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discontinue it’. 104 This evolved into control of the territory from where the pirates
operated, in Borneo through a series of campaigns from 1841-62 to enforce the
authority of the Rajah of Sarawak within progressively extended borders 105 , and in
Malaya through the policy of ‘paramountcy’ in 1874 106 . Since annexation of territory
was not an option in China, the British focused around Hong Kong on the destruction
of Chinese pirate fleets 107 and enforcing severe penalties on anyone in Hong Kong
found to have any dealings with pirates. 108 This did not eliminate the problem – that
could only be achieved through co-operation with the Chinese authorities, for whom
piracy was rarely a priority 109 – but it kept it within acceptable limits.
By the early eighteenth century Britain had more to gain than lose from
protecting a growing maritime trade increasingly dominated by its own shipping. The
parallel growth of the Royal Navy gave it the capacity to do so. But how it sought to
do so differed according to whether or not the threat came from within its own
jurisdiction. In suppressing American piracy it was able to make creative use of
British law, and did so ruthlessly. This was probably the most successful anti-piracy
programme in history. Achieving it required sustained determination, a
comprehensive approach comprising a range of complementary and mutually
reinforcing military and civil measures, and the investment of significant naval
resources.
In suppressing attacks on British and British-protected shipping elsewhere in
the world Britain tended to be highly pragmatic in its approach. Once it had
established that it had the capacity and will to use force to protect its interests, Britain
104
Ibid, p. 97, citing John C. Templer (ed.): The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke KCB, Rajah of
Sarawak, Narrating the Events of his Life from 1838 to the Present Time Vol II (London, 1853) p.110.
105 See Steven Runciman, The White Rajahs: A History of Sarawak from 1841 to 1946 (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 69-149.
106 J.L.Anderson, Op Cit, p 97.
107 Large fleets of up to several thousand junks were characteristic of Chinese piracy, but made them
particularly vulnerable to European warships by the middle of the nineteenth century.
108 J.L.Anderson, Op Cit, p 102.
109 The imperial Chinese government rarely attached much importance to trade, the sea, or those who
made their livings from them. Consequently at various times it tried out some exquisitely logical and
highly arbitrary way to suppress piracy. These included prohibition of all maritime activity and
depopulation of coastal provinces (if there were no trade, fishing or people there could be no pirates).
It is fair to say that these were not an unqualified success. It also co-opted one set of pirates to fight
another. Chinese merchants tended to pay protection and/or arm their ships; as early as the fourteenth
century Ibn Battutah commented on how heavily armed were Chinese trading junks. Tim Mackintosh
Smith (ed.), The Travels of Ibn Battutah (London: Picador 2003) pp. 223-24.
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