong> California and other western<br />

states that permit only one recovery on a debt secured by a mortgage and<br />

those that precondition a deficiency action upon specific acts by the<br />

mortgagee such as bringing a valuation proceeding within a specified<br />

relatively short period <strong>of</strong> time following the foreclosure.<br />

5.2.3 Deficiency judgment law may preclude proceeding against other collateral<br />

or guarantees 110 after execution against real estate, at least until the amount<br />

107 See Federal Wetlands Delineation Manual issued by The Department <strong>of</strong> Army, E.P.A., Fish and Wildlife Service<br />

and Soil Conservation Service. See Avoyelles Sportsman's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897(5th Cir. 1983) (vegetation<br />

criteria)., Leslie Salt Co., v. U.S., 700 F.Supp 476 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20420 (N.D. Cal 1988) (soil criteria) remanded, 896<br />

F.2d 354 (9th Cir. Cal. 1990), cert. den. 498 U.S. 1126, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1194, 111 S.Ct. 1089, on remand reconsideration<br />

denied, affd. 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. Cal. 1995) cert. den. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 133 L. Ed. 2d 325,<br />

116 S.Ct. 407 (1995).<br />

108 See First Capital Life Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 608 A.2d 1082 (Pa Super 1992); RTC v. Polmar <strong>Real</strong>ty, 780<br />

F.Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)<br />

109 See Zeller, Deighan, Practical Consideration Affecting California Non-Judicial Foreclosures, 14 Shopping Center<br />

Legal Update 6, Issue 2 (Summer 1994).<br />

110 See Adams v. Cooper, 340 N.C. 242, 460 S.E.2d 120 (N.C. 1995).<br />

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<strong>of</strong> deficiency has been established in an ancillary proceeding. The<br />

determination <strong>of</strong> market value <strong>of</strong> the foreclosed real estate may limit the<br />

amount that may be recovered against other assets <strong>of</strong> the debtor or against<br />

guarantors or partners <strong>of</strong> the debtor. 111 This may even apply in seeking to<br />

proceed against other primary collateral such as the furniture, fixtures and<br />

equipment (FF&E) on a hotel loan.<br />

5.3 Yield Maintenance Provisions, 112 Prepayment Charges, Default Interest and<br />

Liquidated Damages 113<br />

5.3.1 Yield maintenance provisions are prepayment fees intended to compensate<br />

the lender for income lost as a result <strong>of</strong> a premature payment <strong>of</strong> all or part<br />

<strong>of</strong> the loan principal. The more recently drafted yield maintenance<br />

provisions clearly impose the premium 114 in the event <strong>of</strong> prepayment as a<br />

result <strong>of</strong> an acceleration following a default 115 .<br />

5.3.2 In bankruptcy code proceedings several courts have treated yield<br />

maintenance provisions as liquidated damage clauses 116 and then<br />

characterized the specific provision as an unenforceable penalty provision<br />

on the basis <strong>of</strong> the computational approach used that would yield to the<br />

lender more then the court determined to be appropriate. 117<br />

111 In Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp. v. Arrott Associates, 60 F.3d 1037 (3rd. Cir. 1995) the Court reduced the amount<br />

due under a limited guarantee by the market value <strong>of</strong> the mortgaged property and thus found there to be no liability<br />

under a 10% guarantee.<br />

112 On prepayments generally see Note, Prepayment Penalties: A Survey and Suggestion, 40 Vand L. Rev. 409 (1987).<br />

113 Also see Item 5.28 below on default interest.<br />

114 A careful draftsman will not refer to these payments as "penalties". Perhaps the best characterization in the<br />

document is as a "yield maintenance payment" or an "interest differential adjustment."<br />

115 See Stark, Enforcing Prepayment Charges: Case law and Drafting suggestions, 22 <strong>Real</strong> Prop. Prob & Trust J., 549<br />

(1987).<br />

116 Whether a provision is a penalty or a liquidated damage clause must be decided under state law. In re Tastyest,<br />

Inc., 126 F.2d 879, 881-882 (3rd Cir. 1942), cert den. 316 U.S. 896, 86 L.Ed 1766, 62 S.Ct. 1291 (1942).<br />

117 See In re Skyler Ridge,80 B.R. 500, 16 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 1122 (Bankr. C.D. Cal 1987)(Kansas Law Applied); In re<br />

Kroh Bros Development Company, 88 B.R. 997 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). Complaint dismissed. 148 B.R. 97 (Bankr.<br />

P. Mass 1992) (Court concluded formula used was unreasonable by reason <strong>of</strong> being based on lower yield treasury<br />

bonds and not on a first mortgage interest yield index and because interest loss was not reduced to present value) In re<br />

Imperial Coronado Partners Ltd. v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Assn, 89 C.D.O.S. 1871 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).<br />

Courts have disallowed a portion <strong>of</strong> the formula computed amount rather then disallowing the entire premium. In re<br />

Morse Tool, Inc. (Ferrari v. Barelays Business Credi)t, 87 B.R. 745 (Bank. D. Mass. 1988).<br />

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5.3.3 Determine whether under the documents the prepayment premium is due<br />

following default and acceleration 118 .<br />

5.3.4 A prepayment fee equal to six months interest payable only if the loan is in<br />

default at the time <strong>of</strong> the pay<strong>of</strong>f has been held to be a late charge and as<br />

such an unenforceable penalty. Had the charge not been contingent on the<br />

existence <strong>of</strong> a default it might have been treated as a permissible<br />

alternative mode <strong>of</strong> performance. 119<br />

5.4 Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"). 15 U.S.C. §1691(a); Reg. B, 12<br />

C.F.R. §202.7(d) (1990) prohibits a "creditor" from discriminating against an<br />

applicant in a "creditor transaction" on basis <strong>of</strong> race, color, religion, national<br />

origin, sex, marital status, or age and has been construed to limit circumstances<br />

under which a borrower's spouse may be required by certain lenders to assume<br />

liability for the borrower's debts. 120 A "creditor" is defined at §1691a(e) as<br />

including any person who regularly extends credit. When an applicant has<br />

individually qualified for a loan, requiring a spouse's signature on a note or<br />

otherwise requiring a spouse to guarantee the borrower's obligation is a violation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the ECOA. Punitive damages may be awarded for breach. 121 A breach <strong>of</strong><br />

ECOA has been held to be a valid defense to a suit on the underlying debt even<br />

when the holder <strong>of</strong> the note is a successor to the RTC. 122<br />

118 Where prepayment clause did not clearly provide that the premium was due on acceleration upon default courts<br />

have <strong>of</strong>ten held the premium on prepayment not to be applicable. See In re LHD <strong>Real</strong>ty Corp., 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir.<br />

1984); Nutman, Inc. v. Aetna Business Credit, 453 N.Y.S. 2d 586 (1982). Where the prepayment clause by its terms<br />

applies to an acceleration on account <strong>of</strong> default it will generally be so enforced. See Pacific Trust Co TTEE. v. Fidelity<br />

S&L Ass'n, 184 Cal. App. 3d 817, 229 Cal. Rptr. 269(1986). In Teachers Ins. &Annuity Ass. v. Butler, 626 F.Supp.<br />

1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) Diss. w/o opinion 816 F.2d 670, (2d Cir. NY 1987), the court did not consider the inclusion <strong>of</strong><br />

such a clause by a lender in the required loan documents to be a reasonable basis for the borrower to refuse to close a<br />

loan.<br />

119 Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass’n., 17 Cal. 4 th 970, 953 P.2d 484, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378 (1998) (California<br />

Supreme Court).<br />

120 Anderson v. United Finance Co., 666 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir, 1982), but see Bank <strong>of</strong> America Nat. Trust and Savings<br />

Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Association, 595 F.Supp 800 (E.D. Pa 1984), Evans v. Centralfed Mortgage Co., 815 F.2d<br />

348 (5th cir. 1987). See also Comptroller <strong>of</strong> Currency Letter; No. 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 42,100 (Oct. 27, 1977)<br />

and U.S. v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. NY 1995).<br />

121 In Eure v. Jefferson Nat. Bank, 448 S.E. 2d 417 (Va.1994) the Virginia Supreme Court voided a wife's guarantee<br />

under the ECOA. The wife was not a joint applicant on the loan and she had no interest in the borrower. The bank<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer asked for the wife's guarantee did so because it was "common practice". The Court concluded that, the evidence<br />

supported the conclusion that the wife was asked to guarantee the loan only because <strong>of</strong> her marital status. Note that the<br />

statute provides solely for damages and does not provide for invalidation <strong>of</strong> a proscribed guarantee. See also Anderson<br />

v. United Finance Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1278 ( 9th cir. 1982).<br />

122 Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, LP 51 F.3d 28 (3rd. Cir. 1995). In Silverman the Circuit Court also<br />

held that the two year statute <strong>of</strong> limitation in the ECOA is not applicable to the use <strong>of</strong> the statute as a defense. Calaska<br />

Partners, Inc. v. Corson, 672 A.2d 1099 (ME 1996). But see The Riggs Nat'l Bank <strong>of</strong> Wash. v. Linch, 829 F.Supp. 163<br />

(E.D. Va. 1993).<br />

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5.5 Statutes Limiting Alleged Oral Modification <strong>of</strong> Loan Commitment 123 .<br />

5.6 Multi-State Collateral. 124 Consider application <strong>of</strong> deficiency judgment statutes<br />

and case law relating to recovery <strong>of</strong> deficiencies and enforcement <strong>of</strong> claims<br />

against multiple collateral. 125 A detailed analysis has to be made <strong>of</strong> the law in<br />

each jurisdiction in light <strong>of</strong> the choice <strong>of</strong> internal law applicable to the obligation<br />

and to any guarantees and the order <strong>of</strong> realization on the actions in each<br />

jurisdiction. 126<br />

5.7 Partnership Issues.<br />

5.7.1 Direct Action by Creditor Against General Partners. Many<br />

jurisdictions have interpreted the Uniform Partnership and the Uniform<br />

Limited Partnership Act to permit an action by a creditor directly against a<br />

general partner without the need for the creditor to first proceed against the<br />

partnership. 127<br />

5.8 Additional Advances to Protect Collateral. Although as between lender and<br />

borrower future advances will generally be secured if the parties so agree the law<br />

is diverse and <strong>of</strong>ten confused among the jurisdictions as to the rights <strong>of</strong> those<br />

recording liens after recording <strong>of</strong> a mortgage but prior to specific advances by<br />

such mortgagee. 128<br />

5.9 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 15 U.S.C. §1692 relates to abusive debt<br />

collection practices and includes lawyers as "debt collectors" subject to the Act.<br />

123 See discussion at Item 7.1.13 below<br />

124 See Restatement (Second) Conflict <strong>of</strong> Laws §229.<br />

125 See Annotation, 44 ALR 3rd 922 (1972). Although the prevailing rule generally looks for conflict purposes to the<br />

deficiency law <strong>of</strong> the situs <strong>of</strong> the foreclosed property, this rule is subject to exceptions and is not universally followed.<br />

See United States v. Stewart, 523 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1975) (California law applied by Washington court where<br />

property was located in California, Contra, Gate City Federal Sav. & Loan Asso. v. O'Connor, 410 N.W. 2d 448 (Minn<br />

App. (1987) (although land located in Minnesota the law <strong>of</strong> North Dakota applied. The parties were North Dakota<br />

residents); Ould v. Stoddard, 54 Cal 613 (1980); (plaintiff that sued in Ohio on note was barred from foreclosing in<br />

California under the California "one action" rule.<br />

126 See Guttenberg and Sherlin, a Lender's Guide to California Antideficiency Laws in Multistate Transactions, 14<br />

CEB <strong>Real</strong> Prop. L. Rep. 1, 54 (Jan,Feb 1991).<br />

127 See Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §403 See U.S. Trust Co. <strong>of</strong> N.Y. v. Bamco, 183 A.D.2d 549, 585<br />

N.Y. Supp. 2d 186 (App. Div. 1992), TPS Technologies, Inc. v. Rodin Enterprises Inc.,816 F.Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa.<br />

1993)..<br />

128 See Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> the Restatement <strong>of</strong> the Law Property-Security (Mortgages) and especially the statutory note at 60.<br />

Nelson & Whitman, <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Finance Law §12.7 (1993); §27.05 “‘Future Advances’ Clauses” .<br />

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5.10 Right to Financial Privacy Act. See 12 U.S.C. 3401, et seq. Providing<br />

information regarding bank customer's accounts is limited to disclosures<br />

authorized by customer or in response to legal process. Under FIRREA a bank is<br />

limited in advising customers <strong>of</strong> the existence or content <strong>of</strong> grand jury subpoenas.<br />

5.11 Drug Forfeiture Laws. Innocent mortgagee exception to 19 U.S.C. §1614<br />

requires that lender have no knowledge <strong>of</strong> drug activity. 129<br />

5.12 Foreclosing Partnership Interests. The lender may seek to avoid liability as a<br />

successor general partner by taking title to the general partnership interests in a<br />

properly funded and established subsidiary. 130 A lien may have been provided on<br />

partnership interests in the owning entity either as additional ancillary collateral<br />

on what was basically a loan on the real estate owned by such entity or as the<br />

primary collateral for a "working capital" loan. 131<br />

5.13 F.D.I.C. Superpowers, D'Oench Duhne, 132 Langley, 133 Federal Holder in Due<br />

<strong>Course</strong> Doctrine. 134 Although cases hold that the only defenses that may be<br />

129 See In re Newport Sav. and Loan Association, 928 F.2d 472 (1st Cir. 1991). The U.S. Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals for the<br />

11th Circuit held on June 18, 1991 in a case <strong>of</strong> first impression that the innocent owner defense (21 U.S.C., §881) will<br />

not protect one that adds her own funds to a pot that she knows includes drug source funds. U.S. v. One Single Family<br />

Residence located at 15603 85th Avenue, North Lake Park, Florida, 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990). It has been held<br />

that a transferee who was unaware <strong>of</strong> drug activity at the time it occurred but had knowledge afterwards at any time<br />

property was acquired may nevertheless avail itself <strong>of</strong> the innocent owner defense. U.S. v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, CA 3,<br />

No. 93-1417. 11/25/94; See also U.S. v. Parcel <strong>of</strong> Land Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, (U.S. 1993);<br />

U.S. v. Parcel <strong>of</strong> <strong>Real</strong> Property known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618 (CA 3 1989).<br />

130 Before using a subsidiary to seek to shield partner liability the local law in regard to "piercing <strong>of</strong> the corporate veil"<br />

should be reviewed. The standards for shareholders avoiding environmental claims may be stricter than the law<br />

generally.<br />

131 In some jurisdictions the holder <strong>of</strong> a security interest in a partnership interest which does not represent materially the<br />

entire interest in the partnership may be limited to securing a charging order although in other jurisdictions the right to a<br />

charging order may be cumulative <strong>of</strong> other remedies especially in the case <strong>of</strong> a consensual lien. In a number <strong>of</strong><br />

jurisdictions even a judgment creditor may be able to expose a limited partnership interest to foreclosure if a charging<br />

order is not likely to satisfy the debt within a reasonable time period. A security interest in a partnership interest may<br />

entitle the purchaser at the realization sale to becoming an assignee <strong>of</strong> a limited partnership interest and not to be come a<br />

substitute partner.<br />

132 D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. vs. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) See also 12 U.S.C. §1823(e). See Chapter 27E “The<br />

D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine and 12 U.S.C. §1823(e)” .<br />

133 Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 108 S.Ct. 396, 98 L.Ed,2d 340 (1987).<br />

134 The Federal Holder in Due <strong>Course</strong> Doctrine bars makers <strong>of</strong> negotiable promissory notes from asserting original<br />

defenses against the F.D.I.C. or those that succeed to the interests <strong>of</strong> the F.D.I.C. in connection with the purchase and<br />

assumption transactions involving troubled financial institutions. In Sunbelt Savings, FSB Dallas, Texas v.<br />

Montross, 923 F. 2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1991) the court cited Rep. No. 1269, 81st Congress 2d Session that<br />

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asserted as against the F.D.I.C. 135 or an institution being liquidated by either the<br />

F.D.I.C. or an assignee <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> them are those defenses that are obvious from the<br />

face <strong>of</strong> the note or possibly from other loan documents. 136 The DC Circuit has<br />

held that under the doctrine <strong>of</strong> O'Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 114 S.Ct 2048<br />

(U.S. Sup. Ct. 1994) the detailed regulatory regime <strong>of</strong> FIRREA supersedes the<br />

D'Oench and other federal common law doctrines. 137 The 11th circuit has held<br />

otherwise. 138<br />

5.13.1 D'Oench and §1823(e) have been held not to apply to agreements found in<br />

the loan documents themselves. 139<br />

5.13.2 D'Oench has been held not to bar recovery from F.D.I.C. for escrow<br />

arrangement that was not recorded on banks books. E. I. DuPont de<br />

Nemours and Co. v. F.D.I.C., 45 F.3d 458 (D.C. Cir 1995)<br />

5.13.3 In Langley, the Supreme Court held that the D'Oench doctrine extended to<br />

set-<strong>of</strong>f claims against successors to insured institutions based on alleged<br />

fraud in the inducement by a predecessor. 140<br />

"the F.D.I.C. enjoys this protection as a matter <strong>of</strong> federal common law so that it<br />

may achieve the congressional mandate <strong>of</strong> the sound effective and uninterrupted<br />

operation <strong>of</strong> the [nations] banking system with resulting safety and liquidity <strong>of</strong><br />

bank deposits. . . " and stated that, "The federal holder in due course doctrine<br />

facilitates uninterrupted operation <strong>of</strong> the banking system by allowing the<br />

F.D.I.C. to complete purchase and assumption transactions quickly and based on<br />

the face value <strong>of</strong> a failed bank's negotiable instruments, obviating the need to<br />

scrutinize the instruments for personal defenses. The doctrine also prevents<br />

makers from using personal defenses to gain priority over the failed bank's<br />

creditors' and depositors' rights to the note proceeds." The doctrine applies to<br />

"personal defenses" as differentiated from "real defenses".<br />

135 This was also applicable to the RTC prior to it being liquidated.<br />

136 In F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 755 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1991) involving notes held by F.D.I.C. as receiver for the National<br />

Bank <strong>of</strong> Washington the court referred to Section 3-305 (2)(b) <strong>of</strong> the Uniform <strong>Commercial</strong> Code to the point that not all<br />

form <strong>of</strong> duress void a transaction as distinct from making the transaction voidable and that economic duress is not a<br />

valid defense against the F.D.I.C. since it is not a real defense but rather is a personal defense.<br />

137 DiVail Insured Income Fund, L.P. v. Boatmen's First National Bank <strong>of</strong> Kansas City, 69 F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1398);<br />

Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995); E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F. 3d 592, 597 (D.C. Cir.<br />

1994). See §27E.04[3] <strong>of</strong> Dunaway Text. In Federal Financial Co. v. Hall, 108 F.3 rd 46 (4 th Cir 1997) the Court in<br />

following O'Melveny held that an assignee <strong>of</strong> the RTC does not stand in the shoes <strong>of</strong> the RTC with respect to the six year<br />

statute <strong>of</strong> limitations in FIRREA. See §27E.04[3] <strong>of</strong> Dunaway Text. “Federal Holder in Due <strong>Course</strong> Doctrine” .<br />

138 Motorcity <strong>of</strong> Jacksonville Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., (call) (In Banc No. 93-4634-5-8-96).<br />

139 134 See F.D.I.C. v. McFarland, 33 F.3rd 532 (5th Cir. 1994).<br />

140 The Supreme Court expanded application <strong>of</strong> the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine by interpreting 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e)<br />

