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ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES
SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER
2009
Battling the Bogeyman Lessons from History on Fighting
Piracy
Stephen Willmer
United Kingdom – Ministry of Defence

ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES
Battling the Bogeyman Lessons from History on
Fighting Piracy
A DISSERTATION
BY
Stephen Willmer
United Kingdom - Ministry of Defence
July 2009
© British Crown Copyright 2009/MOD
Published with the Permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty’s Stationery Office

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© British Crown Copyright 2009/MOD
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Romans, Spanish and British all conducted sustained campaigns against
what they saw as piracy. Based on a survey of the literature, the paper assesses how
they did so and with what success, to identify any significant common factors. It then
briefly reviews these in the context of current anti-piracy policies and operations in
the Horn of Africa to identify any relevant lessons. It concludes that it is unlikely that
the international community will take the type of measures previously necessary to
eliminate piracy, and that other ways to shift the cost-benefit balance away from
attacks on shipping should therefore be considered.
2

CONTENTS
Introduction Page 1
Aim Page 3
Rome Page 3
In the Mediterranean
Page 3
In the North Page 6
Spain Page 7
In the Mediterranean
Page 8
In the Americas
Page 9
Britain Page 11
‘The Golden Age of Piracy’
Page 11
North Africa Page 15
India Page 16
The Gulf Page 16
South East Asia and China
Page 17
Analysis Page 19
Lessons for Today
Page 21
The flag on the cover was that of Captain Calico Jack Rackham, hanged for piracy at Gallows-Point,
Port Royal, Jamaica, on November 18, 1720.
3

Battling the Bogeyman 1 : Lessons from History on Fighting Piracy
“The Crime of Pyracy …is of all other Robberies the most aggravating and
inhumane” 2 . So argued the prosecution in a 1720 trial. These days most people
associate piracy with the Caribbean of this time. But it has been around for much
longer, and in many other places, recorded for as long as States have kept records.
The ancient Egyptians faced pirates in the Mediterranean in the fourteenth century
BC 3 , and the Assyrians in the Gulf in the seventh century BC 4 . The Greeks and
Romans record it from Homer onwards 5 (the word pirate derives, via Latin, from the
Greek periato), The Chinese recorded pirates off the coasts of China from the first
century AD 6 and in the Straits of Malacca from the early fifth century 7 . Every major
maritime state in history has at one time had to address piracy in some form.
What is ‘piracy’ There has never been a straightforward answer to this, as
Saint Augustine pointed out some 1,500 years ago in The City of God 8 . It remains a
contested concept today. Over 2,000 years ago In De Officiis Cicero described pirates
as “hostis humani generis” – the enemies of humankind – a concept still reflected in
the universal jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas in international law. King James
I called piracy “depredations committed on the seas by certain lewd and ill-disposed
persons” 9 . In The Devils Dictionary Ambrose Bierce defined it as “Commerce without
its folly-swaddles”, reflecting that at core piracy is a business involving the forcible
1
The bogeyman is a shapeless monster that carries off naughty children. It has been suggested the
word is linked to slave-raiding Barbary Corsairs from Bougie in North Africa or the Bugi pirates
(bugi-men) of South East Asia. Sadly, from this study’s perspective, the most likely etymology
remains the middle-English bugge, a frightening ghost. Derived words such as boggart and bogle are
attested from the early sixteenth century, predating any English acquaintance with North African or
South East Asian pirates.
2 Markus Rediker, Villains of all Nations (London: Verso Books, 2004) p. 135
3 Henry Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World, (London : The John Hopkins University Press, 1997
reprint of 1924 original), pp. 81-2
4 Sir Charles Belgrave, The Pirate Coast, (London: G Bell & Sons Ltd, 1966), p.2
5 Ormerod, op cit, pp 88-90. According to Thucydides the legendary King Minos of Crete was the first
to try and clear the sea of pirates.
6 Robert Antony, Like Froth Floating on the Sea, (Berkeley: University of California, 2003), p.22
7 Adam Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in South East Asia, (Singapore: Institute of South East
Asian Studies, 2007) p.26
8 “It was a pertinent and true answer which was made to Alexander the Great by a pirate whom he had
seized. When the king asked him what he meant by infesting the sea, the pirate defiantly replied: ‘The
same as you do when you infest the whole world; but because I do it with a little ship I am called a
robber, and because you do it with a great fleet, you are an emperor’.”, translated and edited by R.W.
Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Bk IV, Ch.4, 148.
9 Ormerod, op cit., p13
1

