Exhibit 8, 100416 Brazil FMD Risk Evaluation - R-Calf

APHIS Evaluation of the Status of the Brazilian 

State of Santa Catarina Regarding 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Classical Swine Fever, 

Swine Vesicular Disease, and 

African Swine Fever 

United States Department of Agriculture 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

Veterinary Services 

January 16, 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................... 2 

LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................................. 3 

LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................................... 3 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................. 5 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................................. 9 

Background ........................................................................................................................................ 10 

Objective ........................................................................................................................................... 10 

Hazard Identification ........................................................................................................................ 11 

Risk Analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 12 

1. Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services .............................. 12 

2. Disease status in the export region.......................................................................................... 20 

3. Disease status of adjacent regions........................................................................................... 22 

4. Extent of an active disease control program.......................................................................... 26 

5. Vaccination status of the region.............................................................................................. 29 

6. Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk................................................................... 30 

7. Movement control, biosecurity, and the extent to which the movement of animals and 

animal products is controlled from regions of higher risk, and the level of biosecurity 

regarding such movements...................................................................................................... 31 

8. Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region.......................................... 40 

9. Disease surveillance in the region ........................................................................................... 47 

10. Diagnostic laboratory capability............................................................................................. 55 

11. Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region................................... 58 

Release Assessment Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 60 

Exposure Assessment......................................................................................................................... 63 

Consequence Assessment .................................................................................................................. 65 

Risk Estimation.................................................................................................................................. 69 

Annex I. Hazard Identification – Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus ............................................... 71 

Annex II. Hazard Identification – Classical Swine Fever Virus .................................................. 74 

Annex III. Hazard Identification – Swine Vesicular Disease Virus............................................. 75 

Annex IV. Hazard Identification – African Swine Fever Virus ................................................... 76 

Annex V. Epidemiologic Characteristics of Rinderpest ............................................................ 77 

References........................................................................................................................................... 79 

APHIS Evaluation of the Status of the Brazilian State of Santa Catarina 2

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1: Map of Brazil and list of States with their acronyms................................................8 

Figure 2: State of Santa Catarina: Geographic location.........................................................10 

Figure 3: Distribution of regional coordination units of CIDASAC, 2006 ............................15 

Figure 4: Distribution of CIDASC LVUs, 2006.....................................................................16 

Figure 5: FMD status zones, Brazil, 2008 ..............................................................................21 

Figure 6: CSF-Free Zone in Brazil, 2008 ...............................................................................21 

Figure 7: Brazil and neighboring countries ............................................................................22 

Figure 8: Location of permanent inspection stations..............................................................38 

Figure 9: Density distribution of human, swine, cattle sheep and goat populations in Santa 

Catarina........................................................................................................................42 

Figure 10: Bovine density and distribution.............................................................................43 

Figure 11: Distribution of swine population...........................................................................43 

Figure 12: Distribution of SIE and SIF slaughterhouses for swine and beef..........................46 

Figure 13: Sampling strata and location of sampling units, Santa Catarina, 2006 .................49 


LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1. Human resources and infrastructure used in the central and regional coordination 

activities for animal health in Santa Catarina, 2006 ....................................................16 

Table 2. Structure and human resources used in animal health field work, Santa Catarina, 

2006..............................................................................................................................17 

Table 3. Entry of live animals for breeding in Santa Catarina in 2005 and 2006...................33 

Table 4. Swine movement into or within Santa Catarina (2007)............................................34 

Table 5. Imports of animals and products from FMD-susceptible animals into Santa Catarina 

in 2005 and 2006 (partial data, until October 2006)....................................................36 

Table 6. Results of inspections carried out by CIDASC, Santa Catarina, in 2005 and 2006 

(first half) .....................................................................................................................40 

Table 7. Information on livestock farms with FMD susceptible animals susceptible, SC, 

2006..............................................................................................................................41 

Table 8. Animal gathering events involving FMD-susceptible animals inspected by CIDASC 

in Santa Catarina, 2005 and 2006 ................................................................................44 

Table 9. Inspections carried out on rural holdings with FMD-susceptible animals, Santa 

Catarina, 2005 and 2006 ..............................................................................................52 

Table 10. Samples collected in 2000 and 2003 for CSF.........................................................53 

Table 11. Number of notifications of suspected CSF in Santa Catarina, 

2004 to March 2008.....................................................................................................54 


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

ASF: 

APHIS: 

BHK-21: 

African Swine Fever 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

Baby hamster kidney-21 cell line 

BL3: Biosecurity level 3 

BSE: 

CFR: 

CIDASC: 

CONASAN: 

COSALFA: 

CSF: 

CVP: 

DDA: 

DSA: 

EITB: 

ELISA: 

ELISA 3ABC: 

END: 

EPP: 

EU: 

FMD: 

FMDV: 

GTA: 

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy 

United States Code of Federal Regulations 

Companhia Integrada de Desenvolvimento Agricola de Santa Catarina 

Comite Nacional de Saude Animal (National Committee for Animal Health 

Commisao da America do Sul para a Luta contra e Febre Aftosa (South 

American Commission for the Fight Against FMD) 

Classical swine fever 

Comite Veterinaria Permanente (Permanent veterinary committee) 

Department of Animal Health 

Animal Health Directors 

Enzyme-linked immunoelectrotransfer blot 

Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 

ELISA test for detecting FMDV nonstructural proteins 3ABC 

Exotic Newcastle disease 

Expected percentage of protection 

European Union 

Foot-and-mouth disease 

Foot-and-mouth disease virus 

Guia de Transito Animal (Animal movement permit) 


GRSC 

LANAGRO 

LVU: 

MAPA: 

NEPA: 

NSP: 

OIE: 

PANAFTOSA: 

PHEFA: 

PNEFA 

Probang: 

SDA: 

SFA: 

SIF: 

SISBOV: 

SVD: 

TB: 

TSE: 

UPL: 

U.S.: 

Granjas de Reprodutores Suideos Certificadas (Certified Swine Breeding 

Farm) 

Laboratorio Nacional Agropecuario (national agricultural laboratories) 

Local veterinary units 

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply 

National Environmental Policy Act 

FMDV nonstructural proteins 

World Organization for Animal Health (formerly Office International des 

Epizooties) 

Pan-American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Center 

Plano Hemisferico de Eradicacao da Febre Aftosa (hemispheric plan for 

eradication of FMD) 

Programa Nacional de Eradicação da Febre Aftosa.(National Program for 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Eradication) 

Test for identifying the FMDV in esophageal-pharyngeal fluid 

State Department of Agriculture (or State Agricultural Secretariat) 

Federal Agriculture Supervision 

Servicio de Inspecao Federa (Federal plant inspectors) 

Sistema Brasileiro de Identifação e Certificação de Origem Bovina e Bubalina 

(Brazilian System for Identification and Origin Certification for Bovines and 

Buffaloes) 

Swine Vesicular Disease 

Tuberculosis 

Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies 

Piglet Production Unit 

United States 


USDA: 

VIAA: 

VS: 

United States Department of Agriculture 

Virus infection-associated antigen test 

Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 


Figure 1: Map of Brazil and list of States with their acronyms 

Acre AC Paraíba PB 

Lagos AL Pará PA 

Amapá AP Pernambuco PE 

Amazonas AM Piauí PI 

Bahia BA Rio Grande do Norte RN 

Ceará CE Rio Grande do Sul RS 

Distrito Federal DF Rio de Janeiro RJ 

Espírito Santo ES Rondônia RO 

Goiás GO Roraima RR 

Maranhão MA Santa Catarina SC 

Mato Grosso MT Sergipe SE 

Mato Grosso do Sul MS São Paulo SP 

Minas Gerais MG Tocantins TO 

Paraná 

PR 


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), 

Veterinary Services (VS) conducted a risk analysis as a decision-making tool for a proposal to 

initiate trade in fresh pork from the Brazilian State of Santa Catarina. Trade in fresh pork and other 

susceptible animals and products from Santa Catarina has not been allowed because USDA 

considers all of Brazil to be a country affected with foot-and-mouth-disease (FMD), swine vesicular 

disease (SVD), classical swine fever (CSF), and African swine fever (ASF). 

APHIS has evaluated information submitted by Brazil and conducted a site visit to Santa Catarina in 

June 2008 to substantiate the information reported in the documentation and add any new data. 

APHIS also conducted three other site visits to other Brazilian States in 2002, 2003, and 2006. The 

site visits focused on the veterinary and legal infrastructure, border control procedures, laboratory 

and diagnostic capabilities, biosecurity procedures on swine farms, animal health recordkeeping 

systems, movement controls, and disease surveillance systems. APHIS’ analysis was based on 

information gathered from the site visits; on information submitted in writing by the Brazilian 

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) and the Companhia Integrada de 

Desenvolvimento Agricola de Santa Catarina (CIDASC); and on published scientific literature. 

This document describes the animal health system and disease control and eradication measures in 

the Brazilian State of Santa Catarina. It identifies potential areas of risk and discusses how this risk 

is mitigated. The following factors were considered relevant in determining the disease status of 

Santa Catarina: 

No FMD outbreaks have occurred in Santa Catarina since 1993. 

Santa Catarina has not vaccinated against FMD since May 2000. 

No outbreaks of ASF have occurred in Santa Catarina since 1981. 

No outbreaks of CSF have occurred in Santa Catarina since 1990. 

SVD has never occurred in Brazil. 

Surveillance programs in cattle and swine have not detected the presence of the FMD, CSF, SVD, or 

ASF viruses in Santa Catarina. There was no evidence of FMD viral activity in cattle during or after 

the 2000-2001 and 2005-2006 outbreaks in other areas of the country. In addition, Santa Catarina 

does not vaccinate for FMD, so any cattle or swine in that State exposed to the FMD virus can be 

considered sentinels for the disease. 

APHIS considers the legal framework, animal health infrastructure, movement and border controls, 

diagnostic capabilities, surveillance programs, and emergency response systems within Santa 

Catarina adequate to detect and control FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF outbreaks. Although the 

consequences of FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF outbreaks are severe, APHIS considers the likelihood of 

outbreaks occurring in the United States, through exposure of domestic livestock to swine or other 

susceptible species or their related unprocessed products imported from Santa Catarina, to be very 

low. 


I. BACKGROUND 

Brazil has officially requested that APHIS review the disease status of Santa Catarina to initiate 

trade in fresh pork from that State. Trade in fresh pork or other susceptible animals and products 

from Santa Catarina has not been allowed because APHIS considers Brazil to be a country affected 

with FMD, SVD, CSF, and ASF. The last outbreak of FMD in Santa Catarina occurred in 1993. No 

new FMD outbreaks have been reported since then, despite the occurrence of FMD in neighboring 

States in 2000-2001 and 2005-2006. Brazil has recognized Santa Catarina as free of CSF since 

1991, and ASF since 1981. Brazilian authorities report that SVD has never occurred in Brazil. 

Historically, rinderpest virus has never become established in North America, Central America, the 

Caribbean Islands, or South America. A brief incursion into Brazil occurred in 1921 but was limited 

in scope and quickly eradicated. 

Figure 2: State of Santa Catarina: Geographic location 

(source: FMD free OIE document) 

P 

A 

Other countries in State of South Other 

MAPA animal health officials submitted documentation to support their request. APHIS made a site 

visit to Santa Catarina in June 2008 to verify and complement the information submitted by Brazil. 

It focused on the legal framework and veterinary infrastructure, border and movement controls, 

agricultural practices, and laboratory diagnostics and surveillance programs related to Santa 

Catarina’s animal health program. 

Objective 

This is an analysis of the risk of introducing FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF into the United States 

through importation of susceptible species and related unprocessed animal products from Santa 

Catarina (because rinderpest has never been established within the continent it will not be addressed 

further within this document). The risk analysis is intended as a decision-making tool for APHIS 


managers that will allow APHIS to develop appropriate regulatory conditions with mitigations that 

address disease introduction risks posed by any initiation of trade. It also constitutes an information 

source for APHIS stakeholders, providing justification for the conditions in the rule. The analysis 

focuses on Santa Catarina’s status and control measures for FMD, SVD, CSF, and ASF. 

Supporting Data 

The analysis is based on documentation provided by MAPA, observations made by the site visit 

teams, and published information. The report incorporates data obtained from a site visit to Santa 

Catarina in 2008 and previous site visits in 2002, 2003, and 2006 to different areas of Brazil. The 

visits evaluated the risk of importing fresh (chilled or frozen), maturated, deboned beef into the 

United States. The scope of the 2002 site visit included verification of FMD outbreak controls, an 

overview of the surveillance program and laboratory capabilities, vaccination practices and 

eradication activities, and movement and border controls within Brazil. During this visit, APHIS 

placed particular focus on the regional FMD situation in Brazil and South America and on the risk of 

reintroducing FMD into Brazil from neighboring countries. The focus of the 2003 site visit was to 

collect data that APHIS used in our risk assessment. The focus of the 2006 site visit was to evaluate 

the FMD situation following the 2005 and 2006 outbreaks in the States of Mato Grosso do Sul and 

Paraná. The scope of the 2008 site visit was to evaluate the status of Santa Catarina with respect to 

freedom from FMD, CSF, ASF, and SVD. 

Hazard Identification 

APHIS has identified several World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) listed diseases [1] as the 

primary hazards associated with initiating trade in animals and animal products from foreign regions. 

APHIS addresses listed foreign animal diseases of primary concern in our regulations at title 9, Code 

of Federal Regulations (9 CFR), Part 94. APHIS is obligated to evaluate the status of a given region 

or country for specific foreign animal diseases before opening trade in susceptible species and 

related products with that region or country (9 CFR 92.2) [2]. 

The hazards identified for this analysis are FMD, CSF, ASF, and SVD. Epidemiological 

characteristics of the disease agents relevant to the import risks they may pose are described in the 

Annexes. 

Risk Analysis 

This analysis has four components: the release assessment, the exposure assessment, the 

consequence assessment, and the risk estimation. These components are defined in OIE guidelines 

and represent the international recommended components for animal health import risk analyses. 

Release Assessment 

For the purpose of this report, release assessment refers to the evaluation of the likelihood that FMD, 

CSF, SVD, and ASF exist in Santa Catarina and, if so, the likelihood that these diseases could be 

introduced into the United States through imports of susceptible animals or their products from Santa 


Catarina. The report includes an in-depth evaluation of the 11 factors identified by APHIS in 9 CFR 

section 92.2 to consider in assessing risk levels of free regions. Those factors are: 

1. The authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services organization in the 

region. 

2. Disease status. 

3. The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent. 

4. The extent of an active disease control program, if any, if the agent is known to exist in the 

region. 

5. The vaccination status of the region. 

6. The degree to which the region is separated from adjacent regions of higher risk through 

physical or other barriers. 

7. The extent to which movement of animals and animal products is controlled from regions 

of higher risk, and the level of biosecurity regarding such movements. 

8. Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region. 

9. The type and extent of disease surveillance in the region. 

10. Diagnostic laboratory capacity. 

11. Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region, i.e., emergency 

response capacity. 

Risk factors are identified from the information gathered on these topics, and applicable mitigations 

to address those risk factors are discussed. 

Evaluation of Information Provided by MAPA and CIDASC Relevant to the 11 Factors 

Outlined in 9 CFR 92.2 

Assessing the likelihood of introducing FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF into the United States requires an 

evaluation of the relevant characteristics of the exporting regions relative to the epidemiology of the 

diseases. The 11 factors in APHIS’ regionalization rule, described above, provide a context for 

evaluating the risk of exporting a foreign animal disease from a defined region into the United 

States. This section of the risk analysis describes APHIS’ evaluation of these factors for Santa 

Catarina. 

Main Findings: 

1. Authority, organization and infrastructure of the veterinary services 

The authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services must be clearly documented 

to provide confidence in the ability of the country to monitor for disease, oversee veterinary 

activities, and implement disease controls in the region (i.e., control risk). This section is designed 

to provide a comprehensive view of the human, financial, physical, and regulatory resources 

available within MAPA and CIDASC. The section describes the legal authority for animal health 

activities in the region, the organizational structure and function of the veterinary services, and the 

personnel and financial resources available. 

Legal Authority 


Legal authority for animal disease control in Brazil primarily consists of general legal directives and 

regulations issued by the Federal government with the States issuing supplementary legal acts. The 

primary animal health services law in Brazil is contained in Decree No. 24.548, enacted in 1934 [3, 

4]. There are several overlapping laws administered at both the Federal and State levels in Santa 

Catarina which establish, among other things, controls on animal and product imports, disease 

control, farm security, surveillance, risk classification, movement control, animal identification, and 

funding [4]. 

The main law that defines the veterinary medicine profession in Brazil is Law No. 5517. This law 

established the Federal and regional veterinary medicine councils that govern activities and 

professional aspects of veterinary medicine. Currently, there are over 40,000 veterinarians in Brazil 

with the majority being in the southeast (47 percent) and south (23 percent) parts of the country. 

Official services veterinarians are required to participate in specific training programs for different 

sanitary programs. More than 500 veterinarians have been trained specifically in exotic animal 

diseases, including FMD [5]. 

Organization of the Official Veterinary Services 

Federal and State authorities provide the two main structures for Brazil’s veterinary services. 

MAPA, through the Department of Animal Health (DDA), is the main Federal authority for all 

animal health programs and is responsible for coordination of all aspects of the national animal 

health system. MAPA has regional offices, called the Federal Agriculture Supervision (SFA) in all 

26 States in Brazil in addition to central offices located in the Federal District. A Federal 

veterinarian resides in each regional office and oversees compliance with all official animal health 

activities at the State level [4, 6, 7]. 

The State Veterinary Services implements animal health programs with the private sector. The State 

Agricultural Secretariat (SDA) offices coordinate field activities. The coordinating agency directly 

responsible for administration of field activities is an integrated public company referred to as 

Companhia Integrada de Desenvolvimento Agricola de Santa Catarina (CIDASC). Field services 

are carried out by the staff of the local veterinary units (LVUs), which are further coordinated by the 

regional veterinary offices [8]. 

At the international level, Brazil has an agreement to form a Permanent Veterinary Committee 

(Comite Veterinaria Permanente – CVP) composed of the four Mercosur countries (Argentina, 

Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) plus Bolivia and Chile. This committee is working to improve 

international relations and collaboration on disease eradication activities (see 

www.panaftosa.org.br/GIEFA/documentos/Doc2_Ing.DOC). 

Central Competent Authority 

The Federal Government coordinates and supervises the overall animal health programs, develops 

disease control strategies, regulates and controls international commerce in animals and animal 

products, registers and controls vaccines, conducts laboratory diagnosis, audits State veterinary 

services, inspects animals and animal products for import, and conducts training. Federal 

government officials, located primarily in Brasilia, develop policies, laws, and regulations that 

govern all animal health programs and activities [6]. 


Programs managed by the Federal authorities include FMD eradication, swine health (especially 

managing CSF), tuberculosis (TB) and brucellosis management, transmissible spongiform 

encephalopathy (TSE) surveillance, biological residue control, and traceability. To provide effective 

oversight, MAPA officials travel regularly to the Ministry’s offices in each State, and to the SDA 

offices in the field to evaluate programs at the local level [6]. 

The Federal veterinary service workforce consists of 1,629 veterinarians, 2,037 technical assistants, 

and 358 administrative assistants [9]. 

State and Local Veterinary Services 

Federal and State interactions are well defined and structured. State personnel execute Federal 

programs, laws, and policies at the State level. Cooperation is achieved by renewal of signed 

cooperative agreements, which transfer considerable amounts of funding from the Federal budget to 

State agencies. The Federal program has ultimate authority over conduct of the national eradication 

program. It uses its authority to allocate financial resources to ensure compliance with Federal 

program policy and provides oversight to ensure that the resources provided will be effectively 

managed [6, 7, 10]. 

Responsibilities of State officials for carrying out Federal programs are outlined in standard 

operating procedures developed with Federal officials. The standard operating procedures apply to 

defined regions and reflect local circumstances. In Santa Catarina, CIDASC implements Federal 

programs at the field level. It maintains an up-to-date register of rural holdings, controls intra- and 

interstate movement of animals and animal products, provides assistance to Federal authorities 

during outbreaks, investigates suspected notifiable diseases, provides sanitary education to the 

community, develops animal disease surveillance and information systems, inspects livestock events 

such as fairs, exhibitions, auctions and public sales, and inspects animals and their products and 

byproducts before movement. The SFA of MAPA oversees these activities [4]. 

Regional and local offices of the official State veterinary services are part of the CIDASC 

organization. The central and regional units of CIDASC oversee local animal health activities. The 

work of CIDASC is directly inspected by MAPA, through its representatives at SFA. Additionally, 

MAPA carries out audits throughout the State, with the last statewide evaluation occurring during 

August and September of 2006. The evaluation was positive overall and the State adopted the 

auditors’ recommendations (Personal communication, Chapeco Office). 

During the 2008 site visit, the Chapeco Regional Office reported that it had been audited by either 

MAPA (for pigs and poultry) or CIDASC three times over the past year. The last FMD audit in 

Santa Catarina was conducted in 2006, with favorable overall results. A few deficiencies were 

documented, including the need for a single person in charge of sanitary health (since at the time one 

person oversaw both sanitary and animal health). These deficiencies have been corrected. 

Each State in Brazil is administratively divided into municipalities, which comprise the basic units 

of animal health and surveillance. The field structure of the veterinary services in the country 

consists of 1,528 LVUs; 3,940 municipal offices; 5,029 veterinarians; and 13,357 technical and 

administrative assistants and support personnel [9]. The LVUs consist of one or more municipalities 


and implement animal health activities within the area they represent. The local units are 

administratively grouped into regional units (19 total in Santa Catarina). Epidemiologic and health 

data collected by the LVUs are consolidated and analyzed at the local level, used as appropriate, and 

then forwarded to regional, State, and national offices [4]. Geographic distribution of regional and 

local veterinary units in Santa Catarina is displayed in Figures 3 and 4, respectively, below. 

Figure 3: Distribution of regional coordination units of CIDASC, 2006 [4] 


Figure 4: Distribution of CIDASC LVUs, 2006 [4] 

UVL 

CIDASC staffing and infrastructure resources within Santa Catarina are shown below for central and 

regional units (Table 1) and local units (Table 2) at 2006 levels. 

Table 1. Human resources and infrastructure used in the central and regional coordination activities 

for animal health in Santa Catarina, 2006. 

Coordination Structure SFA CIDASC TOTAL 

Central Unit 1 1 2 

Regional Units 9 19 28 

Veterinarians 16 45 61 

Assistants (technical and administrative) 8 40 48 

Vehicles 17 40 57 

Telephones 13 76 89 

Fax machines 12 35 47 

Computers 13 56 69 

(Source: FMD-free OIE document) 


Table 2. Structure and human resources used in animal health field work, Santa Catarina, 2006. 

Field Structure 

Municipalities 293 

Local veterinary units 91 

Community service offices 191 

Veterinarians 295 

Technical assistants 147 

Administrative assistants 140 

Vehicles 295 

Telephones 99 

Fax machines 55 

Computers 277 

(Source: FMD-free OIE document) 

Number of resources 

There are 295 official veterinarians working in Santa Catarina. These professionals participate in the 

surveillance system supporting the official veterinary service, in activities to promote animal health, 

and in notification of animal disease suspicions, especially vesicular diseases [11]. 