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5.13.3 D'Oench has been held not to bar reformation <strong>of</strong> a loan agreement under<br />

doctrine <strong>of</strong> mutual mistake. 141<br />

5.14 Waiver. Consider possible basis <strong>of</strong> claims that lender has waived right to assert<br />

certain default remedies or right <strong>of</strong> acceleration. Courts have generally honored<br />

nonwaiver provisions 142<br />

5.15 Lien Priority Issues<br />

5.15.1 Future Advances 143<br />

5.15.2 Equitable Subordination 144<br />

5.15.3 Erroneous Pay<strong>of</strong>fs <strong>of</strong> Prior Lien. A junior creditor may under certain<br />

circumstances be prevented from obtaining a windfall from a mistake <strong>of</strong> a<br />

new lender which without knowing <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> a junior lien paid<br />

<strong>of</strong>f the prior lien rather than accepting the assignment <strong>of</strong> the obligation and<br />

lien that primed the junior line. 145<br />

5.15.4 Revival and Divesture <strong>of</strong> Junior Liens. Under the law <strong>of</strong> many states<br />

the reacquisition <strong>of</strong> a property by the mortgagor following foreclosure will<br />

revive a divested junior mortgage. 146 Under the laws <strong>of</strong> most states, where<br />

to be applicable to preclude a misrepresentation defense from being advanced by the maker <strong>of</strong> notes against a claim on<br />

the notes by the F.D.I.C. as successor in interest to a closed bank. See Brookside Associates v. Rifkin, 49 F.3rd 490 (9th<br />

Cir. 1995). In Brookside at 497, the Court distinguished so-called "Freestanding Tort Claims" such as slip and fall<br />

cases. Since such matters do not relate to an ordinary banking transaction and so will not usually be recorded in<br />

documents inspected by bank examiners. The Court also held in Brookside that D'Oench does not bar suits against bank<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficers in their individual capacities, "at least ins<strong>of</strong>ar as public funds administered by the federal banking authority<br />

would not be affected." (at 498). See §27E.04[1] <strong>of</strong> Dunaway Text - “Langley Decision: Fortification <strong>of</strong> the D’Oench,<br />

Duhme Doctrine” .<br />

141 R.T.C. v. Midwest Federal Savings Bank <strong>of</strong> Minot, 4 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 1993).<br />

142 See Kirkham v Hansen, 583 A.2d 1026 (Maine 1990) Payment to lender <strong>of</strong> twenty-seven late payments over a four<br />

year period (five <strong>of</strong> which late payment were beyond fifteen day grace period) was not a waiver since conduct <strong>of</strong> lender<br />

did not mislead borrower in light <strong>of</strong> clause in loan documents that authorized acceleration during period <strong>of</strong> default<br />

"regardless <strong>of</strong> prior forbearance". See generally, §11.03[9][c] “Lender’s Waiver or Estoppel” .<br />

143 See discussion at Item 3.6.4.<br />

144 See Item 8.21 below.<br />

145 See United States v. Baran - 996 F.2d 25 (2nd Cir. 1993).<br />

146 Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Currie, 665 A.2d 1153 (N.J. Super Ct. Chancery Div 1995).<br />

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a Mortgagor acquires a prior mortgage directly or through an agent, the<br />

foreclosure <strong>of</strong> such mortgage will not divest the junior lien. 147<br />

5.15.5 Purchase Money Mortgage States. Several federal circuit courts have<br />

held that under specified circumstances rewriting, extending or modifying<br />

loan terms may, under the "Transformation Rule," constitute a novation<br />

that results in loss <strong>of</strong> purchase money mortgage status. 148 The minority<br />

rule is that the loan is treated as being, in effect, two loans one <strong>of</strong> which<br />

retains its special lien status. 149<br />

5.15.6 Circular Lien Priorities. Circular lien issue may arise where a party with<br />

a prior lien is on actual notice <strong>of</strong> the rights <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> several later lien<br />

holders. Conflicts among statutory priority provisions may also create<br />

circular lien issues. For a rational analysis <strong>of</strong> a solution see Tile House v.<br />

Cumberland Fed. Sav. Bank. 150<br />

5.15.7 Personal Property and Fixture Issues. 151<br />

5.16 Jury Trial Waivers. Although these are generally upheld 152 where it is<br />

established that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. Several states had held<br />

pre-litigation waivers to be unenforceable. 153<br />

147 Ray v. Atkins 421 S.E.2d 317 (205 Ga App 85 (1992)<br />

148 Dominion Bank <strong>of</strong> Cumberland v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1985); In Re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990 (5th<br />

Cir. 1975); In Re Freeman, 956 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1992).<br />

149 See Pristas v. Landaus, 742 F.2d 797 (3rd Cir. 1984).<br />

150 942 S.W. 2d 904 (Ky 1997).<br />

151 See Philip Ebling & Steven Weise, What a Dirt Lawyer Needs to Know about New Article 9 <strong>of</strong> the UCC, 37<br />

<strong>Real</strong> Prop., Prob. and Trust Jr. 191 (Summer 2002).<br />

152 See Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 1379 (D.Nev. Jan. 13, 1994).<br />

153 See also discussion at Item 3.15.<br />

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5.17 Choice <strong>of</strong> Forum and <strong>of</strong> Law Provisions <strong>of</strong> Loan Documents.<br />

Contractual choice <strong>of</strong> forum and <strong>of</strong> law 154 provisions will generally be upheld if<br />

the chosen forum has a reasonable contact with the transaction. For discussion <strong>of</strong><br />

arbitration provisions see Item 7.11 below.<br />

5.18 Participation in Co-Lending Arrangements<br />

5.18.1 Lead Lender's Standard <strong>of</strong> Care. If not specified in the participation<br />

agreement such standard may be that the lead lender must exercise at least<br />

the same care and management as it would generally in a transaction solely<br />

for its own account. 155<br />

5.18.2 Implied Covenant <strong>of</strong> Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 156 Application <strong>of</strong><br />

this requirement should not supersede express terms <strong>of</strong> any agreement<br />

between lender and borrower. 157<br />

5.18.3 Conflict <strong>of</strong> Interest. Consider implications <strong>of</strong> any other lending<br />

relationships lead lender may have with the borrower.<br />

5.18.4 Applicability <strong>of</strong> Security Laws. Participation interests in pools <strong>of</strong><br />

mortgages have been held not to be securities subject to federal securities<br />

laws when sold to other banks 158 but by application <strong>of</strong> the "family<br />

154 In National Glass, Inc. v. J. C. Penney Properties, Inc., 336 Md. 606, 650 A.2d 246 (Md. 1994), the court would<br />

not look to Pennsylvania mechanics lien law to uphold validity <strong>of</strong> mechanics lien waiver that would not be enforceable<br />

in Maryland when work was performed in Maryland on a Maryland project by a Maryland corporation and the only<br />

Pennsylvania contact was a Pennsylvania contractor.<br />

155 See Royal Bank <strong>of</strong> Canada v. Interfirst Bank Fort Worth, civ. action CA-4. 84-0161-D (1988 WL 192369 (N.D.<br />

Tex. April 4, 1988)(not reported in F.Supp); Clinton Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank, 391<br />

N.W. 2d 712 (Iowa App. 1986); First Nat. Bank <strong>of</strong> Louisville v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. <strong>of</strong><br />

Chicago, 933 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1991). Consider discovery implications in litigation regarding the application <strong>of</strong> such<br />

standard since the standard may open up an investigation <strong>of</strong> the leading institutions' loan policies generally and a<br />

detailed investigation <strong>of</strong> other unrelated transactions in which the lead bank was the lender solely for its own account.<br />

The actual standard may be "prudent investor" standard. In Sterling National Bank v. Israel Discount Bank <strong>of</strong> N.Y.,<br />

No. 1109 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't May 8, 2003), a New York appeals court affirmed the trial court's denial <strong>of</strong> the<br />

lead bank's motion to dismiss claims by the participants for breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty, fraud and negligence, holding "[i]t<br />

is no longer acceptable, if it ever was, to conclude in knowing silence, a transaction damaging to a party who is<br />

mistaken about its basic factual assumptions when … he would reasonably expect a disclosure [citations omitted].<br />

New York has joined other jurisdictions in limiting the privilege to take advantage <strong>of</strong> ignorance."<br />

156 See Discussion at item 7.1.4 below.<br />

157 In re Continental Resources Corp. 799 F.2d 622, 625 (10th cir 1986).<br />

158 Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. National Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2nd Cir. 1992).<br />

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resemblance test enunciated in Reves v. Ernst & Young 159 to be securities<br />

for such purposes when sold to individuals. 160<br />

5.19 Clogging Equity <strong>of</strong> Redemption -- Equitable Mortgages. Although a deed in<br />

favor <strong>of</strong> a lender that has been escrowed subject to being recorded in the event <strong>of</strong><br />

a default by the grantor borrower will usually be treated as a "equitable<br />

mortgage", 161 courts have on occasion enforced such arrangements when entered<br />

into following a default as part <strong>of</strong> a work-out arrangement. 162<br />

5.20 Rent Assignments. 163<br />

5.20.1 In the bankruptcy context Sec. 552(b) <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code now makes<br />

it clear that post-petition rents are cash collateral for a mortgage holding a<br />

valid pre-petition assignment. Certain hotel revenues may also be treated<br />

as post-petition rent. 164 Broad language has in the non-bankruptcy context<br />

been held to cover such items. 165<br />

5.20.2 In Credit Lyonnais v. Getty Sq. Assoc. 166 the collateral assignment in<br />

present tense was construed to be effective immediately upon the<br />

occurrence <strong>of</strong> the default and result in the general partner <strong>of</strong> the exculpated<br />

borrower being personally liable as a trustee <strong>of</strong> the diverted rents.<br />

5.21 FIRREA Claim Procedure 167 Claims against depository institutions for which<br />

RTC or F.D.I.C. is receiver must be presented through administrative claims<br />

procedures with a very short bar date. RTC and F.D.I.C. may repudiate<br />

burdensome contracts and leases <strong>of</strong> failed financial institutions. 168<br />

159 494 U.S. 56 (1990), 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed. 2d 47 (1990).<br />

160 Pollack v. Laidlaw Holding, Inc., 27 F.3d 808 (2nd Cir. 1994).<br />

161 See Star Enterprises v. Thomas, 783 F.Supp 1564 (D.R.I. 1992).<br />

162 See Ringling Joint Venture II v. Huntington National Bank, 595 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1992).<br />

163 See discussion at 9.0 below on assignment <strong>of</strong> future rents in context <strong>of</strong> a Bankruptcy Code proceeding.<br />

164 See Bankruptcy Code Sec. 552(b).<br />

165 Great-West Life Assur. Co. v. Raintree Inn, 837 P.2d 267 (Colo.App. 1992).<br />

166 876 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)<br />

167 12 USCA §1821(d)(6)(A) and (d)(13)(D). See §14.02[5] “Claims Against Institutions Liquidated by Receiver” in<br />

Dunaway, FIRREA Law and Practice (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1992-1994) and §31.11[4] “Claims Procedures”. In<br />

Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong> Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1985-1996.<br />

168 12 U.S.C.A. §1821(e)(1). See Chapter 16 “Repudiation Under 12 U.S.C. §1821(e) <strong>of</strong> Contracts and Leases” in<br />

Dunaway, FIRREA Law and Practice (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1992-1994). In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond,<br />

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5.22 Amount Due Issues.<br />

5.22.1 Late Charges. Determine whether under local law and provisions <strong>of</strong><br />

document, late charges may be received for payments not paid when<br />

otherwise due after acceleration. 169<br />

5.22.2 Prepayment Premium. 170 Is prepayment premium collectible when the<br />

loan is accelerated as a result <strong>of</strong> a default<br />

5.23 Marshalling. A Junior lien creditors may under certain circumstances require<br />

holders <strong>of</strong> prior liens to exhaust other collateral that is free <strong>of</strong> other liens or, under<br />

some applications <strong>of</strong> the doctrine subject other subordinate lien creditors to later<br />

in time or non pari passu claims. 171<br />

45 F.3d 665 (C.A.2d N.Y.) it was held that in New York this included rent controlled tenancies.<br />

169 In Security Mut. v. Contemporary <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong>, 979 F.2d 329 (3rd Cir. 1992) the court deemed that such charges<br />

were not collectable based on what it believed Pennsylvania law would be if the matter were presented to a Pennsylvania<br />

court. It distinguished Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Pappas, 946 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir 1991) a lease case on basis <strong>of</strong><br />

specific provisions <strong>of</strong> the document. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a intermediate New Jersey court <strong>of</strong><br />

appeals that has held that a 5% late fee was an unenforceable penalty intended to induce a borrower to make timely<br />

payment and also that a default interest charged at 5% above the prime rate that results in a default interest rate that<br />

was 3% above the fixed rate otherwise due was also a penalty. Metlife Capital Financial Corp. v. Washington Ave.<br />

Association, 199 WL 436126 (NJ 6/30/99) Reversing 713 A.2d 527 (1998). See also Velenchik v. First Union<br />

National Bank, No. CV00 037 25 15 (Conn. S. Ct. May 7, 2003) where the Connecticut Superior Court held that a<br />

late fee <strong>of</strong> 4% <strong>of</strong> the balloon balance was exorbitant (especially since the lender received the benefit <strong>of</strong> a default<br />

interest rate) and awarded the borrower damages in the amount <strong>of</strong> the late fee plus $15,000 for emotional distress.<br />

170 Also see discussion <strong>of</strong> yield-maintenance provisions at 3.24. For questions regarding prepayment penalties, see<br />

§17.04 “Transfer Free <strong>of</strong> Mortgage and Prepayment Penalties” and §17.05 “Federal Restrictions on Prepayment<br />

Penalties in Due-on-Sale Situations” .<br />

171 See annotation, 35 ALR 1307. Pro rata marshalling was applied in In re Wilmot Min. Co., 167 B.R. 806<br />

(Bankr.W.D. Pa. 1994) (Ohio law applied). For marshalling, see Dunaway Tex Supra N. 2 §12.08 “Marshalling <strong>of</strong><br />

Assets” .<br />

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5.24 "Fixtures" v. Personalty. 172<br />

5.24.1 Intent. 173<br />

5.25 Waste - Impairment <strong>of</strong> Security. 174 Third parties, otherwise exculpated<br />

mortgagors and transferees <strong>of</strong> the mortgaged property may be personally liable to<br />

the mortgagee for waste which may include not only physical damage and<br />

improper maintenance <strong>of</strong> the mortgaged property, but also intentional<br />

"impairment <strong>of</strong> security" which may exist as in the case <strong>of</strong> a diversion <strong>of</strong> rental<br />

income and failure to pay taxes or maintenance expenses and other items. A<br />

claim by a mortgage against a third party contractor <strong>of</strong> the mortgagor 175 has been<br />

sustained. An action for impairment <strong>of</strong> security where permitted may be brought<br />

either before foreclosure 176 or if the full debt is not satisfied after foreclosure on<br />

the theory that a mortgaged is entitled at all time prior to foreclosure to<br />

unimpairment security.<br />

5.26 Fraudulent Transfers.<br />

5.26.1 "Upstream" and "Cross-Stream" Financing. 177 Corporate guaranties<br />

<strong>of</strong> and providing collateral for parent and shareholder debt or for debt <strong>of</strong><br />

sibling entity 178 may be subject to avoidance or be invalidated as a<br />

fraudulent conveyance under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act or<br />

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, §§548 and 544(b) <strong>of</strong> Bankruptcy Code,<br />

or under Model Business Corporation Act, or similar statute, if it does not<br />

172 See Garfinkel, 1 Pract. <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Lawyer, Jan. (l985). Lighting in a store has been held to be a trade fixture and<br />

not part <strong>of</strong> the real estate. Roebel v. Kossenyans, 629 N.E. 2d 241 (Ind. App. Ct. 1994).<br />

173 In In re International Bldg. Components, 159 B.R. 173 (Bankr.W.D. Pa. 1993) the court, by applying Pennsylvania<br />

law, determined that a floor joist system removed and sold by the debtor was personalty and that therefore since the<br />

financing statements filed at the situs <strong>of</strong> real estate rather than at the location <strong>of</strong> the debtor's principal place <strong>of</strong> business<br />

did not perfect the security interest, a payment to the secured party <strong>of</strong> the proceeds <strong>of</strong> the sale <strong>of</strong> the collateral was a<br />

preference.<br />

174 See Leipziger, The Mortgagee's Remedies for Waste, 64 Calif. L.Rev. 1086 (1976) and Dunaway Text Supra N.<br />

2Chapter 8 “Actions for Waste” .<br />

175 Turner v. Kerin & Associates, 283 Mont. 117, 938 P.2d 1368, 1997 WL 325907 (Mont., Jun 11, 1997) (NO.<br />

96-002)<br />

176 W& R Inv. Co. v. Edwards Supply Co. 24 N.E. 2d 518 (MA. 1939)<br />

177 See Item 3.3.5 above and the discussion <strong>of</strong> fraudulent conveyances at Item 8.6 below. See Dunaway Text Supra N.<br />

2 Chapter 18 “Law <strong>of</strong> Fraudulent Transfers” .<br />

178 See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2nd Cir. 1981), Weintraub & Resnick, Indirect<br />

Economic Benefit as Fair Consideration in Fraudulent Conveyance Cases, 15 UCC LJ 75, 76 (1982). See In re Duque<br />

Rodriquez, 77 BR 937, 939 (Bankr. S.D. Fla, 1987). This may also be referred to as a "sidestream" guarantee.<br />

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further a corporate purpose or otherwise or if a court determines that the<br />

benefit received by the guarantor did not equal the value <strong>of</strong> what was<br />

extended by the guarantor. 179<br />

5.26.2 Collapsing a Transaction - A court will <strong>of</strong>ten "collapse" a transaction<br />

and treat its various phases as a single transaction when the consideration<br />

received by a debtor from a party that has knowledge (actual or<br />

constructive) <strong>of</strong> the scheme 180 in the first phase is in a later phase<br />

transferred for less than fair consideration or with intent to defraud<br />

creditors.<br />

5.26.3 Lien for Antecedent Debt. This may be a fraudulent transfer 181<br />

5.27 Recharacterization. See items 7.1.5 and 8.1 below.<br />

5.28 Default Interest.<br />

5.29 Unconscionability .<br />

5.29.1 Generally - Unconscionability is a "defensive contractual remedy which<br />

serves to relieve a party from a unfair contract or from an unfair portion <strong>of</strong><br />

a contract." 182 The party challenging a contract provision as<br />

unconscionable generally bears the burden <strong>of</strong> proving unconscionability.<br />

183<br />

5.29.2 Procedural Unconscionability - Procedural unconscionability pertains to<br />

the process by which an agreement is reached and the form <strong>of</strong> the<br />

agreement, including the use <strong>of</strong> fine print and convoluted or unclear<br />

language. 184 This type <strong>of</strong> unconscionability involves, for example,<br />

material risk-shifting contractual terms which are not typically expected by<br />

179 See In re Wes Dor, Inc., 996 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1993).<br />

180 See Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., F.2d 31, 35-36 (2nd Cir. 1993); HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3rd 623 (2nd Cir.<br />

1995).<br />

181 See Hasbro Inc. v. Serafino, 1999 W.L. 137752 (D. Mass.)<br />

182 Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 341 Pa.Super. 42, 491 A.2d 138, 145 (1985) (quoting D. Dobbs,<br />

Handbook On The Law Of Remedies 707 (1973)).<br />

183 Bishop v. Washington, 331 Pa.Super. 387, 480 A.2d 1088, 1094 (1984); see also Argo Welded Products, Inc. v.<br />

J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, 528 F.Supp. 583, 592-93 (E.D. Pa. 1981).<br />