exchange of goods, and what one saw as piracy, another often could and did see as
legitimate privateering. Standards in this regard have changed over time, producing
Coleridge’s dictum in response to suggestions that the Elizabethan privateers were
pirates that “no man is a pirate, unless his contemporaries agree to call him so” 10 .
Nor is there any single compelling contemporary definition. The international
legal definition of Piracy in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea 11 is inadequate for a number of reasons, as noted by the House of
Commons Transport Committee in 2006 12 . In particular its exclusion of acts
committed within territorial waters (precisely where most ‘piracy’ has always taken
place) makes it severely deficient as a working definition of the concept as opposed to
a statement about legal jurisdiction. A more useful definition is the International
Maritime Bureau’s: “An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the
intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force
in the furtherance of that act” 13 . While sometimes criticised for not excluding acts
with political rather than pecuniary motives, this is a positive merit for historical
analysis. It side-steps arguments over whether specific acts were piracy or not when
strictly defined in the light of hindsight 14 , and facilitates review of how states
addressed what at the time they perceived and treated as piracy. Although it still
excludes attacks on land from the sea, this represents an important strand in the
historic record and is therefore also covered, to some degree, in this paper.
10 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 17 March 1832, from Table Talk, (London: Routledge, 1884)
11
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, Jamaica 10 December 1982),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (accessed 1 June 2009).
12 House of Commons Transport Committee, Piracy: Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, HC1026, The
Stationery Office Limited London 2006, pp. 10-11.
13
Ibid, Ev 42
14 These issues can still be sensitive, such as whether the Qasimi Arabs were or ‘pirates’ or not. The
issues are encapsulated in Belgrave (Op. Cit), which follows the traditional view that they were;
Sultan Mohammad al-Qasimi of Sharjah’s argument in The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf
(London: Routledge, 1986) that they were not; and Charles E. Davies’ analysis in The Blood-Red
Arab Flag: An investigation into Qasimi Piracy 1797-1820 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press,
1997), which concludes that in strict terms they probably were not, but that their actions were such
that it was neither unreasonable nor surprising the British thought they were (see below pp. 16-17).
2

Aim
What means have been used to combat and suppress piracy They include
diplomacy, bribery and/or tribute, convoys, restrictions on trade, naval patrols,
punitive attacks on pirates bases and destruction of pirate vessels, prosecutions,
changes to the law, exemplary executions, state pardons, building permanent
defences, movements of populations, and conquest of territory. The balance has
varied according to time, place and the nature of the state involved. In their times the
Romans, Spanish and British in particular all conducted sustained campaigns against
what they saw as piracy. This paper assesses how they did so and with what success,
to identify any significant common factors. It then briefly reviews these in the context
of current anti-piracy policies and operations in the Horn of Africa to identify any
relevant lessons.
Rome
Turning first to Rome, piracy was endemic across the Mediterranean
throughout the rise of the Roman Republic. Athens 15 , Rhodes 16 and Ptolemaic Egypt 17
all at various times sought to counter it, generally through a combination of naval
patrols and punitive expeditions, convoys, armed merchantmen, and diplomatic
efforts to deprive pirates of access to ports and markets 18 . None had more than
temporary success. The scale of the problem was significantly exacerbated by
Mithridates VI of Pontus’s incorporation of ‘pirates’ into his fleets in his three wars
with Rome from 88BC to 63BC 19 . This sustained a substantial pool of ships and men
who, on the end of hostilities, simply carried on raiding on their own account from
bases in Crete and, especially, Cilicia 20 , with tacit cooperation from local cities that
benefitted economically from acting as their markets and suppliers 21 . It is also clear
that the sustained economic and political disruption of the late Hellenistic period
associated with the expansion of the Roman Republic may have generated sufficient
15 Ormerod, Op. Cit, pp. 109-10; Philip de Souza, Piracy in the Graco-Roman World, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp 26-30, 38-41.
16 Ormerod, Op. Cit, pp. 133-9; de Souza, Op. Cit, pp. 48-53
17 Ormerod, Op. Cit, pp. 131-2; de Souza, Op. Cit, pp. 53-54
18 Ormerod, Op. Cit, pp 109, 118, 137, 138
19 Ormerod, Op. Cit, pp. 210-11 de Souza, Op. Cit, pp. 125-28
20 Ormerod, Op. Cit pp 210-17; There is a parallel here with the way the buccaneers of the seventeenth
century evolved into the pirates of the eighteenth century.
21 Nicholas Rauh, Merchants, Sailors and Pirates in the Roman World,( Stroud: Tempus, 2003, pp.
171-2; de Souza, Op. Cit, pp. 129-30.
3

