to get the file - Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

More documents

Recommendations

Info

prepared to invest in colonial protection. The net result was that from the beginning Spain adopted a strategic approach of static defence in the Americas 53 . There were several elements to this. Firstly, merchant shipping was required to travel in convoys from the 1520s and by 1561 the regular bi-annual flota to and from Spain was introduced 54 . Although commercially highly inefficient, this system served the purpose of protecting the treasure fleet very effectively. There was only one successful attack in 200 years, in 1628, on an unusually small fleet 55 . Merchant ships were required to be armed (although this was frequently ignored) 56 . A few key ports were defended 57 . Otherwise the colonists were largely left to fend for themselves. What this meant in practice was the levying of taxes to pay for local naval forces, militias and fortifications on the Altantic and, eventually also the Pacific coasts 58 ; the abandonment of indefensible coastal settlements 59 (such as Panama after Henry Morgan’s raid in 1671); and periodic punitive expeditions and exemplary reprisals 60 . In practice given the enormous distances involved and the often low level and unpredictable nature of raiding, only local measures were realistic. 61 In the Seventeenth century this was supplemented by vigorous, if largely ineffective, diplomatic protests in European capitals. The Spanish government inevitably found itself having to provide further help during periods of sustained high levels of attacks such as in the 1560s, during the war with Elizabethan England, and in the later Seventeenth century at the height of the buccaneers’ attacks 62 . This usually consisted of increased naval forces, garrisons and fortifications. But the cost was very high so such efforts were not sustained when the conditions improved. There was an alternative: to resolve the piracy problem at its source by military action in Europe to deprive the pirates and privateers of the bases and political support they needed. In practice, although not with that specific intent, Philip 53 Ibid., p. 19 54 Ibid., p.16. The flota was the authorised and escorted convoy between Spain and the Americas. 55 Ibid., p. 68. 56 Ibid., pp. 16, 22. 57 Lane, Op. Cit., p. 19.; Parry, Op. Cit., p. 254 58 Lane, Op. Cit., p. 18. 59 Ibid., p. 25 60 Ibid., pp. 64-65 61 Parry, Op. Cit., p. 253. 62 Ibid., pp. 256, 262 10
II tried to implement such a policy in the 1580s and 90s. Had the Spanish Armada (or any of its successors) succeeded it is likely that England, and possibly the Netherlands if the loss of English support also enabled the suppression of the Dutch revolt, would at least for a time have ceased to support piracy and privateering in the Americas. Similarly, in such circumstances Philip’s interventions in the French Wars of Religion against Henry of Navarre would have stood a greater chance of success, potentially aligning France with Spain at least for a time. In the event this proved beyond Spain’s capacity, but it is likely that a Spanish victory in Europe would have had a significant impact, at least for a time, on New World piracy. How well did the system work Superficially it might seem to have failed, since at no time did Spain ever manage to eradicate piracy from the Americas. But while in an ideal world that would have been desirable, it was neither realistic, nor in practice something the Spanish Government ever sought to achieve. Looked at strategically, the system did what it was designed for. The treasure fleets were protected. The colonies and colonial trade continued to develop and grow 63 , despite periodic local disruption in the aftermath of specific attacks. Costs to the government, while sometimes uncomfortably high, were lower than any other approach would have achieved. In short, as with the Barbary Corsairs, in the absence of the ability to solve the problem of piracy in the New World, Spain found a way to cope. Britain And now we come to Blackbeard, Captain Kidd and Calico Jack Rackham; to buried treasure, pieces of eight and walking the plank; to Long John Silver, James Hook, and Captain Pugwash 64 . In short, to the so-called ‘Golden Age of Piracy’ 65 , mainly in and around the Caribbean from about 1680 to 1720. Or rather, we come to how England/Britain 66 ended it. There is a certain historical irony to the fact that this task fell primarily to England, long known to itself and others, with some justification, 63 Lane, Op. Cit, pp 204-05. 64 There is a progression in the memorable pirates of children’s literature. Long John Silver (1883) is an ambiguous anti-hero, James Hook (1911) a comic villain, Captain Pugwash (1950 onwards) merely comic. 65 The title is indicative of the romanticisation of piracy at the time and since, in a way only comparable to the later fabulisation of the Wild West. 66 The change in policy from supporting privateers in the sixteenth century to tolerating buccaneers in the seventeenth to suppression of piracy in the eighteenth predated the 1707 Act of Union. For convenience ‘Britain’ is used to cover both England and Britain. 11
Page 1 and 2: ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES SE
Page 3 and 4: CONDITION OF RELEASE The United Kin
Page 5 and 6: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Romans, Spani
Page 7 and 8: Battling the Bogeyman 1 : Lessons f
Page 9 and 10: Aim What means have been used to co
Page 11 and 12: Contemporary accounts of events, pa
Page 13 and 14: Starting in the second century they
Page 15: eing virtually driven out of the Le
Page 19 and 20: sympathetic to the old ways purged
Page 21 and 22: present day. Achieving this was exp
Page 23 and 24: number of Qasimi attacks on British
Page 25 and 26: settled into a mutually beneficial
Page 27 and 28: with a minimum of due process. The
Page 29 and 30: seems a long way off. As a proporti
Page 31 and 32: Guilmartin, John F. Jr, Galleons an
Page 33: International Expert Group on Pirac

to get the file - Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?