During the 2008 site visit, the site visit team visited the regional office in Chapeco, along with two 

LVUs located within this region: Xanxerê and Seara. The Chapeco regional office has jurisdiction 

over 44 municipalities divided into 18 LVUs. It includes 404,000 residents and covers 7,095 square 

kilometers. The livestock population consists of 1,164,000 commercial and 15,000 backyard pigs 

and 700,000 cattle. Forty-seven official veterinarians work within this region, most of whom are 

stationed at LVUs. Additional staffing within the region includes 22 clerks, 6 field assistants, and 74 

personnel stationed at sanitary barriers. Four and three veterinarians, respectively, operated out of 

the Xanxerê and Seara local offices [11]. 

Representative State activities administered by LVU personnel include registering properties, 

collecting and tracking census data, monitoring vaccination and controlling vaccine distribution, 

animal and animal product movement control, reporting suspicious cases, monitoring and 

eradicating outbreaks, surveillance activities, monitoring local animal gathering events (such as fairs, 

expositions, and auctions), monitoring clinical investigations and sampling, and conducting local 

training and outreach [6, 10]. 

Personnel who observe conditions consistent with FMD or swine diseases, including CSF, SVD, and 

ASF, must immediately notify Federal officials. The Federal, State and private sectors exchange 

information freely. Local and regional offices prepare weekly and monthly reports that are shared 

among the three sectors[6, 10]. Interaction among local, regional, State, and Federal authorities and 

private and international organizations is structured and effective. 


Private coordination/contributions 

Veterinary control and infrastructure in Brazil depend on close interaction between Federal and State 

offices, but their functions are also supported strongly by producer groups. In fact, this interaction 

with producers is defined by regulation and considered by Brazilian officials to be a significant 

factor in controlling FMD. The private sector is strongly committed to general animal health 

activities as well as disease eradication and traceability (identification) systems, and shows its 

support by substantial financial contributions [6, 7, 10]. 

Professionals who work in the private sector are often invited to participate in lectures and technical 

meetings with representatives of the official veterinary service. Private sector veterinarians can 

register with MAPA and CIDASC to issue animal movement forms (Guia de Transito Animal, or 

GTAs) for the movement of pigs and poultry, as each official veterinarian works in a limited number 

of municipalities [4]. 

During the 2008 site visit the team observed strong interactions between CIDASC veterinarians, 

production company (cooperative) veterinarians, and producers. The cooperative veterinarians 

trained the producers in basic animal health and production, biosecurity, and disease recognition and 

reporting requirements. The official veterinary services, in turn, trained the private veterinarians. 

On most swine farms, farmers have been trained to diagnose common causes of death, such as 

volvulus, by conducting their own necropsies, but appeared willing to contact their company 

veterinarian if they detected something unknown or suspicious of a viral infection. Company 

veterinarians are in turn required to contact the local CIDASC office upon suspicion of any 

notifiable diseases [11]. 

Indemnity procedures 

Brazil law requires indemnity. The main indemnity procedures are based on Law No. 569, passed 

December 21, 1948, which establishes measures to safeguard public health or for the sanitary 

protection of animals. The Federal government pays indemnity for (1) animals sacrificed due to the 

presence of FMD or any other exotic disease, (2) all susceptible animals that have the disease, and 

(3) all susceptible animals that have a history of contact with affected animals. The Federal 

government provides money for payments; money also comes from private indemnity funds created 

and administered by producers. Federal funds come from the national treasury and complement 

indemnity funds administered by producers [12]. 

Whenever sick animals must be destroyed to safeguard public health, or there is destruction of rural 

buildings or objects, the proprietor must receive financial compensation. Compensation is paid after 

the situation is assessed in accordance with regulations of MAPA and the State government. 

The producers’ private indemnity fund in various Brazilian States comes from fees paid by 

producers and slaughter establishment officials for authorization to move and slaughter animals. 

Santa Catarina has public and private funds for compensation during disease emergencies. During 

the 2008 site visit, CIDASC reported a fund for animal health activities of 17,763,757 reales 

(approximately $11 million.). Brazil’s laws require that records of the entire indemnity process be 


kept, with the documentation being available for auditing in the involved States (presentation 

CIDASC). Owners have been duly compensated in all animal sanitary emergency activities carried 

out in Brazil [11]. 

Garbage control/swill feeding 

Swill feeding to swine is prohibited in all regions of Brazil by Decree No. 201, issued May 1998 [5]. 

State laws in Santa Catarina also prohibit garbage feeding. Although Federal law allows some 

feeding with inactivation of waste, this practice is forbidden by Santa Catarina State law. Official 

veterinarians at the Seara local office reported that if they identified garbage feeding during a farm 

visit they would provide guidance and a verbal warning to stop it. Upon a second finding they 

would issue a fine; however, the officials reported that this has never been necessary[11]. 

Conclusions: 

APHIS considers that MAPA has sufficient legal authority to carry out official disease control, 

eradication, and quarantine activities. MAPA has a system of official veterinarians and support staff 

in place for carrying out field programs and for import controls and animal quarantine. Review of 

veterinary infrastructure with MAPA and CIDASC officials demonstrated an infrastructure adequate 

for rapid detection of FMD, CSF, ASF, and SVD and for carrying out surveillance programs in 

Santa Catarina. The technical infrastructure is adequate, and officials use advanced technologies to 

conduct animal health programs. 

Santa Catarina’s LVU offices are adequately staffed. Assuming that the offices visited during the 

site visit are representative of LVUs throughout the State, the local contacts, coverage, and control 

mechanisms are strong. LVU functions observed in relatively high-risk regions demonstrated close 

contact with individual premises in the regions and strong local controls. LVU personnel appeared 

to be adequately trained in identifying the clinical signs of FMD, SVD, ASF, and CSF. In addition 

they have a close relationship with animal producers and private/company veterinarians in charge of 

cooperative farms. All parties are willing to report suspicious incidents to the next level. LVU 

personnel also regularly provide information on disease signs and reporting requirements to 

producers within their coverage area. It is expected that producers would suspect any of the diseases 

under evaluation if they were to see them. 

During our site visits to Brazil in 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2008, APHIS received overviews of the 

activities and structures of Federal, State and local authorities. APHIS reviewed premises 

registration, census information, vaccination records, and movement control documents. Our 

personnel visited farms to observe farming practices. Officials observed that the structure, 

effectiveness, and organization of the LVUs in Santa Catarina were adequate to perform official 

animal health functions [6, 11]. 

With regard to indemnity procedures, APHIS concluded that sufficient funds are available to 

compensate owners for sacrificed animals. In addition, indemnity provisions can be extended to 

exposed and contact animals. Livestock producers and other industry groups contribute to and 

administer private compensation funds, which show the level of commitment and participation of the 

cattle industry in FMD program activities and of the swine industry to FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF 


program activities. Availability of indemnity provisions should encourage disease reporting and 

complement detection efforts carried out by official veterinary services. 

2. Disease status in the export region 

Gaining a thorough understanding of the history of FMD, CSF, ASF, and SVD in a region is 

essential to assessing its existing export risk. Assessment of risk includes a consideration of the 

effectiveness of control measures the region implements and revises as appropriate. Consequently, 

this section focuses on historical outbreaks and eradication efforts in Santa Catarina. 

FMD 

FMD vaccination became mandatory in Brazil in 1965. The first systematic vaccinations were 

implemented in 1967 through a joint action of the Federal and State governments. In 1992, the 

policy and strategies against FMD were reviewed; as a result, the vaccinations were enforced 

regionally based upon livestock demographics. Stakeholders (producers, agricultural industry, retail, 

universities, etc.) were incorporated as a main element in all phases and activities in the National 

Program for Foot-and-Mouth Disease Eradication (PNEFA - Programa Nacional de Erradicação da 

Febre Aftosa). Consequently, in 1998, the OIE recognized the first FMD-free area where 

vaccination was practiced. 

The last FMD outbreak in Santa Catarina occurred in 1993. Santa Catarina achieved international 

recognition in 1998 as FMD-free with vaccination. In 2000, the year that vaccination ceased in Rio 

Grande do Sul, an FMD outbreak occurred in that State. No FMD was detected in Santa Catarina. 

The 2000 Rio Grande do Sul outbreak affected 22 premises. The disease was eliminated by 

stamping out (destruction of the affected animals). Officials suspected that the disease was linked to 

a Type O1 FMD outbreak in Argentina, which also occurred in 2000. Transit of infected cattle in 

the border region between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay was implicated as the pathway of 

introduction. At that time, vaccination against FMD remained suspended in Santa Catarina and Rio 

Grande do Sul. In 2007, OIE recognized Santa Catarina as an FMD-free zone where vaccination is 

not practiced (see Figure 5). 


Figure 5: FMD status zones, Brazil, 2008. 

Non free 

Buffer zone 

Free zone with vaccination 

Free zone without vaccination 

Suspended free zone 

2008 

(Source: Presentation, U.S. Technical Visit June 8-13, 2008) 

CSF 

No outbreaks of CSF have occurred in Santa Catarina since 1990 [13]. In addition, there have been 

no outbreaks in the CSF-free portion of Brazil, which comprises the 12 southernmost Brazilian 

States, since 1998 (see Figure 6). The CSF-free zone of Brazil was declared in January 2001 

according to Normative Instruction SDA 01/2001. It consists of almost half of the Brazilian territory 

and 80 percent of the national swine population [9]. 

Figure 6: CSF-Free Zone in Brazil, 2008 [9] 

Infected Zone 

Free Zone 


Fifteen outbreaks have been detected since declaration of the free zone in Brazil in 2001, all of 

which occurred in the non-free zone. Most occurred in the State of Ceará; one outbreak occurred in 

Paraíba in 2006 and one in Maranhão in 2008 [9, 14]. 

ASF 

No outbreaks of ASF have occurred in Brazil since 1981. As of 1984 [15], all of Brazil was 

declared to be ASF-free and continues to be regarded as such [14]. 

SVD 

SVD has never occurred in Brazil [14]. 

Conclusions: 

Santa Catarina’s last FMD outbreak occurred in 1993. No outbreaks of ASF have occurred in Santa 

Catarina since 1981 and no outbreaks of CSF have occurred in Santa Catarina since 1990. SVD has 

never occurred in Brazil. There is no evidence of any FMD, CSF, SVD, or ASF infections or 

outbreaks in Santa Catarina. 

3. Disease status of adjacent regions 

This section describes the disease status in other areas of Brazil with respect to FMD, CSF, ASF, and 

SVD, and in Argentina, which borders Santa Catarina (Figure 7). 

Figure 7: Brazil and neighboring countries 



Brazil currently has several different FMD zones. Santa Catarina is the only zone designated by the 

OIE as free of FMD without vaccination. At the time of this analysis, the area recognized by the 

OIE as free of FMD with vaccination contains 16 States, mostly located in the southern and central 

portion of Brazil (OIE reference). Santa Catarina is surrounded by the States of Rio Grande Do Sul 

and Paraná, both recognized by the OIE as free of FMD with vaccination. Outbreaks of FMD have 

occurred in Rio Grande Do Sul (2000/2001) and Paraná and Mato Grosso do Sul in 2005 and 2006. 

Rio Grande do Sul 

In 2000, the year that vaccination ceased in Rio Grande do Sul, an FMD outbreak occurred in that 

State. FMD was not detected in Santa Catarina. The Rio Grande do Sul outbreak affected 22 

premises in four neighboring municipalities in the northwestern region of the State. The disease was 

eliminated by stamping out. The eradication program involved the destruction of 11,017 animals 

(8,185 bovine, 2,106 swine, 722 ovine, and 4 caprine species). In addition, officials imposed strict 

movement controls and biosecurity measures [6, 7, 12, 16]. The disease was linked to a Type O1 

FMD outbreak in Argentina that occurred in 2000. Transit of infected cattle in the border region 

between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay was implicated as the pathway of introduction. At that 

time, vaccination against FMD remained suspended in Rio Grande do Sul [16, 17]. 

In 2001, another outbreak occurred in Rio Grande do Sul affecting 30 premises in six different 

municipalities. In this outbreak, in addition to implementing a stamping out program, officials 

carried out emergency vaccination for all cattle in the State. A total of 2,348 farms were quarantined 

and 32,408 animals were slaughtered. No direct epidemiological relationships between the six 

affected municipalities were identified. Investigation results suggested that the six outbreaks 

resulted from independent re-introductions, all coming from Uruguay. Direct epidemiological 

relationships were established between the owner of an affected herd in one municipality and 

producers in Uruguay. The observation that the first occurrence of disease was farther away from 

the border than subsequent occurrences was significant because the owner of the affected herd had 

been in Uruguay a few days before the outbreak erupted in his herd. 

No direct relationship was identified between the outbreaks in the six municipalities and the 

outbreaks in Argentina since the virus in Argentina was type O and the virus in Uruguay was 

classified as type A [6]. At that time, vaccination against FMD was reinstated throughout Rio 

Grande do Sul [16, 17]. 

Paraná 

On October 21, 2005, Brazilian authorities detected FMD in the State of Paraná. The outbreak was 

immediately reported to the OIE. As a result, the affected properties, as well as those located within 

a 10-km radius, were immediately quarantined and interdicted. Paraná reported a total of 11 

outbreaks (two outbreaks in Maringá, one in Grandes Rios, four in Loanda and two in Amaporã). 

Epidemiological investigation revealed that the disease entered Paraná because of the movement of 

87 heifers from Mato Grosso do Sul on September 27, 2005. These animals originated from a 


property that was later identified as (1) having had FMD cases, and (2) being adjacent to two 

properties with FMD cases. The animals involved remained for 8 days in the municipality of Bela 

Vista do Paraiso in Paraná, and subsequently sold at auction in the municipality of Londrina. 

Clinical and seroepidemiological investigations identified 11 properties with suspected FMD. 

By April, 2006 a total of 6,781 cattle had been destroyed to fight the outbreak. Officials made 

several attempts to isolate and identify the virus; however, due to several factors (such as samples 

taken not being suitable for virus isolation), the laboratory staff could not identify the presence of the 

FMD virus. Nevertheless, based on the clinical signs and epidemiological links to outbreaks in Mato 

Grosso do Sul, the episodes were confirmed as FMD, and officials declared a state of sanitary 

emergency. 

Argentina 

Argentina borders the Brazilian States of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná. In July 

2000, officials recorded an outbreak caused by virus type O. Additional premises were infected with 

virus type O through December 2000 in multiple provinces, including Corrientes and Misiones. 

Detection of separate premises affected with virus type A between August and December 2000 

compounded the situation. Subsequently, multiple outbreaks of virus type A occurred between 

March 2001 and January 2002 throughout Argentina, including 70 outbreaks in Corrientes near the 

border with the Paraná River. In addition, in September 2003, a single outbreak of virus type O 

occurred in the northern province of Salta. This outbreak was limited to swine in a single premises 

and Argentina declared eradication in early October. 

In 2006, Argentina reported an outbreak of virus type O in San Luis del Palmar (Corrientes) near the 

border with Paraguay. This outbreak was quickly contained and eliminated. Molecular 

characterization of the virus revealed that the strain was indigenous to the region and shares common 

similarities with the isolates responsible for the type O outbreaks in South America between 2000 

and 2005 [18]. Specifically, studies showed that the virus presented a high degree of homology (96 

percent) with virus types isolated in Pozo Hondo (Paraguay) in 2003 and in Tarija (Bolivia) in 2000, 

and with 92 percent homology with virus isolated in Mato Grosso do Sul (Brazil) in 2005. 

Brazil appears to have successfully prevented the introduction of FMD from Argentina during some 

but not all outbreaks in that country. 

Regional approach to FMD eradication in South America 

A plan to eradicate FMD in all of South America by 2009 – the Plano Hemisferico de Eradicacao da 

Febre Aftosa, or PHEFA – was created in the mid-1980s. Under this plan, a regional partnership 

agreement involving Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, and Bolivia (the Convention da 

Barcia do Rio do Prata) was implemented in 1997. This agreement aims to integrate the various 

national and regional FMD programs and to coordinate sanitary measures for FMD control and 

eradication, particularly in the border regions [16, 17]. 

As part of the partnership agreement, the veterinary services in the border regions are jointly 

preparing maps that demonstrate the commercial flow of susceptible animals to pinpoint areas of 


higher risk. In addition, the local veterinary services of the involved countries meet periodically to 

discuss available information and conduct joint activities, thereby improving horizontal relationships 

and disease reporting at the local level. 

CSF 

As previously described, Brazil was declared a CSF-free zone in 2001. Santa Catarina is located 

within this CSF-free zone, as are both of its adjoining Brazilian States. No outbreaks of CSF have 

occurred in Santa Catarina since 1990 [13]. There have been no CSF cases detected in the CSF-free 

portion of Brazil since it was declared. Although CSF outbreaks have occurred in Brazil since this 

time, the outbreaks have been limited to States in the northeastern portion of the country, far from 

Santa Catarina. Movement controls are in place at the border between the CSF-infected and free 

zones of Brazil and have prevented spread of the disease into the free zone [9]. 

The last reported case of CSF in Argentina occurred in 1999 [14]. 

ASF 

ASF was first reported in Brazil in 1978 in the State of Rio de Janeiro. It is believed that the disease 

entered via infected food leftovers from an incoming passenger flight from Portugal, which was 

experiencing outbreaks of ASF at the time. Within Brazil, the outbreaks were concentrated in farms 

that produced pigs for their own consumption. These farms were located on the outskirts of Rio de 

Janiero and had access to food waste [13]. The outbreak was contained through stamping out and 

increasing biosecurity to prevent exposure to infective materials and wild boar. Brazil has had no 

further outbreaks of ASF since 1981 [14] and has been declared officially free of ASF since 1984 

[15]. 

ASF has never been reported in Argentina [14]. 

SVD 

SVD has never been reported in Argentina [14]. 

Conclusions: 

There is no evidence that FMD has been transported from surrounding countries or regions of Brazil 

into Santa Catarina. CSF has not occurred within Santa Catarina since 1990. Although CSF has 

been detected in recent years in the CSF-infected zone of Brazil, movement controls have prevented 

introduction of the disease into the free area. CSF does not appear to be circulating within Argentina 

at this time; therefore, it is not likely that transmission of disease would occur from this source. ASF 

has not occurred in Brazil for nearly 30 years, and it has never been reported in Argentina. 

Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the virus exists in areas neighboring Santa Catarina or that these 

areas pose a risk for disease transmission. SVD has never been reported to occur anywhere within 

Brazil or in Argentina. 


4. Extent of an active disease control program 

In this section we describe the disease control programs that led to the eradication of FMD, CSF, 

ASF, and SVD in Santa Catarina, and review MAPA and CIDASC program activities. 

The Brazilian FMD program strategy consists of defining a region based on the livestock circuit or 

ecosystem. Eradication efforts are coordinated by region. The program relies heavily on community 

involvement and joint activities with stakeholder groups interested in animal health and production. 

Brazil has formed local groups that work under the coordination of the States’ regional and central 

offices. One of the main objectives of the program is to shift decision-making to the LVUs, which 

take sanitary actions and generate technical information. 

The DDA coordinates and supervises all aspects of the FMD program. The DDA: 

Develops strategies to combat the disease. 

Develops program rules. 

Controls interstate and international movement of animals, products, and byproducts. 

Registers, tests, and controls specific vaccines. 

Conducts laboratory tests for disease diagnosis and virus isolation. 

Conducts disease surveillance and information systems at national and international levels. 

Audits State veterinary services. 

Conducts sanitary education and training of program personnel. 

Conducts veterinary inspection of animals, animal products, and byproducts at origin and 

after importation. 

Provides financial support through cooperative agreements with the States. 

The States implement program strategies. The States’ secretariats: 

Execute programs at the field level. 

Maintain an updated rural holdings register. 

Promote and monitor the FMD vaccination program for cattle and buffaloes. 

Supervise vaccinations in risky areas or holdings. 

Control intra- and interstate movement of animals and animal products (the interstate control 

is conducted in partnership with the Federal government). 

Help Federal authorities during outbreaks of the disease and investigation of suspected 

vesicular disease. 

Provide sanitary education, 

Organize community participation in the programs. 

Develop animal disease surveillance and information systems. 

Inspect livestock events such as fairs, exhibitions, auctions, and public sales. 

Inspect animals and their products and byproducts before movement. 

Train program personnel. 

The participation of the private sector in the national context is through CONASAN and occurs at all 

levels of administration (national, State, and municipal). The private sector supports the FMD 

program by providing financial resources and participating in the program’s planning, financing, 

implementation, and evaluation of the technical and managerial actions. According to Brazilian 


officials, the private sector’s participation has also strengthened official structures and improved 

sanitary actions, mainly within the local units of the surveillance system. 

The Brazilian Government has promoted and guaranteed the involvement of various groups of 

CONASAN into a plan called the National Program for Foot-and-Mouth Disease Eradication, or 

PNEFA. These groups are composed of people interested or involved in livestock production or 

health, such as rural producers, livestock and livestock product industry personnel, trade agents, 

private veterinarians, and members and officers of farmers’ unions, cooperatives, universities, and 

town halls. The objective of these alliances is to bring greater awareness, a wider scope, 

transparency, and credibility to the program. The Federal Government coordinates the 

implementation of the national plan. 

Eradication of FMD in Santa Catarina followed the basic strategies implemented by PNEFA and are 

summarized here: 

Strengthening and maintaining the animal health system, including hiring personnel for the 

official veterinary service through public agreements. 

Enacting and enforcing compliance with animal health laws. 

Registering rural holdings, herds, and all other establishments linked to the livestock 

production system. 

In its first phase, periodic mass vaccination of bovine animals and buffaloes which can be 

suspended and followed by actions to strengthen the primary surveillance system. 

Working on vesicular disease suspicions and implementing a stamping-out policy if officials 

confirm FMD. 

Control and surveillance of animal movement and prohibiting the entry of at-risk animals and 

animal products. 

Strengthening community participation. 

Auditing and supervising premises as needed. 

Main activities of the FMD and other swine notifiable disease program 

Disease surveillance 

Brazil’s animal health service has a surveillance system that covers the entire country. The LVUs 

collect the necessary data and make decisions based on the data. Many official and private sources 

supply the system’s information. In Santa Catarina, the field units collect and process surveillance 

data and forward the information to the regional offices. Santa Catarina’s central unit and a national 

unit represented by DDA and the MAPA SDA are located in Brasilia. 

The DDA official collects data from the State level and forwards the information to the OIE and 

other parties such as the South American Commission for the Fight against FMD. Reports are sent: 

Weekly for disease notifications. 

Monthly for confirmed cases of animal diseases. 

Biannually for the results of each phase of vaccination against FMD for each Federal unit. 

Annually for full reports of epidemiological and sanitary information. 

Notification and investigation of suspected cases 


All official service field staff, community participants, and private sector veterinarians are trained 

and required to look for signs of notifiable diseases. If any of the listed diseases, including FMD, 

CSF, ASF, or SVD is suspected, the disease must be immediately reported to the local unit or to an 

authority that would notify the local unit. 

Response to a suspected outbreak begins within 12 hours from the time the unit receives notification. 