social disruption across much of the Mediterranean. This may have created a pool of
disaffected and anti-Roman men on the margins of society who prosecuted a rejection
of contemporary social norms and hierarchies through what contemporary sources
called piracy, but which has also been described as akin to a ‘maritime rebellion’ 22 .
The cities and states of the Mediterranean had lived with and managed the
problem throughout their history. The Roman Republic formally conducted a number
of essentially punitive campaigns in Crete, Cilicia and the Western Mediterranean
from 102BC 23 aimed at piracy to a greater or lesser degree, including a wide-ranging
maritime imperium assigned to Marcus Antonius Creticus from 74BC to 72BC. The
record of Julius Caesar’s encounter with pirates as a young man in 75/4BC 24
demonstrates that there were also ad hoc local smaller scale punitive expeditions,
most of which will have been of insufficient interest to attract the attention of
contemporary chroniclers. These came to a peak with the Lex Gabinia that authorised
Pompey’s anti-piracy campaign of 67BC, reflecting a view that the scale and growth
of piracy problem presented a strategic challenge to the Roman Republic that could
not be resolved by ad hoc responses. Firstly, piracy had grown to an unprecedented
level that was both disrupting the grain supply 25 (even by then a significant risk to
internal stability in Rome) and challenging the authority and dignity of the Roman
state 26 (a matter on which the Senate was always sensitive). Secondly, as the
Mithridatean wars were demonstrating, the pirates were providing military support to
enemies of Rome. Thirdly, Rome’s increasing responsibilities in the eastern
Mediterranean imposed an increasing obligation to protect the interests of its subjects
and allies, who were also suffering (and complaining to the Senate). And finally, in
the febrile context of late republican Roman politics, it presented a major opportunity
for Pompey to improve his political standing.
22 Rauh, Op. Cit, p. 194. According to Plutarch they showed their hostility to Rome in their treatment
of Roman prisoners. They would dress them in Roman costume, let down the ship’s ladder far out at
sea, wish them a pleasant journey and require them to climb down or be thrown overboard – a classical
variation on walking the plank.
23 Ormerod, Op. Cit, pp. 208-25, de Souza, Op. Cit, pp. 102-15, 118-24, 128-34, 141-8, 157-61
24 de Souza, Op. Cit, pp. 140-1
25 Ormerod, Op. Cit, p 233; de Souza, Op. Cit, p 166
26
Ormerod, op. cit, p. 231; de Souza, Op. Cit, p 166. This included such humiliations as kidnapping
two Praetors on the Appian Way near Rome, and destroying a Consular fleet in Ostia harbour.
4

Contemporary accounts of events, particularly Cicero’s, need to be read with
an eye to their political agenda, but even so it is clear that the Lex Gabinia was
intended to represent a strategic response. It created a single command covering the
entire Mediterranean, both on sea and at land. It vested unusually wide-ranging civil
and military authority and resources in Pompey, including the capacity to conclude
political settlements binding on Rome. It was supplemented by diplomatic measures
to ensure that the few remaining quasi-independent Mediterranean powers (basically
Syria and Egypt) supported the campaign and did not provide the pirates any safe
haven outside Roman jurisdiction. And it committed significant resources 27 . Pompey
drew on these powers and resources to plan and fight an effective integrated pan-
Mediterranean campaign, starting with action to preserve the grain supply by clearing
the coasts of Italy, then clearing the western Mediterranean, before turning to Cilicia.
His success seems to have derived from a combination of his reputation, adequate
forces to ensure victory, and a willingness to reach political settlements when the
towns and cities of Cilicia preferred to negotiate rather than fight with little prospect
of success. This essentially comprised an offer of amnesty and, in some
circumstances, resettlement to other locations. By offering the main pirate
communities a way out other than fighting 28 he was able to bring the campaign to a
superficially successful conclusion in only three months.
Unfortunately, despite the campaign of 67BC’s contemporary political
significance and its historical impact, it is clear from a careful reading of the sources
that it did not eliminate Mediterranean piracy, but rather reduced it to an acceptable
level. It nevertheless remained a problem throughout the last years of the Roman
Republic and the civil wars 29 . In his official Res Gestae Augustus asserted that he
27 It is impossible definitively to establish the size of Pompey’s forces, but they appear consistent with
a major commitment. De Souza , Op. Cit, p. 167 note 63, p. 170, suggests the 270 ships cited by
Appian as a credible maximum, implying about 50,000 sailors/oarsmen, and notes that he following
year Pompey had some 30,000 soldiers under command. By way of comparison, at the Battle of
Ecnomus in 256BC during the First Punic War the Roman fleet comprised some 330 warships and
140,000 men. J.F. Lazenby¸ The First Punic War, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp 84­
85. For the Lepanto campaign in 1571 the Ottoman fleet comprised some 300 ships and 45,000 men.
Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West, (London: Macmillan, 2006), pp. 259/263. In May 1588 the
Spanish Armada comprised 130 ships and 29.335 men. Duke of Medina Sidonia to Philip II, 9 May
1588, in Stephen Usherwood, The Great Enterprise (London: The Folio Society, 1978), pp. 76-77.
28 His peers did not welcome this. Metellus Creticus came close to open warfare with Pompey when
several Cretan cities he was attacking surrendered to Pompey’s representatives because Pompey’s
terms were more lenient . de Souza, Op Cit, pp. 170-71.
29 De Souza, Op Cit, pp. 179-210.
5