184 See, E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.28 (2D ED. 1990).<br />

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the party who is being asked to 'assent' to them and <strong>of</strong>ten appear in the<br />

boilerplate <strong>of</strong> a printed form. 185<br />

5.29.3 Substantive Unconscionability – "Substantive unconscionability" refers<br />

to contractual terms that are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side<br />

and to which the disfavored party does not assent. 186 Thus,<br />

"[u]nconscionability requires a two-fold determination: that the<br />

contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter and that there is<br />

no meaningful choice on the part <strong>of</strong> the other party regarding acceptance<br />

<strong>of</strong> the provisions." 187<br />

6.0 Deficiencies in Documentation<br />

6.1 Any unperfected liens Have renewal filings been made on U.C.C. security<br />

interests Have all appropriate filings been made Check U.C.C. 1's and any<br />

U.C.C. 3's for completeness and proper identification <strong>of</strong> parties, completeness <strong>of</strong><br />

descriptions and filing <strong>of</strong>fices.<br />

6.2 Any collateral intended but not received.<br />

6.3 Compare commitment with actual documents.<br />

6.4 Are there any conflicts between the binder documents and the commitment where<br />

the binder documents or the commitment provides that the commitment survives<br />

the loan closing<br />

6.5 Consider aspects <strong>of</strong> transaction that are not typical and seek to analyze whether<br />

the documentation actually accommodates the unusual aspects <strong>of</strong> the deal. If not<br />

will the deficiency result in any problem in realization on the collateral or in<br />

exercise <strong>of</strong> lender's remedies.<br />

6.6 Consider validity <strong>of</strong> powers <strong>of</strong> attorney.<br />

6.7 Confirm that important "boilerplate" actually says what is probably intended.<br />

7.0 Lender Liability Claims, Statutory, Public Policy and Other Issues.<br />

7.1 Theories <strong>of</strong> Lender Liability. More <strong>of</strong>ten than not there will be no basis for a<br />

borrower to assert a lender liability claim. Nevertheless because <strong>of</strong> the possibility<br />

185 Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlison, 491 A.2d 138 at 145-46. (1985)<br />

186 See id., at 145-147; Delinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 415 Pa.Super. 164, 608 A.2d 1061, 1068 (1992).<br />

187 Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1312 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting<br />

Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brady, 973 F.2d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1992)).<br />

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<strong>of</strong> substantial punitive damages if a tort is established by the borrower and <strong>of</strong><br />

damages based on possible lost pr<strong>of</strong>its, a lender is well advised before taking any<br />

action and in communicating with a borrower after or in anticipation <strong>of</strong> a default<br />

to always consider possible exposure to lender liability claims. Consider various<br />

lender liability theories such as the following: 188<br />

7.1.1 Contractual Rights <strong>of</strong> Borrower - Loan Commitments. Courts have<br />

imposed upon perspective lenders an obligation to use due care in the<br />

processing <strong>of</strong> loan applications. 189 See discussion at item 7.1.13 below on<br />

oral commitments and modification. 190 Absent unusual circumstances, a<br />

lender does not incur liability for strictly enforcing the terms <strong>of</strong> a loan<br />

commitment. 191<br />

7.1.2 Negligent Misrepresentation. Allegation may, for instance, be that the<br />

lender failed to disclose to the borrower adverse facts known to the lender<br />

in regard to the transaction for which the loan was made. 192 Liability has<br />

been based on a jury finding that a bank <strong>of</strong>ficer negligently misrepresented<br />

that the bank was willing to negotiate in good faith to restructure a loan. 193<br />

In Texas a bank may be liable for negligent misrepresentation if it gives<br />

"false information for the guidance <strong>of</strong> others in their business<br />

transactions". 194 A lender may have a basis to assert a claim <strong>of</strong> negligent<br />

misrepresentation against third party service providers such as<br />

accountants, lawyers or appraisers upon which the lender relied. 195<br />

188 See Chapter 4B “ Liability <strong>of</strong> Lender for Controlling Debtor and for Other Acts” in Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong><br />

Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1985-1996)<br />

189 See High v. McLean Finance Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987); Jacques v. First National Bank, 307 Md.<br />

527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).<br />

190 See Shadur, Avoiding Lender Liability at the Loan Commitment Stage, The Practical Lawyer, May 1990, p.47.<br />

Clardy Manufacturing Co. v. Maine Midland Business Loan, Inc., 88 F.3d 347, rehearing denied, 96 F.3d 1447 (5 th<br />

Cir. 1996)<br />

191 On appeal in the infamous, Penthouse Int’l v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. case (855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.<br />

1988), the Court reversed the massive expectation damage verdict below in holding that the lender had no obligation to<br />

extend the loan closing date.<br />

192 See Sumitomo Bank <strong>of</strong> Cal. v. Iwasaki, 447 P.2d 956, 73 Cal Rptr. 564 (1968). Restatements Second, Torts §552<br />

(1977) MSA Tubular Prod, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 869 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1989) (Inaccurate response<br />

to credit inquiries).<br />

193 Richter, S.A. v. Bank <strong>of</strong> Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1991).<br />

194 Federal Land Banks Ass'n v. Sloane, 793 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App. 1990).<br />

195 See Soderberg v. Mckinney, 52 Col Rptr. 635 (Cal App. 2 Dist 1996 (appraiser); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3<br />

Cal 4th 370 (1992) (no claim against accountant)<br />

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7.1.3 Duress. Business Compulsion. If under local law it is an affirmative tort<br />

economic duress involves a threat by lender to commit an act it has no<br />

legal right to commit, such as refusal to meet a legal obligation to advance<br />

additional funds that results in the borrower doing something it is not<br />

obligated to do to avoid damage from lender's threatened illegal act. It is<br />

to be distinguished from hard bargaining. 196 These cases <strong>of</strong>ten involve the<br />

lender inducing the borrower to provide additional collateral. 197<br />

7.1.4 Breach <strong>of</strong> Implied Covenant <strong>of</strong> Good Faith and Fair Dealing.<br />

(1) Cases under this concept usually involve inappropriate exercise <strong>of</strong><br />

default remedies. 198<br />

(2) Determine whether in the particular jurisdiction the concept actually<br />

exists or appears to be on the way to being developed by the courts. 199<br />

196 Sheehan v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1987). For instance in Tennessee "economic duress"<br />

consists <strong>of</strong> "imposition, oppression, undue influence, or the taking <strong>of</strong> undue advantage <strong>of</strong> the business or financial stress<br />

or extreme necessities or weakness <strong>of</strong> another." Crocker v. Schneider, 683 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tenn. App. 1984).<br />

Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Company <strong>of</strong> Great Bend, 936 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1991).<br />

197 See Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. Creole Supply, 596 F.2d 515 (2nd Cir. 1979); In re Osborne, 42 Bankr. 988 (W.D.<br />

Wis. 1984).<br />

198 In Duffield v. First Interstate Bank <strong>of</strong> Denver, N.A., 13 F.3d 1403 (10th Cir. December 23, 1993) the Court<br />

sustained a $6 Million jury verdict where the bank had allegedly agreed after a default to accept a prepayment to release<br />

a property and to apply a portion <strong>of</strong> the prepayment to past and future interest and instead applied the entire prepayment<br />

to principal and then notified the operators <strong>of</strong> oil and gas wells on which it held assignment as collateral to pay all<br />

production proceeds directly to it, the bank. This resulted in the borrower losing all his oil and gas interests for lack <strong>of</strong><br />

cash flow to pay operating expenses. The Tenth Circuit on the basis <strong>of</strong> its analysis <strong>of</strong> Section 1-203 <strong>of</strong> the UCC<br />

concluded that the covenant <strong>of</strong> good faith overrode the express terms <strong>of</strong> the document. See also Big Horn Coal Co. v.<br />

Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259 (10th Cir. 1988) where the court stated that: "Where a contract provision is<br />

exercisable only at some discretion <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the parties, and expectations are created by the contract, good faith<br />

limitations are applicable to protect the non-exercising party from unexpected invocation <strong>of</strong> the option." See also Four<br />

Times Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. Cigna Invs., Inc., 306 A.D.2d 4, 764 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6170<br />

(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2003) (Court reversed the lower court's order denying the ground lessor/borrower's motion<br />

for preliminary injunction preventing the loan servicers from holding it in default for failing to obtain terrorism<br />

insurance) and Philadelphia Plaza-Phase II v. Bank <strong>of</strong> America National Trust and Savings Association, 2002 WL<br />

1472337 (Pa.Com.Pl.) (In overruling the lender's preliminary objections to the complaint, the court held that the<br />

borrower's complaint set forth a justiciable claim in alleging facts that demonstrated the existence <strong>of</strong> an active<br />

controversy involving the lender's breach <strong>of</strong> the implied covenant <strong>of</strong> good faith with respect to the provisions <strong>of</strong> the loan<br />

documents governing insurance; the lender had interpreted "other insurance" to include terrorism insurance, rejected<br />

borrower's request for time to investigate the feasibility <strong>of</strong> obtaining terrorism insurance and threatened to force place<br />

such insurance and demand reimbursement from borrower for the cost <strong>of</strong> the premium).<br />

199 See Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corp. v. Zollic<strong>of</strong>fer, 719 F.Supp. 650 (N.D.III 1989), K.M.C., Inc. v. Irving Trust<br />

Co. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir 1985); Barrett v. Bank <strong>of</strong> America, 183 Cal. App. 3rd 1362; 229 Cal Rptr. 16(1986);<br />

Restatement Second, Contracts §205; Section 1-203 <strong>of</strong> the Uniform <strong>Commercial</strong> Code provides that "every contract or<br />

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(3) The trend <strong>of</strong> the cases may be that although the lender may not<br />

interfere with right <strong>of</strong> borrower under document absent a contrary<br />

course <strong>of</strong> dealing, express or implied modification or other collateral<br />

circumstances, the lender is not required to accept material change to<br />

existing arrangement. 200<br />

(4) A substantial judgment has been recovered for lender's lack <strong>of</strong> good<br />

faith in not accepting property equal in value to debt and thus<br />

attempting to foreclose on all <strong>of</strong> the collateral although the value<br />

substantially exceeded the debt. 201<br />

(5) See discussion at Item 7.10 below on implied promise <strong>of</strong> borrower not<br />

to file lender liability suit in bad faith.<br />

(6) Several courts have refused to extend the implied covenant beyond<br />

what is specifically provided for by the U.C.C. 202<br />

(7) A related approach is for a court to deny the equitable remedy <strong>of</strong><br />

foreclosure if it finds that the mortgagee engaged in conduct violative<br />

<strong>of</strong> the "clean hands" doctrine. 203<br />

duty within this Act imposes an obligation <strong>of</strong> good faith in its performance or enforcements." According to the Code,<br />

"good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in the transaction concerned." U.C.C. §1-201(19). The Code renders<br />

unenforceable contracts deemed unconscionable.See Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 1, 537 N.Y.S.<br />

2d 787, 534 N.E. 2d 824 (1988).<br />

200 Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356 (Wash 1991) reversing the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals decision at 786 P.2d 302<br />

(Wash. App. 1990). Courts generally have not imposed new obligations outside the parties’ agreement or modified<br />

legal rights under the guise <strong>of</strong> the implied duty <strong>of</strong> good faith; they have not imposed implied terms and/or covenants<br />

as to matters specifically covered by the contract between the parties nor invoked the duty to preclude a creditor<br />

from exercising its bargained for rights under a loan agreement. See USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing, Inc., 988 F.2d 433<br />

(3d Cir. 1993) (denying equipment-financier's claim for breach <strong>of</strong> implied covenant <strong>of</strong> good faith and fair dealing<br />

based upon the same acts alleged to be in breach <strong>of</strong> express covenants contained in collateral assignment <strong>of</strong> leases);<br />

Berry v. First National Bank <strong>of</strong> Mercer County, 892 F. Sup 127 (WD Pa. 1994), affirmed, 60 F.3d 813 (holding that<br />

implied duty <strong>of</strong> good faith in breach <strong>of</strong> contract action will not defeat lender’s express contract rights); Temp-Way,<br />

supra (denying borrower’s claim that lender breached financing agreement by not dealing with the borrower in good<br />

faith and by failing to comply with oral promises for financing, by refusing to impose duties upon creditors which<br />

would modify or defeat their legal rights); AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Harris, 759 F. Sup 1141 (E. D. Pa.. 1991)<br />

(refusing to apply implied covenant to modify express terms <strong>of</strong> franchise agreement regarding the franchiser's duty to<br />

train franchisee or assist in the operation <strong>of</strong> the franchise); Sons <strong>of</strong> Thunder, supra (stating that implied duty cannot<br />

override an express termination clause; the only issue being whether the defendant exercised the right to terminate in<br />

good faith); Glenfed, supra (holding that implied duty did not require lender to cooperate with borrower's attempts to<br />

secure additional financing, or to consent to requests to waive defaults or extend maturity date).<br />

201 See Wells Fargo <strong>Real</strong>ty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Violi, Inc., 872 P.2d 1359 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1994).<br />

See also Dolton v. Capital Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 642 P.2d 21, 23-24, (Colo. App. 1981).<br />

202 People's Heritage Sav. Bank v. Recoll Management, Inc., 814 F. Supp 159 (D.ME. 1993). See Good Faith<br />

Acceleration Provisions <strong>of</strong> U.C.C. §1-208.<br />

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(8) The implied obligation has been imposed upon the F.D.I.C. despite the<br />

D'Oench Duhne Doctrine. 204<br />

7.1.5 Recharacterization <strong>of</strong> Transaction 205 .<br />

(a) Purported Leases. The borrower or general creditors in a chapter<br />

proceeding may seek to recharacterize a purported ground lease as being a<br />

joint venture and thus possibly subject the purported ground lessor to the<br />

liabilities <strong>of</strong> the debtor.<br />

(b) Purported Financing Arrangement. Mere sharing <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its will<br />

generally not be adequate basis for the recharacterization <strong>of</strong> a purported<br />

participating loan as a joint venture. 206 Lack <strong>of</strong> an obligation to reply on a<br />

specified date and power to control may be significant factors.<br />

7.1.6 Fraud and False Lender Representations. A false representation will<br />

usually support an action for fraud which being a tort may involve punitive<br />

damages. Lenders should be particularly careful not to make enforcement<br />

threats unless there is a real intention to take the specific action if the<br />

borrower fails to affirmatively respond. 207 False representation may also<br />

be made by a lender in connection with negotiation or performance <strong>of</strong> loan<br />

or negotiation <strong>of</strong> forbearance arrangements. 208 Cause <strong>of</strong> action may be<br />

based on lender's knowledge <strong>of</strong> falsity <strong>of</strong> representation or material<br />

concealment by lender and damage to borrower. A borrower may in some<br />

jurisdictions establish "promissory fraud" by establishing that a lender<br />

made a promise <strong>of</strong> future conduct with no present intention <strong>of</strong> performing<br />

the promise. 209<br />

7.1.7 Regulatory or Statutory Violations by Lender.<br />

203 Prudential Ins. Co. <strong>of</strong> America v. Jackson, 270 N.J.Super. 510, 637 A.2d 573 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1994).<br />

204 In re Beltzell & Co., Inc., 163 B.R. 637 (Bankr. D.Dist. Col. 1993).<br />

205 See also item 8.1 below.<br />

206 See Stone A. Michaud Ins. v. Bank Five for Savings 785.F Supp. 1065 (D.N.H. 1992)<br />

206 Threats <strong>of</strong> lender action that was in fact not intended but did induce a transfer <strong>of</strong> control to the lender was one basis<br />

for the successful lender liability claim in State Nat’l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)<br />

208 For instance, fraudulent promise not to call loan: Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F.Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)<br />

Aff'd 516 F.2d 1396 (2nd Cir.); See Security Pacific National Bank v. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3rd 927 (1989).<br />

(Depublished in Calif.)<br />

209 See Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W. 2d 496 (Tenn. 1978). A mere subjective belief on the part <strong>of</strong> the<br />

borrower that the lender did not at the time <strong>of</strong> the promise intend to perform should not be adequate to support a<br />

promissory fraud case.<br />

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(1) Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §1691(a); Reg. B, 12<br />

C.F.R. §202.7(d) (1990) limits circumstances under which persons<br />

(including a borrower's spouse) may be required to assume liability. 210<br />

(2) Anti Tying Provisions - TIRA- 12 U.S.E. §1464 (q)(1) prohibits a<br />

thrift from requiring a borrower to provide or obtain certain unrelated<br />

services in conjunction with a loan. 211 Similar provisions are found in the<br />

Bank Holding Company Act Amendments <strong>of</strong> 1970, §106(b) [12 U.S.C.<br />

§1972(1)]. 212 Requirements for liability include extension <strong>of</strong> credit or<br />

perhaps <strong>of</strong>fer on condition that the customer obtain or provide some<br />

additional credit, property or service. To establish a claim under 12<br />

U.S.C. §1972(1)(b) the bank customer is not required to show that it was<br />

coerced to take some other action as a condition <strong>of</strong> receiving the loan. 213 It<br />

has been held that these anti-tying provisions bar only anti-competitive<br />

arrangements. 214<br />

(3) Securities Law Violations. 215 To establish a claim under federal<br />

securities law against a lender for aiding and abetting fraudulent activity,<br />

lender with knowledge <strong>of</strong> a fraud provided substantial assistance in<br />

perpetuating the fraud If the bank has a fiduciary duty to the defrauded<br />

party, recklessness rather than actual knowledge <strong>of</strong> the fraud may be<br />

adequate. A bank holding purchaser deposit escrows may thus owe a<br />

210 See discussion at item 5.4 above.<br />

211 See Tri-Crown, Inc. v. American Federal Savings & Loan Asso., 908 F.2d 578 (10th Cir 1990)(1990-2 CCH<br />

Trade Cases §69,159) Bruce v. First Federal Saving and Loan Association <strong>of</strong> Conroe, Inc., 837 F.2d 712 (5th Cir<br />

1988) .<br />

212 See Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and Amerifirst Properties, Inc. v.<br />

FDIC, 880 F.2d 821 (5th Cir 1989).<br />

213 Dibidale <strong>of</strong> Louisiana, Inc. v. American Bank & Trust Co. 916 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1990), (involved an allegation<br />

that the bank's encouragement <strong>of</strong> borrower's use <strong>of</strong> a particular contractor breached the anti-tying provisions <strong>of</strong> the Bank<br />

Holding Company Act. The court concluded that because <strong>of</strong> the banking industry's "aggregate economic power and<br />

unique economic "role" market power need not be established to provide requisite coercion since "power to coerce is<br />

inherent in the banking relationship itself."<br />

214 Graue Mill Development Corp. v. Colonial Bank & Trust Company Chicago,927 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1991) In<br />

Bieber v. State Bank <strong>of</strong> Terry, 928 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1991) the court required that (1) the banking practice in question<br />

must be unusual (2) an anti-competitive tying arrangement must exist (3) the arrangement must benefit the Bank.<br />

215 This has generally not been to fruitful for borrowers except where the banks actions have been the basis <strong>of</strong> a<br />

security <strong>of</strong>fering as in the case <strong>of</strong> issuance by bank's <strong>of</strong> letters <strong>of</strong> confidence that a loan would be available which letters<br />

was allegedly issued with the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud under Rule 10b-5.<br />

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fiduciary duty to the purchaser that was allegedly defrauded by the<br />

developer-seller client <strong>of</strong> the bank. 216<br />

(4) RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). 18<br />

U.S.C. Sec.1962, 18 U.S.C.Sec. 1962 217 a "pattern" <strong>of</strong> "racketeering"<br />

activity must be established. Because <strong>of</strong> the banking industry's "aggregate<br />

economic power and unique economic "role" market power need not be<br />

established to provide requisite coercion since "power" to coerce is<br />

inherent in the banking relationship itself.<br />

(5) State Unfair Trade Practices Acts. These usually include triple<br />

or other multiple damage awards and possible award <strong>of</strong> attorney fees.<br />

