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Commonwealth of Virginia Single Audit Report for the Year Ended ...

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We fur<strong>the</strong>r recommend that Motor Vehicles expands its user access monitoring process to<br />

include consideration <strong>of</strong> current job responsibilities against current access privileges in addition to<br />

currently authorized access privileges.<br />

Management Plan <strong>for</strong> Corrective Action <strong>for</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Motor Vehicles<br />

DMV will implement a more detailed Oracle access review process. The new process<br />

will be per<strong>for</strong>med every 6 months and will require supervisors to document <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

approval <strong>for</strong> each individual’s system responsibility <strong>the</strong>reby ensuring that <strong>the</strong><br />

responsibility is in line with <strong>the</strong>ir EWP.<br />

Responsible Party: John Gruber, DMV FAR Director Jeff Ryan, DMV Assistant<br />

Commissioner <strong>for</strong> Finance<br />

Estimated Completion Date: June 1, 2012<br />

11-03: Improve System Access Management<br />

Applicable to: Department <strong>of</strong> Behavioral Health and Developmental Services<br />

During our review <strong>of</strong> access management at BHDS, we noted three areas in need <strong>of</strong><br />

improvement.<br />

Granting Capabilities<br />

Management has not educated its system security <strong>of</strong>ficers on which system capabilities <strong>the</strong>y<br />

should not combine because toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y eliminate an internal control. We noted 32 instances<br />

where an employee was granted both entry and approval capabilities within <strong>the</strong> agency’s accounts<br />

payable ledger. We also noted two employees with financial capabilities across multiple ledgers that<br />

could also change <strong>the</strong>ir abilities within <strong>the</strong> system. Management should limit <strong>the</strong>se capabilities to<br />

maintain proper separation <strong>of</strong> duties.<br />

The data owners should document and provide <strong>the</strong> system security <strong>of</strong>ficers with <strong>the</strong> user<br />

capabilities that when combined would compromise internal control within critical systems. The<br />

Security Officer in <strong>the</strong> central <strong>of</strong>fice should ensure system security <strong>of</strong>ficers do not combine<br />

incompatible roles and grant individuals <strong>the</strong>se roles across <strong>the</strong> agency’s in<strong>for</strong>mation systems.<br />

Access Monitoring<br />

The Security Officer <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> agency’s financial system does not per<strong>for</strong>m regular system<br />

access reviews. The Security Officer <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> financial system relies on regional security <strong>of</strong>ficers to<br />

ensure that access to <strong>the</strong> system is reasonable and current and does not review users’ capabilities in<br />

<strong>the</strong> system.<br />

The Security Officer should work with <strong>the</strong> BHDS’ Internal <strong>Audit</strong> Director to develop regular<br />

access reviews <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> agency’s financial management system and o<strong>the</strong>r critical systems. Security<br />

Officers should periodically review user capabilities <strong>for</strong> critical systems to ensure that users do not<br />

have capabilities that allow <strong>the</strong>m to circumvent internal controls.<br />

10

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