“made the sea peaceful and cleared it of pirates” 30 , and historians such as Strabo and
Suetonius generally accepted this as a fair reflection, even if there may have been
occasional incidences of piracy throughout the Principate and empire. What was
different that enabled this more lasting success There seem to have been three
interrelated factors involved. First, Augustus established for the first time a state that
effectively controlled the entire Mediterranean coastline, including previously
uncivilised areas such as Illyria (roughly the modern coastline of Croatia). 31 This
deprived pirates of any potential refuge from imperial authority – but it is worth
noting that it took over 30 years of fighting to achieve. Second, he created a standing
imperial fleet in numerous widely dispersed bases to patrol the seas and enforce the
Pax Romana at sea 32 . Third, and partly as a consequence of the stability and security
created by the new empire, economic conditions improved, providing employment for
men previously on the margins of society and potentially tempted to turn pirate 33 .
Looked at another way, Augustus created conditions that reduced the potential return
from piracy in the Mediterranean, while simultaneously increasing the inherent risks
considerably. Only when these conditions changed in the later empire do we see
piracy returning as a significant concern.
This picture of success can be contrasted to the Empire’s struggle against
piratical raiding of Britain, Gaul and Belgium. The Romans were never able to
eliminate such attacks, which were mounted from beyond the range of Roman arms.
The first recorded attacks were in AD41, by the Chauci of northern Germany. Chauci
raids continued until the late second century, when they blend into the Frankish and
Saxon piracy of the third and fourth centuries 34 , which then became settlement and
conquest in the fifth century on the end of the empire. Insofar as the limited written
and archaeological evidence goes, it suggests that the Roman response to these threats
was consistently military and reactive (at any rate, no record has survived of any
attempt to resolve the problem by offensive, economic or diplomatic action 35 ).
30
Ibid, p. 186
31
Ibid, p. 195
32
Ibid, pp. 204-05
33
Ibid, pp. 197-99
34 John Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power (Thetford: Anglo-Saxon Books,1999) pp. 21-28.
35 It seems unlikely any such efforts would have succeeded. A local rise in North Sea levels in the third
and fourth Centuries AD must have generated considerable demographic and economic pressures
among the Saxons and Franks, increasing the economic pressure to raid while making more targets
available. See Haywood, Op. Cit Pp. 44-7.
6

Starting in the second century they fortified major centres of population 36 . They
established garrisons and watchtowers to provide warning and generate an immediate
local military response to any attacks, using regional reserves to respond to larger
scale incursions. This system was ultimately formalised as the ‘Saxon Shore’,
although the precise nature and date of its creation as an integrated system is a matter
of debate 37 38 . And until the late fourth century they maintained a dedicated fleet, the
Classis Britannica, with specialised naval units 39 to patrol and intercept where
possible. This was clearly a significant responsibility; command of the fleet was a
strong enough base to sustain Carausias’ usurpation of Britain and northern Gaul in
286. And a permanent military establishment on this scale must have been expensive.
For as long as Rome was able to sustain the costs, it could usually keep piratical
raiding within limits. But it could never provide the same security and stability to its
northern coasts as in the Mediterranean because it could neither control the territory
from where the raids originated nor provide sufficiently strong a defence to make the
risks and costs of raiding greater than the benefits.
Spain
Over a thousand years later, years from the early Sixteenth century to the early
Eighteenth century, Spain also faced substantial problems over what it viewed as
piracy. There were two main theatres, largely unrelated to each other. In the
Mediterranean there were the Barbary Corsairs of North Africa (based in Algiers,
Tunis and Tripoli in particular). In the Atlantic, the Caribbean and around the coasts
of South America, Spanish domination of the New World and its resources provided
fertile ground for attacks on Spanish shipping and settlements. In both cases the
situation was complicated by religious and political conflicts. In the Mediterranean
between Christianity and Islam, linked to the extended struggle with the Ottoman
empire through most of the Sixteenth century; and in the Americas between Protestant
36 Guy de la Bedoyere, Roman Towns in Britain ( London: Batsford, 1992) p. 73
37 The archaeology indicates considerable fort building on both sides of the Channel in the later third
century; the main literary evidence is the early fifth century Notitia Dignitatum. See Peter Salwey,
Roman Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), note pp, 320-21.
38 Other parts of Britain faced similar attacks from Scottish and Pictish pirates, Various fortification
were built down both eastern and western coasts. But the absence of epigraphical and literary evidence
means their purpose and organisation is conjectural.
39 Vegetius describes small warships in the Channel with sails, rigging and sailors’ uniforms
camouflaged to blend into the sea. Adrian Galsworthy, The Fall of the West (London: Wiedenfeld &
Nicolson, 2009) p 343.
7