All actions are carried out as if the herd is infected until proven otherwise. The suspect holding is 

immediately quarantined, movement of animals is prohibited, and samples are collected and sent to a 

laboratory to confirm the diagnosis. 

Field inspections 

LVU personnel carry out special visits to certain herds classified as “risky” by the official service. 

Risky herds are those owned by rural landless herd owners and Indian tribes, herds in areas densely 

populated with backyard and street cattle, or herds that have previously been affected by one of the 

diseases under evaluation. In addition, official veterinarians inspect animals prior to movement into 

Santa Catarina. 

Surveillance at abattoirs and meat packing plants 

Animals are individually inspected by personnel from the official service for signs of vesicular 

disease before slaughtering. Other body parts, including the tongue and feet, are examined during 

postmortem inspection. 

Surveillance at animal gathering places 

All animals entering fairs, auctions, or exhibitions are clinically inspected by official veterinarians. 

Laboratory diagnosis 

There are three laboratories for diagnosing FMD. These are located in Recife (Pernambuco State), 

Para (Belen State), and Pedro Leopoldo (Minas Gerais State). MAPA supervises these laboratories. 

The Pan-American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Center (PANAFTOSA), located in Rio de Janeiro, is 

the reference laboratory for FMD in Brazil and neighboring countries. The Recife laboratory 

performs routine serology for CSF, and for SVD and ASF if necessary. 

Serological monitoring 

Serologic studies follow OIE guidelines. (See section 9.) 

Regarding reportable swine diseases, current strategies under MAPA’s disease prevention and 

control programs include: 

Permanent sanitary surveillance. 

Mandatory and immediate notification of events or suspicion of occurrence of CSF or other 

swine diseases. 


Immediate assistance to States for control and eradication of outbreaks. 

Control of the transit of swine, their products and byproducts, and genetic material. 

Control of pathological and biological products that are possible vectors of disease. 

Control of places where swine concentrate. 

Disinfection of vehicles, equipment, and environments. 

Destruction of potentially infected materials. 

Control of stamping-out policies. 

Control and prohibition on the use of vaccines. 

None of the diseases under evaluation have been found in Santa Catarina for more than 8 years. 

Activities designed to detect and prevent introduction of any of these diseases and quickly eradicate 

them are all in place and are described in subsequent sections of this document. 

Conclusions: 

APHIS considers that Santa Catarina has a control program and a national plan sufficient to respond 

quickly to any emergencies related to the diseases under evaluation. Santa Catarina has a structured 

system of notification and official involvement to investigate all reports of suspected vesicular 

disease. In addition, Santa Catarina maintains a surveillance program at the field level on farms, in 

slaughterhouses, and at animal gathering locations. 

The community takes an active part in program activities, which has played an integral role in the 

motivation and strengthening of the program. 

5. Vaccination status of the region 

Santa Catarina does not vaccinate against FMD. FMD vaccination was last applied in May 2000. 

Brazil prohibited CSF vaccination in 1998. 

MAPA may approve emergency CSF or FMD vaccinations if necessary. The vaccinations must be 

conducted under the strict control of the official veterinary services [4]. Vaccine has been 

administered as part of outbreak control measures in the CSF-infected zone, although this has not 

occurred since 2003 (OIE). Vaccine has not been used anywhere within the CSF-free zone since it 

was prohibited in 1998 [3]. 

There are currently no available vaccines for either SVD or ASF. 

Conclusions: 

Santa Catarina does not vaccinate for any of the diseases under evaluation. In the absence of 

vaccination, it is likely that clinical signs resulting from an incursion of disease would be quickly 

identified. 


6. Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk 

Geographic barriers, such as mountains or expanses of water, impede the natural and humanmediated 

movements of animals and animal products. In this section we highlight the geographical 

and other barriers that limit introduction of diseases from other Brazilian States into Santa Catarina. 

Santa Catarina is in the southern region of Brazil, between parallels 25º 56 and 29º 23 S and 

meridians 48º 20 and 53º 51 W. The State has an area of 95,346 km 2 , representing about 1 percent 

of Brazilian territory. Santa Catarina has two large regions separated by mountains: The coastal 

area, also referred to as the eastern area, which extends for approximately 400 km along the Atlantic 

Ocean; and the plateau area (or western area), the remaining 66 percent of the State’s territory. The 

western area is where the greatest livestock production occurs (See Figure 2). 

Santa Catarina is bounded to the east by the Atlantic Ocean, and otherwise borders the States of 

Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul and the Argentinian Province of Misiones. At the northern border of 

Santa Catarina, with Paraná, the border is approximately 860 km long, 54 percent of which is rivers. 

The remainder is formed by the Serra do Mar mountain ridge at the extreme northeast of the State. 

The south border, with Rio Grande do Sul, is approximately 1,170 km long, 65 percent (750 km) of 

which is formed by permanent rivers. The western border, with the Province of Misiones, 

Argentina, is 237 km long, 86 percent of which runs along the Rio Peperi-Guaçú. In Misiones, the 

border area is formed mainly by protected natural areas, among which is the Yaboti Biosphere 

Reserve. 

In addition to the geographical characteristics that control entry of products at risk for FMD into 

Santa Catarina, the protection system includes 67 fixed inspection posts, strategically located at the 

entry points. These inspection stations employ 429 professionals from the official veterinary 

service, who work in shifts that provide uninterrupted operation of the posts. Inspection station staff 

members are coordinated by an official veterinarian, and have police support. The inspection 

stations are described in further detail in Section 7 of this document. 

In addition, movement controls are in place between Santa Catarina (which is considered free of 

FMD without vaccination) and areas of Brazil affected with FMD or where vaccination against the 

disease is practiced. Similarly, there are movement controls between the CSF-free zone and the 

CSF-infected zone in the northern portion of Brazil [3, 4]. 

Conclusions: 

Although some natural barriers to animal movement into Santa Catarina from surrounding areas 

exist, most of the controls of animal movement and their products are administrative. These two 

factors combined (geographical and administrative separation) have prevented the introduction of 

the diseases under evaluation into Santa Catarina. In addition, the lack of recent disease history for 

any of the diseases under evaluation in the adjacent areas further reduces the likelihood of their 

introduction into Santa Catarina. 


7. Movement control, biosecurity, and the extent to which the movement of animals and 

animal products is controlled from regions of higher risk, and the level of biosecurity 

regarding such movements 

Border controls, including inspections at ports of entry and other surveillance practices, enable a 

country to monitor the movement of people, animals, and goods into the country or a particular 

region. Illegal movements of susceptible commodities or people and equipment can spread disease. 

A thorough understanding of animal movement controls helps assess the likelihood of disease 

introduction. Further, biosecurity measures are critical to minimize the spread of disease should an 

outbreak occur. In this section we review Santa Catarina’s border control capabilities for monitoring 

and controlling the movement of species and products that could carry the diseases under evaluation 

into the State. 

Among general animal health measures carried out by the official veterinary service in order to 

protect the animal health status of Santa Catarina, control at the entry points into the State is the 

primary prevention mechanism. 

Both international and domestic movement of animals and their products and byproducts are 

regulated by federal rules. MAPA is directly responsible for the control of permanent inspection 

stations on the border with Argentina, three ports and the international airport in Florianopolis, the 

State capital, through its International Plant and Animal Surveillance (Vigilância Agropecuária 

Internacional). Santa Catarina controls other inspection stations through CIDASC [4]. 

Animals must be accompanied by a Zoosanitary Certificate signed by an official veterinarian from 

the exporting country, pursuant to the model in Normative Instruction SDA 31/2002. Controls for 

international transport and trade are defined by Normative Instruction SDA 47/2001, which bans the 

import of animals and products at risk of FMD from countries where the disease has occurred. 

Normative Instruction SDA 31/2002 and Normative Instruction SDA 54/2002 include information 

on the extent of control and biosecurity measures on imports from higher risk areas for CSF. The 

movement from the non-free zone into Brazil’s free zone of animals or other products capable of 

introducing CSF is regulated by Normative Instruction SDA 01/2001. The requirements for entry of 

animals, products, and byproducts at risk for FMD into Santa Catarina are contained in Normative 

Instruction SDA 05/2003 [3, 4]. 

All animals and products (plus plant products) must enter and leave Santa Catarina via one of the 67 

fixed inspection stations [4]. 

Domestic movement controls and animal identification 

Brazil has stringent movement controls. MAPA requires that all cattle owners identify their animals 

with a unique brand. Sheep and swine are identified by an individual brand or notch in the ear. 

Each LVU keeps a registry of identification systems and a complete registry of the livestock 

holdings in the region with animal populations listed by age group and sex. The registry must be 

updated at least twice a year, and whenever animals are moved (farmers must notify the LVU of 

changes to the animal inventory due to birth, death, or movement off premises and must do so within 

30 days [7]. 


The Brazilian System for Identification and Origin Certification for Bovines and Buffaloes 

(SISBOV- Sistema Brasileiro de Identifação e Certificação de Origem Bovina e Bubalina) is 

currently being used in Santa Catarina. Within Santa Catarina, CIDASC has implemented a program 

for the individual identification of the State’s entire herd. This identification is mandatory, with ear 

tags issued by the State government, as per State Ordinance n. 44, issued December 18, 2006 [4]. 

The LVU must issue an animal movement permit (GTA) before any animal can be moved [6]. 

Those seeking a GTA must meet certain requirements, such as: balance of animals for the specific 

age group and sex; vaccination against the diseases listed by the local veterinary service; obtaining 

sanitary certificates, when necessary; and meeting the necessary sanitary condition or status at the 

origin and at the destination. A copy of the GTA is sent to the destination. In addition, the LVU 

staff must verify that the vehicle transporting the animals has been cleaned and disinfected as 

required by law [4, 7]. 

The GTA must include a list of the bar codes of all animals in the shipment. If animals are going to 

slaughter, the slaughter plant must make sure that all of the numbers and animals are accounted for 

and that the information is recorded in a controlled database [11]. 

Pigs are sent by lot to slaughter. Each farmer has a specific farm number which is applied by back 

tag when the animal is moved to slaughter. Piglets also receive ear notches. If necessary, a lot of 

animals can be traced back to the piglet level through the GTA (the lots stay together throughout 

their lifetime). Some slaughterhouses will slaughter cull animals (i.e., not shipped by lot); however, 

these animals are slaughtered last each day and if any problems (such as signs of disease) are noted 

the plant will stop the line and disinfect the premises and staff clothing [11]. 

The official veterinary service controls animal movement within the country. At the request of the 

potential purchaser, the official service of the destination State analyzes the risk rating of the origin 

State [5]. The main factors considered in the risk rating are: 

The time passed since the last outbreak 

The presence or absence of viral activity 

The extent of vaccine coverage 

Control and inspection of incoming animals and products 

The disease status of adjacent areas 

The infrastructure of the official services 

The level of surveillance 

The degree of community participation [19] 

If the risk rating is acceptable, and the destination and origination premises are suitable for 

quarantine purposes, the movement process begins [16]. Animals are isolated at the origin property 

for at least 30 days, during which time they are serologically tested for FMD. Once moved, the 

animals are isolated at the destination property for another 14 days and re-tested. If a single animal 

tests positive for FMD, the entire group is denied entry (except for animals moving directly to 

slaughter) and the official service conducts an epidemiological investigation [19]. 


In 2005, Santa Catarina’s official veterinary service issued 272,000 movement permits, which 

included the movement of 14 million FMD-susceptible animals. Ninety-two percent of the permits 

were issued for intrastate movement and the other 8 percent permitted movement to other States, 

especially neighboring ones. Ninety-six percent of the animals moved were swine. Fifty-three 

percent of those were transported to slaughter. Cattle movements accounted for 3.7 percent of all 

movements, and small ruminants accounted for less than 1 percent. In the period from January to 

October 2006, a total of 258,000 GTAs were issued allowing the movement of 11 million FMDsusceptible 

animals. Similar percentages were reported in 2005, with swine representing 94 percent 

of all animals moved [4]. 

Table 3 shows the movement of FMD-susceptible and nonvaccinated animals into Santa Catarina 

from other Brazilian States recognized by MAPA as FMD free or where vaccination is practiced. 

All movements are recorded by GTAs and the animals were inspected at the point of entry. The 

entry is regulated by the Normative Instruction SDA 05/2003[4]. 

In specific cases of swine, in 2005 and 2006, only animals for reproductive purposes from Certified 

Swine Breeding Farms (Granjas de Reprodutores Suideos Certificadas – GRSC) were allowed into 

Santa Catarina. These farms have a high level of biosecurity, having been subject to certification by 

the official veterinary service every six months. The farms keep their own permanent veterinary 

assistance and only swine from other GRSCs can enter the premises. In 2006, swine that entered 

Santa Catarina came from 36 GRSCs. Animals from Mato Grosso do Sul and Parana, where FMD 

outbreaks were reported, came from farms not located in the municipalities where the disease 

occurred. 

Santa Catarina is a large producer of swine. Of all the animals slaughtered in the State, only 2 

percent came from other States [4]. 

Table 3. Entry of live animals for breeding in Santa Catarina in 2005 and 2006 [4] 

State of Origin 2005 2006 

Pigs Sheep and 

goats 

Pigs Farms of 

Origin 

Rio Grande Do 

Sheep and 

goats 

4,380 612 5,478 11 843 

Sul 

Paraná 15,920 111 17,459 11 0 

Minas Gerais 14,450 0 10,747 6 0 

Goiás 7,470 0 5,610 2 0 

São Paulo 413 0 2,465 4 104 

Mato Grosso do 

0 0 2,925 1 0 

Sul 

Mato Grosso 100 4 500 1 4 

Total 42,733 727 45,184 36 951 

*certified Swine Breeding Farms (GRSC), with biosafety level defined by Normative Instruction SDA 19 


Santa Catarina is a large producer of swine. Of all the animals slaughtered in the State, only 2 

percent came from other States. The movement of swine during 2007 in Santa Catarina according to 

purpose is described in Table 4 below. 

Table 4. Swine movement into or within Santa Catarina (2007) [13] 

Origin Slaughter Fattening Reproduction Total 

GO 0 0 73 73 

MG 226 300 7,158 7,684 

MT 0 0 112 112 

PR 0 0 1,271 1,271 

RS 19,219 379 914 20,512 

SC 1,200,018 1,308,696 27,149 2,535,863 

The requirements for entry of animals, animal products and byproducts at risk for FMD into Santa 

Catarina are contained in Normative Instruction SDA 05/2003. Any animals, animal products and 

byproducts, veterinary products, material or substances that might transmit the FMD virus cannot 

enter the State. However, FMD-susceptible animals may enter Santa Catarina if the importer seeks 

prior authorization from MAPA. This request for authorization must include specific information on 

the animals’ place of origin, route and destination, sanitary tests, a place of destination for isolation, 

and a description of the animals. The authorization must include the date and identification of the 

issuer. All animals must undergo clinical inspection and quarantine at both their points of origin and 

their destination [4]. 

No bovines or other animals vaccinated against FMD are allowed to enter Santa Catarina. However, 

certain animals and animal products originating from FMD-free zones in Brazil where vaccination is 

practiced may enter Santa Catarina with certain provisions. Sheep, goats, and pigs destined for 

immediate slaughter may enter if they have not been vaccinated and were born in States MAPA 

considers to be FMD-free with vaccination. They must be transported in vehicles that have been 

sealed by the official veterinary service of the State of origin. Sheep, goats, and pigs may also enter 

for stocking, fattening, breeding, or exhibition if they receive prior authorization from the official 

veterinary services of Santa Catarina and if they are subjected to a 30-day pretransport quarantine 

approved by and under the supervision of the official veterinary services, have tested negative for 

FMD, and are transported in sealed vehicles [4]. 

Maturated boneless beef may enter if it is obtained from bovines that have remained in the FMD-free 

(with vaccination) State for the 2 years immediately before slaughter (or since birth in the case of 

animals less than 2 years old), were slaughtered in slaughterhouses under Federal inspection, did not 

show signs of FMD at the time of being transported, and displayed no FMD lesions on antemortem 

or postmortem inspection. Additional animal products are permitted from FMD-free (with 

vaccination) States as long as they are processed in a manner that eliminates FMD infectivity [4]. 

Certain products are also permitted from States located in a buffer zone or infected zone for FMD 

with medium or low-risk FMD classification. These include maturated boneless beef as described 

above sent directly to inspected establishments within Santa Catarina where it is processed for 

internal consumption, or fresh pork that has been treated to inactivate the FMD virus. Other 


products, such as offal for human consumption that has been heat-treated to inactivate the FMD 

virus, raw hides and skins salted with sea salt containing 2 percent sodium carbonate, tanned hides 

and skins, hoofs, horns, hairs, and manes, processed animal feed, tallow, and beef and dairy products 

and byproducts that have been submitted to physical and chemical treatment capable of inactivating 

the FMD virus, are also permitted [4]. 

Swine from the non-CSF-free area of Brazil may not enter the CSF-free zone (which includes Santa 

Catarina) with certain exceptions. Pigs from non-CSF free areas may enter for immediate slaughter 

only, with prior authorization by MAPA and provisions that the pigs have lived on the farm of origin 

since birth or are quarantined at the farm of origin with negative serological tests for CSF [9]. 

International movement controls 

International transport and trade controls are defined by Normative Instruction SDA 47/2001. SDA 

47 bans the import of animals and products at risk of FMD from countries where the disease has 

occurred[4]. Information on the extent of control and biosecurity measures on imports from higher 

risk areas for CSF are included in Normative Instruction SDA 31/2002 and Normative Instruction 

SDA 54/2002 and are listed in Annex 1. The movement of animals or other products capable of 

introducing CSF into the free zone of Brazil from the non-free area is regulated by Normative 

Instruction SDA 01/2001[3]. 

The list of countries from which FMD-susceptible animals and their products and byproducts may 

enter is based on OIE recognition as updated by DSA (the animal health directors). Unauthorized 

countries may import some products if the producers meet specific requirements that ensure sanitary 

safety. These requirements are similar to those outlined above for products entering Santa Catarina 

from other Brazilian States [4]. 

Swine destined for import must originate from a country or region considered free from ASF, SVD, 

CSF, and other diseases, according to the standards set by the OIE as recognized by MAPA. In 

addition, the animals must be quarantined at the point of origin and tested (with negative results) for 

brucellosis, TB, CSF, Aujesky’s disease, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS), 

transmissible gastroenteritis, enterovirus encephalomyelitis, and leptospirosis. The condition of the 

country, zone, or establishment as free from a given disease waives the need to test for the disease 

during quarantine at the point of origin. In addition, a second 14-day quarantine must be conducted 

upon entry into Brazil under the supervision of the official veterinary service. Animals are 

quarantined in establishments approved by MAPA and which employ a veterinarian to serve as the 

Technical Official in Charge [3]. 

Individual identification is required for imported dairy and breeding animals. For slaughter animals, 

only information on the number, sex, and age of the animals is required, and they must be 

transported in a sealed vehicle. These animals must go to a federally inspected (SIF) plant and can 

only be used for the internal market because they have not been in the country for more than 90 

days. If an animal arrives at the border with clinical symptoms of disease, it is sent back to the place 

of origin; however, animals that show signs of FMD are quarantined and sampled [6]. 


Animal products that enter Brazil must have a MAPA import permit, comply with all sanitary health 

requirements, originate from an establishment approved to export to Brazil, and declare the port of 

entry and final destination. Animals must be accompanied by a Zoosanitary Certificate as required 

in Normative Instruction SDA 31/2002 [3]. 

According to Brazilian officials, 100 percent of animal products entering the country receive a 

primary and a secondary inspection. An inspection for animal health purposes is conducted, which 

includes a check for compliance with labeling and packaging requirements. For the secondary 

inspection, the product is sent to a storage facility registered with MAPA for public health sampling. 

If a shipment is rejected, Brazil law authorizes a number of actions. The product may be returned to 

its place of origin, may be confiscated and incinerated, or may be retained for possible resolution. 

There was no international importation into Santa Catarina of live animals susceptible to FMD, 

semen, or embryos from January 2005 to October 2006. All registered imports of products and 

byproducts are listed table 5 [4]. 

Table 5. Imports of animals and products from FMD-susceptible animals into Santa Catarina in 

2005 and 2006 (partial data, until October 2006). 

Product Country of Origin Quantity (kg) 

2006 2005 

Fresh or chilled boneless maturated beef 

Argentina 163,841 192,000 

Uruguay 203,200 109,615 

Frozen maturated boneless beef 

Argentina 43,716 104,861 

Uruguay 20,200 23,200 

Fresh or chilled bone-in beef cuts Uruguay 1,300 1,000 

Frozen bone-in beef cuts Uruguay 500 0 

Frozen boneless lamb Uruguay 29,980 18,500 

Frozen bone-in lamb cuts Uruguay 558,946 318,500 

Frozen pork South Africa 51,000 0 

Spain 91,200 412,089 

Frozen pork edible offals 

United States 0 101,870 

France 0 24,747 

Beef casings Australia 72,955 11,520 

Pig casings 

Germany 116,600 0 

Denmark 22,400 0 

Spain 242,960 241,800 

United States 290,899 500,545 

Poland 271,850 147,000 

Whole cattle hides Paraguay 0 24,130 

Pre-tanned cattle hides Uruguay 2,860 0 

Whole cattle hides/skins Italy 61 0 

Raw sheepskin with wool 

Argentina 11,853 0 

United States 0 19,278 

Raw goatskin United States 0 154 

Tanned pigskins China 352 0 

Source: Foreign Trade Information Analysis System/ Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) / Ministry of Development, 

Industry and foreign Trade (MDIC). 


Brazilian law prohibits all transport of animal and plant products from anywhere in the world 

without proper permits. Airline passengers are checked for animal and plant products. The type of 

inspection depends on the origin of the flight. Shipments arriving by sea are also checked for 

animals and animal products, while ship passengers receive random checks for the presence of 

animals and animal products. Prohibited items are confiscated, stored, and transported by the 

contract company to the incinerator under MAPA supervision. Customs officials X-ray a percentage 

of arriving luggage and confiscate prohibited products. They increase the percentage of luggage 

undergoing X-ray for flights arriving from high-risk areas such as Spain and Portugal, which have 

small artisan farms with no government oversight, or countries with outbreaks. In addition, 

passengers from high-risk countries must walk across a disinfectant mat. One hundred percent of 

luggage from countries having an FMD outbreak goes through X-ray inspection. 

Inspection stations 

MAPA controls products imported from other countries at the authorized entry points. Prior to 

importation, the importer must procure authorization from MAPA. MAPA evaluates the sanitary 

conditions of the exporting country as well as the exporting facility. If MAPA authorizes the 

importation, the entry point into Brazil will be specified on the authorization and MAPA’s 

International Agriculture and Livestock Surveillance Service at the point of entry will receive a copy 

of the authorization with all the specific sanitary requirements listed. The products must receive 

inspection and authorization from the official veterinarian at the point of entry to be released into 

Santa Catarina [4]. 

Permanent inspection stations are located at strategic points along the border of Santa Catarina. 

There are 67 permanent inspection stations for import of plants, animals and products into Santa 

Catarina (see Figure 8). These stations are staffed by 429 professionals from the official veterinary 

services, who work in shifts to provide 24-hour coverage. Operations at each post are coordinated 

by an official veterinarian and include police support. The inspection posts have communications 

equipment, computers, vehicles, equipment for cleaning and disinfection, and an area for 

disinfecting and disposing of confiscated material [4]. 