Although <strong>of</strong>ten limited to consumer transactions they will in many<br />

jurisdictions also be applied to commercial transactions, especially where<br />

small businesses or individual liability may be involved. 218<br />

7.1.8 Damage to Borrower During Period <strong>of</strong> Control <strong>of</strong> Borrower by<br />

Lender. 219 Interference with corporate governance <strong>of</strong> debtor control<br />

might be alleged to have created a fiduciary duty on lender. 220<br />

7.1.9 Collateral Inducements and Undertakings.<br />

7.1.10 Prima Facie Tort. An intentional, unjustified act intended to cause injury<br />

and which in fact does cause injury. 221 In some states the plaintiff must<br />

216 See Schoepe v. Zions First National Bank, 750 Fed Supp 1084 (D.Utah 1990). See also Berry v. Meleod, 604 P.2d<br />

610 (Ariz. 1979); Powell v. H.E.F. Partnership, 793 F.Supp. 91 (D.Vt. 1992).<br />

217 In Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1990) Lender's RICO claim against borrower was sustained<br />

where the borrower obtained three loans over a five year period and misappropriated collateral by use <strong>of</strong> 95 checks over<br />

the life <strong>of</strong> the loans. Cf. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406 (3rd Cir. 1991).<br />

218 See Grigsby v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co. d/b/a ITT Fin. Servs., 127 B.R. 759 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1991).<br />

219 In State National Bank <strong>of</strong> El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Company, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984), the<br />

lender was held liable for over 18 million dollars <strong>of</strong> damages to the borrower as a result <strong>of</strong> wrongful control by lender <strong>of</strong><br />

the borrower. The lender controlled the choice <strong>of</strong> the Board <strong>of</strong> the borrower, forced hiring <strong>of</strong> a consultant <strong>of</strong> lender's<br />

choice and forced the sale <strong>of</strong> assets <strong>of</strong> the borrower to reduce the indebtedness. The court found lender fraud in lender<br />

asserting an intent to call the loan if certain conditions were not accepted by the borrower when such intent did not in<br />

fact exist. See Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 SW L.J. 775 (1986).<br />

See Cappello and Konoroske, Lender Liability Based on Undue Control over a Borrower, 28 Trial 19 (Dec. 1992).<br />

220 See discussion at 7.1.14(2).<br />

221 Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W. 2d 265 (Mo. App. 1980) This theory is most developed in New York and<br />

Missouri. Several Missouri cases have found lender's acts justified. See Centerre Bank <strong>of</strong> Kansas City, N.A. v.<br />

Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1985).<br />

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also establish that the lender’s actions are tortious under a or subjective<br />

“Balancing <strong>of</strong> Interests” test. 222<br />

7.1.11 Negligent Loan Administration. May relate to failure <strong>of</strong> lender to inspect,<br />

procure insurance, etc. This is more commonly a guarantor or other third<br />

party defense.<br />

7.1.12 Tortious Interference with Contact or Prospective Economic<br />

Advantage. 223 This cause <strong>of</strong> action requires a lender’s improper or<br />

unjustified interference with a valid existing contract or opportunity on the<br />

part <strong>of</strong> the borrower that is known to the lender. 224<br />

7.1.13 Breach <strong>of</strong> Oral Commitment To Lend or To Forestall Resort to<br />

Default Remedies. Oral commitments to loan have been enforced. 225<br />

Legislation has been adopted in a substantial majority <strong>of</strong> the states to bring<br />

loan commitments within the statute <strong>of</strong> frauds. 226 Even when a statute <strong>of</strong><br />

frauds is found applicable, it may be held inapplicable if, for instance,<br />

there is held to be part performance by the lender 227 or an allegation <strong>of</strong><br />

lender fraud. 228 A Montana court on a merger theory 229 dismissed a claim<br />

<strong>of</strong> an oral commitment to lend. To be binding on a lender a loan<br />

222 Killion v. Bank Midwest, N.A., 1998 WL 863347 (Md. App. W.D. Dec. 15, 1998) (default attributable to refusal<br />

<strong>of</strong> bank to permit pay<strong>of</strong>f unless the borrower paid an unenforceable claim for contingent interest.<br />

223 See Restatement (Second) Torts §767; Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y. 2d 183, 406<br />

N.E. 2d 445, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 628 (1980).<br />

224 Fury Importing, Inc. v. Shakespeare, 554.F 2d 1376 (5 th Cir. 1977); See Felsen v. Sol Cafe Mafg. Corp., 24 N.Y.2d<br />

682, 249 N.E.2d 459, 301 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1969)<br />

225 Champaign Nat’l Bank v. Landers Seed Co., 165 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 519 N.E.2d 957 (1988); Gold v. Vasileff,<br />

160 Ill. App. 3d 125, 513 N.E.2d 446 (1987).<br />

226 In St Sys. Corp. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 112 Md. App. 20, 684 A.2d 32 (1996) the court applied the Maryland<br />

Lender Liability Statute <strong>of</strong> Frauds (§5-317 <strong>of</strong> the Maryland Code) to sustain a dismissal <strong>of</strong> claims by a Borrower. In<br />

1986 Minnesota became the first state to adopt such a law, Min. Stat. Ann. §513.33 (West). See Drewes v. First Nat'l<br />

Bank <strong>of</strong> Detroit Lakes, 461 N.W. 2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)(sustains application <strong>of</strong> Minnesota statute <strong>of</strong> frauds<br />

adopted in 1985 (Minn Stat. §513.33(2) on alleged 1981 oral modification <strong>of</strong> a loan arrangement where suit was<br />

initiated after the effective date <strong>of</strong> the statute. But see Beal Bank S.S.B. v. Krock, ___ F.3d ___ (1 st Cir. 1998), LEXIS<br />

22051 (oral modification <strong>of</strong> agreement to credit guarantor with sale proceeds upheld notwithstanding prohibition against<br />

oral modification) on the ability to orally modify an integrated document that prohibits subsequent oral modification.<br />

See Cambridge Sav. Bank v. Boersner, 413 Mass. 432, 597 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Mass. 1992) and Wagner v. Graziano<br />

Const. Co., 390 Pa. 445, 136 A.2d 81, 83 (Pa. 1957).<br />

227 Integra Nat'l. Bank v. Oakes Constr. Co., 1994 WL 68045 (Ohio App. 1994)(not reported in N.E.2d)..<br />

228 Brown v. Founders Bank & Trust Co., 890 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1994).<br />

229 Eislein v. Montana Bank <strong>of</strong> Roundup, 818 P.2d 365 (Mont. Sept. 9, 1991).<br />

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commitment must generally contain all material terms <strong>of</strong> the loan which<br />

probably include at least the identity <strong>of</strong> parties, amount <strong>of</strong> the loan and<br />

terms <strong>of</strong> repayment. 230 See Discussion at 3.3.8 on enforcement <strong>of</strong> oral<br />

modifications even where the document includes a prohibition <strong>of</strong> oral<br />

modification.<br />

7.1.14 Breach <strong>of</strong> Fiduciary Duty.<br />

(1) It has been held that despite lack <strong>of</strong> a written agreement evidencing<br />

a fiduciary relationship a prospective subordinate lender may be liable to a<br />

borrower for breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty when to facilitate the purchase <strong>of</strong> a<br />

property by a third party it utilizes confidential information provided by<br />

the prospective borrower. 231<br />

(2) Although ordinarily a lender does not owe a fiduciary duty to a<br />

borrower 232 it has been held that a “confidential relationship” that creates a<br />

fiduciary duty on the lender with respect to the borrower may arise where<br />

the lender gains substantial control over the debtor’s business affairs. 233 It<br />

is important to distinguish between mere monitoring <strong>of</strong> a borrower’s<br />

operations 234 and the sort <strong>of</strong> control that may create a fiduciary<br />

relationship. Although absent at least a State National Bank v. Farah 235<br />

situation a court should not find a fiduciary obligation in the control and<br />

limitations <strong>of</strong>ten found in loan documents and especially in work out<br />

documents, it may not be difficult for a borrower by alleging such control<br />

to get beyond preliminary objections or a motion to dismiss and thus<br />

significantly delay a foreclosure proceeding. 236<br />

7.1.15 Unjust Enrichment.<br />

230 Lowe v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1976) 54 Cal App. 3rd 718, 127 Cal. Rep. 23; Patterson Dev. Co., Inc. v. Torrey<br />

Pines Bank, 284 Cal. Rep. 367 (1991).<br />

231 Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 241 App. Div. 2d 114, 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., Apr 16, 1998).<br />

Compare this with Northeast General Corp. v. Wellington Advertising Inc. 82 N.Y 2d 158, 624 N.E. 2d, 129, 604<br />

N.Y. 5, 2d 192 (1993)<br />

232 See GE Capital Mortgage Service v. Pinnacle Mortgage Inv. 897 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Pa. 1995) citing Federal<br />

Land Bank v. Fetner, 410 A.2d 344 (Pa. 1979) cert. denied 446 U.S. 9187 (1980)<br />

233 Id. Citing Stainton v. Tarantino, 637 F. Supp 1051, 1066 (E.D. Pa 1986)<br />

234 see In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599 , 610-11 (2d Cir. 1983)<br />

235 see item 7.1.8 above .<br />

236 For instance see Rodin Properties-Shore Mall. N.V. v. Cushman & Wakefield <strong>of</strong> Pennsylvania , 49 F.Supp. 2d<br />

728 (D. N.J. 1999)<br />

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7.1.16 Loan Prohibited by Borrower's Partnership or Corporate Governing<br />

Documents. 237<br />

7.1.17 "Demand" Instrument Containing Acceleration Provisions. Courts<br />

are split on whether U.C.C. §1.208 is applicable to a "demand" instrument<br />

that also contains Events <strong>of</strong> Default and provision for acceleration on<br />

default. 238<br />

7.2 Punitive Damages. Wrongful foreclosure may be basis for punitive damages. 239<br />

7.3 Review <strong>of</strong> Lender's Files, Memoranda and Correspondence. Review all<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficial and personal credit and collateral files - These may include not only the<br />

usual correspondence reports and studies but also memoranda, notes <strong>of</strong> meetings,<br />

phone conversations and, reminders. Be particularly sensitive to possible<br />

existence <strong>of</strong> files maintained by loan <strong>of</strong>ficers and others involved in processing<br />

and administration <strong>of</strong> the loan. Be sensitive to "aggressive" language. At a later<br />

phase <strong>of</strong> review it may be appropriate to review lender's approval manuals,<br />

guidelines and procedural memorandum <strong>of</strong> general applicability. Evaluate the<br />

lender <strong>of</strong>ficer's conduct. This includes consideration not only <strong>of</strong> what the lending<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer says she did but what a fact finder might perceive the <strong>of</strong>ficer did. Consider<br />

possible existence <strong>of</strong> personality conflicts between lender personnel and borrower<br />

personnel<br />

7.4 Alleged <strong>Course</strong> <strong>of</strong> Dealing Modifications. <strong>Course</strong> <strong>of</strong> dealing modification -<br />

consider possible basis <strong>of</strong> any such allegation.<br />

7.5 Breach <strong>of</strong> an Oral Commitment. Consider basis for borrower to claim that there<br />

has been a breach <strong>of</strong> an oral commitment - These usually involve alleged<br />

agreements to extend payments or other borrower obligations or performance or<br />

alleged agreements to make additional loans or to arrange other financing, or for<br />

the lender to forestall action based on partial performance or specific borrower<br />

action in regard to another loan. 240 A number <strong>of</strong> states have amended their<br />

statutes <strong>of</strong> fraud to bar enforcement <strong>of</strong> oral agreements to lend. 241<br />

237 Whitney v. Citibank, 782 F.2d 1106 (2nd Cir. 1986) (Lender held to have induced breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty by two<br />

<strong>of</strong> three partners). Interstate Properties v. Pyramid Co. <strong>of</strong> Utica, 581 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).<br />

238 See Shawmut Bank v. Miller, 415 Mass. 482 (Mass. 1993); Reid v. Key Bank <strong>of</strong> Southern Maine, Inc., 821 F.2d 9<br />

(1st Cir. 1987); Bank One Texas, N.A. and F.D.I.C. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1992).<br />

239 First Union National Bank <strong>of</strong> Georgia v. Cook, 477 S.E.2d 649 (Ga Ct. <strong>of</strong> Appeals 1996). Sustained refusal <strong>of</strong><br />

true count to give directed verdict in permitted damage claim.<br />

240 Landes v. Construction Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank <strong>of</strong> Canada, 833 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir 1987)(Oral Commitment to<br />

make advances); Kruse v. Bank <strong>of</strong> America; 202 Cal. App 3rd 38, 248 Cal Rptr 217(1988). As to commitment to issue<br />

letters <strong>of</strong> credit see Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat'l Bank <strong>of</strong> Jefferson Parish, 583 S.2d 443 (La. 1991).<br />

241 See, for instance §11.2(9) <strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong> Virginia which was applied in Riggs Nat'l Bank <strong>of</strong> Washington D.C. v.<br />

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7.6 Fraudulent Transfers. See discussion at §8.6 below.<br />

7.7 Usury. 242<br />

7.8 Personal Exemptions. Consider personal exemptions, life insurance policies and<br />

annuities, entireties property, community property 243 homestead exemptions 244<br />

7.9 Waiver as Defense to Lender Liability Claims. Execution by borrower <strong>of</strong><br />

renewal note or other extension documentation may constitute a waiver <strong>of</strong><br />

borrowers claims against the lender. 245<br />

7.10 Lender Liability Claim Defenses<br />

7.10.1 Borrower's Breach <strong>of</strong> Implied Promise Not to Make Lender Liability<br />

Claim in Bad Faith. This is a theory <strong>of</strong> tort liability similar to Rule 11 <strong>of</strong><br />

the Federal Rules <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure and is based on Section 205 <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Restatement (Second) <strong>of</strong> Contracts which applies to "assertion, settlement<br />

and litigation <strong>of</strong> contract claims and defenses". 246 Although this is a<br />

contract claim punitive damages may be available. 247<br />

7.11 Arbitration Provisions. 248<br />

Wrigley Field Ltd. Partnership, C.A. 1991 WL 342380 (No. 90-1357-A) (E.D. Va. 2-8-91).<br />

242 See Chapter 22 “Violation <strong>of</strong> Usury Laws” in Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong> Distreszsed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark Boardman<br />

Callaghan 1985-1996).<br />

243 See discussion in United States v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 816 F. 2d 487 (9th Cir 1987)<br />

244 The homestead exemption in states such as Florida and Texas may protect property worth many millions <strong>of</strong> dollars<br />

from creditor claims. Consider possibility <strong>of</strong> setting aside as fraudulent conveyances midnight acquisitions <strong>of</strong> alleged<br />

exempt property by borrower, general partners <strong>of</strong> borrower or guarantors or the reduction <strong>of</strong> loans on exempt property.<br />

Notwithstanding favorable legislative history the courts have not recently been too kindly disposed to "pre-bankruptcy<br />

planning" <strong>of</strong> this nature where the planning was intended not merely to facilitate the debtors "fresh start" but to provide a<br />

"head start". See discussion at item 8.10 below.<br />

245 Austin Dev. Co. v. Bank <strong>of</strong> Meridian, 569 So.2d 1209 (Miss. 1990). See also, discussion <strong>of</strong> enforceability <strong>of</strong><br />

waivers in workout documents at item 3.17 above.<br />

246 See Association Group Life, Inc. v. Catholic War Veterans <strong>of</strong> the United States <strong>of</strong> America, 61 N.J. 150, 293 A.2d<br />

382 (1972). See also Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. <strong>of</strong> California, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d<br />

1158 (1984).<br />

247 See Riveredge Assocs. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1991) which recognizes this cause <strong>of</strong><br />

action.<br />

247 See item 5.17 above in regard to choice <strong>of</strong> forum and choice <strong>of</strong> law provisions in loan documents.<br />

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7.11.1 If the dispute involves “commerce” as defined in the Federal Arbitration<br />

Act 249 it comes within the scope <strong>of</strong> the act. It has generally been<br />

concluded that federal law favors the enforcement <strong>of</strong> arbitration<br />

agreements 250 and determines whether an issue governed by the federal<br />

act is referable to arbitration. 251<br />

7.11.2 Most <strong>of</strong> the federal courts that have considered the issue have concluded<br />

that mutuality <strong>of</strong> obligation is not required for an arbitration clause to be<br />

enforceable. 252 Thus is such jurisdiction, if federal law is applicable, one<br />

party to the agreement may be bound to arbitrate all disputes while the<br />

other party might be granted an election to either arbitrate or resort to the<br />

courts. Many state courts have come to the same conclusion. 253<br />

7.11.3 The California Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals has affirmed a trial court determination<br />

that an arbitration provision in an agreement was unenforceable as<br />

unconscionable. 254 The Third Circuit did not consider to be<br />

unconscionable a clause in a home improvement agreement that required<br />

the unsophisticated elderly and low income home owner to arbitrate all<br />

disputes but permitted the home improvement lender and contractor<br />

involved in an allegedly fraudulent scheme to arbitrate or go to court. 255<br />

249 9 U.S.C. § et. Seq.<br />

250 In re Prudential Insurance Company <strong>of</strong> America Sales Practice Litigation , 133 3d 225,231 (3 rd Cir 1998)<br />

251 Prima Paint Corp. v Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 338 U.S. 395, 401-403 , 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967)<br />

252 See e.g. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451-53 (2d Cir. 1995); Wilson Elec. Contractors, Inc.<br />

v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1989); Dorsey v. H.C.P. Sales, Inc., 46 F.Supp. 2d<br />

804, 806-07 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F.Supp. 11410, 1421-22 (M.D. Ala. 1997)<br />

(rejecting claim that arbitration clause that required one party to arbitrate all claims, while giving the second party<br />

the option not to arbitrate anything was invalid); Pate v. Melvin Williams Manufactured Homes, Inc., 198 B.R. 841,<br />

844 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (rejecting argument that arbitration agreement lacked mutuality because defendant<br />

company could sue over certain issues, while consumer had to arbitrate all claims).<br />

253 See, e.g., Smith v. Sanderson Group, Inc., 736 So. 2d 604, 612-13 (Ala. 1999); Parker v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,<br />

730 So. 2d 168, 170-71 (Ala. 1999); Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C. 388, 498 S.E. 2d 898, 904 (App.<br />

1998); Ishmael v. Dutch Housing Inc., No. 96AP100084, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3974 *4-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).<br />

254 Paterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rept. 2d 563 (1st Dist. 1993).<br />

255 Harris v. Green Tree Financial, 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999). It is also true that (when arbitration clauses are<br />

embedded within a larger contract, there is no need to search for mutuality in the arbitration clause specifically if<br />

there is consideration beyond the promise to arbitrate).<br />

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7.12 Jury Trial Waivers. Waiver must be knowing and voluntary 256 to be enforced.<br />