and Catholic, linked to the national rivalries between the European states (particularly
Spain, France, England, and the Netherlands). In these circumstances the boundary
line between privateering and piracy was inevitably very blurred. But from the
perspective of this study, Spain viewed the vast majority of attacks as piracy, so how
it addressed the challenges it faced, and the success of the measures it took, are a valid
basis for examination.
For most of the Sixteenth century Spain sought to protect its people and
shipping in the Western Mediterranean from attacks by the Barbary Corsairs as part of
a wider strategy of resistance to Ottoman expansion. Primarily it sought to achieve
this by dominating the coast and ports from which they operated (Algiers, Oran,
Bougie, Tunis and Tripoli). It had very limited success. While at times it controlled a
number of the ports it was never, despite several attempts, including by Charles V in
person in 1541, able to take Algiers. This remained the stronghold of the Corsairs
from the time it came under the control of the Barbarossa brothers in 1516. In the
second half of the century Spain also lost control of Tripoli, Bougie and Tunis, and
despite diplomatic pressure was unable to prevent Morocco also coming under
informal Ottoman influence from the 1570s 40 . Nor was it able to stop the Corsairs
raiding the coasts and harassing Christian shipping. However, the Ottoman defeats at
Malta in 1565 and Lepanto in 1571 ended the Ottoman threat to the Western
Mediterranean, and both Ottoman and Spanish priorities shifted away from the
Mediterranean to Persia and the Netherlands respectively. This enabled the Barbary
states increasingly to go their own way from the 1580s 41 .
Thereafter there was continuing low level privateering from both sides 42 ,
including a substantial increase in Christian piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean 43
(including by the English, Dutch and Germans now beginning to penetrate the
Mediterranean). This was fuelled by a combination of growing trade 44 and the
availability of men no longer needed for the national fleets 45 . Venice suffered most,
40 Peter Pierson, Philip II of Span, (London: Thames & Hudson, 1975) p. 156
41
Ibid., pp. 156-58
42 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,
(translation of second Revised edition 1972/73, London: The Folio Society, 2000) Volume II p. 455
43
Ibid., Volume II p. 466
44
Ibid., Volume II p. 472
45
Ibid., Volume II p. 479
8

eing virtually driven out of the Levant shipping trade by about 1620 by expenses and
losses she could not sustain 46 . Algiers, Valetta and Livorno were the three main
centres and markets, but they were supplemented by a host of others, including
Naples and Palermo in the Spanish controlled Kingdom of Naples 47 . Spanish losses
never thereafter rose so high as to force the Spanish Government to take substantive
action beyond the occasional punitive expedition, thereafter leaving routine policing
efforts to the Knights of St John on Malta 48 . Essentially Spain decided to live with it,
and eventually the Barbary states evolved the more or less formalised system of
issuing safe-passes in return for payment that they then sustained until they lost their
independence in the nineteenth century 49 .
With the conquest of its American empire Spain also acquired a piracy
problem. Its shape and scale was closely linked to the state of its relations with
France, England and the Netherlands. All consistently refused to accept the claimed
monopoly of Spain and Portugal and sought their own share of the wealth of the New
World, directly or indirectly. The first recorded attack, by a French corsair, was in
1523, only two years after the conquest of Mexico 50 . Not until the 1730s, when the
other European powers had stopped supporting peacetime attacks 51 and following a
sustained British anti-piracy campaign (see below), could Spanish ships sail (at least
in peacetime) with no expectation of attack 52 . So how did Spain deal with the problem
over the two intervening centuries Throughout the period the Spanish government
had one overriding priority – the protection of the annual treasure shipments on which
its credit and solvency relied heavily. Protection of colonial settlements, trade and
shipping, and preservation of the Spanish monopoly of settlement were, however
important, always subordinate to that goal. Moreover, colonial affairs were secondary
to European priorities, and this heavily constrained the resources the Government was
46 See Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice 1580-1615, (English translation Oxford:
Longmans, 1967).
47 Braudel, Op. Cit, Volume II p. 459.
48 H.J.A. Sire, The Knights of Malta (London: Yale University Press, 1994) pp. 89-98.
49 See Sir Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415-1830,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957) especially Appendix J.
50 Kris Lane, Blood and Silver: A History of Piracy in the Caribbean and Central America (Oxford:
Signal Books,1999) p. 16.
51 J.H.Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Oxford: University of California Press, 1966) pp. 266-67.
52
Ibid., p. 195
9

prepared to invest in colonial protection. The net result was that from the beginning
Spain adopted a strategic approach of static defence in the Americas 53 .
There were several elements to this. Firstly, merchant shipping was required to
travel in convoys from the 1520s and by 1561 the regular bi-annual flota to and from
Spain was introduced 54 . Although commercially highly inefficient, this system served
the purpose of protecting the treasure fleet very effectively. There was only one
successful attack in 200 years, in 1628, on an unusually small fleet 55 . Merchant ships
were required to be armed (although this was frequently ignored) 56 . A few key ports
were defended 57 . Otherwise the colonists were largely left to fend for themselves.
What this meant in practice was the levying of taxes to pay for local naval forces,
militias and fortifications on the Altantic and, eventually also the Pacific coasts 58 ; the
abandonment of indefensible coastal settlements 59 (such as Panama after Henry
Morgan’s raid in 1671); and periodic punitive expeditions and exemplary reprisals 60 .
In practice given the enormous distances involved and the often low level and
unpredictable nature of raiding, only local measures were realistic. 61 In the
Seventeenth century this was supplemented by vigorous, if largely ineffective,
diplomatic protests in European capitals. The Spanish government inevitably found
itself having to provide further help during periods of sustained high levels of attacks
such as in the 1560s, during the war with Elizabethan England, and in the later
Seventeenth century at the height of the buccaneers’ attacks 62 . This usually consisted
of increased naval forces, garrisons and fortifications. But the cost was very high so
such efforts were not sustained when the conditions improved.
There was an alternative: to resolve the piracy problem at its source by
military action in Europe to deprive the pirates and privateers of the bases and
political support they needed. In practice, although not with that specific intent, Philip
53
Ibid., p. 19
54
Ibid., p.16. The flota was the authorised and escorted convoy between Spain and the Americas.
55
Ibid., p. 68.
56
Ibid., pp. 16, 22.
57 Lane, Op. Cit., p. 19.; Parry, Op. Cit., p. 254
58 Lane, Op. Cit., p. 18.
59
Ibid., p. 25
60
Ibid., pp. 64-65
61 Parry, Op. Cit., p. 253.
62
Ibid., pp. 256, 262
10