Figure 8: Location of permanent inspection stations 

(Source Presentation: CIDASC) 

Some of the permanent inspection stations are designated as control points for moving animals and 

products through the State. There are 12 of these “sanitary corridors” in Santa Catarina. At these 

posts, vehicles are sealed at the entry point and the person in charge of the transportation signs a 

liability commitment which identifies the entire route through the State, including the exit inspection 

station. The exit station, which is in charge of verifying the integrity of the seal and information on 

the exiting cargo, is notified of the shipment by the official in charge of the entry station. In case of 

conflicts or the failure of the transiting cargo to arrive at the destination, the State’s health authorities 

are immediately notified, initiating the search and apprehension process with involvement of the 

official veterinary services at both the origin and destination points of the shipment as well as police 

[4]. 

In addition to the permanent inspection stations, there are also a number of mobile inspection 

stations. These are organized by the LVUs and set up at strategic points without advance notice. 

They are staffed by official veterinarians and paraveterinarians and include police support [4]. 

During the 2008 site visit, the site visit team visited two land interstate border inspection posts with 

each of the Brazilian States bordering Santa Catarina (Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul) and the 

MAPA office at the International Airport Hercilio Luz at Florianopolis. Officials at the sanitary 


corridor inspection posts that were visited demonstrated working knowledge of requirements for 

animals and products to enter or transit Santa Catarina. They described the day-to-day procedures 

and provided copies of MAPA and CIDASC procedural manuals, personnel logs, and records of 

activities. They also outlined the actions that would be taken if a transiting vehicle did not arrive at 

the exit point within the appropriate time [11]. 

The site visit team examined paperwork of exiting vehicles and reviewed seal verification and 

removal. The paperwork included the authorization for movement (issued by MAPA), the GTA 

(provided by the LVU), and farm certification documents (issued by the local MAPA office in the 

State). The site visit team observed that cargo trucks were properly checked and disinfected. The 

team also observed that passenger cars are not routinely stopped at border points, but only vehicles 

that could carry animals or large amounts of animal products. These vehicles were stopped and the 

drivers were asked to open all cargo compartments. However, officials reported that during 

outbreaks in neighboring areas (and a corresponding elevation in the risk status of the affected area), 

security measures are tightened. Inspectors inspect more passenger vehicles and confiscate more 

materials, including items for personal use such as sandwiches. In addition, staff clean and disinfect 

all vehicles, not just livestock trucks [11]. 

Officials at the inspection station reported that any trucks with animals destined to stay in Santa 

Catarina (as opposed to transiting the State) would be followed to the destination farm by CIDASC 

officials who would break the seal on the farm and oversee the required 14-day quarantine period, 

after which the animals may be allowed to move. The wheels and undercarriage of all trucks 

carrying animals into Santa Catarina for any reason are disinfected on entry. The disinfection 

equipment and procedures were demonstrated during the visit [11]. 

If confiscated materials exceed the local inspection post’s ability to properly disinfect and dispose of 

them on site, the entire shipment will be directed to a local renderer for autoclave sterilization. The 

official veterinarian on site will issue a seizure document and contact the highway police to escort 

the truck to the plant. The plant will issue a document of inactivation, which is returned to the 

inspection post. The shipper will also be fined. The border post with Rio Grande do Sul had not had 

to do this and had no records to show the site visit team. Smaller amounts of confiscated material 

are usually inactivated on site with iodine and buried. This process was demonstrated to the site visit 

team [11]. 

Actions taken in the case of illegal entry 

All animals susceptible to FMD, animal products and byproducts, veterinary products and materials 

or substances that can carry the FMD virus coming into Santa Catarina that are not in compliance 

with current legislation are slaughtered or destroyed at the discretion of the official veterinary 

service and in accordance with the risk represented by the animal or product (Normative Instruction 

SDA 05/2003). The results of inspection activities carried out in 2005 and the first half of 2006 are 

shown in Table 6. 


Table 6. Results of inspections carried out by CIDASC, Santa Catarina, in 2005 and 2006 (first 

half). 

Noncompliance encountered 2005 2006 

Fine for transporting animals without a GTA 61 33 

Fine for transporting products without documentation (meat, dairy, hides, lard) 41 27 

Slaughtered bovines 127 132 

Slaughtered sheep and goats 192 863 

Meat products destroyed (tons) 20.3 133 

Dairy products destroyed (tons) 5 24 

Ref [4] 

Waste destruction 

Waste of food transported or consumed in air, sea, river, or land travel into Santa Catarina is 

destroyed under MAPA’s official supervision, by incineration at ports and airports (Normative 

Instruction SDA 05/17/2003) [4]. 

Conclusions: 

APHIS concludes that CIADSC has adequate controls at ports of entry for legal importation of 

species and products that could carry the diseases under evaluation. Santa Catarina also has the legal 

framework and authority to deal with the entry of illegal animal or animal products into the State. 

8. Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region 

Market practices and movements within the State could lead to exposure to or spread of diseases. In 

this section we explain the livestock demographic practices and the type of production systems in 

different areas of Santa Catarina. 

General information 

The livestock population of Santa Catarina is shown in Table 7. There are currently 178,945 rural 

holdings in the State that are registered in CIDASC and contain one or more species susceptible to 

FMD. Included among these are over 75,000 holdings that contain domestic pigs or wild boar, both 

of which are susceptible to FMD, CSF, ASF, and SVD. Eighty percent of the total number of 

registered holdings have been georeferenced by CIDASC [4]. 


Table 7. Livestock farms in Santa Catarina with FMD-susceptible animals, 2006 [4] 

Data 

Quantity 

Holdings with FMD-susceptible animals 178,945 

Holdings with bovines 164,33 

Bovine population 2,748,8 

Bovines per holding 17 

Holdings with buffalo 534 

Buffalo population 37,685 

Buffalo per holding 71 

Holdings with pigs 74,490 

Swine population 5,248,9 

Swine per holding 70 

Holdings with wild boars 794 

Wild boar population 16,467 

Wild boars per holding 20 

Holdings with goats 3,021 

Goat population 36,705 

Goats per holding 12 

Holdings with sheep 7,820 

Sheep population 195,78 

Sheep per holding 25 

The density distributions of holdings containing various types of livestock within Santa Catarina, 

broken out by species, is provided in Figure 9. The total population of susceptible species within 

Santa Catarina is 5,250,000 domestic swine; 2,750,000 cattle; 196,000 sheep, 37,000 goats, and 

16,000 farmed wild boar [4]. 


Figure 9: Density distribution of human, swine, cattle, sheep and goat populations in 

Santa Catarina [4] 

Santa Catarina is primarily known for its swine production. The swine population of Santa Catarina 

is approximately twice the size of its cattle population. While the State provides almost 30 percent 

of Brazil’s pork industry, it contains less than 3 percent of the country’s cattle industry. Although 

the zebu cattle breeds predominate in most of Brazil, European breeds are more common in Santa 

Catarina [10]. Most of Santa Catarina’s cattle are dairy cattle. The State contains 97 federally 

inspected and 60 State inspected dairy facilities. The State produces approximately 1.5 billion liters 

of pasteurized milk annually [4]. 


Figure 10: Bovine density and distribution [9] 

Brazil has the largest swine herd in Latin America, with the majority of the production concentrated 

in the southern and southeastern regions of the country, primarily Santa Catarina (Figure 11). 

Figure 11. Distribution of swine population [9] 


The majority of Santa Catarina’s swine industry consists of a vertically integrated production system 

from breeding stock to processing (85 percent of the State’s producers operate under such a system 

according to officials interviewed during the 2008 site visit). In this system, a certified breeding 

farm, or GRSC, produces breeding animals and distributes them to piglet production units (UPLs). 

The GRSCs are highly controlled facilities that produce all of the breeding/grandparent stock for all 

aspects of production within the cooperative [11, 13]. 

There are no animals introduced to the GRSCs; they use their own genetics. Biosecurity 

requirements for GRSCs, as provided in Normative Instruction No. SDA 19/2002, include 

requirements for peripheral fencing, a single entry point for people and vehicles with an appropriate 

disinfection system, a loading and unloading station next to the fence, and disinfection for materials 

and equipment. In addition, a locker room and shower facility with impermeable floors must be 

available for visitors to shower in. Visitors must shower twice before entering the facility, once at a 

nearby hotel and then again within the facility. Visitors must also shower before leaving the facility. 

Visitors must complete a form describing the date and place of visits to facilities containing pigs (no 

one can visit such a facility more than once within 24 hours). Clean water must be available. 

Finally, the facility must be licensed by the environmental department for treating and disposing of 

waste. A system must be in place for proper disposal of dead animals. 

GRSCs must conduct routine testing for CSF, Aujesky’s disease, brucellosis, TB, scabies, and 

leptospirosis every six months. Additionally, GRSCs will lose their certification if a slaughter plant 

or feed mill locates too close or is classified as an at-risk facility for any reason. There are 306 

GRSCs in Brazil within the CSF-free zone. The majority of them (136) are located within Santa 

Catarina [11]. 

The cooperative production system is governed by contract, with the parent company guaranteeing 

the supply of piglets, feed, and veterinary assistance [13]. The cooperative agencies involved in the 

production systems reviewed during the site visit included many aspects of agriculture, including 

crop production and the rearing of different livestock species. The parent company has minimum 

biosecurity standards, which they help the small producer to meet and maintain. Additional 

requirements for participation in the cooperative include minimum traceability requirements, 

required reporting of disease or production problems to the company veterinary representative (plus 

concurrent notification of CIDASC in the event of a vesicular or hemorrhagic disease), and the 

producer’s periodic training in disease and production measures. Cooperative company 

veterinarians are trained by official veterinarians from CIDASC. 

During the 2008 site visit, the team visited several individual facilities operating within an integrated 

system, including farrowing farms, finishing operations, and UPLs. Some of the facilities were 

involved in all phases of production and some included other species, primarily dairy cattle. All of 

the farms visited followed (or were implementing) basic biosecurity measures required by the 

cooperative, such as perimeter fencing, footbaths or lime, and vehicle wash stations at the entry. In 

addition, representatives of the cooperative provided protective clothing and footwear. The UPLs 

and the GRSC facilities maintained more intense biosecurity measures, including showering and 

additional clothing requirements [11]. 


The cooperative farm producers kept records of births and mortalities as well as all veterinary visits 

and all treatments provided. They were willing to contact their company veterinarian with any 

animal health questions or disease suspicions. The company veterinarians, in turn, expressed close 

relationships with the LVU veterinarians and would help them should they encounter an issue of 

concern [11]. 

During the site visit, official veterinarians and producers reported that producers often relied on 

official veterinarians rather than private veterinarians to provide diagnostic services because the 

State veterinary service was free. In addition, since most of the swine farms are integrated, they 

receive frequent official visits, and when needed, will call the company veterinarians or 

paraveterinarians employed by the corporation. During farm visit inspections the official 

veterinarian or paraveterinarian educates the producer and staff as necessary regarding the signs of 

disease and reporting requirements, and checks animal health, records (including copies of GTAs), 

and current inventory [11]. 

The farming of wild boar in Santa Catarina is controlled by the Brazilian Institute of Environment 

and Renewable Natural Resources, which operates under the Ministry of the Environment. The total 

population of wild boar numbers approximately 16,500 animals, most of which reside in the middle 

western part of the State [13]. 

The 2008 site visit team visited a wild boar facility. This facility handled all aspects of pig 

production. The producer delivered pigs to a local slaughter plant when enough animals became 

available to warrant the movement. The facility had a perimeter fence of cement block topped with 

chain link and similar fencing among the houses. The farrowing facilities consisted of open pens 

with solid block walls separating them and a nursery area for the newborn piglets. Pig rearing areas 

consisted of solid block foundation with metal bars. Lime was used at the entrances to the pig 

houses to prevent entry of contaminants [11]. 

The Brazilian sheep flock consists of approximately 14.8 million animals and is concentrated in the 

southern region of the country, especially in Rio Grande do Sul. The goat population consists of 

approximately 12.1 million animals and is concentrated in the northeastern region of Brazil. Most 

small ruminants are produced for the internal market [5, 10]. 

Animal identification 

Brazil is implementing the SISBOV national identification system for cattle and buffalo. SISBOV’s 

goal is to individually identify and monitor all cattle and buffaloes born or imported into Brazil. The 

system is designed to trace animals from birth to death. A unique 17-digit identification code is 

given to each animal and is registered in a national database managed by MAPA. Additionally, the 

system includes information on the owner’s registration, date and place of the animal’s birth, breed 

characteristics, feeding practices, vaccination data, movement records, death information, and other 

animal health indicators [6, 12]. 

MAPA accredits private companies to assign the codes and collect the relevant information. There 

are eight accredited companies. The companies select the type of identification used and certify the 

status of each animal enrolled. MAPA audits the companies regularly. A visit by a veterinarian is 


equired to register the animals [7, 11]. Participation in the program is voluntary, but Brazilian 

officials intend to make it mandatory at the national level. At the present time, all farms and animals 

that export to the European Union (EU) must participate [6, 12]. 

Identified animals that move to slaughter are issued a SISBOV card. The slaughter facility checks 

the documentation and terminates the registration of slaughtered animals in the national database. If 

the slaughter facility is not federally inspected, the accredited company terminates the registration of 

slaughtered animals [12]. 

Santa Catarina producers use SISBOV tags (provided by MAPA) for identification. The tags are not 

registered with the SISBOV system unless the animals are exported. Individual farmers are required 

to apply tags and maintain an inventory. The LVU distributes the tags along with a listing of tags by 

number. MAPA is working with the swine industry to define ear tag use in pigs to be exported to 

the European Union. Farmers must place the ear tags on the animals, maintain tag inventories, and 

report all movements, including births, to the LVU within 30 days. The farmer must also report the 

loss of a tag, as well as the death or slaughter of an animal (along with its tag number) to the LVU. 

Santa Catarina’s animal identification system was fully implemented at the end of 2008 [11]. 

Slaughter inspection 

There are 58 slaughterhouses for swine in Santa Catarina. These include 18 federally inspected 

slaughterhouses (SIF) and 40 using the State inspection service (SIE). For cattle, the State has four 

SIF slaughterhouses and 34 SIE facilities, and for small ruminants, a total of 10 SIE slaughterhouses. 

The health inspection of these establishments is carried out by 126 official veterinarians, with 79 

official paraveterinarians and 459 hired employees [4]. (See Figure 12 for the location of slaughter 

plants within Santa Catarina.) 

Figure 12: Distribution of SIE and SIF slaughterhouses for swine and beef [4] 


Animal gathering points 

In Santa Catarina, CIDASC inspects most fairs, exhibitions, and events where animals are gathered. 

In 2005 and 2006 there were 162 such events, involving 83,449 bovines and 2,949 small ruminants 

(Table 8). All animals are inspected and have their health documents checked on arrival by a 

representative of the official veterinary service. The representative is present during the entire event 

[4]. 

Table 8. Animal gathering events involving FMD-susceptible animals inspected by CIDASC in 

Santa Catarina, 2005 and 2006 [4]. 

Animal gathering events (auctions, fairs, etc.) involving FMDsusceptible 

Year 

animals 

2005 2006 

Total events inspected by CIDASC 61 101 

Total cattle at the events 46,277 37,222 

Total sheep and goats at the events 1,790 1,159 

Conclusions: 

The livestock industry in Santa Catarina appears to be well organized and knowledgeable of 

necessary biosecurity precautions. APHIS finds that different controls and biosecurity measures at 

commercial swine farms effectively mitigate introduction and spread of the diseases under 

evaluation. The slaughter inspection system is robust. Animal identification systems are 

comprehensive and allow officials to trace the movement of cattle and swine within Santa Catarina. 

Further, APHIS concludes that Santa Catarina has adequate control of inspection activities within 

integrated production systems, animal concentration points, and slaughter plants. 

9. Disease surveillance in the region 

Documenting surveillance systems that ensure early detection of the diseases under consideration is 

essential for the risk assessment. This section explains the characteristics of the FMD, CSF, SVD, 

and ASF surveillance programs in Santa Catarina. 


Brazil employs both passive and active surveillance strategies designed to demonstrate freedom from 

FMD. The strategies’ emphases differ depending on the phase of the eradication process within a 

given State or zone. During the first phase, the zone demonstrates its freedom from disease. The 

second phase consists of monitoring of the zone. The second phase begins once the zone is free 

from infection and is recognized as free of FMD by the OIE, either with or without vaccination 

(Santa Catarina is recognized as free without vaccination). The primary goal of the first phase is to 

document freedom from disease while the second phase prevents the reintroduction of the disease, 

maintains good sanitary conditions, and provides technical grounds to demonstrate the continual 

absence of disease and viral activity in the zone. 


The first phase relies on active surveillance while the second phase uses both active and (mainly) 

passive surveillance. Active surveillance complements passive surveillance primarily by targeting 

specific “high-risk” areas within the zone for serological sampling and more in-depth investigations. 

Santa Catarina is currently in the second phase; therefore, the emphasis is on passive surveillance for 

FMD. 

The surveys and monitoring carried out in Brazil follow the guidelines for FMD surveillance 

contained in Annex 3.8.7 of the Terrestrial Code of the OIE. Brazil uses the I-ELISA 3ABC 

(enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay test for detecting FMDV nonstructural proteins 3ABC) and 

the EITB (enzyme-linked immunoelectrotransfer blot) system developed by PANAFTOSA as the 

diagnostic method to test for antibodies against non-structural proteins of the FMD virus. The two 

tests are conducted consecutively. The I-ELISA 3 ABC screens for the disease and the EITB is used 

for confirmation. As a complementary test in animals testing positive for non-structural proteins, the 

ELISA CFL (ELISA liquid phase competition) is used to determine antibody titers for the three viral 

strains prevalent in South America and used in the vaccine. Samples of esophageal-pharyngeal 

liquid are collected for viral testing [4]. 

All animals sampled, whether through passive or active surveillance, are individually identified and 

examined by an official veterinarian. The holding cannot sell sampled animals during the testing 

period [4]. 

Active surveillance 

Active surveillance for FMD in Brazil consists mainly of targeted serologic surveys conducted 

primarily in specific “high-risk” farms within the zone under evaluation. Serological testing is also 

conducted whenever there is a suspicion of disease. High-risk farms are defined as those that: 

Have a high volume of movement of animals or their products 

Are located close to animal or waste-gathering facilities, such as 

o Slaughterhouses 

o Livestock event centers 

o Feed mills 

o Highways 

o Landfills 

o International borders 

o Borders with States where the disease is present 

Engage in a high level of breeding activities 

Contain over 100 cattle or multiple species 

The first survey to assess the circulation of the FMDV in Santa Catarina was carried out in 1997 

with Rio Grande do Sul to meet the OIE’s requirements for establishing an FMD-free zone where 

vaccination is practiced. Another survey was carried out in Santa Catarina in 2002, after an outbreak 

of the disease in Rio Grande do Sul, and serologic monitoring was performed in 2003 and 2004. In 

2006, a new serological survey was carried out to evaluate viral circulation, so that Santa Catarina 

could be declared FMD-free without vaccination. Samples were collected during November and 

December [4]. 


Three geographical sampling strata were established for the survey. An independent survey was 

carried out within each stratum using a two-stage cluster sampling design with the following 

statistical parameters: 95 percent confidence level; 95 percent sensitivity of the diagnostic system; 

100 percent specificity; expected prevalence among herds of at least 2 percent; and expected 

prevalence within herds of at least 5 percent. About 468 primary sampling units consisting of 1,347 

holdings were established throughout the State. A total of 11,059 samples were collected, out of 

which 48 were determined to be reactors to I-ELISA 3ABC/EITB testing [4]. 

Figure 13 depicts the three sampling strata and the location of primary sampling units, including 

those where a positive reactor was found in Santa Catarina during the 2006 study. 

Figure 13: Sampling strata and location of sampling units, Santa Catarina, 2006 [4] 

In locations where at least one animal reacted to the serologic sampling, a complementary 

investigation was carried out which included detailed clinical inspection of all sampled and 

susceptible animals on the farm. None of the animals showed any evidence of vesicular disease. 

The high susceptibility of the cattle herd in Santa Catarina coupled with the low number of reactive 

animals, and the absence of clustering as supported in complementary investigations and analyses, 

led Brazilian authorities to conclude that the FMD virus was not circulating in the population at the 

time of the survey [4]. 


Passive surveillance 

Passive surveillance is the primary form of evaluation conducted during the second phase of FMD 

eradication, and involves monitoring for disease. Many individuals carry out this phase of 

surveillance using many different types of activities, including: 

Animal movement control activities 

Farm inspections 

Slaughterhouse inspection 

Inspections during livestock fairs [6] 

High-risk farms receive more visits during passive surveillance. Because passive surveillance relies 

heavily on community participation and similar inputs through the LVU, officials try to keep the 

level of community participation high and the participants informed of both the suspicious signs of 

disease and its reporting requirements. For example, in 2002, the official service held 9,702 

seminars, reaching 213,131 people, with an average of 23 participants per event [7]. 

Any suspicion of vesicular disease must be immediately reported to the official veterinary services 

(or in the case of animal owners or handlers, to their private veterinarian, who must then report a 

continued suspicion to the official service). Animal owners or those responsible for the animals who 

fail to report suspicious cases of officially notifiable diseases, such as FMD or SVD, are subject to 

State civil penalties and may also be charged under the Brazilian Penal Code. Veterinarians may 

also face disciplinary sanctions by the Veterinary Medicine Regional Councils [4]. 

There are several participants in the vesicular disease surveillance system in Brazil: 

Cattle raisers, owners of susceptible animals, and rural workers who handle the animals 

Official employees, as part of their duties while visiting farms or animal gatherings (such as 

shows, auctions, and exhibitions) 

Contracted, approved or official vaccinators 

Technicians 

Representatives of rural communities, especially those who work in cattle holdings and 

receive training from the official veterinary service 

Slaughterhouse employees 

Official employees who check the movement of animals and their products and byproducts in 

permanent inspection stations and on mobile inspection teams 

Veterinarians, paraveterinarians and other private sector professionals who work with animal 

health [4] 

Records of notifications submitted to the official veterinary service are kept at LVUs and include 

information about the time of notification, the location of the holding or premises where the animals 

are kept, the species involved, the type of notification (by owner, veterinarian, or third party), how 

the notification was made (personally, by phone, or otherwise), and an initial description of the 

event. After receiving the notification, official service veterinarians must respond to the suspicion as 

soon as possible. This response is usually immediate, especially if the report is made during 

business hours, but must be made within 12 hours regardless of weekends or holidays. A vesicular 

disease suspicion kit is available in all LVUs and includes the necessary equipment to hold the 

animal, collect samples, take appropriate biosafety measures, and record the collected information. 

A standard national notification form is used. The kit also includes a manual detailing the steps to 


follow on notification of vesicular disease suspicions, including the appropriate information flow 

and the technical procedures to be followed. All official veterinarians are trained in carrying out this 

initial response [4]. 

After completing the initial records and before leaving the field, the official service veterinarian on 

site will inform his or her work team, immediate superior, and the regional representative of the 

emergency diseases group about the suspicion. Until the investigation has been completed, animals 

cannot be moved from the holding, from any adjacent holdings, or other holdings that have traded 

animals, products, or equipment with the affected holding [4]. 