Among the factors courts consider in determining the enforceability <strong>of</strong> a waiver<br />

are the negotiations <strong>of</strong> parties relating to the waiver, conspicuousness <strong>of</strong> the<br />

waiver provisions, relative bargaining power <strong>of</strong> the parties and whether the<br />

waiving party was represented by counsel 257 in executing the document containing<br />

the waiver.<br />

8.0 Relevant Bankruptcy Considerations<br />

8.1 Recharacterization.<br />

8.1.1 Purported Leases. A document that purports on its face to be a lease may<br />

be recharacterized as possibly either a mortgage or as a joint venture. 258 In<br />

the latter case the "Lessor" may be liable as a partner to the general<br />

creditors. If the "lease" is recharacterized as a mortgage it will not benefit<br />

from the favorable bankruptcy provisions applicable to nonresidential<br />

leases 259 and may be subject to a "cram down". 260<br />

8.1.2 Purported Financing Arrangement. Participating mortgages may be<br />

recharacterized as joint ventures.<br />

8.1.3 Title Insurance. It has been held that a title insurer need not defend a<br />

claim to recharacterization in a sale leaseback transaction. 261<br />

8.2 Rent Assignment.<br />

256 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).<br />

257 Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmission, 717 F. Supp. 589, 595-596 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Whirlpool Financial Corp. v.<br />

Sevaux, 874 F.Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1994).<br />

258 See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) see generally Faber, Determining the Owner Of An<br />

Asset For Tax Purposes, 61 Taxes 795, 803-804 (1983); Homburger and Andre, <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Sale and Leaseback<br />

Transactions and The Risk <strong>of</strong> Recharacterization in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 <strong>Real</strong> Property, Probate and Trust<br />

Journal. 95 (Spring 1989); In the personal property context the recharacterization <strong>of</strong> a "lease" as or security device may<br />

result in the "lessor" losing all property right to the chattel. See also In re Valley Forge Plaza Associates v. Academy<br />

Life Ins. Co. 1990 WL 153999 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 1990) (unreported). See Kenneth P. Coleman, How to Tell if a<br />

Transaction is a True Lease or a Disguised Secured Transaction, 114 Banking C.J. 953 (Nov/Dec 1997).<br />

259 See 11 U.S.C. §365.<br />

260 See item 8.8 below.<br />

261 Ticor Title Insurance Co. <strong>of</strong> California v. FFCA/11P 1988 Property Company, 898 F.S. 633 (N.D. Ind. 1995);<br />

TransAmerica Title Ins. Co. v. Alaska Federal S&L Association <strong>of</strong> Juneau, 883 F.2d 775 (9th Cir 1988); Bidart v.<br />

American Title Ins. Co. 734 P.2d 732 (Nev. 1987) 84 ALR 3d 515; Homberger and Gallagher, To Pay or Not To Pay:<br />

claiming damages for Recharacterization <strong>of</strong> Sale Leaseback Transaction Under Owners Title Insurance Policies, 30<br />

<strong>ABA</strong> <strong>Real</strong> Prop, Prob & Trust Journ. 443 (1995).<br />

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See 9.0 below on effect <strong>of</strong> assignment to lender <strong>of</strong> future rents.<br />

8.3 Preferences.<br />

8.3.1 Generally. Basic 90 day preference period is provided for by §547 (b) <strong>of</strong><br />

the Bankruptcy Code. 262 Transfers made for "contemporaneous exchange<br />

<strong>of</strong> new value", in payment <strong>of</strong> ordinary course obligations within 45 days <strong>of</strong><br />

the same being incurred and security for new value are excluded. A<br />

creditor may not invoke enabling loan exemption under section 547(e)(3)<br />

unless the lien has been perfected within twenty (20) days even if state law<br />

provides for a longer period 263<br />

8.3.2 Triangular Preference - DePrizio - Reversed by 1994 Act. Application<br />

<strong>of</strong> one year preference period. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In<br />

re V.N. DePrizio Construction Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir 1989) applied<br />

the insider one year preference period to an unrelated lender where the<br />

debt was guaranteed by an insider. This was reversed by the Bankruptcy<br />

Reform Act <strong>of</strong> 1994. The ninety (90) day preference period now applies to<br />

all non-insiders. 11 U.S.C.A. §550(c).<br />

8.3.3 Standing. Under the Bankruptcy Code only a trustee or a debtor in<br />

possession may seek to avoid preferences. A lienholder or other creditor<br />

has no standing to initiate an action to avoid a preference. 264<br />

8.3.4 Payment to Unperfected Secured Creditor. A payment to a secured<br />

creditor within the applicable preference period may be recovered if the<br />

trustee can establish that the security interest was not properly perfected or<br />

was otherwise defective. 265<br />

8.4 Stays .<br />

8.4.1 Automatic Stay - Adequate Protection<br />

(1) Under Bankruptcy Code §362(a) upon commencement <strong>of</strong> case<br />

nearly all action by creditors to enforce or litigate rights against debtor or<br />

262 See Chapter 25 “Trustee’s Avoiding Powers” in Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong> Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark Boardman<br />

Callaghan 1985-1996)<br />

263 Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 118 S. Ct. 651, 139 L.Ed 2d 571 (U.S. 1998)<br />

264 See In re SRJ Enterprises, Inc. 151 B.R. 189 (Bnkrcy N.D. Ill. 1993)<br />

265 See In re International Bldg. Component, 159 B.R. 173 (Bankrtcy. W.D. PA) - (joist system determined to be<br />

personal property and not fixture and the payment <strong>of</strong> proceeds <strong>of</strong> pre-chapter sale <strong>of</strong> the system by debtor was a<br />

preference.<br />

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any <strong>of</strong> its assets are stayed. 266 See exception at 362(b) and elsewhere in<br />

the Code. Among the actions <strong>of</strong> a creditor to which the automatic stay<br />

may be applicable are the following:<br />

(a)<br />

Administrative stay that freezes debtor's account with depository<br />

institution that may assert §553 set<strong>of</strong>f right. 267<br />

(2) The automatic stay is extremely broad in scope. Violations are<br />

very serious and may even result in punitive damages in addition to actual<br />

damages, attorney fees, etc.<br />

(3) The automatic stay may be terminated, conditioned or modified<br />

upon showing <strong>of</strong> cause by a stayed party. 268 As to a secured creditor<br />

seeking to realize on its collateral, such cause may be lack <strong>of</strong> "adequate<br />

protection." Adequate protection may include<br />

(a) equity cushion<br />

(b) periodic cash payments<br />

(c) additional or replacement security<br />

(d) "indubitable equivalent" 269<br />

(e) discharge <strong>of</strong> liens prior to those <strong>of</strong> party seeking protection<br />

(f) segregation <strong>of</strong> cash collateral<br />

(g) insurance<br />

(h) third party guarantees<br />

(4) The F.D.I.C. is not exempt from the §362(a) automatic stay<br />

notwithstanding 12 U.S.C. §1821(d)(17) which provides for the rights <strong>of</strong><br />

the F.D.I.C. to be superior to those <strong>of</strong> the bankruptcy trustee. 270<br />

Enforcement <strong>of</strong> governmental, police and regulatory powers is under<br />

266 See §23.05 in Dunaway “Automatic Stay” .<br />

267 The cases are in conflict as to whether an administrative stay violates the automatic stay. Those holding that it<br />

does include In re Strumpf, 37 F.3rd 155 (C.A. 4 Md. 1944); In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505 (C.A. 11, Ala. 1992).<br />

Those cases to the contrary include In re Lough, 163 BR 586 (Bankrptcy. D. Idaho 1994); In re Moreira, (Bankr. D.<br />

Mass.); In re Edgins, 36 B.R. 480 (9th Cir. Bap-Cal 1984).<br />

268 For instance, a stay may be lifted to permit litigation to continue in another forum that may be better suited to<br />

adjudicate the issues although the bankruptcy court will in such cases control proceeding on any judgment that might<br />

be entered against the debtor. For standards the courts apply in such cases see In Re Sonnax Industries, Inc., 907<br />

F.2d 1280, 1285 (2 nd Cir. 1990); In Re Mazzeo, 167 F.3d. 139 (2 nd Cir. 1999).<br />

269 See Learned Hand's opinion in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2nd Cir. 1935). Section 361(3) <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Bankruptcy Code, contrary to Yale Express System, Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2nd Cir. 1967), makes it clear that "indubitable<br />

equivalent" does not include mere administrative priority.<br />

270 F.D.I.C. v. Hirsch (In re Colonial <strong>Real</strong>ty Co.), 980 F.2d 125 (2nd Cir. 1992).<br />

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362(b)(4) exempt from the stay. This may be the basis for stay avoidance<br />

by the F.D.I.C. or RTC in an appropriate situation. 271<br />

8.4.5 § 105(a) Stays Code § 105(a) authorizes the bankruptcy court to “issue<br />

any order, process or judgement that is necessary or appropriate to carry<br />

out the provisions <strong>of</strong> this title” has been construed to grant broad authority<br />

to the bankruptcy court in exercise <strong>of</strong> its equitable powers to implement<br />

the specific provisions <strong>of</strong> the Code so long as such action is consistent<br />

with the provisions and intent <strong>of</strong> the Code. Under this section a<br />

bankruptcy court may stay the action <strong>of</strong> a state court 272 , A common use <strong>of</strong><br />

this provision is for the bankruptcy court to effectively bring a non-debtor<br />

(such as the general partner <strong>of</strong> a debtor partnership) that it determines is<br />

essential to a reorganization under the protection <strong>of</strong> a stay that may be as<br />

broad as the Automatic Stay under § 362(a).<br />

8.5 Reciprocal Easement Agreements. 273 Consider possibility <strong>of</strong> assumption or<br />

rejection. 274 An attempt <strong>of</strong> the debtor 275 to partially reject an REA should not be<br />

effective although it may be ineffective as against only those aspects <strong>of</strong> the REA<br />

that are non-executory because they are deemed to run with the land. 276<br />

8.6 Fraudulent Transfer Issues. Nearly any transaction that transfers an interest <strong>of</strong><br />

an insolvent transferee for less than reasonably equivalent value may be treated as<br />

a fraudulent transfer. 277<br />

271 See Board <strong>of</strong> Governors <strong>of</strong> the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp. Financial, Inc., 499 U.S. 904, 112 S.Ct. 459,<br />

113 L. Ed 2d 212 (1991).<br />

272 See the Notes <strong>of</strong> the Committee on the Judiciary Senate Report No. 95-989.<br />

273 Reviewing a Shopping Center REA, 18 <strong>Real</strong> Prop. Pro. & Tr. J. 651 (1983). Reciprocal Agreements in Shopping<br />

Center Developments, 14 St. Mary's L.J. 541 (1983). M.Garfinkel, May all or Portions <strong>of</strong> a Recorded Shopping Center<br />

Reciprocal Arrangement be Rejected as an Executory Agreement under Section 365 <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code, 28 <strong>Real</strong><br />

Prop. Pro. & Tr. J. 83 (1993).<br />

274 See Savage, Reciprocal Easement Agreement: Assumption and Rejection in Bankruptcy, 19 R.E. Law Journal 99<br />

(1990). See Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973). In Gouveia v. Tazbir,<br />

37 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 1994) the court concluded that a reciprocal land covenant prohibiting any use <strong>of</strong> the debtor's land<br />

other than for single family dwelling was not an executory contract since once recorded no further performance was<br />

required by either party. See also In re Chestnut Ridge Plaza Associates L.P., 156 B.R. 477 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).<br />

275 The Bankruptcy Code uses the term "Debtor" for the subject <strong>of</strong> the proceedings instead <strong>of</strong> the term "Bankrupt"<br />

used under the old Bankruptcy Act.<br />

276 See Cook, Judicial Standards for Rejection <strong>of</strong> Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Code Cases, 1980 Ann. Sur.<br />

Am. 689, 702 (1980); Net <strong>Real</strong>ty Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, 544 F.Supp., 759; Carlson, Successor Liability<br />

in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes <strong>of</strong> Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products<br />

Liability, and Toxic Waste Cleanup, 50 L. & Contemp Probs. 119,124 (1987).<br />

277 See Chapter 25 “Bankruptcy-Trustee’s Avoiding Powers” in Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong> Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark<br />

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8.6.1 See 11 U.S.C. §548 (1 year rule), and 11 U.S.C. §544 (strong arm<br />

powers), 278 Cook, Fraudulent Transfer Liability Under the Bankruptcy<br />

Code, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 263 (1980). Section 548 <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code<br />

(one year rule) and either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or the<br />

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 279 may be applicable.<br />

8.6.2 As to loans that arise in the context <strong>of</strong> leveraged buy outs (LBOs) see<br />

United States v. Tabor Court <strong>Real</strong>ty Corp. 803 F.2d 1288 (3rd Cir 1986).<br />

The Third Circuit has limited the application <strong>of</strong> Tabor Court on the basis<br />

<strong>of</strong> the intangible benefits <strong>of</strong> the LBO to the borrower as being part <strong>of</strong> the<br />

required "reasonably equivalent value." 280<br />

8.6.3 Section 101(48) <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code defines "transfer" to include<br />

"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or<br />

involuntary <strong>of</strong> disposing <strong>of</strong> or parting with property or with an interest in<br />

property... ." The term "transfer" includes just about every possible means<br />

<strong>of</strong> transferring <strong>of</strong> a property interest.<br />

8.6.4 Prepetition Lease Terminations have been held to be fraudulent<br />

transfers. 281 Prepetition franchise termination for good cause has been<br />

held not to be avoidable since although it was a "transfer" it was neither<br />

"fraudulent" nor preferential. 282<br />

Boardman Callaghan 1985-1995).<br />

278 See item 8.17 below.<br />

279 See Cook and Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 Am. Bankr. L.J.<br />

87(1988)<br />

280 Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc. 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991).<br />

281 See, In re Pinto, 98 B.R. 200 (E.D. Pa 1989) ( termination <strong>of</strong> lease); In re Edward Harvey Co., 68 B.R. 851 (D.<br />

Mass. 1987); In re Eastern Parlliament Corp., 67 F.2d 871 (2nd Cir. 1933); In re Queen City Grain, 51 B.R. (S.D.N.Y.<br />

1971) (month-to-month lease is a valuable right which may be subject to fraudulent conveyance); In re Ferris, 415<br />

F.Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (the termination <strong>of</strong> a leasehold for non-payment <strong>of</strong> rent where the tenant had paid a<br />

substantial amount <strong>of</strong> money for improvements); Fashion World, Inc., 44 B.R. 754 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1984) (voluntary<br />

termination <strong>of</strong> lease by tenant for no actual consideration constitutes fraudulent conveyance <strong>of</strong> leasehold) In re D.H.<br />

Overmyer Telecasting Co., Inc., (N.F. Ohio, E.D. 1983) (leases for lack <strong>of</strong> good consideration set aside as fraudulent<br />

conveyance) . The assignment <strong>of</strong> a leasehold may be considered a fraudulent conveyance if all the tests are met. See, In<br />

re 716 Third Avenue Holding Corp., 225 F.Supp 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See, Robert E. Goodman, Jr., Avoidance <strong>of</strong><br />

Lease Terminations as Fraudulent Transfers, 43 The Business Lawyer 807(1988). Contrary authority includes Haines v.<br />

Regina C. Dixon Trust, 178 B.R. 471 (W.D. Mo. 1995), Callia v. Original Great America Chocolate Chip Cookie Co.,<br />

1994 W.L. 151091,<br />

282 In re Thompson, 186 B.R. 301 (Banktcy. N.D. Ga. 1995)<br />

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8.6.5 Although foreclosures 283 and tax sales 284 had been held to be fraudulent<br />

transfers, the United States Supreme Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust<br />

Corp., 285 in a 5 to 4 opinion held that the price received in a non-collusive<br />

foreclosure sale conducted in accordance with state law should<br />

conclusively be deemed to be "reasonable equivalent value". Justice<br />

Scalia, speaking for the majority, refused to read the phrase "reasonably<br />

equivalent value" to mean in its application to mortgage foreclosure sales,<br />

either "fair market value" or "fair foreclosure price". The dissent objected<br />

to the substitution <strong>of</strong> a procedural test for a substantive test. The BFP case<br />

has been held not to be applicable to termination <strong>of</strong> an agreement for deed<br />

or conditional sale agreement. 286<br />

8.6.6 An exercise <strong>of</strong> an option to extend a leasehold may be a fraudulent transfer<br />

where the debtor is the landlord. 287<br />

8.6.7 Relevant state law may be either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance or<br />

Act the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. There may also be other<br />

specialized state law. 288<br />

8.7 Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> Bankruptcy Oriented Prepetition Workout Agreements by<br />

Debtor. 289<br />

283 Opposing approaches were those <strong>of</strong> Durrett V. Washington National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).<br />

In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir 1992) and Lawyers Title Insurance Co. v. Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bnkr 9th Cir. 1982)<br />

aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir), cert. denied 469 U.S. 833, 105 S. Ct. 125, 83 L.Ed 2d 68 (1984) had<br />

adopted the irrebuttable presumption <strong>of</strong> reasonably equivalent value in regularly conducted noncalusive foreclosure sale<br />

approach sustained by the United States Supreme Court in the BFP case.<br />

284 In re Makeever, 132 B.R. 996 (N.D. ILL. 1991).<br />

285 114 S.Ct 1757 (1994).<br />

286 In re Grady, 202 B.R. 120 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Iowa) contra In re Vermillion, 176 B.R. 563 (Bkrtcy D. OR 1994)<br />

287 In re Thrifty Dutchman, Inc., 97 B.R. 101 (Bkty S.D. Fla. 1988).<br />

288 For instance New York Debtors and Creditor Law Section 278(1) provides in part that: "Where a conveyance or<br />

obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor ... may, as against any person except a purchaser for fair<br />

consideration without knowledge <strong>of</strong> the fraud at the time <strong>of</strong> the purchase ... have the conveyance set aside or obligation<br />

annulled."<br />

289 For an extensive consideration <strong>of</strong> this issue, see Michael Baxter, Prepetition Waivers <strong>of</strong> the Automatic Stay: A<br />

Secure Lenders Guide, 52 Bus. Lawyer 577 (Feb. 1997). In Tampa Bay Briarwood Assoc., Ltd.,1990 Bankr. Lexis<br />

1841 (M.D. Fla.) the court enforced the provisions <strong>of</strong> a Ginnie Mae regulatory agreement to require bankruptcy counsel<br />

fees paid out <strong>of</strong> project rents to be reimbursed to debtor by general partner that so diverted the funds. See D.L.<br />

Campbell and Julie Lennon, Drafting Bankruptcy Relief Clauses in Loan Documents, 10 Prac. Lawyer, July 1994, 27;<br />

McFarland, Waivers Of Bankruptcy Rights In Workout Agreements, 8 Prob. & Prop. 15 (Nov/Dec 1994). For a<br />

discussion <strong>of</strong> pre-bankruptcy waivers see KUPETZ, THE BANKRUPTCY CODE IS PART OF EVERY CONTRACT: MANAGING<br />

THE IMPACT OF CHAPTER 11 IN NON DEBTOR BARGAINS, 54 Business Lawyer 55, 67 (Nov. 1998)<br />

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8.7.1 Pre bankruptcy waivers <strong>of</strong> the right to seek bankruptcy court protection are<br />

not enforceable. 290 There is though a split <strong>of</strong> authority on the<br />

enforceability <strong>of</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> prebankruptcy agreements that limit a<br />

party's rights in the event such party should later become the debtor in a<br />

bankruptcy proceeding. 291 See In Re Powers 292 for extensive discussion <strong>of</strong><br />

this issue.<br />

8.7.2 The pre-petition existence <strong>of</strong> a full workout agreement in which all<br />

material interests are represented may be adequate basis for a court to<br />

dismiss a Chapter 11 petition as having been filed in bad faith. 293<br />

8.7.3 It appears that personal liability may be conditioned on a default if<br />

bankruptcy action is commenced by or against obligor. 294<br />

8.8 Plan Approval, "Cram-Down" Possibility, Absolute Priority Rule, New<br />

Value Exception. 295<br />

8.8.1 Undersecured Lender. Consider whether the lender is undersecured. 296<br />

Cram-down must satisfy "fair and equitable" standards. 297 It is not clear<br />

290 See Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F. 2d 899, 905 (2nd Cir. 1986); re Tru Block Concrete Products, Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492<br />