II tried to implement such a policy in the 1580s and 90s. Had the Spanish Armada (or
any of its successors) succeeded it is likely that England, and possibly the Netherlands
if the loss of English support also enabled the suppression of the Dutch revolt, would
at least for a time have ceased to support piracy and privateering in the Americas.
Similarly, in such circumstances Philip’s interventions in the French Wars of Religion
against Henry of Navarre would have stood a greater chance of success, potentially
aligning France with Spain at least for a time. In the event this proved beyond Spain’s
capacity, but it is likely that a Spanish victory in Europe would have had a significant
impact, at least for a time, on New World piracy.
How well did the system work Superficially it might seem to have failed,
since at no time did Spain ever manage to eradicate piracy from the Americas. But
while in an ideal world that would have been desirable, it was neither realistic, nor in
practice something the Spanish Government ever sought to achieve. Looked at
strategically, the system did what it was designed for. The treasure fleets were
protected. The colonies and colonial trade continued to develop and grow 63 , despite
periodic local disruption in the aftermath of specific attacks. Costs to the government,
while sometimes uncomfortably high, were lower than any other approach would
have achieved. In short, as with the Barbary Corsairs, in the absence of the ability to
solve the problem of piracy in the New World, Spain found a way to cope.
Britain
And now we come to Blackbeard, Captain Kidd and Calico Jack Rackham; to
buried treasure, pieces of eight and walking the plank; to Long John Silver, James
Hook, and Captain Pugwash 64 . In short, to the so-called ‘Golden Age of Piracy’ 65 ,
mainly in and around the Caribbean from about 1680 to 1720. Or rather, we come to
how England/Britain 66 ended it. There is a certain historical irony to the fact that this
task fell primarily to England, long known to itself and others, with some justification,
63 Lane, Op. Cit, pp 204-05.
64 There is a progression in the memorable pirates of children’s literature. Long John Silver (1883) is an
ambiguous anti-hero, James Hook (1911) a comic villain, Captain Pugwash (1950 onwards) merely
comic.
65 The title is indicative of the romanticisation of piracy at the time and since, in a way only comparable
to the later fabulisation of the Wild West.
66 The change in policy from supporting privateers in the sixteenth century to tolerating buccaneers in
the seventeenth to suppression of piracy in the eighteenth predated the 1707 Act of Union. For
convenience ‘Britain’ is used to cover both England and Britain.
11

as a ‘nation of pirates’ 67 , The scale of the challenge was considerable. As Peter Earle
puts it:
The extermination of pirates...posed a host of problems…These were
problems of diplomacy, law and public relations, manpower and resources,
intelligence, strategy and tactics and, perhaps above all, motivation and will.
Until states were absolutely determined to eradicate piracy and were prepared
to devote considerably increased numbers of ships and men to such a policy,
little would be achieved. And even with such determination, little could be
done without the right ships, the right men and the right methods to ensure that
at least some pirates would be caught. Men of the sea had to become
convinced that piracy was an unwise choice of occupation and that, if they
were so foolish as to follow it, they were more than likely to die, and die
violently and soon. What was needed was the creation of a state of maritime
and legal terror in which pirates knew that they were likely to be tracked down
and killed or captured and, if they were captured, they were likely to be tried
and found guilty and, if they were found guilty, they were likely to be
hanged. 68
How did Britain achieve this sea change As the quotation above suggests, it
required the combination of several different elements, social, legal, political and
military. Firstly, it was necessary for piracy to become socially unacceptable and
delegitimised as a business, to make it much more difficult for pirates to purchase the
supplies they needed and sell on the goods they stole. The economic development of
the West Indies and American colonies created an ever stronger planting and
merchant interest in the suppression of piracy, which increased the costs of doing
business 69 . Legislation was passed in the Colonies on the lines of the 1683 Jamaica
Act, making it illegal to do business with pirates (although it took some time before
this was widely observed). 70 Corrupt officials were removed 71 and those thought
67 Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (London: Methuen, 2004), p. 18; In 1584 in A Discourse Concerning
Western Planting, Richard Hakluyt, who ought to know, described the English as “most infamous for
our outrageous, common and daily piracies.“ Peter Gosse, The History of Piracy (New York: Dover,
1932, republished 2007), p. 104).
68 Earle, Op. Cit, pp. 56-57.
69 Lane, Op. Cit, pp. 171-72
70
Ibid., p. 173
71
Ibid., p. 122.
12