Once the disease suspicion has been ruled out, the official services veterinarian records the final 

diagnosis, lifts the animal movement restrictions on the affected and related holdings, and 

communicates the results to his or her immediate superior, work team, and the regional 

representative of the special group for emergency diseases. Most investigations concern false 

reports, traumatic injuries, intoxication and malnutrition rather than actual OIE reportable disease 

[4]. 

If the official veterinarian determines that a disease suspicion is valid and needs to collect specimens 

for laboratory analysis, the involved holdings will remain under quarantine until testing is completed 

and negative results returned. Positive results would extend the quarantine until disease control 

measures are completed. The veterinarian immediately sends the laboratory materials, along with 

the appropriate submission forms, to a MAPA laboratory. The official veterinary service sends 

additional teams to provide extra surveillance around the primary holding and investigate the 

movement of susceptible animals in and out of the affected holding within the 60 days prior to the 

most probable first occurrence of the disease [4]. 

If the investigation confirms FMD, an animal sanitary emergency state is established during the 

completion of the investigation and eradication efforts. If tests do not detect FMD, differential 

diagnostic tests are carried out for vesicular stomatitis, bovine viral diarrhea, infectious bovine 

rhinotracheitis, and bluetongue. Specific procedures exist for each of these diseases and would be 

carried out if any of the diseases were detected [4]. 

Santa Catarina reported 83 notifications of reportable disease suspicions in holdings with FMDsusceptible 

animals in 2005. These notifications were investigated. Thirty involved a report of 

possible vesicular disease. Of the vesicular notifications, none were confirmed to be FMD. Instead, 

13 were determined to involve trauma and 17 involved a variety of toxic plant exposures. In 2006 

there were 201 notifications of suspicious reportable diseases in holdings containing FMDsusceptible 

animals. Eighty-one of these were related to possible vesicular disease with 41 

eventually determined to involve trauma and the remaining 40 to involve toxicosis [4]. 

Official veterinary services staff also conduct inspections during their regular duties. These duties 

include control of animal movement at permanent inspection stations or by mobile inspection teams; 

antemortem and postmortem activities at slaughterhouses; supervision of livestock congregations; 

and direct inspection at rural holdings [4]. 


In addition to responding to reportable disease suspicions, official veterinary services staff also 

conduct inspections during routine surveillance activities (while updating inventory numbers 

provided by the farmer to the local veterinary unit) and certification of holdings as part of specific 

sanitary programs. None of these visits detected any clinical signs compatible with vesicular or 

notifiable disease [4]. Information on the number of rural holdings inspected by the official 

veterinary service in 2005 and 2006 is provided in Table 9. 

Table 9. Inspections carried out on rural holdings with FMD-susceptible animals, Santa Catarina, 

2005 and 2006 [4] 

Year 

Inspected 

Existing susceptible animals 

Holdings Swine Bovine Sheep Goats 

2005 11,445 1,539,937 160,907 23,002 122 

2006 13,489 1,626,798 145,991 22,104 142 

Total 25,034 3,166,735 306,898 45,106 264 

To ensure that members of the public that have contact with animals know the signs of the diseases 

under evaluation as well as their obligation to report any suspicion of such diseases, the official 

veterinary service held 323 lectures and technical meetings, reaching 42,223 people in 2005, and 325 

lectures, involving 44,258 community participants, in 2006. In addition, the official veterinary 

service is implementing several educational projects, including plans to create and maintain 

community support resources by fostering municipal commissions of animal health, training and 

maintaining health technicians, and creating a health education plan in schools [4]. 

Santa Catarina operates a 24-hour hotline for reporting suspicions of notifiable animal diseases 

(particularly for the notification of suspect FMD cases). This service began in May 2001, and from 

that time until November 2006 community members made 116 reports. All reported incidents have 

been recorded, including the date and time of the report, history of the report, and actions taken 

regarding the event [4]. 

CSF 

Brazil carries out passive surveillance for CSF, particularly at the border between the CSF-free zone 

and the infected region (see Figure 6). The border of the CSF-free zone corresponds to that of the 

FMD-free zone; therefore, sanitary defense staff and programs can control of the entry of susceptible 

animals and products for both diseases [3]. 

MAPA coordinated serologic surveys in 2000 and 2003 to delineate and maintain the free zone. The 

surveys were conducted in accordance with the OIE’s statistical parameters. These include a 

confidence level of 95 percent, specificity of 100 percent, and sensitivity of 95 percent at a 

prevalence of 1 percent among farms. The target population included the entire hog and wild boar 

population within the free area, except for those in GRSC farms, which are officially and 

individually certified as free from diseases. The number of samples collected in each investigation 

was approximately 28,000 (Table 10) [3]. 


Table 10. Samples collected in 2000 and 2003 for CSF 

Type of farm 

Technologically 

advanced 

farms* 

2000 2003 

Other Wild Technologically 

farms boar advanced farms 

Other 

farms 

farms 

1,241 640 182 1,243 1,600 150 

Wild boar 

farms 

Number of 

farms sampled 

Number of 

53 28 2 9 13 3 

farms with 

reactors 

Percentage 4.27 4.37 1.1 0.72 0.81 2.0 

Number of 24,100 3,190 909 19,246 6,514 1,781 

Samples 

Number of 

216 59 2 16 15 4 

reactors 

Percentage 0.9 1.85 0.22 0.08 0.23 0.22 

* Includes large integrated farms with the exception of GRSCs. 

Source: Correspondence with MAPA officials, January 16, 2009 

Diagnostic tests are conducted at official public service laboratories. Screening tests are performed 

using an ELISA for the detection of antibodies to the CSF virus (IDEXX). Any reactive or 

suspicious samples are submitted for differential diagnosis using virus-neutralization tests in cell 

cultures for bovine viral diarrhea and CSF. Additionally, if the screening test returns a suspicious 

result, a confirmatory test will be performed. The farm that provided the sample will undergo 

serologic evaluation of additional susceptible animals. The laboratory will also attempt to isolate the 

virus [3]. 

Pursuant to Decree No. 24.548, and as with FMD and other vesicular diseases, every citizen must 

report the suspicion of CSF to the nearest LVU. If the owner of the animals fails to report the 

suspicion of disease, he or she will lose a claim to indemnity if the herd must be destroyed to control 

the disease. Veterinarians and other field professionals may be subject to legal action before their 

respective trade guilds [3]. 

If a sanitary emergency or documented disease event occurs, blood samples are collected from all 

animals on the farm, both sick and healthy exposed animals, to allow for a comparison of antibody 

titers. Samples are frozen and sent to the Laboratório Nacional Agropecuário in Recife, in 

Pernambuco, outside the CSF-free zone. Sick animals are killed and tonsils, spleen, lymph nodes, 

kidneys, and the distal portion of the ileum are collected and submitted for virus isolation [3]. 

As with FMD, all suspicious cases of CSF or other diseases with similar clinical signs must be 

investigated by the official veterinarian. The investigation must be initiated within 12 hours of the 

report and must be conducted using appropriate biosecurity. If the responding official cannot 


dismiss the suspicion of disease on clinical examination of the animals on the farm, he or she must 

collect the appropriate samples, issue a quarantine, and immediately communicate the event to the 

higher sanitary authority [3]. The official veterinarian must also fill out the Initial Disease 

Investigation Form, collect information on the premises under suspicion, prohibit the movement of 

hogs, their products and byproducts from the property, clean and disinfect the equipment and 

materials used in examinations and specimen collection, incinerate expendable work clothes, and 

keep outsiders out of the facilities [3]. 

Santa Catarina reported three CSF notifications in 2007, as shown in the table below. Followup tests 

were negative for CSF and the implicated farms received post-investigation evaluations by the 

official veterinary service [13]. 

Table 11. Number of notifications of suspected CSF in Santa Catarina, 2004-March 2008 [13] 

SVD 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (to March) 

0 0 0 3 0 

Brazil does not routinely test for SVD since the disease is exotic to Brazil. However, the country 

carries out passive surveillance in a manner similar to that conducted for other vesicular diseases, as 

detailed above. If FMD is ruled out as a diagnosis in clinically affected pigs, evaluation for SVD is 

included as part of the followup testing. In suspicious cases, movement of animals from the 

involved farms and the region is restricted until a definitive diagnosis is reached [13]. 

ASF 

For ASF, which is also an exotic disease, no specific surveillance is conducted. Instead, if CSF is 

ruled out in the susceptible population, ASF is considered as a possibility and investigated as such. 

As with SVD and other notifiable diseases, any implicated farms as well as those associated with 

them undergo movement restrictions until the investigation is completed and a final diagnosis 

achieved [13]. 

Conclusions: 

APHIS concludes that the serologic sampling conducted in Santa Catarina for FMD and CSF is valid 

and the sampling coverage is adequate. As with FMD, all suspicious cases of CSF or other diseases 

with similar clinical signs must be investigated by the official veterinarian. SVD surveillance is 

addressed within the passive surveillance system for other vesicular diseases. ASF surveillance is 

combined with CSF surveillance. Furthermore, given the historical absence of the diseases under 

evaluation in the region, quick detection of clinical signs should disease be introduced in the absence 

of vaccination would provide further evidence of freedom of the diseases under evaluation in Santa 

Catarina. 


10. Diagnostic laboratory capacity 

The laboratory system, including test procedures for the diseases under evaluation, quality assurance 

measures, and official oversight procedures, must be clearly documented to provide confidence in 

disease surveillance activities and the ability to quickly detect and confirm a disease outbreak. This 

section explains the laboratory capabilities of Santa Catarina for diagnosing and detecting FMD, 

CSF, SVD, and ASF. 

General information 

Brazil’s Ministry of Agriculture has three laboratories that perform diagnostic tests for FMD. These 

laboratories are located in Pedro Leopoldo, Pará, and Recife. The PANAFTOSA laboratory in Rio 

de Janeiro is the reference laboratory. The laboratory in Recife performs CSF serological testing, 

and SVD and ASF testing if necessary. 

Brazil’s laboratories perform the following routine FMD tests: 

Virus typing: Complement fixation and ELISA test (double antibody sandwich ELISA). 

Assessment of antibody level: ELISA test in liquid phase (blocking ELISA) and serum 

neutralization. 

Detection of viral activity through the anti-virus infection associated antigen (VIAA), 

ELISA 3ABC, and EITB tests. 

Identification of the virus in esophageal-pharyngeal fluid through the Probang test. 

Four State laboratories are part of a network of authorized laboratories that perform certain FMD 

diagnostics to admit animals into the export region and for serological monitoring. The laboratories 

perform EITB and VIAA tests and began ELISA 3ABC testing in 2002. Only MAPA laboratories 

carry out diagnostic activities in response to suspected outbreaks of vesicular diseases and as a part 

of viral activity studies to implement free zones. 

The 2002 site visit team visited three of the abovementioned laboratories [6] and reported the 

following: 

Diagnostic laboratory in Pedro Leopolodo, Minas Gerais: 

This Federal laboratory had a biosafety level (BSL) 2 facility for bacteriology 

(brucellosis and TB testing) and chemistry laboratory. 

The staff had about 94 people. 

Behind the BSL-2 facility, a new BSL-3 laboratory was under construction. 

The laboratory was about 2,500 square meters in size and had nine laboratories with a 

double airlock and a separate air zone for each laboratory. There was a separate animal 

facility with a separate entrance. 

The facility had three rooms for large animals with an individual shower for each room, 

and three rooms for small animals with a common shower in the hallway. 

The necropsy room had two oversized autoclaves for decontaminating carcasses. 

HEPA filters and the mechanical room were located on the third floor. 

The basement had three 3,000-gallon tanks for decontaminating effluent by boiling at 

100C. 

Animal Products Analysis Laboratory (LAPA/Recife), Pernambuco 


This Federal laboratory conducted FMD serology for all of Brazil except the northern 

part, where FMD was considered endemic. 

Vaccine efficacy was assessed in 5- to 7-day-old mice. FMD vaccine safety testing was 

tested in the baby hamster kidney-21 (BHK-21) cell line. 

At the time of the visit, the laboratory had five professional staff and three technicians. 

They tested 30,000 serum samples per month for FMD serology. 

Criteria for conducting followup on the positive samples seemed correct and well carried 

out through EITB and ELISA confirmatory tests. The laboratory used virus isolation, 

ELISA, complement fixation and IDGA to confirm vesicular disease diagnosis from the 

regional authorized laboratories. 

The laboratory was also equipped to run the highly sensitive suckling mice inoculation 

technique for antigen detection, which is used for vaccine security tests. 

The laboratory used ELISA, complement fixation, virus isolation and seroneutralization 

assays to diagnose differential diseases such as infectious bovine rhinotracheitis, bovine 

viral diarrhea virus and vesicular stomatitis virus. 

The 2008 site visit team visited the Recife laboratory in Pernambuco and found: 

The laboratory visited provides FMD and CSF serology and FMD vaccine efficacy for all 

of Brazil except for the northern part, where FMD is endemic. 

The laboratory is working under MAPA Regulation N 0 1 issued January 16, 2007; 2 0 

Art.; 5,741 Decree of March 30, 2006, and according to the process n 0 

21000.004072/2005-19, which defines the criteria for accreditation of MAPA’s national 

agricultural laboratories (Laboratorio Nacional Agropecuario, or LANAGRO). An 

independent agency regularly audits facilities under this regulation. 

The laboratory also diagnoses: 

o FMDV and its differentials vesicular stomatitis virus, bovine viral diarrhea virus, and 

bovine rhinotracheitis virus; 

o CSFV and its differentials Aujeszky’s disease, swine colibacillosis, porcine erysipela, 

pasteurellosis and salmonellosis; and 

o 17 other animal diseases. 

Brazil has five FMDV vaccine plants in production. Two are close to Santa Catarina, one 

in Parana and one in Matto Grosso do Sul. The laboratory visited provided vaccine 

efficacy for each lot of FMDV vaccine produced. 

The laboratory tests vaccine efficacy and potency using inoculation in 5- to 7-day-old 

mice and seroneutralization titers in sera from the vaccinated animals. The animals are 

not given live virus. 

 

 

 

FMD vaccine safety is tested using the BHK-21 cell line. 

CSFV vaccine is produced only for export. The laboratory visited does safety tests in cell 

cultures and potency tests with live virus challenges to vaccinated pigs, in facilities 

located in endemic areas of the country. Although these techniques differ from OIE 

recommendations, the site visit team considers them adequate because of the limitations 

of BSL-3 agriculture animal facilities and the cost of bovine test techniques. 

The laboratory has 27 professional staff members and 110 technicians or supporting 

personnel. Seven professionals (veterinarians and chemical and agronomic engineers) 


provide CSFV-FMDV diagnostics. These individuals have been working at the 

laboratory for at least 10 years. 

The laboratory is old but well maintained and reasonably equipped. 

The site visit team found the laboratory personnel highly qualified and motivated. The 

team also found that they have the equipment necessary to detect disease. 

The turnaround time for results is excellent, avoiding the extension of quarantine time on 

farms and States affected by an epidemiological alert. 

The laboratory has SOPs (standard operating procedures) and QA (quality assurance) 

control for, at least, the two tests the site visit team scrutinized. The procedures for 

CSFV and FMDV diagnosis are well established and are suited for both detection and 

confirmation of the etiologic agent. They are: 

o FMDV: Surveillance and transport certificates and sera samples are sent to 

accredited laboratories in Rio Grande do Sul, Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Mato 

Grosso. Inconclusive ELISA/ITB results go to Recife. If a clinical case is reported, 

the DSA direct that the samples be sent to LANAGRO to perform VIAA or ELISA 

3ABC/EITB. If a case ends up with suspected positive results, an alert is sent to the 

DSA and CGAL (General Coordination for Animal Laboratories) authorities who in 

turn will implement their control and eradication policies. 

o CSFV: The same accredited laboratories perform ELISA for CSFV antibodies in 

sera. Any serum-positive or inconclusive result is sent to LANAGRO-Recife for 

confirmation. If a clinical case is reported, the samples go to LANAGRO-Recife 

only, where VIAA, virus neutralization, and/or ELISA are performed. If the result is 

confirmed as positive, the authorities take the appropriate measures for control and 

eradication. 

Conclusions: 

APHIS concludes that Brazil has the diagnostic capability to adequately test samples for the 

presence of the FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF virus. The laboratories in Pedro Leopoldo, Pará, and 

Recife have adequate diagnostic capabilities to test samples for the FMD virus, including adequate 

quality control activities, laboratory equipment, and sufficient staff. The Recife laboratory has 

adequate diagnostic capabilities to test samples for FMD and other swine notifiable diseases. The 

tests used to investigate evidence of viral activity are consistent with OIE guidelines. The staff 

members at the facilities visited in 2002 and 2008 were well trained and motivated. The laboratories 

have sufficient quality control activities, routinely monitor and calibrate laboratory equipment, have 

sufficient staff, have an effective and efficient recordkeeping system for storage and retrieval of data, 

and turn samples around quickly. 

11. Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region 

Each country should have contingency plans in place to limit any disease outbreak. In this section 

we provide an overview of the elements of Santa Catarina’s emergency plan if suspect cases of 

FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF are identified. 

The Brazilian government has developed a Federal contingency plan for FMD and CSF. Each State 

also drafts a specific contingency plan for immediate, effective action in an emergency. Each State 


must maintain an organization to handle health emergencies, establish coordinating committees and 

emergency animal health technical groups, define strategies and plans of action, and, when 

necessary, carry out the appropriate control measures within a timeframe compatible with a state of 

emergency [4, 7]. 

Santa Catarina’s contingency plan requires each municipality to have a local operational plan that 

lists the names and contact information for all entities involved in emergency response. These 

include local police officials and mayors as well as truck washing terminals and technical 

responders. The emergency plan is triggered by an official declaration of sanitary emergency at the 

State level [11, 16]. 

The 2008 site visit team reviewed local emergency operational plans while visiting the LVUs. These 

plans were up to date and included a high level of detail such as assignment of specific individuals to 

the various emergency functions. The local contingency plan is not specific to a particular disease, 

but is designed to be applied to any animal disease emergency [11]. 

CIDASC has held sanitary emergency training sessions for professionals working in the official 

veterinary service. Recently, CIDASC trained 30 veterinarians in the management of emergencies. 

CIDASC also held two simulations, with the participation of all sectors, institutions and authorities 

involved in an emergency response [4]. 

Animal owners, veterinarians, transporters, and members of the public are required by law to notify 

the LVU upon suspicion of a notifiable disease in any livestock. Penalties for noncompliance can 

include significant fines and/or legal actions. The official service is required by law to respond to 

reports of disease suspicion within 12 hours. All official veterinarians have been trained in carrying 

out this response [4]. If the LVU confirms a probable outbreak by clinical observation, the central 

offices of the affected State, the SFA and the DSA in Brasilia must be informed immediately. If the 

suspected case occurs in an area bordering another country, the local unit of the neighboring country 

must also be informed [5, 7]. 

A vesicular disease suspicion kit, which is available to all LVUs through the regional office, is taken 

to the suspect holding by the official services veterinarian. This kit includes equipment for animal 

restraint, sample collection, and sanitation as well as disposable clothing and forms to collect 

information. The kit also includes a disease response manual which lists technical procedures and 

required reporting hierarchy. 

The 2008 site visit team reviewed the emergency response kit at the Chapeco regional office. The 

team found the kit to be extremely well stocked. It included laboratory submission materials and 

forms, protective clothing, cleaning and disinfection materials, and information on appropriate steps 

in the response, among other items [11]. 

Once the LVU clinically confirms a notifiable disease, the involved holding and others in close 

proximity are quarantined and all animal movement is prohibited. Unauthorized movement of 

people and vehicles onto and off the holding is also prohibited. Officials collect samples for 

laboratory analysis and start an epidemiological investigation. At this point additional official 

veterinary teams are called on to conduct clinical and serologic surveillance around the suspected 


holding and begin tracing animal movement on and off the premises during the 60 days prior to the 

likely beginning of the sanitary problem (30 days for CSF) [4, 7]. 

Following laboratory confirmation, the LVU declares a state of sanitary emergency and recruits the 

civilian defense and military forces to the effort. In addition, other States, neighboring countries, 

trading partners, and international organizations are notified of the outbreak [19]. 

Upon confirmation of disease the trace investigation is expanded to include the transit of people, 

transportation of products, fairs, abattoirs, and buyers who, before the imposition of the restrictions, 

had been in contact with the infected establishment. All professionals who work with animals inside 

the infected zone are informed of the occurrence of disease and are required to provide the official 

veterinary service with a list of all breeding establishments visited during the last 7 days [3]. 

Ongoing sanitary emergency actions also include defining an emergency area around the affected 

holding at least 25 km in radius, restricting the transport of animals, animal products, and byproducts 

in the emergency area (as well as those related commercially to the affected holding), and banning 

agricultural and livestock events (shows, markets, auctions, and similar events) in the emergency 

area. The emergency area is subdivided into three areas, which are, in order of decreasing severity, 

the infected area, the surveillance area, and a buffer or protection area [4]. 

The infected area includes the affected holding plus all other holdings within a minimum radius of 

3 km from the outbreaks. Within this area the movement of animals, people, and vehicles onto and 

off holdings is prohibited. Sick and contact animals must be destroyed (using compensation funds), 

and all places where the sick and contact animals had been held must be cleaned and disinfected [4]. 

The surveillance area includes all holdings located within 7 km of the infected area. Animal 

movements are banned within this area, although animals may be slaughtered for internal 

consumption only (i.e., in slaughterhouses located within the surveillance zone itself) following 

approved biosecurity measures. Slaughter, when authorized, must be supervised by the official 

veterinarian and the meat boned with the bones incinerated. All susceptible animals must receive a 

clinical inspection, and surveillance and monitoring of this population must be constant. 

Surveillance must include serological evaluation of all susceptible animals within the infected zone 

[4]. 

The buffer area surrounds the infected and surveillance areas and extends 15 km beyond the outer 

limits of the surveillance area. Measures taken within this zone include restrictions on animal 

transport, slaughter of animals for internal consumption only (in local abattoirs) as above, and 

ongoing surveillance, including clinical inspection of susceptible animals [4]. 

Cleaning and disinfection of affected premises starts with removal of any excess organic matter. 

The area is then cleaned with water under pressure. All the material collected during this stage, 

including food, excreta, and effluents, must be destroyed (buried or incinerated). The facilities are 

washed again with detergents, followed by a preliminary disinfection after the facilities and the 

waste-collecting gutters have dried. The process is repeated as many times as the official service 

deems necessary. Machinery, equipment, and materials used to end the outbreak are also disinfected 

[3]. 


The minimum period required before restocking with sentinel animals after disinfection is 30 days 

for FMD and 10 days for CSF. Sentinel animals (young, weaned, unvaccinated animals) are 

introduced to the holding and held there for at least 30 days. The sentinel animals undergo serologic 

testing on introduction and at 15 days and 30 days after introduction. They are also subjected to 

weekly clinical evaluation, including measurement of body temperature. If both clinical exams and 

laboratory testing yield negative results at the end of the 30-day period, the facility may gradually 

carry out a controlled repopulation, under the supervision of the official veterinary service. If any of 

the sentinel animals test positive on serologic evaluation, all other animals are killed and the process 

starts again. The contingency measures applied in protection and surveillance zones are maintained 

until the property has been determined to be free of disease [3, 4]. 