(Bankr. S.D.Cal 1983) (Agreement not to seek bankruptcy relief not enforceable); In re George, 15 B.R. 247, 248<br />

(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (Prepetition waiver <strong>of</strong> discharge right not enforceable); In re Markizer, 66 B.R. 1014, 1018<br />

(Bankr. S.D. Fla.1986) (Pre-petition discharge waiver not enforceable)<br />

291 The court In re Citadel Properties, Inc., 86 Bankr. 2nd 275 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1988) enforced as sufficient "cause"<br />

under §362 (d)(1) a prepetition settlement agreement that the borrower would not object to a lifting <strong>of</strong> the automatic stay<br />

if the workout failed and the mortgagee went into a Chapter 11 proceeding. See also In the Matter <strong>of</strong> Gulf Beach<br />

Development Corp. 48 B.R. 40 (M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 B.R. 322 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa.<br />

1982) - Contra - In re Sky Group International, Inc., 108 Bankr. 86, (Bkrtcy. W.D. Pa. 1989). In re Club Towers, L.P.,<br />

138 B.R. 307 (Bkr. N.G. Ga. 1991). In Re Jenkins Court Associates, Ltd. Partnership, 181 B.R. 33 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.<br />

1995) (Enforcement prepetition waiver is in effect enforcement <strong>of</strong> restraint in filing a voluntary proceeding); In Re<br />

Powers, 170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).<br />

292 25 BCD 1586 (Bankr., D. Mass, E.D.) In Powers the court determined that a prepetition waiver <strong>of</strong> a debtor's<br />

opposition to a Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is not self executing but does shift the burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> from<br />

the creditor to the debtor.<br />

293 See 8.11 below.<br />

294 First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven <strong>Real</strong>ty Associates, 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y.A.D. 2nd Dept. 1996).<br />

295 See generally, Chapter 24 “Bankruptcy Reorganization Under Chapter 11" and Chapter 24C-”Bankruptcy Cram<br />

Down in Chapter 11" .<br />

296 The "Cram Down" is based on §1129(b) <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code where all <strong>of</strong> the requirements <strong>of</strong> §1129(a) other<br />

then 1129(a)(8) are met. In a Cram Down the creditor under the Reorganization Plan retains its lien and may receive<br />

deferred cash payments at least equal to the amount <strong>of</strong> the claim <strong>of</strong> a current value at least equal to the value <strong>of</strong> the<br />

creditor's collateral. See also Bankruptcy Code §1111(b)(2). It is rarely advantageous for the mortgagee to make this<br />

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whether partial interest deferral and negative amortization will satisfy this<br />

requirement. 298<br />

8.8.2 Requirements. A plan rejected by an impaired class may nevertheless be<br />

approved if (1) it does not "discriminate unfairly" and (2) it is fair and<br />

equitable. 299 The Absolute Priority Rule, 300 requires that a senior<br />

nonconsenting class must be satisfied in full before a juror or equity class<br />

may receive a distribution. In 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership 301 the<br />

New Value Exception, if it exists, 302 that permits participants to acquire<br />

equity position as part <strong>of</strong> the plan for providing fresh contribution <strong>of</strong><br />

reasonably equivalent value was severely limited by the United States<br />

Supreme Court. The Court applied a "market test" that may require either<br />

a right in parties other than the debtor to <strong>of</strong>fer plans or at least a right <strong>of</strong><br />

election. See generally, Chapter 24C “Bankruptcy-Cram Down .<br />

297 Bank Code §1129(b). See In re Bryson Properties, XVIII F.2d (4th Cir. 1992). The court rejected a plan based on<br />

a scheme <strong>of</strong> claim classification in involving a secured creditors deficiency claim being placed in a class separate from<br />

other general creditors. See also, In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991). See Id. Chapter 24C.<br />

298 See In re McCombs Properties VIII, 91 B.R. 907 (U.S. Bank Ct. Calif. 1988); Great Western Bank v. Sierra Woods<br />

Group, 953 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1992). Factors include: (1) does the plan <strong>of</strong>fer a market rate <strong>of</strong> interest and present<br />

value <strong>of</strong> deferred payments; (2) is the amount and length <strong>of</strong> the proposed deferral reasonable; (3) is the ratio <strong>of</strong> debt to<br />

value satisfactory throughout the plan; (4) are the debtor's financial projections reasonable and sufficiently proven, or is<br />

the plan feasible; (5) what is the nature <strong>of</strong> the collateral, and is its value appreciating, depreciating or stable; (6) are the<br />

risks unduly shifted to the creditor; (7) are the risks borne by one secured creditor or class <strong>of</strong> secured creditors; (8) does<br />

the plan preclude the secured creditor's foreclosure; (9) did the original loan terms provide for negative amortization;<br />

and (10) are there adequate safeguards to protect lender against plan failure. A Debtor is not required to accept "pie in<br />

the sky" In re Pelham St. Associates, 134 B.R. 700.<br />

299 Bankr. Code § 1129(b)(1). Although § 1129(b)(2) provides examples <strong>of</strong> "fair and equitable" treatment the term is<br />

not defined other than by case law. Any modification <strong>of</strong> a non-consenting creditor's secured loan must be fair and<br />

equitable to such creditor. Adequate protection <strong>of</strong> the secured creditors property right may be required to meet the fair<br />

and equitable test. See In re Monnier Bros. 755 F.2d 1336 (8th cir. 1985), Vanston Bondholders Protective Co., 329<br />

U.S. 156 (1946). Significant negative amortization is generally not permitted. In re D&F Construction, Inc., 865 F.2d<br />

673 (5th Cir. 1989). But see In re Sierra Woods Group, 953 F.2d 1174 ( 9th Cir. 1992).<br />

300 In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3rd 899 (CA 9th. Idaho 1993),Motion to Vacate Denied and Dismissed by 5<br />

U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S.Ct. 386 (1994), holds that the Absolute Priority Rule<br />

survived the enactment <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code;<br />

301 524 U.S. 975, 141 L.Ed. 2d 785, 119 S.Ct. 24 (1999)<br />

302 The exception was found applicable by the Ninth Circuit in Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp. Mortgage<br />

Co. 2 F.3d 899 (9 th Cir. 1993), Motion to Vacate Denied and Dismissed by 5 U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner<br />

Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994). In In re A.V.B.I., Inc., 143 B.R. 738 (Bkrtcy.C.C.Cal. 1992) the court<br />

concluded that a New Value exception does not exist under the Bankruptcy Code since any such exception to the<br />

Absolute Priority Rule was intentionally omitted from the condification <strong>of</strong> the § 1129(b)(2)(B) Absoulte Priority<br />

Rule standard. In the majority opinion in 203 LaSalle Street Partnership Judge Souter found it unnecessary to<br />

decide whether the New Value Exception exists.<br />

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such other parties to bid for the right to reorganize the Debtor. 303<br />

number <strong>of</strong> cases have recognized the New Value Exception. 304<br />

A<br />

8.8.3 "Artificial Impairment". In the Eight Circuit, a Chapter 11 debtor may<br />

not "manufacture" an impaired class to accept the plan so as to permit a<br />

restructuring <strong>of</strong> the principal secured debt as part <strong>of</strong> a "cram down"<br />

plan. 305<br />

8.8.4 Purchase <strong>of</strong> Trade Claims by Secured Creditor. Since acceptance <strong>of</strong><br />

the plan by the trade creditor class is usually required to "claim down" a<br />

plan, secured creditors will <strong>of</strong>ten attempt to acquire sufficient trade debt to<br />

vote against and defeat a plan proposed by the debtor that includes a<br />

"claim down." 306<br />

8.9 Collection <strong>of</strong> Interest, Costs and Fees by Secured Creditor.<br />

8.9.1 §502(b)(2) Unmatured Interest 307 may be a problem in case <strong>of</strong> deferred<br />

interest or contingent interest loans. 308<br />

303 Although the Supreme Court has in Northwest Bank <strong>of</strong> Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 108 S.Ct. 963, 99<br />

L.Ed. 2d 169 (1988) noted the division <strong>of</strong> authority on whether its "New Value Exception" is viable under the<br />

Bankruptcy Code it has not determined its validity. For an analysis <strong>of</strong> Ahlers see In re Johnston, 21 F.3rd 323 (9th Cir.<br />

1994). The New Value Exception has been questioned in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank <strong>of</strong> Whiting, 908<br />

F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990). The opinion in A.V.B.I., Inc. 143 B.R. 738 (Bkrc. C.D. Cal. 1992) considers not only the<br />

split <strong>of</strong> authority on whether there is a New Value Exception but also the legislature history.<br />

304 See In re Rocha, 179 B.R. 305 (Bkrtcy M.D. Fla. 1995) In BT/SAP Pool C. Ass L.P. v. Coltex, 1996 WL 684445<br />

(S.D.N.Y.) the court concluded that the New Value Exception survived codification <strong>of</strong> the Absolute Priority Rule in<br />

§1129 <strong>of</strong> the Code.<br />

305 In re Windsor on the River Associates, Ltd., 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993).<br />

306 The purchase <strong>of</strong> $7,000 (99%) <strong>of</strong> trade claims at full value by a first mortgagee (FHMC) holding a $1.26 Million<br />

mortgage on property worth $800,000 was upheld over claims by the debtor that in doing so the mortgagee acted in bad<br />

faith. In re Kellogg Square Partnership, 160 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D.Minn.1993). In In Re: Three Flint Hill Ltd.<br />

Partnership 213 B.R. 292 (D.Md) a purchaser <strong>of</strong> debt was considered an insider and its vote disqualified for purposes <strong>of</strong><br />

determining whether the plan had been accepted by one impaired class although the purchaser had no control over the<br />

Debtor.<br />

307 The meaning <strong>of</strong> the term "Unmatured Interest" is not clear except that it is intended to at least cover "post petition<br />

interest that is not due and payable:. In the Matter <strong>of</strong> Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 894 (Bankr.S.D. Ohio 1985);<br />

Collier on Bankruptcy, 502.02, at 502-32 (15th ED. 1988) (H.R. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess 62-63 (1978).<br />

The legislative history makes it clear that 502(b)(2) is intended to require that original issue discount attributable to the<br />

post-petition period should be disallowed. This would for instance be applicable to a zero interest coupon bond. See In<br />

re Allegheny Intern, Inc., 100 B.R. 247, (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (Proration <strong>of</strong> OID is part <strong>of</strong> §502(b)(2) legislative<br />

history) In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 B.R. 51 (Bankr S.D.N.Y. 1990). The problem is that it is not clear just how far the<br />

term "unmatured interest" goes beyond OID.<br />

308 These may include arrangements pursuant to which all or a portion <strong>of</strong> the stated interest at an accrual rate is<br />

postponed if cash flow is not adequate to serve debt at accrual rate, participation loans, deferral <strong>of</strong> front end fees, etc.<br />

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8.9.2. §506(b) Fees and Costs <strong>of</strong> Collection (State v. Federal Standard)<br />

8.10 "Pre-Bankruptcy Planning" By Debtor 309<br />

Inappropriate "planning" approaches may constitute grounds to bar debtor's<br />

discharge and possibly be the basis <strong>of</strong> claims against attorneys and other<br />

advisors. 310 Although there is a split among the circuits, courts in the Fifth and<br />

Seventh Circuits have held that actual fraud need not be established to deny a<br />

discharge under §727(a)(2). 311 Consummating a transfer within one (1) year <strong>of</strong><br />

the filing for the purpose <strong>of</strong> hindering or defrauding a creditor is sufficient to<br />

come within §1141(d)(3). 312 Creditors may also object to claims that specific<br />

assets are entitled to state created exemptions. These exemptions vary from state<br />

to state and include the homestead exemption 313 which may or may not be limited<br />

as to value, and exemptions for entireties properties, musical instruments,<br />

antiques, life insurance policies, and annuities, bibles, tools, clothing, etc.<br />

8.10.1 Foreign Situs Trusts<br />

8.11 Bad Faith Chapter Filing - Two Party Disputes - New Debtor Syndrome.<br />

8.11.1 A single asset voluntary Chapter 11 proceeding may on occasion be<br />

dismissed for "cause" <strong>of</strong> the basis <strong>of</strong> it having been initiated in "bad<br />

309 See Alexander Bove, Asset Protection Strategies, <strong>ABA</strong> Section <strong>of</strong> <strong>Real</strong> Prop., Probate and Trust Law<br />

Publication (2002); Charles Fox IV and Michael Muft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37 <strong>Real</strong> Prop., Probate<br />

& Trust, Jr. in 287 (Summer 2002).<br />

310 A discharge may be denied in a Chapter 11 proceeding pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §1141(d)(2) as to specific<br />

obligations as provided for by §523 or as generally under §1141(d)(3) to the extent §1141(d)(3) incorporates §727(a).<br />

See NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Bowyer, 916 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir 1990). A discharge was denied in In re Johnson, (Bankr.<br />

Minn.March 1, 1991) CCH Bankruptcy L.Rep. 73,836 on the basis <strong>of</strong> In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989).<br />

There is a full discussion <strong>of</strong> the issue in the district court's decision <strong>of</strong> March 1, 1991. Compare Norwest Bank<br />

Nebraska, N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988). (Physician that guaranteed nineteen million dollar loan and<br />

transferred $700,000 <strong>of</strong> assets denied discharge) with Hanson v. First Na. Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir.<br />

1988) (Farmer that transferred $31,000 <strong>of</strong> property not denied discharge)<br />

311 In re Bouyer, 916 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Smiley, 864 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1989). Debtor's intent must be<br />

shown in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits; In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Carey, 938 F.2d 1073 (10th<br />

Cir. 1991).<br />

312 Ameritrust Nat'l Bank v. Davidson, 164 B.R. 782 (Bankrtcy S.D. Fla. 1994).<br />

313 A district court in Florida has determined that Florida's constitutional homestead exemption did not contain an<br />

exception for real property acquired in Florida for the sole purpose <strong>of</strong> defeating the claims <strong>of</strong> out-<strong>of</strong>-state creditors.<br />

(Debtor sold N.J. Home for $947,000 and purchased Florida home for $522,000 at about same time). Bank Leumi Trust<br />

Co. <strong>of</strong> N.Y. v. Lang, 898 F.Supp. 883 (S.D. Fla. 1995).<br />

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faith." 314 Issues include whether there is a realistic possibility <strong>of</strong> the<br />

debtor putting together a confirmable plan and whether the Court views<br />

the case as essentially a mere private dispute. 315 Cases have been<br />

dismissed on the basis <strong>of</strong> admissions in prepetition work out<br />

agreements. 316<br />

8.11.2 The "New Debtor Syndrome" typically invoices segregation <strong>of</strong> assets into<br />

the debtor 317 and other entities immediately prior to the filing.<br />

8.11.3 Involuntary petition allegedly induced by debtor to circumvent bankruptcy<br />

remote provisions was not dismissed in the Southern District <strong>of</strong> NY as<br />

being filed in bad faith. 318<br />

314 In Matter <strong>of</strong> Little Creek Development, 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986) the court deemed it the courts<br />

obligation to sua sponte look into the good faith <strong>of</strong> the Chapter 11 filing and listed indicia <strong>of</strong> bad faith to include a filing<br />

precipitated by a foreclosure <strong>of</strong> the entities single significant asset that is being foreclosed, lack <strong>of</strong> employees, cash flow<br />

and material unsecured creditor interests and recent transfer <strong>of</strong> principal asset to the debtor. Transfers <strong>of</strong> a property by<br />

the borrower from multi asset entity to a single asset entity immediately prior to the Chapter filing may not be<br />

disadvantageous to the lender since it may significantly simplify the Bankruptcy Court proceedings. See Chapter 24D<br />

Bankruptcy-Single Asset <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Cases” .<br />

315 See In re Anderson Oaks (Phase I) Limited Partnership, 77 B.R. 108 (Bankr. Tex. 1987); In re Landmark Capital<br />

Company, 27 B.R. 273 (Bankr. Ariz. 1983); In re Volpe, 53 B.R. 46 (Bankr. 1985). See also In re Albany Partners,<br />

Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Waldron, 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986) cert. dismissed, 478 U.S. 1028,<br />

1065 S. Ct. 3343, 92 L.Ed.2d 763 (1986); In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd, 849 F.2d 1393, (11th Cir 1988). In re Humble<br />

Place Joint Venture, 936 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1991) (Petition dismissed where Chapter 11 petition was filed to avoid<br />

foreclosure, although debtor had substantial bank accounts, unencumbered assets and no material debts other than the<br />

mortgage loan).<br />

The following factors are listed in In re Club Towers L.P. 138 B.R. 307,309 (Bkry. N.D. Ga 1991):<br />

1. The Debtor has only one asset, the Property;<br />

2. The Debtor has few unsecured creditors whose claims are small in relation to the claims <strong>of</strong> the<br />

secured creditor;<br />

3. The Debtor has few employees;<br />

4. The Property is the subject <strong>of</strong> a foreclosure action as a result <strong>of</strong> arrearages on the debt;<br />

5. The Debtor's financial problems involve essentially a dispute between the Debtor and secured<br />

creditor which can be resolved in a state court action; and<br />

6. The timing <strong>of</strong> the Debtor's filing evidences an intent to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts <strong>of</strong><br />

the Debtor's secured creditors to enforce their rights.<br />

316 In re Aurora Investment, Inc., 134 B.R. 982 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).<br />

317 See Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Laguna Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 30 F.3d 734 (6th<br />

Cir. 1994). In re Cherokee New York Investment, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1010 1995 WL 548182 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.)(not<br />

reported in B.R.) a large number <strong>of</strong> fractional interests in mortgaged real estate were transferred to different entities.<br />

318 In Re: Kingston Square Associates, 214 B.R. 713, 1997 WL 594707, 31 Bankr.Ct. Dec. 615 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y., Sep<br />

24, 1997).<br />

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8.11.4 Successive Chapter 11 filings on eve <strong>of</strong> foreclosure sale may be basis for a<br />

bad faith dismissal with prejudice to refiling. In re Cassie, 219 B.R. 657<br />

1998 WL 197234 Bkrtcy. E.D.N.Y.)<br />

8.12 Entry into Possession by Mortgagee. If local law permits mortgagee to enter<br />

into possession, the advantages and disadvantages to lender <strong>of</strong> taking such action<br />

should be evaluated at the time the lender became sensitized to the possibility <strong>of</strong> a<br />

default. Such action prior to the institution <strong>of</strong> a Bankruptcy Code proceeding is<br />

no longer relevant to the lender's right to post-petition rent being treated as cash<br />

collateral 319 and lender may even be permitted to remain in possession <strong>of</strong> the<br />

property post-petition. 320 A major counterindication to the lender is the possibility<br />

<strong>of</strong> environmental clean-up exposure under CERCLA. 321<br />

8.13 Single Asset Case Issues. 322 Under Sec. 362(d) <strong>of</strong> the Code, special treatment is<br />

provided for a “Single Asset <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong>” debtor having liquidated secured debt <strong>of</strong><br />

less than $4,000,000. The following issues may arise in the context <strong>of</strong> a motion to<br />

dismiss, motions for relief from stay 323 and confirmation <strong>of</strong> a plan:<br />

8.13.1 Bad Faith Filing. Debtor's lack <strong>of</strong> good faith. 324 The "bad faith filing".<br />

8.13.2 Absolute Priority Rule. Absolute priority rule and so called Fresh<br />

Capital Exception. 325<br />

8.13.3 Classification <strong>of</strong> Claim Issues.<br />

(1) Debtor's in seeking to secure approval <strong>of</strong> a reorganization plan will<br />