sympathetic to the old ways purged 72 . In 1700 Parliament passed a new Piracy Act
(the first since Henry VIII) expressly designed to make it much easier to capture, try,
convict and execute pirates. It imposed the same law across all the colonies;
established Vice-Admiralty courts in the colonies with powers to try pirates
(previously all piracy trials had to be held in London); provided that the trials should
be heard by panels of appointed commissioners (including naval officers with a prize
money interest) unlikely to be sympathetic to accused pirates, rather than more
sympathetic local juries; made the death sentence mandatory; changed trial procedure
to help the prosecution (including allowing for conviction on a simple majority
verdict); and increased the incentives for merchant crews to defend their ships if
attacked. Royal Navy captains were even given rights of summary justice, although
this was rarely exercised. The effect was to make it much easier and quicker both to
try and convict accused pirates, at some considerable cost to their civil rights 73 .
Captured pirates were thereafter tried rapidly. Between 400 and 600 were hanged
between 1716 and 1726, often in batches of a dozen or more as deliberate exemplary
punishment 74 . Many more suffered lesser punishments. This means that about 10% of
the estimated total of some 5,000 pirates operating during the ‘Golden Age’ 75 were
tried and executed – a high enough proportion to act as an effective deterrent, despite
the attractions of a pirate life. As Rediker puts it, with reference to Bartholomew
Roberts’ motto a merry life, and a short one: ‘The English ruling class was less than
keen about the merriment, but more than happy to oblige Roberts and his men in
making their lives short ones.’ 76 Overall, therefore, over the course of a generation or
so the combined effect of this consistent government activism and the growing
economic incentive to eradicate piracy, effectively both delegitimised piracy in the
eyes of local and national elites and deterred sailors from taking it up.
These changes would, however, have been ineffectual without parallel
increased commitment to their enforcement. In practice this meant equipping the
72 Dudley Pope, Harry Morgan’s Way (London: Secker & Warburg, 1977), pp. 328-31.
73 Joel Baer, Pirates of the British Isles (Stroud:Tempus, 2005) pp. 164-68. The parallels with modern
counter-terrorist legislation are instructive, including the original intent as time limited emergency
legislation fairly quickly made permanent.
74 Earle, Op. Cit, pp. 206-07.
75 Marcus Rediker, Hydrarchy and Libertalia: The Utopian Dimensions of Atlantic Piracy in the Early
Eighteenth Century, from Starkey, van Eyck van Heslinga and de Moor (ed), Pirates and Privateers,
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997) p. 37.
76
Idem.
13

Royal Navy to conduct effective anti-piracy operations sustained over several
decades. There were several elements to this. The nearly continuous wars with France
from 1688 to 1713 saw a massive increase in the size of the Royal Navy, with a
particular increase in the number of smaller, faster ships that were most useful for
commerce protection. This peaked in the early 1720s, with nine ships in the West
Indies, five off the coasts of America, two or three off Newfoundland in the fishing
season (to stop pirates recruiting fishermen to their crews), supplemented by locally
owned vessels hired or pressed into service 77 . At the same time crews were
increasingly fully manned, Captains required to careen their ships several times a year
(ensuring they remained fast enough to catch or head off pirate ships), and local repair
and provisioning allowed to extend time on station and thus local knowledge and
expertise 78 . (All this represented a significant cost to the Treasury). Moreover, ships
and goods recaptured from pirates were treated as prize, which gave Navy officers a
strong financial incentive to pursue pirates 79 . The government was, however, prepared
to be pragmatic. At times when naval action was less successful, it sometimes
resorted to the back up policy of offering a general pardon to all those who gave
themselves up 80 . In the context of increasing effectiveness of the Royal Navy and the
increasing penalties for those caught, this could be an effective tool to reduce the
number of active pirates.
The net impact of these measures sustained over time was the effective
elimination of piracy from American waters by 1730. The economic and social
benefits of this are hard to assess, but between 1700 and 1770 merchant crew sizes
fell by about a third, merchant ships no longer required to be armed, and trans-
Atlantic and American marine insurance rates dropped by up to 50% 81 . And, of
course, bar brief resurgences in the margins of the Napoleonic Wars and following the
liberation of the Spanish colonies in the Nineteenth Century, eventually suppressed by
the Royal and US Navies 82 , these waters have remained largely free of piracy to the
77 Earle, Op. Cit, pp. 136-37, 150-51, 185. This represented over 10% of the Royal Navy. By contrast
there were only 25 ships in pay in the Royal Navy in 1685. (Lane, Op. Cit, p. 184).
78
Ibid., pp. 187-88.
79 Robert Ritchie, Government Measures against Piracy and Privateering in the Atlantic Area, 1750-
1850, from Starkey, et al., Op. Cit, p. 12.
80 Earle, Op. Cit, pp. 189-90.
81 Gary Walton & James Shepherd, The economic rise of early America (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), pp. 120-21.
82 Earle, Op. Cit,pp. 235-47. It was the Cuban pirates of the 1820s who invented walking the plank.
14