In 2005, Santa Catarina reported and investigated 83 notifications of reportable disease suspicions in 

holdings with FMD-susceptible animals. The State investigated 30 notifications for vesicular 

disease, 13 of which were due to trauma and 17 of which were due to diverse intoxications. In 2006, 

Santa Catarina reported and investigated 201 notifications of reportable disease suspicions in 

holdings with FMD-susceptible animals, 81 of which were investigated as vesicular disease 

suspicions. These were all found to be unfounded, with 41 due to traumatic injuries and 40 due to 

intoxication[4]. 

Santa Catarina did not report any suspected cases of CSF in 2005 and 2006; however three suspected 

cases were reported in 2007. All of these were investigated and subsequently determined to be 

negative for CSF [3]. 

Conclusions: 

Brazil has effective disease control and response programs for FMD and other notifiable ruminant 

and swine diseases. Santa Catarina has developed specific contingency plans for immediate action 

in any emergency situation. The State handles animal health emergencies, establishes coordinating 

committees and emergency animal health technical groups, defines strategies and plans of action, 

and, when necessary, carries out the appropriate control measures within a timeframe compatible 

with a state of emergency. Quarantine and movement restriction decisions are made by State 

officials with input from Federal authorities. There are also systems for notification and training that 

ensure emergency preparedness and response with a legal framework to authorize needed actions. 

APHIS concludes CIDASC has the capabilities to respond rapidly and effectively to an animal 

disease outbreak and limit the spread of the disease should an outbreak occur. 

Release Assessment Conclusions 

APHIS identified risk factors associated with importing FMD-susceptible species or their products to 

the United States from Santa Catarina. APHIS discussed these risk factors in the context of the 

potential for counterbalancing circumstances or applying appropriate risk mitigations to reduce the 

risk of introducing and establishing FMD or other swine notifiable diseases under evaluation in the 

United States. The risk mitigation procedures, which will be defined in the proposed rule, include 

various forms of verification and inspection to which APHIS will propose that MAPA certify to 

provide confidence that susceptible animals and their products meet acceptable export criteria. 


Likelihood of the introduction of notifiable diseases into Santa Catarina 

Risk Factor 

1. FMD is endemic in some South American countries. CSF outbreaks have been detected in 

northern Brazil, in States located within the CSF-affected area, as recently as 2008. The FMD or 

CSF viruses could be reintroduced into Santa Catarina from adjacent affected areas. Consequently, 

there is a risk that susceptible species or products from such species bound for the United States 

could originate from or be commingled with animals or animal products from affected neighboring 

areas. 

In contrast, ASF and SVD are not present in South America. SVD has never been reported in the 

countries closest to Santa Catarina (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), nor has it been reported in 

Brazil. ASF has been reported in Brazil; however the last case occurred over 20 years ago. 

Discussion 

Santa Catarina authorities allow FMD-susceptible species to enter the State from other Brazilian 

States as long as the animals are not vaccinated against FMD, the risk of introducing such animals is 

considered acceptable, and the destination and origination premises are suitable for quarantine 

purposes. Additionally, Santa Catarina has requirements in place, including serological testing, for 

susceptible animals (such as sheep, goats, and pigs) entering Santa Catarina from other States. 

Matured, deboned fresh beef is imported into Santa Catarina from other areas of Brazil for local 

consumption, since beef is not produced in sufficient quantities for local demand. This meat has a 

low risk of introducing FMD into Santa Catarina since it must go through a maturation process that 

kills the FMD virus. 

Swine entering Santa Catarina must originate from countries considered free of ASF, SVD, and 

CSF, as well as other swine diseases. The animals are also quarantined and may be tested for swine 

diseases both before and after import. Live swine may be imported from areas not considered free of 

CSF within Brazil if they are destined for immediate slaughter, but only under permit from MAPA. 

This comprises a minority of the pigs slaughtered in Santa Catarina. 

Mitigations 

Based on site visit observations, APHIS considers that Santa Catarina’s veterinary officials have 

adequate controls at the ports of entry (including airports) to mitigate risk for commercial and legal 

importation. Santa Catarina prohibits the importation of susceptible animals and animal products 

from areas considered affected by FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF. In addition, Santa Catarina has 

stringent requirements in place, including serological testing, for importing animals from other 

States susceptible to the diseases under evaluation. Therefore, APHIS concludes that it is unlikely 

that FMD or other diseases of concern will be introduced through legal importation. 


To ensure compliance with the appropriate controls for FMD, APHIS will propose in its rule that 

MAPA certify that FMD-susceptible animals and products did not originate from and were not 

commingled with animals or products from areas APHIS considers to be FMD affected. 

Specifically, APHIS will require the following certifications for beef or pork products exported to 

the United States from Santa Catarina: 

The beef or pork comes from animals that have been born, raised, and slaughtered in Santa 

Catarina. 

The beef or pork comes from animals that originated on premises where FMD has not been 

present during the lifetime of any of the animals slaughtered. 


2. There is a potential risk from illegal introduction of affected animals or animal products from 

affected regions. Santa Catarina contains several inspection posts in internal and external border 

areas. Even where there are barriers or checkpoints, people and animal products may cross both 

domestic and international borders illegally, particularly by passenger car. This increases the 

potential for the viruses under evaluation to cross the border. 

Mitigations 

APHIS evaluated Santa Catarina’s controls for animals moving into the State, as well as its 

biosecurity procedures and quarantine procedures, and concluded that they sufficiently mitigated the 

risk of illegal importations from affected regions. 


3. If FMD or the swine diseases under evaluation were to be reintroduced into Santa Catarina, 

disease might be spread through animals scavenging unmonitored garbage dumps. 

Mitigation 

Brazilian laws prohibit the feeding of untreated garbage to animals, while Santa Catarina prohibits 

garbage feeding regardless of treatment. These laws are enforced effectively, so that animal garbage 

feeding is unlikely to occur in Santa Catarina. 

Release Assessment – Conclusion 

Based on evaluation of the 11 factors as well as observations from the site visits, APHIS considers 

that Santa Catarina possesses the detection capabilities, reporting systems, and emergency response 

systems necessary to combat FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF. 


Exposure Assessment 

An exposure assessment as defined by OIE describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for 

exposure of animals and humans in an importing country to the hazards of a given risk source, and 

estimates the probability of the exposure(s) occurring [20]. APHIS’ regulatory authority is limited 

to animal health, however, so its evaluation focuses on potential risks to animals. APHIS considers 

that domestic livestock are most likely to be exposed to FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF viruses through 

feeding contaminated food waste to swine [21]. Other exposure pathways are more direct and 

include contact with imported infected live animals or contact with infected genetic material. 

Waste feeding to susceptible swine 

The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to virus-infected meat was evaluated in previous 

APHIS studies. In 1995, APHIS conducted a pathway analysis to estimate the likelihood of 

exposing swine to infected waste. The analysis included two pathways for exposure of swine to 

contaminated waste: Exposure associated with illegal household imports, and exposure associated 

with legal imports [22]. The latter is the exposure pathway applicable to meat or meat products 

imported from Santa Catarina. With 95 percent confidence, APHIS estimated that 0.023 percent or 

less of plate and manufacturing waste would be inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine. 

Based on this fraction, less than 1 part in 4,300 (reciprocal of 0.023 percent) of imported meat is 

likely to be fed to swine as inadequately cooked waste [22]. 

APHIS conducted a survey in 2001 of the U.S. swine waste-feeding sector to update a similar study 

done in 1994 [23]. Based on this survey, APHIS estimated that the proportion of plate and 

manufacturing waste fed to swine diminished by about 50 percent between 1994 and 2001 due to a 

significant decrease in the number of waste-feeding premises. The study also found that: 

1. Several additional States prohibited feeding food wastes to swine. 

2. The number of waste-feeding premises in the continental United States decreased by 40.5 

percent from 1994 to 2001, and in Hawaii and Puerto Rico decreased by 37.5 percent and 

52.3 percent, respectively. 

3. Institutions and restaurants provide nearly 90 percent of all plate waste fed to swine. 

APHIS considers that prohibiting feeding unprocessed plate waste to swine has further contributed 

to the reduction of swine waste-feeding. Waste-feeding operations must be licensed and inspected 

regularly by USDA inspectors under 9 CFR 166. The licensing process requires that producers 

adequately cook the waste fed to swine using methods designed to reduce the probability of survival 

of foreign animal disease agents. 

Based on the 1995 estimate that a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately processed 

prior to feeding to swine, and the substantial reduction in waste-feeding operations in recent years, 

APHIS concludes that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to FMD, CSF, SVD, or ASF 

viruses through inadequately processed food waste is low. 


Imported live animals 

The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to infected live animals was evaluated by briefly 

reviewing virus persistence and shedding in live swine and ruminants, as well as standard import 

requirements for these species. The exposure assessment focuses on breeding animals because of 

high transportation costs for export of other live animals (such as feeder pigs or cattle) to the United 

States from Brazil. APHIS considers exposure of susceptible U.S. animals to illegally imported 

infected live animals from Santa Catarina to be highly unlikely. 

The survival period of CSF virus within live swine ranges from 1 week to greater than 6 months, 

depending on various host-pathogen factors. Similarly, up to 50 percent of ruminant animals may 

become carriers of the FMD virus. The maximum reported duration of the carrier state is 3.5 years 

in cattle, 9 months in sheep, and 4 months in goats. Carrier virus is fully infectious, and 

consequently the carrier state is associated with at least a theoretical risk of introducing FMD into a 

susceptible population. ASF may also exhibit a chronic carrier state, while SVD virus is not known 

to cause persistent infection. A large percentage of infections are subclinical and therefore may 

remain undetected without diagnostic testing prior to export [24]. 

Consequently, APHIS considers this potential pathway to pose a high risk for disease introduction if 

unmitigated. However, current U.S. regulations require certification that ruminants and swine have 

been kept in a region entirely free of FMD, CSF, SVD, and ASF for 60 days prior to export (9 CFR 

93.405 and 9 CFR 93.505). They also require a minimum quarantine of 30 days for most imported 

ruminants (9 CFR 93.411) and 15 days for all imported swine (9 CFR 93.510). These requirements 

serve to partially mitigate the risk of exposure by increasing the likelihood of detection in exported 

animals. 

Based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS considers the likelihood that animals infected 

with FMD, CSF, SVD, or ASF virus will enter the United States from Santa Catarina to be very low. 

The resultant likelihood of animal exposure to FMD, SVD, and ASF viruses via this pathway is 

similarly low. 

Imported genetic material 

Genetic materials have been implicated in the introduction of foreign animal disease into susceptible 

populations, as well as the spread of established disease epidemics over considerable distances. For 

example, two semen collection centers became infected during the course of the 1997-1998 CSF 

epidemic in the Netherlands. Potentially contaminated semen was distributed to 1,680 swine herds 

over the course of 5 weeks, during which the disease remained undetected in the donor boars. 

Although investigators concluded that only 36 farms had been infected through artificial 

insemination, all suspect farms were subject to quarantine and testing, resulting in a tremendous 

expenditure of resources [25]. 

Survival of CSF virus in semen has been estimated in experimental studies to be 12 to 72 hours at 

20C, but ranges from 1 month to several years at 4C or below [26]. Survival in embryos and ova is 

unknown [26, 27]. FMD virus may be present in semen up to 4 days before clinical signs become 


apparent [28]. Survival of both SVD and ASF viruses in genetic material is possible but is not 

considered to be a primary mode of transmission [29, 30]. 

Based on the extended period of survival of CSF and FMD viruses in frozen semen, APHIS 

considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to these viruses in infected semen, if it 

were to be imported into the United States, to be high if unmitigated. However, based on the results 

of the release assessment, APHIS considers the likelihood of release of CSF or FMD viruses via 

infected semen from Santa Catarina to be very low. The likelihood of exposure of domestic 

livestock would be similarly low. 

Consequence Assessment 

A consequence assessment describes the biologic and economic consequences of introducing the 

hazards under consideration into the United States. This consequence assessment addresses both 

direct and indirect consequences, as recommended by the OIE [20]. 

The magnitude of the biologic and economic consequences following an introduction of FMD, CSF, 

SVD, or ASF virus would depend on the location of the introduction, the virus serotype introduced, 

the rate of virus spread and whether environmental conditions at the introduction site might facilitate 

this spread, the site’s ability to detect the disease rapidly, livestock demographics and movement 

patterns, and the ease of employing eradication procedures. In addition, depending on the extent of 

export of livestock and animal products, trade restrictions imposed by trading partners may result in 

severe economic consequences [31]. 

Direct consequences include effects of the disease on animal health and subsequent production 

losses, the total costs of control and eradication, the effect on the environment, and public health 

consequences. Indirect consequences include effects on international trade and associated domestic 

consequences. 

Animal health consequences 


FMD causes significant distress and suffering to animals regardless of the size and sophistication of 

their livestock unit. Very high mortality rates in young animals can occur, particularly among pigs 

and sheep. Mortality in older animals occurs less frequently but may be significant with certain 

virus strains [24, 32, 33]. 

FMD also causes significant losses in the production capacity of affected animals. Productivity 

losses of 10 percent to 20 percent are reported in FMD-infected livestock if the disease is allowed to 

run its course. In addition, FMD can cause a reduction in the growth rate of animals raised for meat. 

The comparatively greater severity of FMD in pigs would imply at least similar losses to those 

described for cattle [31, 34]. 


CSF 

CSF has acute and chronic courses. The severity of the disease depends largely on the age of the 

animal and the virulence of the viral strain, with young animals usually more severely affected than 

older animals. In older breeding pigs the course of infection is often mild or even subclinical, 

whereas mortality rates may reach 90 percent in young pigs [35]. Low virulence strains may 

manifest primarily as poor reproductive performance and birth of piglets with neurologic defects 

[35]. 

SVD 

SVD is typically a transient vesicular disease of pigs. The virus causes essentially no mortality, and 

infected pigs generally recover within 1 week (on occasion, recovery may take up to 3 weeks). 

Some strains produce only mild clinical symptoms or are asymptomatic. Morbidity rates may be 

low throughout a whole herd but high in certain pens [29]. 

ASF 

ASF is a highly contagious hemorrhagic disease of pigs. All age groups are equally susceptible. 

With high virulence forms of the virus, ASF is characterized by high fever, loss of appetite, 

hemorrhages in the skin and internal organs, and death within 2 to 10 days on average. Herd 

mortality rates may be as high as 100 percent [30]. 

Economic consequences 

The overall cost of control and eradication depends on the mitigation or policy options chosen to 

control and eradicate the disease. Potential costs include costs for disease control measures such as 

imposing quarantine measures and movement controls, direct costs related to stamping out of 

affected herds, indemnity payments, vaccination costs, and costs for surveillance and laboratory 

testing. For disease-free countries like the United States that have a substantial export market for 

livestock and livestock products, the preferred option for control and eradication has traditionally 

been to stamp out infected herds without the use of vaccine. 

The U.S. policy for most significant foreign animal disease emergencies is to follow strict quarantine 

measures and stamp out infected and contact herds. Officials also assess the need for strategic 

vaccination, and carry out vaccination if necessary. Available data do not allow quantification of the 

number of herds or farms that could be infected if one of the diseases under evaluation were 

introduced into the United States. Nevertheless, the cost of control, eradication, and compensation is 

likely to be significant. 


A few studies have estimated the potential consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States. 

Bates et al (2003) used results from an FMD simulation model to estimate the direct costs associated 

with indemnity, slaughter, cleaning, and disinfecting livestock premises for various vaccination and 


eradication strategies to control transmission of FMDV in a cattle population of 2,238 herds and 5 

sale yards located in 3 counties in California. The study found that mean herd indemnity payments 

were $2.6 million and $110,359 for dairy and non-dairy herds, respectively. Cleaning and 

disinfection costs ranged from $18,062 to $60,205 per herd. The mean vaccination cost was $2,960 

per herd and the total eradication cost ranged from $61 million to $551 million, depending on 

eradication strategy [36]. 

McCauley et al (1979) conducted a comprehensive study to assess the potential economic impact of 

FMD in the whole of the United States. The study estimated the direct costs (control and eradication 

program costs) and increased costs borne by consumers of FMD introduction over a 15-year period 

(1976-1990). Using the Consumer Price Index to update to 2001, the estimated total cost of a strict 

quarantine and slaughter policy was $34.4 million [31]. 

CSF 

Since there have been no CSF outbreaks in the United States from which economic estimates can be 

derived, estimates of economic effects in other countries are provided as illustrations. 

Saatkamp et al (2000) reviewed the economic aspects of control of small and large CSF outbreaks in 

the European Union (EU) from 1990 to 1997. For the largest outbreak, involving 429 herds over 14 

months, the cost of removing affected swine was 426.9 million Euros, slaughter for welfare purposes 

cost 1.2 billion Euros, and program operational costs were 134.3 million Euros. Overall, the 

outbreak cost pig producers 712.4 million Euros, the national government 230.5 million Euros, and 

the EU 807.8 million Euros. Approximately 10 million pigs were destroyed during the outbreak, 

primarily for welfare reasons (being in overcrowded conditions, or being overweight) [37]. The total 

cost of smaller outbreaks ranged from 10.9 million Euros (8 affected herds over 2 months) to 208.7 

million Euros (113 affected herds over 10 months) [38]. 

Garner et al (2001) estimated the potential economic impact of CSF on the Australian pig industry 

using a stochastic modeling process. The model estimated a loss in gross income of 28 percent to 37 

percent for the pig industry in the affected region, and a 9 percent to 11 percent loss in gross income 

for the national pig industry [39]. 

SVD 

Little information exists on the cost of control and eradication of SVD in a previously free region. 

SVD virus generally does not spread as quickly as CSF virus, even on infected premises. Spread 

from one pen to another may not occur in the absence of a common open drainage system or of 

frequent movement of pigs between pens. However, an SVD outbreak may not be detected for 

weeks or even months due to the frequently mild nature of the disease, allowing ample time for it to 

spread to other swine establishments. In addition, the virus is extraordinarily stable in the 

environment, which could lead to disease recurrence on previously infected farms [40]. In the 

absence of specific data on the cost of control and eradication, APHIS assumes a baseline cost 

similar to that of a small- to medium-sized CSF outbreak (see above). 


ASF 

As with SVD, there is little information on the cost of control and eradication of ASF in a previously 

free region. In the absence of specific data on the cost of control and eradication, APHIS assumes a 

baseline cost similar to that of a small- to medium-sized CSF outbreak (see above). 

While these examples estimate a more severe outcome of an outbreak, the consequences could be 

lessened if the outbreak was detected earlier and appropriate controls implemented to quickly 

eradicate the disease. 

Environmental consequences 

Environmental consequences resulting from introduction of FMD, CSF, SVD, or ASF would 

primarily occur from disposal of carcasses due to death from disease or depopulation of herds, as 

well as disposal of contaminated bedding and manure. The methods of disposal employed in 

response to an outbreak would affect the environment differently. Disposal of contaminated 

materials could potentially affect air, water, and soil quality, as well as potentially releasing live 

virus into the environment. 

Disposal options previously employed in other countries in response to large-scale animal disease 

outbreaks include rendering, burial, and incineration. Factors influencing the decision as to which 

methods of disposal to use include the volume of contaminated material (dependent on the number 

of animals affected), geographic features (such as soil and surface water) of the areas where 

outbreaks occur, other environmental considerations such as weather and ambient temperature, and 

available emergency resources such as funds, equipment, and personnel. The environmental 

consequences of an outbreak of one of these diseases in the United States could vary from marginal 

to extreme depending on factors related to disposal of contaminated carcasses and materials. 

Public health consequences 

Although APHIS’ regulatory authority does not cover public health consequences, this assessment 

briefly addresses the issue. Direct public health consequences are insubstantial because the 

occurrence of FMD, CSF, SVD, or ASF virus in humans is quite rare. In fact, the number of cases 

reported is so small compared with the number of persons exposed to these viruses that the World 

Health Organization generally does not consider FMD, CSF, SVD, or ASF to be threats to humans. 

Perhaps more importantly, a substantial foreign animal disease outbreak can result in severe 

psychosocial effects on farmers and farming communities. Farmers and their families can suffer 

from grief over losing animals, in some cases bloodlines kept over many generations, as well as loss 

of control over their lives due to movement restrictions, disruptions in community life, and shortand 

long-term financial stress. 

Indirect consequences 

In addition to the direct costs of FMD, CSF, SVD, or ASF introduction, the effect on international 

trade and related domestic consequences must also be considered. Export losses caused by trade 


partners’ restrictions on animals and products susceptible to the diseases under evaluation could run 

into billions of U.S. dollars. The value of U.S. exports of pork and pork products that would be 

immediately lost if an outbreak of one of these diseases occurred was an estimated $1.3 billion in 

2003 [41]. Similarly, the value of U.S. exports of beef products that would also be lost in an FMD 

outbreak was over $3 billion in 2001. Since the United States exports only small amounts of lamb 

and mutton, economic losses associated with these commodities are not likely to be significant 

compared to cattle and swine. 

The effect of an outbreak of a foreign animal disease on rural and regional economic viability, 

including businesses reliant on livestock revenue, could also be substantial. For example, Paarlberg 

et al. (2002) conducted a study to estimate the potential revenue impact of an FMD outbreak in the 

United States similar to the one that occurred in the United Kingdom in 2001. This study estimated 

the gross revenue losses for the animal sector as follows: live cattle (17 percent), beef (20 percent), 

milk (16 percent), live swine (34 percent), pork (24 percent), live sheep and lambs (14 percent), and 

sheep and lamb meat (10 percent) [42]. 

Indirect economic losses to U.S. firms that support export markets for live animals and animal 

products could also be substantial. For example, such firms could lose at least $2.5 billion annually 

if ruminant export markets were lost. More than 33,000 full-time U.S. jobs, accounting for almost 

$1 billion in wages annually, could be jeopardized by loss of these markets. In the longer term, if 

trade restrictions persisted and alternative export markets did not develop, the U.S. ruminant 

production sector could contract, allowing other supplying countries to establish trade relationships 

in the absence of U.S. supply. Losses due to restrictions on live swine, pork, and pork products 

could also be significant [43]. 

Risk Estimation 

Risk estimation consists of integrating the results from the release assessment, exposure assessment, 

and consequence assessment to produce overall measures of risk associated with the hazards 

identified at the outset. Thus, risk estimation takes into account the whole risk pathway from the 

hazard identified to the unwanted event [20]. 

APHIS concludes from the assessment that the surveillance, prevention, and control measures 

implemented by Santa Catarina are sufficient to minimize the likelihood of introducing FMD, CSF, 

SVD, and ASF into the United States via imports of FMD-susceptible species or products from such 

species. Although consequences of an FMD, CSF, SVD, or ASF outbreak are potentially 

substantial, the likelihood of an outbreak occurring via exposure of the domestic livestock 

population to pork or pork products imported from Santa Catarina is very low. 