<strong>of</strong>ten seek to place a secured creditor's unsecured claim in a class<br />

separate from that <strong>of</strong> other unsecured creditors notwithstanding 11<br />

U.S.C.A. §1122(a) 326 The purpose is to permit the debtor to secure<br />

consent to the plan by at least one class -- the general unsecured<br />

320 See Landau v. Western Pennsylvania National Bank, 445 Pa. 217, 282 A.2d 335 (1971).<br />

321 See Item 4.7 above.<br />

322 See Chapter 24D “Bankruptcy-Single Asset <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Cases” in Dunaway Text; Carlisle III, Single Asset <strong>Real</strong><br />

<strong>Estate</strong> in Chapter 11 - Need For Reform, 25 <strong>Real</strong> Property, Probate and Trust Journal, 673 (Winter 1969); see In re<br />

Anderson Oaks (Phase I), 77 B.R. 108, 112 stating that two party disputes have no place in the bankruptcy courts; Good<br />

Faith and the Single Asset Debtor, 62 Am Bankr. L.J. 131, 132 (Spring 1988). Bankruptcy Code §362(d).<br />

324 See item 8.11 above.<br />

325 See item 8.8 above.<br />

326<br />

See Chapter 24B.04[2] “Classification <strong>of</strong> Claims”. In Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong> Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark<br />

Boardman Callaghan 1985-1995).<br />

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creditors -- without the secured creditor using its unsecured claim<br />

to out-vote the other unsecured creditors who the debtor believes<br />

will approve the plan.<br />

(2) The debtor will <strong>of</strong>ten seek to provide a distribution to the general<br />

unsecured creditors that is better than that proposed for the<br />

unsecured claim <strong>of</strong> the under secured lien creditor. Courts have<br />

differed on whether to approve such classification schemes. 327<br />

(3) The debtor may use a lender liability counterclaim as basis <strong>of</strong> a<br />

claim that existence <strong>of</strong> such unliquidated <strong>of</strong>fsets requires separate<br />

classification <strong>of</strong> the lender's unsecured portion <strong>of</strong> the loan from the<br />

claims <strong>of</strong> other general creditors.<br />

8.13.4 "Single Asset <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong>" Provisions <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code. If the<br />

Debtor is the owner <strong>of</strong> a “Single Asset <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong>” 328 Debtor as defined in<br />

Section 101 (51B) <strong>of</strong> the Code a reasonable possibility <strong>of</strong> reorganization is<br />

required under a plan that (unless extended) must be filed within 90 days<br />

after the commencement <strong>of</strong> the case. 329 At that time interest must start to<br />

be paid at market rate on the value <strong>of</strong> the secured creditors' interest in the<br />

real estate.<br />

8.13.5 A secured creditor's lack <strong>of</strong> adequate protection. 330<br />

8.13.6 Artificial Impairment. 331<br />

327 Separate classification was denied in John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business Park Assoc. 987<br />

F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1993) and Matter <strong>of</strong> Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991) but permitted in<br />

Matter <strong>of</strong> Woodbrook Ass., 19 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1994), In re ZRM-Oklahoma Partnership, 156 BR 67 (Bankruptcy<br />

W.D. Okl. 1993), In re D & W <strong>Real</strong>ty Corp., 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993). See In re Windsor on the River<br />

Associates, Ltd., 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir.. Iowa 1993) and article by Weintraub and Resneck at 26 UCC L.J. 359 (Spring<br />

1994). This case may preclude confirmation in single asset cases (unless the mortgagee accepts the plan) due to<br />

difficulty <strong>of</strong> finding an impaired class. Notwithstanding contrary Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals authority in seven federal circuits,<br />

the court in In Re: Cross Creek Apartment Ltd. 213 B.R. 521, 1997 WL 606517 (Bkrtcy E.D. Tenn) permitted<br />

separate classification <strong>of</strong> a secured creditors unsecured claim <strong>of</strong> over a million dollars and $26,000 <strong>of</strong> general creditor<br />

debt.<br />

328 A marina has been held not to be “Single-Asset <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong>,” since it is a "business." In re K. Kemko, Inc., 181<br />

B.R. 47 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995). A housing co-op corp has been held to fall within the 51B definition In In Re: 83-84<br />

116 th Owners Corp., 214 B.R. 520, 1997 WL 735677 (Bktcy E.D.N.Y.) (1977). See Chapter 24D <strong>of</strong> the Dunaway text<br />

on “Bankruptcy-Single Asset <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> Cases” .<br />

329 Section 362(d)(3) requires the Court to grant a motion for relief from the stay unless a feasible plan is filed within<br />

90 days <strong>of</strong> the entry <strong>of</strong> the Order for Relief.<br />

330 Bankr. Code §362(d)(1). See United Savings Ass. v. Timbers <strong>of</strong> Inwood Forest Ass., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).<br />

See §24B.03 “Immediate Issues in Bankruptcy Reorganization” .<br />

331 See In re Windsor on the River Associates, Ltd., 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993)(refusal to confirm plan which<br />

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8.13.7 New Value Rule. 332<br />

8.14 Third Party Releases Plan Provisions. 333 Under Bankruptcy Code §524(e)<br />

discharge <strong>of</strong> debtor does not effect other entities. The lead case is Union Carbide<br />

Corp. v. Newboles 334 which holds third party releases in plan ineffective. Courts<br />

have though permitted voluntary releases. 335<br />

8.15 Landlord's Rent Claim.<br />

8.15.1 Rent Recovery Cap. 336 The cap will apply where the debtor is a<br />

guarantor. 337<br />

8.15.2 Post Petition Rent. §365(d)(3) requires the trustee (subject to a<br />

performance extension by the court <strong>of</strong> not more than 60 days) to perform<br />

the debtors obligation, under a non residential lease, until the effective<br />

date <strong>of</strong> a rejection. There is a split <strong>of</strong> authority as to whether the rents that<br />

so accrue must be paid currently or may be postponed to confirmation and<br />

possibly lost to the landlord to the extent there are not sufficient funds to<br />

pay administrative claims in full. 338<br />

8.16 Post-petition Credit - Bankruptcy Code Section 364. Consider possibility <strong>of</strong><br />

pre-petition lender securing cross collateralization in consideration <strong>of</strong> providing<br />

debtor in possession ("DIP") financing. 339<br />

artificially impaired a class <strong>of</strong> creditors). See §24C.01 “Introduction” and footnotes to that section .<br />

332 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); §24.10 “Cramdown, Absolute Priority and New<br />

Value” .<br />

333 See Kaplan & Harwood, Limits <strong>of</strong> Third Party Releases in Reorganizations, 9 Bankruptcy Strategist, No. 4, p. 3<br />

(Feb. 92).<br />

334 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982).<br />

335 In re AOV Industries, Inc. 31 Bankr. 1005 (D.C.D.C., 1983), aff'd in part 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Monroe<br />

Well Service, Inc., 80 Bankr. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Resorts Int., (No. 89-10119) (Bankr. N.J. 1990).<br />

336 Bank Code §502(b)(6).<br />

337 In re Clements, 185 B.R. 895 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1995).<br />

338 See In re Telesphere Communications, Inc. 148 B.R. 525 (Bankr. N.D. Ill 1992).<br />

339 Matter <strong>of</strong> Saybrook Mfg. Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992) holds on basis<br />

<strong>of</strong> requirement for equal treatment <strong>of</strong> creditors within class that neither §105 nor §364 authorize pre-petition debt being<br />

cross collateralized and thus afforded a super priority. See D.G. Carlson, Postpetition Security Interests Under the<br />

Bankruptcy Code, 48 Bus. Lawyer 483 (Feb 93).<br />

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8.17 "Strong Arm Clause" 340 Section 544(a) - Trustee's Avoiding Power<br />

Bankruptcy Code §544(a) trustee or DIP may avoid any prepetition transfer or lien<br />

that is voidable by a judgment lien creditor or BFP at time <strong>of</strong> petition. 341<br />

8.18 Valuation Issues. Consider purpose and implications <strong>of</strong> valuation<br />

prior to securing appraisals.<br />

8.18.1 Valuation may determine extent <strong>of</strong> secured claim - under Code<br />

Section 506(a), secured creditor may hold a secured claim for value<br />

<strong>of</strong> asset and an unsecured claim for balance <strong>of</strong> amount due. 342<br />

8.18.2 Existence <strong>of</strong> equity cushion for lifting <strong>of</strong> stay and determination <strong>of</strong><br />

existence <strong>of</strong> adequate protection.<br />

8.18.3 Classification <strong>of</strong> claim for Chapter 11 plan approval purposes.<br />

8.19 § 363 Free and Clear Sale <strong>of</strong> Asset <strong>of</strong> Debtor Subject To Lender's Lien.<br />

Courts are split on whether a bona fide purchaser at a bankruptcy sale gets good<br />

title over an existing lien where the lien holding secured creditor was not notified<br />

<strong>of</strong> the sale. 343<br />

8.20 Discharge Issues. 344 Consider the possibility that discharge may be denied under<br />

11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) 345 for an extension <strong>of</strong> credit to the extent obtained by<br />

340 See The Trustee's Strong Arm Power under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 S.C.L. Rev. 841 (Sum 1989).<br />

341 Trustee's status under Section 544(a)(3) is that <strong>of</strong> a hypothetical purchaser and as such will be subject to<br />

constructive or inquiry notice based on possession see McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1982). See §25.04<br />

“Code Section 544(a): Avoidance Based on Hypothetical Unsecured Creditor Status” .<br />

342 In Associates <strong>Commercial</strong> Corp. v. Rash et ux, _____ US ___________, 117 S.Ct. 1879, 138 L.E.D.2d 148,<br />

No. 96-454 decided June 16, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court applies Section 506(a) to conclude that a debtor under a<br />

Chapter 13 plan that retains assets must value such assets on the basis <strong>of</strong> its replacement value.<br />

343 In In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1991) a Chapter 13 creditor listed a lien creditor in schedules with an<br />

erroneous address and although a correct address was provided in the lien creditor's pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> claim, the court by way <strong>of</strong><br />

a practical analysis decided not to set aside a sale that has occurred more then a year prior to the filing by the lien<br />

creditor <strong>of</strong> motion to set aside the sale. See Rule 2002(g) as to use <strong>of</strong> address in pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> claim for giving notice to<br />

creditors and Federal Rule 60(b). Compare with MRR Traders, Inc. v. Cave Atlantique, Inc. (In re Cave Atlantique,<br />

Inc.), 788 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1986), 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 363.13 at p. 363-43, 1st Ed. 1991).<br />

344 See item 8.10 above on "Pre-Bankruptcy Planning" by Debtor.<br />

345 See Carrie Bland Field v. Mans and Justifiable Receiving Under Section 523(a)(2)(A) <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code<br />

Determining who is an experienced horseman, 52 The Bus. Lawyer 739 (Feb. 1997).<br />

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false representation or actual fraud subject to reliance considered at 8.20.1<br />

below. 346<br />

8.20.1 - Reliance element under 11 U.S.C.A. §523(a)(2)(A) may be satisfied by<br />

reliance <strong>of</strong> FDIC, RTC or assignee <strong>of</strong> either upon D'Oench Duhme Doctrine. 347<br />

Although the standard for excepting debt from discharge is not "reasonable<br />

reliance" but rather the lesser standard <strong>of</strong> "justifiable reliance" 348 Courts <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

refer to a reasonable reliance standard. Ignoring “red flags” may negate the<br />

reasonableness <strong>of</strong> reliance in specific situations. 349<br />

8.20.2 - On use <strong>of</strong> consent and default judgment see Stewart, Use <strong>of</strong> Default and<br />

Consent Judgment to Prevent the Discharge <strong>of</strong> Debt in Bankruptcy, 33 N.H.B.J.<br />

40 (Dec. 1992).<br />

8.20.3 - Several cases have denied discharges to the innocent parties on the basis<br />

<strong>of</strong> a partner's fraud. 350<br />

8.21 Equitable Subordination 351 - A power <strong>of</strong> federal bankruptcy courts, as courts <strong>of</strong><br />

equity, to subordinate the claim <strong>of</strong> the creditor to those <strong>of</strong> another. The principal<br />

<strong>of</strong> Pepper v. Litton 352 is codified at 11 U.S.C. §510(c). 353<br />

8.22 Successor Liability<br />

8.23 Bar Dates<br />

346 See Cohen v. DeLa Cruz et al., 523 U.S. 213, 118 S.Ct. 1212, 140 L.Ed. 2d. 341 (1998).<br />

347 See contra, F.D.I.C. v. Smith, 133 B.R. 800 (N.D. Tex. 1991) Note, 23 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 935 (June 1992).<br />

Yarbow v. FDIC, 150 B.R. 233 (9th Cir. 1993) No. cc - 92-1315.<br />

348 Field v. Mans, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995).<br />

349 First National Bank <strong>of</strong> Olathe, Kansas v. Portow, 111 F.3d 604 (8 th Cir. 1997); Coston v. Bank <strong>of</strong> Malvern, 991<br />

F.2d 257 (5 th Cir. 1993 (en banc.)) In re Eckert, 221 B.R. 40 1998 WL 229825 (Bkrtcy S.D.FLA.)<br />

350 In re Ledford, 970 F.2d 1556 (6th Cir. 1992); In re Luce, 960 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1992); see Strang v. Bradner,<br />

114 U.S. 555, 561, 5 s. et. 1038, 1041, 29 L.ed. 248 (1885)<br />

351 See Scott M. Browning, Note, "No Fault Equitable Subordination," 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 487 (1993); Helen D.<br />

Chaitman, "The Equitable Subordination <strong>of</strong> Bank Claims," 39 Bus. Law 1561 (1984); see also Stoumbos v. Kilimnik,<br />

988 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1993); HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3rd 623 (2nd Cir. 1995).<br />

352 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238 (1939).<br />

353 See Chapter 26D “Bankruptcy-Equitable Subordination,” Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong> Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark<br />

Boardman Callaghan 1985 - 1996).<br />

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8.23.1 Rule 3002(a). Rule 3002(a) requires unsecured creditors to file pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

claims as provided for by Rules for claim to be allowed. 354<br />

8.24 Section 365 Rejection <strong>of</strong> Leases and Executory Agreements<br />

8.24.1 Rejection by Debtor Lessee. Rejection constitutes a default as <strong>of</strong><br />

immediately prior to the filing <strong>of</strong> the petition. 355 In the case <strong>of</strong> a lease the<br />

landlord's claim against a rejecting debtor lessee will be limited by code<br />

§502(b)(6). 356<br />

8.24.2 Rejection by Debtor Lessor. 357 Under 11 U.S.C.A. §365(h)(2) the tenant<br />

may either remain in possession for the remainder <strong>of</strong> the lease term or treat the<br />

lease as terminated. The extent <strong>of</strong> the tenant's rights to enforce under various<br />

lease provisions clarified under the 1994 amendments. These include use,<br />

possession, quiet enjoyment, transfer and for shopping centers, exclusive use and<br />

tenant mix provisions. 358 If tenant remains in possession, the tenant can <strong>of</strong>fset<br />

its damages against rent otherwise due.<br />

8.24.3 Assumption. 359<br />

(a)<br />

Requirements for Assumption. Under §365(b)(1) where there<br />

has been a default under an executory contract or lease, the debtor<br />

to assume must:<br />

(1) Cure the breach or provide adequate protection <strong>of</strong> prompt<br />

cure. 360<br />

354 In re Rago, 149 B.R. 882 (Bkrtcy N.D. Ill. 1992). Consider relationship <strong>of</strong> Rule 3002(a) and Code §§502 and 746<br />

and 746 and compare holdings <strong>of</strong> various circuits on impact <strong>of</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> claim.<br />

355 A repudiation by the RTC under 12 USC 1821(e)(ii) cuts <strong>of</strong>f the lessor's right to obtain damages. (See 12 U.S.C<br />

1821(e)(4)(A)) even out <strong>of</strong> collateral provided to secure the failed institution's lease obligation. See Unisys Finance<br />

Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. 979 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1992).<br />

356 See 8.15.1 above.<br />

357 See 11 U.S.C.A. §365(h).<br />

358 See Grohsgal, Landlord's Lease Rejection under the Bankruptcy Reform Act <strong>of</strong> 1994, 13 ABI J. 20 (Dec./Jan.<br />

1995)<br />

359 A lease may be assumed under 11 U.S.C.A. §365(a) unless it has expired, provided that under state law the Debtor<br />

had as <strong>of</strong> the commencement <strong>of</strong> the Chapter preceeding some leasehold interest. For the distinction between<br />

"expiration" and "termination" see Matter <strong>of</strong> DiCamillo, 206 B.R. 64 1997 WL 123015 (Bkrtcy D.N.J.)<br />

360 If the breach was a non-curable (non-monetary) default it may not be possible to cure and under such circumstances<br />

the lease or other executatory agreement may not be assumable by the Debtor. See In re Claremont Acquisition Corp.<br />

Inc. 1997 WL 236282 (9th Cir.) 113 F.3d 1029 and 113 F.3d, 1240 (9th Cir 1997) as to application <strong>of</strong> Bankruptcy Code<br />

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(2) Compensate non-debtor party for actual loss from default.<br />

(3) Provide actual assurance <strong>of</strong> future performance. [Note: if<br />

no default adequate assurance not required.]<br />

(b)<br />

Shopping Center Leases<br />

(1) See 11 U.S.C.A. §365(b)(3) that establishes special<br />

provisions for adequate assurance for leases in "shopping<br />

centers" 361<br />

(2) A debtor has been precluded from assigning a shopping<br />

center lease where the court found that the nature <strong>of</strong> the proposed<br />

assignee's was such as would disrupt the tenant mix. 362<br />

(c)<br />

(d)<br />

Administrative Expense Priority For Rent Obligation. The<br />

Second Circuit Court Of Appeals has held that a landlord's claim<br />

for future rent damages as a result <strong>of</strong> rejection <strong>of</strong> an assumed lease<br />

is entitled to administrative expense priority under code<br />

§503(b)(1)(A) and is not subject to the §502(b)(6) cap. 363<br />

Sale <strong>of</strong> Assumed Asset - Mootness. The Mootness Doctrine may<br />

preclude appellate review <strong>of</strong> an assignment <strong>of</strong> a lease following an<br />

assumption. 364<br />

8.24.4 REA - CC&Rs. For treatment <strong>of</strong> Reciprocal Easement Agreement<br />

(REA's) Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and other servitudes<br />

see Garfinkel, May All or Portions <strong>of</strong> a Recorded Shopping Center Reciprocal<br />

Arrangement Be Rejected as an Executory Agreement under Section 365 <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Bankruptcy Code. 365 . It has been held that under Indiana law restrictive covenants<br />

§365(b)(2)(D).<br />

361 No "shopping center" in cases <strong>of</strong> In re Goldblatt Bros. Inc., 766 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1985) (Strip Center -<br />

no consistent hours or other focus or marketing uniformity); H<strong>of</strong>fman v. 905 International Stores, Inc., 57 B.R. 786<br />

(E.D. Mo. 1985) (strip center - no interdependence); In re Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081 (3rd Cir. 1990)<br />

(establishes 14 criteria), In re Ames Department Stores, Inc., 127 B.R. 744 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).<br />

362 In Matter <strong>of</strong> Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. 135 B.R. 941 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (assignment <strong>of</strong> Jordan Mash Store<br />

lease to Mervyn's).<br />

363 In Re Kleins Sleep Product, Inc. 78 F.3d 18, 1996 WL 70233 (2nd Cir - NY) See also In Re Amber's Stores, Inc.<br />

1996 WL 138 125 (Bkrtcy ND Tex. 1996).<br />

364 See Pittsburgh Food & Beverages, Inc. v. Ranallo, 1997 WL 216499 112 F. 3rd 645 (3rd Cir 1997)<br />

365 28 <strong>Real</strong> Prop, Prob and Trust Jr. 82 (Spring 1993).<br />

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being primary property interests are not executory contracts and thus not subject<br />

to rejection under §365. 366<br />

8.24.5 Definition <strong>of</strong> an Executory Contract 367<br />

8.25.5.1 In Robert L. Helms Construction & Development Co. Inc. v.<br />

Southmart Corp. 368 the Ninth Circuit reviewing a prior determination that<br />

all option agreements are executory agreements 369 adopted the view <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel to hold that each option contract<br />

must be analyzed on its individual characteristics.<br />

8.24.6 Effect <strong>of</strong> Determination that Contract is not Executory. A contract<br />

with obligations due on only one side is an asset or liability <strong>of</strong> the estate. If<br />

performance is due to the debtor, the contract is an asset, which becomes estate<br />

property, and which the trustees may reject if burdensome. 370 If the performance is<br />

due by the debtor, it is a liability <strong>of</strong> the estate and the nondebtor is an unsecured<br />

creditor. When a contract is rejected under Section 365(a), the nondebtor has a<br />

claim for damages. 371<br />

8.25 Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit. 372<br />

366 Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F. 3d. 295 (7th Cir. 1994)<br />

367 See Discussion <strong>of</strong> the Countryman definition at Garfinkel, May All or Portions <strong>of</strong> a Recorded Shopping Center<br />

Reciprocal Arrangement Be Rejected as an Executory Agreement under Section 365 <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Code..<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Countryman defines executory contracts, as those where the obligations <strong>of</strong> both parties "are so far<br />

unperformed that the failure <strong>of</strong> either to complete the performance could constitute a material breach, excusing the<br />

performance <strong>of</strong> the other." Benevides v. Alexander (In re Alexander), 670 F.2d 885,887 (9 th Cir 1982).<br />

368 110F. 3rd 1470 (9 th Cir. 1997) (the circuit court panel nevertheless held that:<br />

"despite the clear logic and persuasive reasoning <strong>of</strong> the B.A.P. decision, the B.A.P. erred in straying from<br />

binding Ninth Circuit authority. Given the plain language <strong>of</strong> Easebe, the B.A.P. was not free to take a contrary<br />

position in accordance with its own, albeit better reason, analysis.<br />

The decision <strong>of</strong> the B.A..P. is therefore reversed. The validity <strong>of</strong> appellate South Meadows' free and clear<br />

title on the property, pursuant to 11. U.S.C. §363(f)(4), was not affected by these proceedings, and therefore its<br />

appeal is moot. 11 U.S.C. §363(m); Ewell v. Diebert (In re Ewell), 958 F.2d 276, 280 (9 th Cir. 1992)."<br />

369 Gill v. Easebe 900 FC.2d 1417 (9 th Cirr. 1990)<br />

370 T.G. Motors, Inc. v. C.M. Turtur Investments, Inc. (In re C.M. Turtur Investments, Inc.) 93 B.R. 526, 532-33<br />

(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988.). See 11 U.S.C. §§542, 554.<br />

371 C.M. Turtur, 93 B.R. at 532-33.<br />

372 See Item 3.13 above for a discussion <strong>of</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> Letters <strong>of</strong> Credit in Bankruptcy. See Wysko Inv. Co v. Great<br />

American Bank, 131 B.R. 146 (D. Ariz 1991).<br />

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8.26 Ipso Facto Clauses. Under 11 USCA §365(e) a lease or executory agreement <strong>of</strong><br />

the debtor may not be terminated or modified after commencement <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy<br />

case because <strong>of</strong> provision conditioned on bankruptcy or financial condition <strong>of</strong><br />

debtor.<br />

8.27 Partnership Issues. The First Circuit Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals has held that provisions<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Uniform Limited Partnership Act and <strong>of</strong> a limited partnership agreement<br />

that purported to divest a bankrupt general partner <strong>of</strong> control were ineffective<br />

under the 11 U.S.C.A 365(e) prohibition against enforcement <strong>of</strong> Ipso Facto<br />

clauses. 373<br />

8.28 Substantive Consolidation - Enforcement <strong>of</strong> Bankruptcy Remote Provisions -<br />

These have evolved through case law, rather then by statute. 374<br />

(1) Common Ownership or Control; Identical or Overlapping Officers or<br />

Directors. 375<br />

(2) Consolidated Tax Returns or Financial Reporting. 376<br />

(3) Inter-Entity Debts or Guarantees. 377<br />

(4) Undercapitalization. 378<br />

(5) Commingling <strong>of</strong> Assets or Business Functions. 379<br />

(6) Failure to Maintain Organizational and Other Corporate Formalities. 380<br />

373 Summit Inv. and Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608 (1st Cir) the court also held that the general partner acting as<br />

debtor-in-possession is the same person as the pre-chapter general partner in applying state law which limits right <strong>of</strong><br />

assignee to act as a general partner. See item 8.26 above.<br />

374 11 USCA 302 and 1123(a)(5) do not provide a standard for substantive consolidation. Bankruptcy Rule<br />

1015(b) expressly permits the "joint administration" <strong>of</strong> separate debtors' estate, but the Official Advisory Committee<br />

Note to Rule 1015(b) makes clear that Rule 1015(b) does not deal with, much less authorize substantive<br />

consolidation.<br />

375 See, e.g., Bruce Energy Centre Ltd. v. Orfa Corp. <strong>of</strong> America (In re Orfa Corp. <strong>of</strong> Philadelphia), 129 B.R.<br />

404, 415 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (citing cases); In re Paolo Gucci, 174 B.R. 401 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).<br />

376 In re Apex Oil Co., 118 B.R. 683, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990). Compare Saccurato v. Shawmut Bank, N.A.<br />

(In re Mars Stores, Inc.), 150 B.R. 869, 880 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (consolidated financials in 10-Q weighed in<br />

favor <strong>of</strong> consolidation) with In re Auto-Train Corp. Inc., 810 F.2d 270, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1987)<br />

377 See, e.g., Standard Brands, 154 B.R. at 568, 572; In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 B.R. 238 n.5.<br />

378 See, e.g., In re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 15 B.R. 89, 96 (Bankr. D.C. 1981) See Brunswick Corp. v.<br />

Waxman, 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979).<br />

379 Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 519; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc., et al., 138 B.R. 723 (Bankr.<br />

S.D.N.Y. 1992) Standard Brands, 154 B.R. at 572.<br />

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(7) Fraudulent or Preferential Transfers Involving a Related Entity. 381<br />

(8) Fraudulent or Inequitable Use <strong>of</strong> Related Entity. 382<br />

(9) Prejudice or Benefit to Creditors. 383<br />

(10) Reliance on Separate Credit <strong>of</strong> Entity Sought to be Consolidated. 384<br />

(11) Degree <strong>of</strong> Difficulty in Segregating Assets and Liabilities. 385<br />

(12) Economic Benefits <strong>of</strong> Consolidation By the Court. 386<br />

9.0 Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> Assignment <strong>of</strong> Future Rents.<br />

9.1 Generally.<br />

9.1.1 Under the 1994 amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, the effectiveness <strong>of</strong><br />

rent assignment to create "cash collateral" in bankruptcy is no longer<br />

dependent on state law. Code §552(b) now provides that post-petition<br />

rents will be treated as cash collateral if the mortgage lender holds a valid<br />

pre-petition assignment <strong>of</strong> rents.<br />

9.1.2 An example <strong>of</strong> the decisions that are becoming more common is that <strong>of</strong><br />

the United States Court <strong>of</strong> Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which affirmed the<br />

determination <strong>of</strong> a bankruptcy court 387 that under Mississippi law a<br />

380 In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); Soviero v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 328 F.2d 446,<br />

448 (2d Cir. 1964) Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Langenkamp (In re Tureaud), 45 B.R. 658, 660 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.)<br />

aff’d, 59 B.R. 973 (N.D. Okla. 1986); Central Claims Serv., Inc., BDS v. Engle-Picher Indus., Inc., et al. (In re<br />

Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.), 192 B.R. 903 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).<br />

381 Tureaud, 59 B.R. at 977; Standard Brands, 154 B.R. at 571. Lease-A-Fleet, 141 B.R. at 875-76.<br />

382 This is a typical basis for “piercing the corporate vail” under the laws <strong>of</strong> many states especially found in<br />

conjunction with gross under-capitalization.<br />

383 E.g., Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 517-19. In re Murray Indus., Inc., 119 B.R. 820, 828 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)<br />

(citing In re <strong>Commercial</strong> Envelope Mfg., Co., 3 B.C.D. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).<br />

384 Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 277-78; Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 515. Eastgroup, 935 F.2d at 249 n.11 (citing Snider<br />

Bros., 18 B.R. at 235, 237, 238). Munford, 115 B.R. at 395-96 In re Crown Machine & Welding, Inc., 100 B.R. 25,<br />

28 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989)<br />

385 Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 519; Apex Oil Co., 118 B.R. at 693. But see DRW Property, Co. 82, 54 B.R. 489.<br />

386 In re Vecco Construction Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) Orfa, 129 B.R. at 414-15 (citing<br />

In re F.A. Potts & Co., 23 B.R. 569, 572 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982))<br />

387 In the matter <strong>of</strong>: Thomas Shannon Millette, 186 F.3d 638 (C.A. 5 (Miss.) 1999)<br />

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mortgage that has obtained an assignment <strong>of</strong> rents obtains a perfected lien<br />

on rents when it properly records the mortgage or deed <strong>of</strong> trust document<br />

that includes the assignment. 388 In doing so the court upheld the lien <strong>of</strong> the<br />

mortgage over that <strong>of</strong> a judgement creditor that attached the rents prior to<br />

the mortgage taking possession <strong>of</strong> the rents by notifying the tenants <strong>of</strong> the<br />

assignment and demanding direct payment. In reaching its decision the<br />

circuit court concluded that since there was no relevant Mississippi law<br />

that the Mississippi courts would adopt what the circuit court refereed to<br />

as the “modern approach” that the recording <strong>of</strong> a mortgage document<br />

containing an assignment <strong>of</strong> rents “gives the mortgagee rights superior to<br />

any subsequent third party who would seek to take a security interest in the<br />

leases and rentals …” 389<br />

9.1.3 Whether the state law that eliminates the need to further “perfect” or<br />

“make coate” the interest <strong>of</strong> the mortgage in the rents is based on a<br />

priorities theory or an ownership theory may be quite significant in<br />

determining whether the rents are “merely” cash collateral or are<br />

completely out <strong>of</strong> the grasp <strong>of</strong> the bankruptcy court. Under recent<br />

discisions in a number <strong>of</strong> states, an "absolute and unconditional<br />

assignment" <strong>of</strong> rents that is effective without regard to default assigns<br />

present title to future rents and as a result future rents belong to the<br />

assignee and are not the property <strong>of</strong> the debtor in the mortgagor’s Chapter<br />

11 proceeding. 390 Some courts will characterize the assignee as the<br />

"owner" <strong>of</strong> assigned rents if the assignment is by its terms absolute with<br />

the debtor granted a limited license to collect the collateral. 391<br />

388 In its opinion in distinguishing several Mississippi bankruptcy courts that adopted the “old rule” the Circuit<br />

court concluded (at 644) that Mississippi is an “intermediate theory” state rather then a “lien theory state”<br />

389 186 F.3d 638, 642 . This opinion includes an extensive discussion <strong>of</strong> the public policy considerations that weigh<br />

in favor <strong>of</strong> rejecting the old rule and the various approaches that courts have taken to come to effectively the same<br />

result. The opinion also includes extensive citations to the decisions under the “old” approach and under the “new”<br />

approach. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY-MORTGAGES § 4.2(b) (1997) cited by the court in<br />

Millette.<br />

390 See In re Carretta, 220 B.R. 203, 1998 WL 237689 (D.N.J.) In In re Guardian <strong>Real</strong>ty Group, LLC, 1997 WL<br />

50183 (Bartly D.D.C.), the court determined that future net rents were estate property although the assignment<br />

language was absolute where the mortgagee could collect the rent from the tenant only after a Loan Default and the<br />

Lender could not collect rent after the Loan was paid in full.<br />

391 See In re Jason <strong>Real</strong>ty, 59 F.3 rd 423 (3 rd Cir. 1995 - N.J.). In In Re Guardian <strong>Real</strong>ty Group, LLC, 1997 WL<br />

50183 (Bkrtcy. D.D.C.) Where the mortgagee could collect the rent from the tenant only after a loan default and the<br />

judgment creditor could not collect rent after the loan was paid in full the Court determined that future rents were<br />

estate property although the assignment language was absolute.<br />

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9.1.4 In a bankruptcy context consider possibility <strong>of</strong> rent diversions being<br />

treated as nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) see Item 8.20<br />

below.<br />

9.2 Notices to Tenant <strong>of</strong> Rent Assignment. Does the rent assignment in the<br />

mortgage or in a separate assignment document irrevocably authorize the tenant to<br />

pay rents to the lender upon mere receipt from the lender <strong>of</strong> notices <strong>of</strong> default<br />

under the loan documents 392 . Review loan document to determine if in the lease,<br />

estoppels or attornment and nondisturbance agreements the tenant agrees upon<br />

notice from lender to pay rent directly to lender.<br />

9.3 Hotel Receipts. Although hotel receipts from room charges and restaurants are<br />

not generally considered to be "rent and pr<strong>of</strong>it" under a mortgage, 393 several courts<br />

have held otherwise. 394 Revenues for use <strong>of</strong> self-storage space have been treated<br />

as "rent". 395 Under Section 552(b)(2) <strong>of</strong> the Code adopted in 1994 security<br />

interests in post petition hotel receipts in favor <strong>of</strong> mortgagees will be enforced<br />

"except to the extent the court based on the equities <strong>of</strong> the case orders<br />

otherwise." 396<br />

10.0 Review <strong>of</strong> Condominium and P.U.D. Documentation<br />

10.1 Declarant's Rights. Does lender have right to succeed to Declarant's Rights<br />

392 A form <strong>of</strong> such provision might be "Landlord irrevocably authorizes and directs Tenant, upon receipt from Lender<br />

<strong>of</strong> written notice to do so to pay all rents and other monies payable by Tenant under the Lease to or at the direction <strong>of</strong><br />

Lender. Landlord irrevocably releases Tenant <strong>of</strong> any liability to Landlord for all payments so made, and Landlord<br />

agrees to defend, indemnify and hold Tenant harmless from and against any and all claims, demands, losses, or<br />

liabilities asserted by, through, or under Landlord (except by Lender) for any and all payments so made. Tenant agrees<br />

that upon receipt <strong>of</strong> such notice it will pay all monies then due and becoming due from Tenant under the Lease to or at<br />

the direction <strong>of</strong> Lender, notwithstanding any provision <strong>of</strong> the Lease to the contrary. Such payments shall continue until<br />

Lender directs Tenant otherwise in writing. Tenant agrees that neither Lender's demanding or receiving any such<br />

payments, nor Lender's exercising any other right, remedy, privilege, power or immunity granted by this document or<br />

the Assignment, will operate to impose any liability upon Lender for performance <strong>of</strong> any obligation <strong>of</strong> Landlord under<br />

the Lease unless and until Lender elects otherwise in writing or unless Lender takes possession <strong>of</strong> the Premises and<br />

assumes the functions <strong>of</strong> a landlord."<br />

393 Financial Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Tollman-Hundly Dalton, L.P., 165 B.R. 698 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (Applied law <strong>of</strong><br />

Georgia).<br />

394 See In re Punta Gorda Associates, 137 BR 535 (Bankrtcy M.D. Fla. 1992) and In re GGVXX, Ltd., 130 B.R. 322<br />

(Bankr. D.Colo. 1991). In re T-H New Orleans Ltd, Partnership, 5 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 1993) reversed 148 B.R. 592<br />

(Bankruptcy E.D. L.A. 1992) on the basis <strong>of</strong> Louisiana law that under Code §552(b) the court determined "rent" to<br />

included revenues generated by hotels for use and occupancy <strong>of</strong> space.<br />

395 In re Safeguard Self-Storage Trust, 2 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 1993).<br />

396 See §7.09[2][g] “Assignment <strong>of</strong> Rents as Including Hotel Revenues” . In Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong> Distressed <strong>Real</strong><br />

<strong>Estate</strong> (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1985-1996).<br />

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10.2 Mortgagee Provisions. Describe any provisions regarding mortgages applicable<br />

to major lenders.<br />

10.3 Association Financial Statements. Secure recent financial statement <strong>of</strong><br />

Association.<br />

10.4 Association Activities. Review board meeting minutes.<br />

10.5 Developer Assessments. Determine if all developer assessments have been paid.<br />

10.6 Association's Director Liability. If there is evidence <strong>of</strong> association related<br />

developer irregularities, consider possible liability <strong>of</strong> developer appointed<br />

association directors and availability <strong>of</strong> director liability insurance.<br />

10.7 Timeshare Issues.<br />

11.0 Borrower's Tax Circumstances.<br />

11.1 Issue. Consider whether foreclosure or bankruptcy code proceeding may result in<br />

significant realization <strong>of</strong> taxable income to the borrower, its partners or<br />

shareholders 397 . If so this may be inducement for such individuals to contribute<br />

additional capital to avoid or postpone foreclosure.<br />

11.2 §61(a)(12) <strong>of</strong> the IRC provides that gross income includes income from<br />

cancellation <strong>of</strong> indebtedness. See Kirby Lumber v. United States, 284 U.S. 1<br />

(1931).<br />

11.3 IRC §108 provides an exception for cancellation <strong>of</strong> debt in a Chapter 11<br />

proceeding. Under IRC §108(a)(3) insolvent debtors are permitted to exclude<br />

forgiveness income to the extent <strong>of</strong> insolvency.<br />

12.0 Advice to Client<br />

12.1 Lender Liability Cautions. 398<br />

12.2 Avoid undocumented forbearance.<br />

397 The general rule is that discharge <strong>of</strong> partnership indebtedness results in income at the partnership level under IRC<br />

§61(a)(12) and 64 that is passed through to the partners as ordinary income under IRC §702(a) and as a §752(b)<br />

deemed distribution <strong>of</strong> money. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) I.R. Regs. §1001-2. Kalteyer, <strong>Real</strong><br />

<strong>Estate</strong> Workouts - Original Issue Discount Implications <strong>of</strong> Troubled Debt Restructuring, 43 Tax Lawyer 579 (Spring<br />

1990). See Chapter 28 “Tax Consequences to Borrowers, Investors and Lenders” .<br />

398<br />

See Chapter 4B “Liability <strong>of</strong> Lender for Controlling Debtor and for Other Acts” . In Dunaway, The Law <strong>of</strong><br />

Distressed <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1985-1996).<br />

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12.3 Be careful in exercising control and approval rights and seek to avoid depending<br />

on discretion provisions. Seek always to act "reasonably."<br />

12.4 Consider possible adverse implications <strong>of</strong> characterizations <strong>of</strong> the lender's action<br />

or lack <strong>of</strong> action as being based on ulterior motives and thus breaching an alleged<br />

obligation <strong>of</strong> good faith and fair dealing even if in fact the action is not so<br />

motivated. 399<br />

12.5 Remember that discovery rules are very broad and privilege may be narrow. So<br />

be careful what you say or write if it can be misconstrued out <strong>of</strong> context.<br />

12.6 Deeds In Lieu. 400<br />

399 See discussion at item 7.1.4 above.<br />

400 See Appleby, N., Counseling the Lender on Friendly Foreclosures and Deeds in Lieu, 10 Prac. R.E. Law (March<br />

1992) 21.<br />

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