The consequences of a FMD outbreak in the United States would be extremely high. The major 

economic consequence of importing FMD would be export trade losses. The sum of the consumer 

impacts, direct costs and trade losses over a 15-year period would be between $37 billion and $44 

billion (in 2001 dollars), depending on the magnitude of the outbreak and eradication strategy. 

Although the consequences are significant, the results of both the release and exposure assessment 

indicate that the likelihood of introduction and establishment of FMD is low. 


In summary, although the consequences of a FMD outbreak in the United States would be very high, 

the findings of the release and exposure assessments lead APHIS to consider the risk of FMDinfected 

animals or products entering the United States from Santa Catarina and exposing U.S. 

livestock to the disease to be low. 


ANNEXES 

Annex 1. Hazard Identification: Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus 

Etiologic Agent 

Family Picornaviridae, Genus Aphthovirus, types O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia 1. 

Status in the United States 

FMD virus was eradicated from the United States in 1929. 

Epidemiology 

FMD is a highly communicable disease of cloven-hoofed animals caused by an Aphthovirus of the 

family Picornaviridae. FMD has seven immunologically distinct serotypes (O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, 

SAT3, and Asia 1). The O, A, and C serotypes have historically been found in South America [44]. 

Research indicates that one serotype does not confer protective immunity against the other six; thus 

a disease outbreak can be caused by one serotype or a combination of serotypes [45]. 

FMD virus serotype O (PanAsia strain) has been isolated in over 60 percent of positive samples 

received by the World Reference Laboratory for FMD in the United Kingdom (Institute for Animal 

Health, Pirbright Laboratory). Along with being the most prevalent type O strain, the PanAsia strain 

is also the most widely distributed, causing FMD outbreaks in many parts of Africa, Asia, and South 

America as well as in Europe since 1998. This virus strain can infect a wide range of species 

including cattle, water buffalo, pigs, sheep, goats, and gazelles. 

FMD virus can be transmitted by direct or indirect contact or aerosol. Fomites (items such as feed, 

drinking water, equipment, animal products, human clothing, transportation vehicles, rodents, stray 

dogs, wild animals, and birds) can transmit FMD over long distances. The five main elements that 

influence the extent of FMD spread are: 

The quantity of virus released 

The means by which the virus enters the environment 

The ability of the virus to survive outside the animal body 

The quantities of virus required to initiate infection at primary infection sites 

The period of time the virus remains undetected [46, 47] 

The incubation period of the FMD virus is 2 to 14 days in cattle, depending on the viral strain and 

dose and the level of susceptibility of the animal [48]. Morbidity in unvaccinated herds can be high, 

but mortality usually does not exceed 5 percent. If an outbreak occurs during the calving season, 

calf mortality can be considerable [49]. Young calves may even die before clinical signs appear, 

because the virus attacks the heart muscles [48]. 

The respiratory tract is the usual route of infection in species other than pigs. Infection can also 

occur through abrasions of the skin or mucous membranes. In cattle and sheep, the earliest sites of 

virus infection and possibly replication appear to be in the mucosa and the lymphoid tissues of the 

pharynx. Following initial replication in the pharynx, the virus then enters the bloodstream. 

Viremia in cattle lasts for 3 to 5 days; as a result, the virus spreads throughout the body and 

establishes sites of secondary infection [50]. 


The usual route of infection in pigs is through ingestion of FMD-virus contaminated products, direct 

contact with infected animals, or occupation of heavily contaminated environments. The incubation 

period in pigs will vary with the strain, dose, and route of infection. Serotype O, which is highly 

virulent in pigs, can produce clinical signs within 18 to 24 hours, while pigs with low-level 

exposures may take up to 11 days to develop clinical signs. Pigs that recover from FMD infection 

do not become carriers, as was thought with ruminants [51]. 

FMD virus localizes in various organs, tissues, body fluids, bone marrow, and lymph nodes [52]. 

Viral replication may reach peak levels as early as 2 to 3 days after exposure. Virus titers differ in 

different organs or tissues. Some tissues, such as the tongue epithelium, have particularly high titers. 

Recent data indicate that the most viral amplification occurs in the stratified, cornified squamous 

epithelia of the skin and mouth (including the tongue). Although some viral replication also occurs 

in the epithelia of the pharynx, the amount of virus produced there is apparently much less than the 

amount produced in the skin and mouth during the acute phase of the disease. By comparison, the 

amount of virus (if any) produced in other organs like salivary glands, kidneys, liver, and lymph 

nodes is negligible [53, 54]. 

Immunity to FMD is primarily mediated by circulating antibodies [55]. The host reaction, including 

antibody production, occurs from 3 to 4 days after exposure. In infected pigs, the virus is cleared 

within 3 to 4 weeks. In contrast, around 50 percent or more of cattle will develop a low-level 

persistent infection, localized to the pharynx [56-58]. According to Alexandersen (2002), a model 

for progression of infection starts with virus exposure, then accumulation of virus in the pharyngeal 

area, followed by the initial spread through regional lymph nodes, and then via the bloodstream to 

epithelial cells. Several cycles of viral amplification and spread follow[55]. 

Clinical signs in cattle during acute infection include fever, profuse salivation, and mucopurulent 

nasal discharge. The disease is characterized by development of vesicles on the tongue, hard palate, 

dental pad, lips, muzzle, gum, coronary band, and interdigital spaces. Vesicles may develop on the 

teats. Affected animals lose condition rapidly, and there is a dramatic loss of milk production [48]. 

The animal usually recovers by 14 days post infection provided no secondary infections occur [50]. 

The most consistent clinical signs in pigs are lesions around the coronary bands and lameness, but 

fever may be inconsistent. Pigs may develop vesicles on the tongue and snout, but these may be less 

conspicuous than lesions seen in ruminants. The severity of clinical disease depends on the age of 

the infected pig. Adult swine may recover or become chronically lame while younger pigs, 

especially those less than 8 weeks of age, may die from acute myocarditis without developing other 

clinical signs [48, 57]. 

Diagnosis of the disease relies heavily on recognizing clinical signs. In unvaccinated cattle and pigs, 

the clinical signs are obvious. However, in small ruminants the disease is often subclinical or is 

easily confused with other conditions. In addition, in endemic regions, clinical signs in partially 

immune cattle may be less obvious and could pass unnoticed [48, 57]. Virus isolation and serotype 

identification are necessary for confirmatory diagnosis. The clinical signs of FMD are similar to 

those seen in other vesicular diseases. Differential diagnosis of vesicular diseases includes vesicular 

stomatitis, mucosal disease of cattle, bluetongue, rinderpest, and FMD. Serological diagnostic tests 

include the complement-fixation test, virus neutralization test, and an enzyme-linked immunosorbent 


assay test. Other diagnostic tests include one- or two-dimensional electrophoresis of the viral DNA, 

isoelectric focusing of the viral structural proteins, or nucleotide sequencing of the viral RNA[47]. 

FMD virus is a relatively resilient virus. It can survive up to 15 weeks in feed, 4 weeks on cattle 

hair, and up to 103 days in wastewater. The survival of the virus in animal tissues is closely 

associated with the acidity of that tissue. For example, in muscular tissues the acidity of rigor 

mortis, which occurs naturally, inactivates the virus. The production of lactic acid in these tissues 

during maturation is considered the primary factor for inactivation [43]. An acid environment where 

the pH is less than 6.0 will destroy the virus quickly [43, 59]. Several studies showed that in tissues 

where no acidification occurs (e.g., lymph nodes, bone marrow, fat, and blood), the virus may 

survive for extended times in cured, uncured, and frozen meat [43, 60, 61]. Heating at 50° C [43] 

and up to 155° F [59] will inactivate the virus. 


Annex 2. Hazard Identification: Classical Swine Fever Virus 

CSF, also known as hog cholera, is a contagious and economically damaging viral disease of 

domestic swine and wild boar with worldwide distribution. It is caused by the CSF virus of the 

family Flaviviridae, genus Pestivirus [62]. CSF virus is quite hardy, being stable between pH 4 and 

10, and is also stable at low temperatures [63, 64]. The virus may remain viable even after carcass 

maturation, and is unlikely to be destroyed by transport or cold storage. Laboratory confirmation of 

infection, essential during an outbreak, is complicated by the close antigenic relationship of the CSF 

virus with bovine viral diarrhea virus and border disease virus [62]. 

The incubation period for CSF is 2 to 14 days [28]. The virus multiplies in the epithelial crypts of 

the tonsils and may be carried to local lymph nodes and into the bloodstream for distribution 

throughout the body [65]. Blood and all tissues, secretions, and excretions of sick and dead animals 

are sources of infection [28]. CSF virus has been recovered from muscle and lymph nodes of 

infected pigs, and high titers of virus have been isolated from bone marrow [66]. The disease may 

also be introduced or spread via infected semen [67]. 

CSF can spread in an epidemic form as well as establish enzootic infections in domestic swine and 

wild boar populations. Infection generally spreads directly from pig to pig, but products including 

fresh, frozen, or cured pork can remain infectious to other pigs by mouth [68]. Imported pig 

products are frequently implicated in the introduction of CSF virus into previously disease-free 

regions, primarily through the practice of swill feeding [69]. Dahle and Liess (1992) demonstrated 

that the oral infectious dose of CSF virus is very low [70]. Indirect transmission may occur via 

movement of people, wild animals, and inanimate objects such as live-haul trucks [71]. 

The role of wild boar as a virus reservoir and possible source of infection for domestic swine is well 

known, and epidemiological links between CSF virus infection in wild boar and domestic swine 

have been reported repeatedly in recent years [72, 73]. In countries that are free of CSF in domestic 

swine, epidemics in wild boar are often started by feeding the animals infected human food waste 

(EC 1999). Abnormal mortality and sometimes obviously sick animals are the first indicators of 

CSF introduction into a wild boar population (EC 1999). 

Four distinct clinical forms of CSF have been described, including acute, chronic, congenital, and 

mild manifestations. The acute form involves a disease progression of 2 to 4 weeks and is 

characterized by high fever, generalized illness, hemorrhagic lesions, immunosuppression with 

secondary infections, and high mortality. The chronic form may last 30 to 90 days before death and 

usually involves older swine or congenitally infected piglets. Congenitally infected piglets may 

develop symptoms of chronic CSF within 3 to 6 months, or may never develop symptoms but 

continuously shed virus. Mild CSF is typically seen only in sows and may result from exposure to a 

low-virulent strain. Infected sows may show no overt clinical signs but continuously shed virus to 

their young and to other swine they contact [74, 75]. 


Annex 3. Hazard Identification: Swine Vesicular Disease Virus 

SVD is a contagious and economically damaging disease of domestic swine and wild boar. The 

disease has historically been recorded in Hong Kong, Japan, and several European countries; 

however, in 2004 the disease was primarily limited to Italy and Portugal (OIE 2005a). The SVD 

virus belongs to the family Picornaviridae, genus Enterovirus [62]. SVD virus is particularly hardy, 

as it is resistant to pH changes between 2.5 and 12 and is very stable under cold conditions [76, 77]. 

The virus is therefore unlikely to be destroyed by the postmortem decrease in muscle pH that 

accompanies carcass maturation. SVD virus is also resistant to fermentation and smoking. It may 

remain in hams for 180 days, sausages for over a year, and processed intestinal casings for over 2 

years [29]. 

The incubation period for SVD is 2 to 7 days. The intestinal tract is the primary site of infection; 

however, all tissues contain virus during the viremic period. Blood and feces of sick animals, as 

well as epithelium from vesicles and vesicular fluid, are significant sources of virus. Although SVD 

virus does not appear to have a tropism for skeletal muscle cells, it is easily isolated from muscle 

tissue from infected animals after slaughter and bleeding out. SVD may be introduced into a herd by 

feeding garbage containing infected meat scraps, by introducing infected animals into a herd, or by 

contacting infected feces (e.g., an improperly cleaned truck). After the initial introduction the 

disease spreads through contact of susceptible pigs with infected pigs and infected feces. 

The clinical signs of SVD are easily confused with those of FMD and include fever, sudden 

lameness, and vesicles with subsequent erosions along the snout, feet, and teats. Morbidity rates 

may be low throughout a whole herd but high in certain pens. SVD causes essentially no mortality, 

and recovery usually occurs within 1 week (in some cases, up to 3 weeks). SVD infections seldom 

persist (Lin et al 2001); however, some strains produce only mild clinical symptoms or are 

asymptomatic, and are detected only through laboratory surveillance [29]. For example, a 2002 

outbreak of SVD in Italy involved subclinical infection in all but one of 10,312 affected pigs 

(Brocchio et al 2002). 


Annex 4. Hazard Identification: African Swine Fever Disease Virus 

African swine fever (ASF) is a highly contagious, frequently fatal, and economically damaging viral 

disease of pigs. As specified in 9 CFR 94.8, APHIS believes that ASF exists in all countries of 

Africa, as well as in Brazil, Cuba, Georgia, Haiti, Malta, and Sardinia, one of Italy’s islands. ASF 

has never been reported in the United States [78]. Natural hosts of ASF virus are members of the 

suidae family of mammals, including domestic and wild swine [30, 79]. 

In sub-Saharan Africa, ASF is maintained in the wild through a life cycle including wild suidae and 

soft-bodied ticks (Ortnithodoros sp.)[80]. The disease is primarily spread into previously uninfected 

areas through feeding improperly cooked swill containing ASFV to domestic swine. The virus is 

generally spread among domestic pigs by direct or indirect contact [80]. The virus is present in all 

secretions and excretions, including blood and oral and nasal secretions, and may be spread through 

semen [79]. Virus is often shed before the onset of clinical signs in acute and subacute disease [81]. 

The incubation period following exposure via direct contact is 5 to 19 days, while the incubation 

period following tick exposure may be fewer than 5 days. Depending on the virulence of the strain, 

ASF can manifest as percute, acute, subacute, chronic, or even inapparent disease. The peracute 

form generally causes sudden death. In the acute form, pigs display a multitude of clinical signs, 

ranging from cyanosis and dyspnea to diarrhea. Nearly all body systems are affected. Death 

generally follows in 7 to 10 days. 

The signs of subacute ASF are similar to those of the acute disease, but are less severe. Low virulent 

viral strains can cause inapparent, mild, or chronic infections. Abortion may be the only clinical 

sign, but intermittent fevers, emaciation, respiratory problems, swollen joints, skin lesions and 

potentially death may occur [80]. 

The ASF virus is stable across a wide temperature and pH range [79]. The virus has been shown to 

survive in chilled or frozen pork for 104 days. The virus has also been shown to survive for at least 

some period at pHs ranging from 3.1 to 11.5. Pork generally reaches a pH of 5.4-5.5 following 

carcass maturation, but this varies depending on the specific carcass and the temperature. The virus 

can often survive processes such as curing and salting. Farez and Morley conducted a literature 

review and reported survival times ranging from 30 days in salami to 399 days in Parma ham [82]. 


Annex 5. Epidemiologic Characteristics of Rinderpest 

Etiologic Agent 

Family Paramyxoviridae, Genus Morbillivirus 

Status in the United States 

The United States has been historically free from rinderpest. 

Distribution 

Historically the virus was widely distributed throughout Europe, Africa, Asia and West Asia, but 

never became established in either the Americas or Australia/New Zealand. Rinderpest is an OIE 

listed disease. [83] In Africa it has been eradicated from several countries and sub-regions, and is 

normally absent from the northern and southern parts of the continent. Rinderpest occurs in the 

Middle East and in southwestern and central Asia [84]. 

Epidemiology 

Rinderpest is a highly fatal viral disease of domestic cattle, buffaloes and yaks. It also affects sheep, 

goats and some breeds of pigs (Asian pigs seem more susceptible than African and European pigs). 

Rinderpest can infect a large variety of wildlife species, including African buffaloes, eland, kudu, 

wilde-beest, various antelopes, bushpigs, warthog and giraffes but is rare among camelids [83, 84, 

85]. 

Transmission of rinderpest can occur through direct or close indirect contacts. The usual route of 

infection is via the respiratory tract with an incubation period of generally 4 to 5 days following 

natural exposures but which may range from 3 to 15 days. Viral shedding begins 1-2 days before 

pyrexia in tears, nasal secretions, saliva, urine and feces and typically continues for 8 to 9 days after 

the onset of clinical signs. Blood and all tissues are infectious before the appearance of clinical 

signs. 

Rinderpest can take several clinical presentations; classic, peracute, subacute and atypical. There is 

no carrier state following infection. The classic form is characterized by a 2- to 3-day period of high 

fever, depression, anorexia, reduced rumination, increased respiratory and cardiac rate, congested 

mucus membranes, intense mucopurulent lachrymation and excessive salivation. Gastrointestinal 

signs appear when the fever drops with profuse hemorrhagic diarrhea. Dehydration, abdominal pain, 

abdominal respiration, weakness, recumbency and death generally occur within 8-12 days. In rare 

cases, clinical signs regress by day 10 and recovery occurs by day 20-25. 

The peracute form has no prodromal signs and is characterized by high fever (>40-42°C) and death. 

The peracute form occurs in highly susceptible young and newborn animals. The subacute form has 

a low mortality rate and a similar clinical presentation to the classic form. The atypical form is 

characterized by irregular pyrexia with mild or no diarrhea. 

Rinderpest virus is relatively resistant and is stable between pH 4.0 and 10.0 but is susceptible to 

most common disinfectants including lipid solvents. The virus remains viable for long periods in 

chilled or frozen tissues. Small amounts of rinderpest virus may survive relatively high 

temperatures—56°C (133°F) for 60 min or 60°C (140°F) for 30 min. 


Differential diagnosis of rinderpest is similar to that of other viral vesicular diseases including FMD, 

Bovine viral diarrhea/mucosal disease (BVD), Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR), Malignant 

catarrhal fever, Vesicular stomatitis, and in small ruminants, peste des petits ruminants. 


REFERENCES 

1. Office International des Epizooties (OIE). International Animal Health Code: Mammals, 

Birds and Bees. 2004. 

2. Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations (9 CFR), section 92.2. Application for Recognition of 

the Animal Health Status of a Region. 2004. 

3. MAPA. Clarification of Information Requested for Recognition of a Region Free from 

Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Brazil. 2005. 

4. MAPA. State of Santa Catarina Proposal for Recognition as an FMD-Free Zone where 

Vaccination is not Practiced, D.o.A. Health, Editor. 2007. 

5. MAPA. Response to Specific Comments on the 11 Factors Given in 9 CFR 92.2, Application 

for Recognition of the Animal Health Status of a Region. 2003a: Department of Animal 

Health. 

6. APHIS. Observations Made During APHIS' Site Visit to Brazil. October 2002 & August 

2003. 2003. 

7. MAPA. Regionalization of FMD. 2002b, Department of Animal Health. 

8. MAPA. Missao Estados Unidos da America - powerpoint presentation. 2008. 

9. MAPA. USA Technical Visit, APHIS/USDA - powerpoint presentation. 2008. 

10. MAPA. Enlargement of the Foot-and-Mouth Disease-Free Zone, where Vaccination is 

Practiced: Midwestern and Eastern livestock circuits. 2000a, Department of Animal Health. 

11. APHIS. Observations Made During APHIS' Site Visit to Santa Catarina, Brazil. June 2008. 

2008. 

12. MAPA, Complementary Information Requested by USDA Regarding the Process of Risk 

Assessment for Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Beef Exported to NAFTA. 2003c: Department of 

Animal Health. 

13. MAPA. Information Requested by APHIS for the Risk Assessment of Pork from Santa 

Catarina State. 2006 

14. OIE. OIE WAHID. 2008 [cited 2008 December]; Available at www.oie.int/hs2. 

15. Freitas, T.E.E., Oliveira, A., Joineau, M., Souza Duarte, A., C.L. Vargas, I, and Rebello, M. 

Classical Swine Fever in Brazil: Study for the Survey of Classical Swine Fever Outbreaks in 

Brazil from 1978 to 2004. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, Londrina, 2007. 28: pp. 277-286. 

16. MAPA. Expansion of Foot-and-Mouth Disease-Free Zone with Vaccination: State of 

Rondônia. 2002d, Department of Animal Health. 

17. MAPA. Elimination of the Outbreaks of Foot-and-Mouth Disease that Occurred in the State 

of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. 2002c, Department of Animal Health. 

18. Secretariat of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. National Animal Health and Agrifood 

Quality Service. SENASA., Annex IV -FMD - Sero-Epidemiological Surveillance, San Luis 

del Palmar, Corrientes. 2006. 

19. MAPA. Proposal for the Enlargement of the Foot-and-Mouth Disease-Free Zone, where 

Vaccination is Practiced. 2000b, Department of Animal Health. 

20. OIE. Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2008, Volume 1, Chapter 2.2, Import Risk Analysis 

2008 [cited 2008 December]. Available at www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_titre_1.3.htm. 

21. CEAH. Pathway Assessment of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Risk to the United States: 

An Evaluation in Response to International FMD Outbreaks in 2001. 2001. 


22. CEAH. Risk Assessment of the Practice of Feeding Recycled Commodities to Domesticated 

Swine in the U.S. 1995. 

23. CEAH. 2001 Waste-Feeder Survey, unpublished data. 2002, USDA, APHIS, VS. 

24. Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, et al. The Pathogenesis and Diagnosis of Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease. Journal of Comparative Pathology, 2003. 129(1): pp 1-36. 

25. Hennecken, M., J.A. Stegeman, et al. Transmission of Classical Swine Fever Virus by 

Artificial Insemination During the 1997-1998 Epidemic in the Netherlands: A Descriptive 

Epidemiological Study. Vet Q, 2000. 22(4): pp 228-233. 

26. Floegel, G. and Wehrend, A. Detection of Classical Swine Fever Virus in Semen of Infected 

Boars. Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 77: pp. 109-116. 

27. Glossup, C.E. and Cameron, R. Transmission of Viruses Through Pigs and Products of Pig 

Origin. Trends in Emerging Viral Infections of Swine, ed. A. Morilla, K.Y. Yoon, and J.J. 

Zimmerman. 2002, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State Press. 3-11. 

28. OIE. Classical Swine Fever Disease Card. 2008 [cited 2008 December]; Available from: 

www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A130. 

29. OIE. Swine Vesicular Disease Disease Card. 2008 [cited 2008 December]; Available from: 

www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A130.htm. 

30. OIE. African Swine Fever Disease Card. 2008 [cited 2008 December]; Available from: 


31. McCauley, E.H. et al. Potential Economic Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United 

States. St. Paul, Minnesota: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1979. 

32. Dunn, C.S. and Donaldson, A.I. Natural Adaption to Pigs of a Taiwanese Isolate of Footand-Mouth 

Disease Virus. Vet Rec, 1997. 141: pp. 174-75. 

33. Geering, W.A. and Forman, A.J. Foot-and-Mouth Disease, in Exotic Diseases of Animals: a 

Field Guide for Australian Veterinarians, Australian Government Publishing Service, Editor. 

1995: Canberra. 

34. Doel, T.R. FMD Vaccines. Virus Res, 2003. 91(1): pp. 81-99. 

35. Moennig, V. Introduction to Classical Swine Fever: Virus, Disease and Control Policy. 

Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 73: pp. 93-102. 

36. Bates, T.W., Carpenter, T.E. and Thurmond, M.C. Benefit-Cost Analysis of Vaccination and 

Preemptive Slaughter as a Means of Eradicating Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Am J Vet Res, 

2003. 64(7): pp. 805-812. 

37. Stegeman, J.A., Elbers, A. et al. The 1997-1998 Epidemic of Classical Swine Fever in the 

Netherlands. Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 73: pp. 183-196. 

38. Saatkamp, H.W., Berentsen, P.B.M., et al. Economic Aspects of the Control of Classical 

Swine Fever Outbreaks in the European Union. Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 73: pp. 

221-237. 

39. Garner, M.G., Whan, I.F., et al. The Expected Economic Impact of Selected Exotic Diseases 

on the Pig Industry of Australia. Revue Scientifique et Technique de l'Office International 

des Epizooties, 2001. 20(3): pp. 671-685. 

40. Lin, F. and Kitching, R.P. Swine Vesicular Disease: An Overview. Veterinary Journal, 2000. 

160: pp. 192-201. 

41. FAS. U.S. Beef, Pork and Poultry Trade Charts, www.fas.usda.gov/dlp/tradecharts/. 2003. 

42. Paarlberg, P.L., Lee, J.G., and Seitzinger, A.H. Potential Revenue Impact of an Outbreak of 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United States. J Am Vet Med Assoc, 2002. 220(7): pp. 988- 

992. 


43. Green, J.W. and Grannis, J.L. Economic Impact of Alternative Management Strategies for 

Regulating Canadian Ruminant/Product Imports. Unpublished report. 2003, Centers for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health. 

44. Hall, H. Diseases and Parasites of Livestock in the Tropics, 2nd Edition. Intermediate 

Tropical Agriculture Series, 1985: pp. 41-46. 

45. Kitching, R., et al. Development of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus Strain Characterization 

A Review. Trop An Health Prod, 1989. 21: pp. 153-166. 

46. Mann, J. and Sellers, R.F. Foot and Mouth Disease, in Virus Infections of Vertebrates, Z. 

Dinter and B. Morein, editors. 1990, Elsevier, pp. 903-912. 

47. Thomson, G. Foot-and-Mouth Disease, in Infectious Diseases of Livestock, Coetzer, 

Thomson, and Tustin, editors. 1994, Oxford University Press: Cape Town, South Africa, 

pp. 825-852. 

48. Kitching, R.P. Clinical Variation in Foot and Mouth Disease: Cattle. Rev Sci Tech, 2002a. 

21(3): pp. 499-504. 

49. Seifert, H. Foot-and-Mouth Disease, in Tropical Animal Health. 1996, Kluwer Academic 

Publishers: London, Massachusetts, pp. 418-31. 

50. Woodbury, E.L. A Review of the Possible Mechanisms for the Persistence of Foot-and- 

Mouth Disease Virus. Epidemiol Infect, 1995. 114(1): pp. 1-13. 

51. Kitching, R., and Hughes, G.J. Clinical Variation in Foot-and-Mouth Disease: Sheep and 

Goats. Rev Sci Tech, 2002b. 21(3): pp. 505-512. 

52. Sellers, R.F. Quantitative Aspects of the Spread of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Vet Bull, 1971. 

41(6): pp. 431-439. 

53. Salt, J.S., The Carrier State in Foot and Mouth Diseasean Immunological Review. Br Vet 

J, 1993. 149(3): pp. 207-223. 

54. Zhang, Z.D. and R.P. Kitching. The Localization of Persistent Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

Virus in the Epithelial Cells of the Soft Palate and Pharynx. J Comp Pathol, 2001. 124: pp. 

89-94. 

55. Cottral, G.E., Cox, B.F., and Baldwin, D.E. The Survival of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus 

in Cured and Uncured Meat. Am J Vet Res, 1960. 21: pp. 288-297. 

56. Cottral, G.E., Cox, B.F., and Baldwin, D.E. Further Studies on the Survival of Foot-and- 

Mouth Disease Virus in Meat. Am J Vet Res, 1961, pp. 224-226. 

57. Henderson, W.M. and Brooksby, J.B. The Survival of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus in 

Meat and Offal. J Hyg (Lond), 1948. 46(4): pp. 394-402. 

58. Lasta, J., et al., Combined Treatment of Heat, Irradiation, and pH effects on the Infectivity of 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus in Bovine Tissues. J Food Sci, 1992. 57(1): pp. 36-39. 

59. Heidelbaugh, N. and Graves, J., Effects of Some Techniques Applicable in Food Processing 

on the Infectivity of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus. Food Tech, 1968. 22: pp. 120-124. 

60. Cottral, G.E. Persistence of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus in Animals, their Products and 

the Environment. Bull Off Int Epizoot, 1969. 70(3): pp. 549-568. 


in Cured and Uncured Meat. Am J Vet Res., 1960. 21: pp. 288-297. 

62. Wengler, G. and Bradley, D.W., et al. Flaviviridae in Virus Taxonomy: Sixth Report of the 

International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses., C.M.F. F. A. Murphy, D. H. L. Bishop et 

al (eds). 1995, New York: Springer Verlag, pp 415-427. 

63. Depner, K. and Bauer, T. et al. Thermal and pH Stability of Pestiviruses. Revue Scientifique 

et Technique de l'Office International des Epizooties, 1992. 11: pp. 885-893. 


64. Harkness, J.W. Classical Swine Fever and its Diagnosis: A Current View. Veterinary 

Record, 1985. 116: pp. 288-293. 

65. Trautwein, G. Pathology and Pathogenesis of the Disease, in Classical Swine Fever and 

Related Infections. B. Liess, ed. 1988, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, pp 24-27. 

66. Wood, L., and Brockman, S., et al. Classical Swine Fever: Virulence and Tissue 

Distribution of a 1986 Isolate in Pigs. Veterinary Record, 1988. 122, pp. 391-394. 

67. Elbers, A.R. and Stegeman, J.A., et al. The Classical Swine Fever epidemic 1997-1998 in the 

Netherlands: Descriptive Epidemiology. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 1999. 42: pp. 

157-184. 

68. Edwards, S. Survival and Inactivation of Classical Swine Fever Virus. Veterinary 

Microbiology, 2000. 73: pp. 175-181. 

69. Fritzemeier, J., et al. Epidemiology of Classical Swine Fever in Germany in the 1990s. 

Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 77(1-2): pp. 29-41. 

70. Dahle, J., and Liess, B., A Review of Classical Swine Fever Infections in Pigs: 

Epizootiology, Clinical Disease and Pathology. Comp Immun Micro, 1992. 20: pp. 261- 

274. 

71. Elbers, A.R. and Stegeman, J.A. et al. Factors Associated with the Introduction of Classical 

Swine Fever Virus into Pig Herds in the Central Area of the 1997/98 Epidemic in the 

Netherlands. Veterinary Record, 2001. 149 (13): pp. 377-382. 

72. Biagetti, M., Greiser-Wilke, I., and Rutili, D. Molecular Epidemiology of Classical Swine 

Fever in Italy. Veterinary Microbiology, 2001. 83(3): pp. 205-215. 

73. Laddomada, A. and Patta, C., et al. Epidemiology of Classical Swine Fever in Sardinia: A 

Serological Survey of Wild Boar and Comparison with African Swine Fever. Veterinary 

Record, 1994. 134(8), pp. 183-187. 

74. Moennig, V. and Floegel-Niesmann, G., et al., Clinical Signs and Epidemiology of Classical 

Swine Fever: A Review of New Knowledge. Veterinary Journal, 2003. 165: pp. 11-20. 

75. Paton, D.J. and Greiser-Wilke, I. Classical Swine FeverAn Update. Research in Veterinary 

Science, 2003. 75(3): pp. 169-178. 

76. Dawe, P.S. Viability of Swine Vesicular Disease in Carcasses and Faeces. Veterinary 

Record, 1974. 94: p. 430. 

77. Herniman, K.A. and Medhurst, P.M., et al. The Action of Heat, Chemicals and Disinfectants 

on Swine Vesicular Disease Virus. Veterinary Record, 1973. 93: pp. 620-624. 

78. OIE, World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) Interface. 2007 [cited 2007 

March]; available from www.oie.int/wahid. 

79. Penrith, M.-L., Thompson, G. and Bastos, A. African Swine Fever, in Infectious Diseases of 

Livestock, Coetzer, J.A.W. and Tustin, R.C., editors. 2004, Oxford University Press: Cape 

Town, South Africa, pp. 975-986. 

80. Kleiboeker, S.B. African Swine Fever, in Foreign Animal Diseases: The Gray Book. 2008, 

United States Animal Health Association. 

81. Kleiboeker, S.B. Swine Fever: Classical Swine Fever and African Swine Fever. Vet Clin 

North Am Food Anim Pract, 2002. 18(3): pp. 431-451. 

82. Farez, S. and Morley, R.S. Potential Animal Health Hazards of Pork and Pork Products. 

Revue Scientifique et Technique de l'Office International des Epizooties, 1997. 1: pp. 65-78. 

1. Office International des Epizooties (OIE). International Animal Health Code: Mammals, 

Birds and Bees. 2004. 


2. Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations (9 CFR), section 92.2. Application for Recognition of 

the Animal Health Status of a Region. 2004. 

3. MAPA. Clarification of Information Requested for Recognition of a Region Free from 

Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Brazil. 2005. 

4. MAPA. State of Santa Catarina Proposal for Recognition as an FMD-Free Zone where 

Vaccination is not Practiced, D.o.A. Health, Editor. 2007. 

5. MAPA. Response to Specific Comments on the 11 Factors Given in 9 CFR 92.2, Application 

for Recognition of the Animal Health Status of a Region. 2003a: Department of Animal 

Health. 

6. APHIS. Observations Made During APHIS' Site Visit to Brazil. October 2002 & August 

2003. 2003. 

7. MAPA. Regionalization of FMD. 2002b, Department of Animal Health. 

8. MAPA. Missao Estados Unidos da America - powerpoint presentation. 2008. 

9. MAPA. USA Technical Visit, APHIS/USDA - powerpoint presentation. 2008. 

10. MAPA. Enlargement of the Foot-and-Mouth Disease-Free Zone, where Vaccination is 

Practiced: Midwestern and Eastern livestock circuits. 2000a, Department of Animal Health. 

11. APHIS. Observations Made During APHIS' Site Visit to Santa Catarina, Brazil. June 2008. 

2008. 

12. MAPA, Complementary Information Requested by USDA Regarding the Process of Risk 

Assessment for Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Beef Exported to NAFTA. 2003c: Department of 

Animal Health. 

13. MAPA. Information Requested by APHIS for the Risk Assessment of Pork from Santa 

Catarina State. 2006 

14. OIE. OIE WAHID. 2008 [cited 2008 December]; Available at www.oie.int/hs2. 

15. Freitas, T.E.E., Oliveira, A., Joineau, M., Souza Duarte, A., C.L. Vargas, I, and Rebello, M. 

Classical Swine Fever in Brazil: Study for the Survey of Classical Swine Fever Outbreaks in 

Brazil from 1978 to 2004. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, Londrina, 2007. 28: pp. 277-286. 

16. MAPA. Expansion of Foot-and-Mouth Disease-Free Zone with Vaccination: State of 

Rondônia. 2002d, Department of Animal Health. 

17. MAPA. Elimination of the Outbreaks of Foot-and-Mouth Disease that Occurred in the State 

of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. 2002c, Department of Animal Health. 

18. Secretariat of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. National Animal Health and Agrifood 

Quality Service. SENASA., Annex IV -FMD - Sero-Epidemiological Surveillance, San Luis 

del Palmar, Corrientes. 2006. 

19. MAPA. Proposal for the Enlargement of the Foot-and-Mouth Disease-Free Zone, where 

Vaccination is Practiced. 2000b, Department of Animal Health. 

20. OIE. Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2008, Volume 1, Chapter 2.2, Import Risk Analysis 

2008 [cited 2008 December]. Available at www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_titre_1.3.htm. 

21. CEAH. Pathway Assessment of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Risk to the United States: 

An Evaluation in Response to International FMD Outbreaks in 2001. 2001. 

22. CEAH. Risk Assessment of the Practice of Feeding Recycled Commodities to Domesticated 

Swine in the U.S. 1995. 

23. CEAH. 2001 Waste-Feeder Survey, unpublished data. 2002, USDA, APHIS, VS. 

24. Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, et al. The Pathogenesis and Diagnosis of Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease. Journal of Comparative Pathology, 2003. 129(1): pp 1-36. 


25. Hennecken, M., J.A. Stegeman, et al. Transmission of Classical Swine Fever Virus by 

Artificial Insemination During the 1997-1998 Epidemic in the Netherlands: A Descriptive 

Epidemiological Study. Vet Q, 2000. 22(4): pp 228-233. 

26. Floegel, G. and Wehrend, A. Detection of Classical Swine Fever Virus in Semen of Infected 

Boars. Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 77: pp. 109-116. 

27. Glossup, C.E. and Cameron, R. Transmission of Viruses Through Pigs and Products of Pig 

Origin. Trends in Emerging Viral Infections of Swine, ed. A. Morilla, K.Y. Yoon, and J.J. 

Zimmerman. 2002, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State Press. 3-11. 

28. OIE. Classical Swine Fever Disease Card. 2008 [cited 2008 December]; Available from: 

www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A130. 

29. OIE. Swine Vesicular Disease Disease Card. 2008 [cited 2008 December]; Available from: 


30. OIE. African Swine Fever Disease Card. 2008 [cited 2008 December]; Available from: 


31. McCauley, E.H. et al. Potential Economic Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United 

States. St. Paul, Minnesota: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1979. 

32. Dunn, C.S. and Donaldson, A.I. Natural Adaption to Pigs of a Taiwanese Isolate of Footand-Mouth 

Disease Virus. Vet Rec, 1997. 141: pp. 174-75. 

33. Geering, W.A. and Forman, A.J. Foot-and-Mouth Disease, in Exotic Diseases of Animals: a 

Field Guide for Australian Veterinarians, Australian Government Publishing Service, Editor. 

1995: Canberra. 

34. Doel, T.R. FMD Vaccines. Virus Res, 2003. 91(1): pp. 81-99. 

35. Moennig, V. Introduction to Classical Swine Fever: Virus, Disease and Control Policy. 

Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 73: pp. 93-102. 

36. Bates, T.W., Carpenter, T.E. and Thurmond, M.C. Benefit-Cost Analysis of Vaccination and 

Preemptive Slaughter as a Means of Eradicating Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Am J Vet Res, 

2003. 64(7): pp. 805-812. 

37. Stegeman, J.A., Elbers, A. et al. The 1997-1998 Epidemic of Classical Swine Fever in the 

Netherlands. Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 73: pp. 183-196. 

38. Saatkamp, H.W., Berentsen, P.B.M., et al. Economic Aspects of the Control of Classical 

Swine Fever Outbreaks in the European Union. Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 73: pp. 

221-237. 

39. Garner, M.G., Whan, I.F., et al. The Expected Economic Impact of Selected Exotic Diseases 

on the Pig Industry of Australia. Revue Scientifique et Technique de l'Office International 

des Epizooties, 2001. 20(3): pp. 671-685. 

40. Lin, F. and Kitching, R.P. Swine Vesicular Disease: An Overview. Veterinary Journal, 2000. 

160: pp. 192-201. 

41. FAS. U.S. Beef, Pork and Poultry Trade Charts, www.fas.usda.gov/dlp/tradecharts/. 2003. 

42. Paarlberg, P.L., Lee, J.G., and Seitzinger, A.H. Potential Revenue Impact of an Outbreak of 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United States. J Am Vet Med Assoc, 2002. 220(7): pp. 988- 

992. 

43. Green, J.W. and Grannis, J.L. Economic Impact of Alternative Management Strategies for 

Regulating Canadian Ruminant/Product Imports. Unpublished report. 2003, Centers for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health. 

44. Hall, H. Diseases and Parasites of Livestock in the Tropics, 2nd Edition. Intermediate 

Tropical Agriculture Series, 1985: pp. 41-46. 


45. Kitching, R., et al. Development of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus Strain Characterization 

A Review. Trop An Health Prod, 1989. 21: pp. 153-166. 

46. Mann, J. and Sellers, R.F. Foot and Mouth Disease, in Virus Infections of Vertebrates, Z. 

Dinter and B. Morein, editors. 1990, Elsevier, pp. 903-912. 

47. Thomson, G. Foot-and-Mouth Disease, in Infectious Diseases of Livestock, Coetzer, 

Thomson, and Tustin, editors. 1994, Oxford University Press: Cape Town, South Africa, 

pp. 825-852. 

48. Kitching, R.P. Clinical Variation in Foot and Mouth Disease: Cattle. Rev Sci Tech, 2002a. 

21(3): pp. 499-504. 

49. Seifert, H. Foot-and-Mouth Disease, in Tropical Animal Health. 1996, Kluwer Academic 

Publishers: London, Massachusetts, pp. 418-31. 

50. Woodbury, E.L. A Review of the Possible Mechanisms for the Persistence of Foot-and- 

Mouth Disease Virus. Epidemiol Infect, 1995. 114(1): pp. 1-13. 

51. Kitching, R., and Hughes, G.J. Clinical Variation in Foot-and-Mouth Disease: Sheep and 

Goats. Rev Sci Tech, 2002b. 21(3): pp. 505-512. 

52. Sellers, R.F. Quantitative Aspects of the Spread of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Vet Bull, 1971. 

41(6): pp. 431-439. 

53. Salt, J.S., The Carrier State in Foot and Mouth Diseasean Immunological Review. Br Vet 

J, 1993. 149(3): pp. 207-223. 

54. Zhang, Z.D. and R.P. Kitching. The Localization of Persistent Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

Virus in the Epithelial Cells of the Soft Palate and Pharynx. J Comp Pathol, 2001. 124: pp. 

89-94. 


in Cured and Uncured Meat. Am J Vet Res, 1960. 21: pp. 288-297. 

56. Cottral, G.E., Cox, B.F., and Baldwin, D.E. Further Studies on the Survival of Foot-and- 

Mouth Disease Virus in Meat. Am J Vet Res, 1961, pp. 224-226. 

57. Henderson, W.M. and Brooksby, J.B. The Survival of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus in 

Meat and Offal. J Hyg (Lond), 1948. 46(4): pp. 394-402. 

58. Lasta, J., et al., Combined Treatment of Heat, Irradiation, and pH effects on the Infectivity of 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus in Bovine Tissues. J Food Sci, 1992. 57(1): pp. 36-39. 

59. Heidelbaugh, N. and Graves, J., Effects of Some Techniques Applicable in Food Processing 

on the Infectivity of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus. Food Tech, 1968. 22: pp. 120-124. 

60. Cottral, G.E. Persistence of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus in Animals, their Products and 

the Environment. Bull Off Int Epizoot, 1969. 70(3): pp. 549-568. 


in Cured and Uncured Meat. Am J Vet Res., 1960. 21: pp. 288-297. 

62. Wengler, G. and Bradley, D.W., et al. Flaviviridae in Virus Taxonomy: Sixth Report of the 

International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses., C.M.F. F. A. Murphy, D. H. L. Bishop et 

al (eds). 1995, New York: Springer Verlag, pp 415-427. 

63. Depner, K. and Bauer, T. et al. Thermal and pH Stability of Pestiviruses. Revue Scientifique 

et Technique de l'Office International des Epizooties, 1992. 11: pp. 885-893. 

64. Harkness, J.W. Classical Swine Fever and its Diagnosis: A Current View. Veterinary 

Record, 1985. 116: pp. 288-293. 

65. Trautwein, G. Pathology and Pathogenesis of the Disease, in Classical Swine Fever and 

Related Infections. B. Liess, ed. 1988, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, pp 24-27. 


66. Wood, L., and Brockman, S., et al. Classical Swine Fever: Virulence and Tissue 

Distribution of a 1986 Isolate in Pigs. Veterinary Record, 1988. 122, pp. 391-394. 

67. Elbers, A.R. and Stegeman, J.A., et al. The Classical Swine Fever epidemic 1997-1998 in the 

Netherlands: Descriptive Epidemiology. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 1999. 42: pp. 

157-184. 

68. Edwards, S. Survival and Inactivation of Classical Swine Fever Virus. Veterinary 

Microbiology, 2000. 73: pp. 175-181. 

69. Fritzemeier, J., et al. Epidemiology of Classical Swine Fever in Germany in the 1990s. 

Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. 77(1-2): pp. 29-41. 

70. Dahle, J., and Liess, B., A Review of Classical Swine Fever Infections in Pigs: 

Epizootiology, Clinical Disease and Pathology. Comp Immun Micro, 1992. 20: pp. 261- 

274. 

71. Elbers, A.R. and Stegeman, J.A. et al. Factors Associated with the Introduction of Classical 

Swine Fever Virus into Pig Herds in the Central Area of the 1997/98 Epidemic in the 

Netherlands. Veterinary Record, 2001. 149 (13): pp. 377-382. 

72. Biagetti, M., Greiser-Wilke, I., and Rutili, D. Molecular Epidemiology of Classical Swine 

Fever in Italy. Veterinary Microbiology, 2001. 83(3): pp. 205-215. 

73. Laddomada, A. and Patta, C., et al. Epidemiology of Classical Swine Fever in Sardinia: A 

Serological Survey of Wild Boar and Comparison with African Swine Fever. Veterinary 

Record, 1994. 134(8), pp. 183-187. 

74. Moennig, V. and Floegel-Niesmann, G., et al., Clinical Signs and Epidemiology of Classical 

Swine Fever: A Review of New Knowledge. Veterinary Journal, 2003. 165: pp. 11-20. 

75. Paton, D.J. and Greiser-Wilke, I. Classical Swine FeverAn Update. Research in Veterinary 

Science, 2003. 75(3): pp. 169-178. 

76. Dawe, P.S. Viability of Swine Vesicular Disease in Carcasses and Faeces. Veterinary 

Record, 1974. 94: p. 430. 

77. Herniman, K.A. and Medhurst, P.M., et al. The Action of Heat, Chemicals and Disinfectants 

on Swine Vesicular Disease Virus. Veterinary Record, 1973. 93: pp. 620-624. 

78. OIE, World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) Interface. 2007 [cited 2007 

March]; available from www.oie.int/wahid. 

79. Penrith, M.-L., Thompson, G. and Bastos, A. African Swine Fever, in Infectious Diseases of 

Livestock, Coetzer, J.A.W. and Tustin, R.C., editors. 2004, Oxford University Press: Cape 

Town, South Africa, pp. 975-986. 

80. Kleiboeker, S.B. African Swine Fever, in Foreign Animal Diseases: The Gray Book. 2008, 

United States Animal Health Association. 

81. Kleiboeker, S.B. Swine Fever: Classical Swine Fever and African Swine Fever. Vet Clin 

North Am Food Anim Pract, 2002. 18(3): pp. 431-451. 

82. Farez, S. and Morley, R.S. Potential Animal Health Hazards of Pork and Pork Products. 

Revue Scientifique et Technique de l'Office International des Epizooties, 1997. 1: pp. 65-78. 

83. Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for 

Terrestrial Animals; Chapter 2.1.4. 

84. Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code , 2008, Chapter 

8.13 1., Terrestrial Animal Health Code – 2008; available at: 

http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_sommaire.htm. 

85. Foreign Animal Disease, 7 th edition, 2008. United States Animal Health Association. p. 377- 

382.

Exhibit 8, 100416 Brazil FMD Risk Evaluation - R-Calf

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?