present day. Achieving this was expensive (which was partly why Spain had never
seriously tried to do so previously). While there are no figures available, it is likely
that suppressing piracy in these years cost more than the damage the pirates would
otherwise have inflicted, suggesting that at core Britain was, at least in part, motivated
by ideological as well as economic motives.
American waters were not, of course, the only part of the world where Britain
faced what it perceived to be piracy, and sought to eliminate it. As its Empire
expanded in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, Britain was drawn into piracy
suppression across wider and wider bounds. Unlike the ‘Golden Age’ pirates, mostly
this involved individuals who were not British subjects operating from territories that
were not (at least at the time) British. Inevitably, therefore, the approach taken was
somewhat different. This activity can be broken down into three distinct areas, each
with its own distinct characteristics: North Africa (i.e. the Barbary Corsairs); the Gulf
and India; and the Far East (primarily China and South East Asia).
Like Spain, Britain had a long relationship with the Barbary Corsairs of North
Africa. Unlike Spain it never sought to do so by dominating the coast and ports.
Rather for several centuries Britain normally maintained treaty and tribute
relationship with the various Barbary States 83 . This was punctuated throughout the
Seventeenth century by periodic naval expeditions 84 , usually related to perceived
breaches, to renegotiation of the Treaties, or to the recovery of British subjects taken
prisoner by the corsairs 85 . This arrangement suited the British. In a somewhat
Machiavellian way, paying the corsairs off meant that they focused on the shipping of
other, weaker or poorer states, giving British commerce a comparative advantage 86 .
83 Fisher, Op. Cit, pp. 11-12.
84 1620 Algiers, 1637 the Sallee Rovers of Morocco, 1655 Tunis, 1677-83 Algiers, Thereafter relations
with most Barbary States remained good, although there were occasional attacks on the Sallee Rovers.
85 From 1530 and 1780 from a million to a million and a quarter European Christians were enslaved by
the Barbary corsairs. Giles Milton, White Gold (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 2005), p 304, citing
Robert C. Davies, Christian Slaves, Muslim Master: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary
Coast and Italy, 1500-1800.(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
86 Earle, Op. Cit, p. 73. This lasted till the nineteenth century. Viscount Exmouth, Commander of the
fleet that bombarded Algiers in 1816 to abolish the white slave trade (the price for European agreement
at the Congress of Vienna to abolition of the black slave trade), wrote that he feared this may have led
him into “an awkward situation” as the action he had taken might not be supported in England “the old
mercantile interest being against it” (Edward Osler, The Life of Admiral Viscount Exmouth, London:
Smith, Elder & Co, 1835, p. 303).
15

This was supplemented by an effective convoy system on vulnerable Atlantic and
Mediterranean routes 87 and, from the 1660s by a pass system guaranteeing the holders
against corsair attack 88 . The value was shown by the experience of the new United
States after 1783. When it ceased to be protected by the Royal Navy, the corsairs
started attacking its shipping (the first were in 1785) 89 . This led directly to the
foundation of the US Navy in 1794 90 , and war with Tripoli from 1801-06, to restore
arrangements similar to Britain’s 91 .
Britain initially took a similar approach in India, albeit modified as the East
India Company grew more powerful. In 1713 the Company agreed with Kanhoji
Angrey, the Maratha Grand Admiral who controlled the coast for several hundred
miles south of Bombay, a mutual non-aggression pact, backed up by armed ships and
convoys 92 . This arrangement rapidly broke down (largely because the Company
would not observe its terms) and following Angrey attacks on its shipping (which the
Company viewed as piracy) a Royal Navy squadron was posted to the Indian Ocean
in 1721, partly to deal with this 93 . The next thirty or so years saw a pattern of
occasional punitive raids in response to attacks on Company ships, interspersed by
periodic lulls. But by the 1750s the Company had established itself as the leading
military power in India, and in 1754-56 it solved the problem by attacking the main
Angrey ports, destroying their ships and capturing their strongholds 94 .
A roughly similar pattern, but with a different denouement, can be seen in the
approach to the Qasimi Arabs in the Gulf half a century later. A relatively small
87 Earle, Op. Cit, pp. 77-78.
88 Earle, Op. Cit, p. 79; Fisher, Op. Cit, pp. 326-27.
89 Ian Toll, Six Frigates (London: Michael Joseph, 2006) p. 25. US insurance rates for Mediterranean
voyages rose to 25% by the early 1790s (i.e. roughly one in four US ships were expected to be lost).
This is comparable to the loss rate that drove Venice out of the eastern Mediterranean carrying trade in
the early seventeenth century (see Tenenti, Op. Cit, p. 103).
90
Ibid., pp. 40-43. In response to a Senate resolution that “ a naval force adequate to the protection of
the commerce of the United States, against the Algerine corsairs, ought to be provided”, the Act to
Provide a Naval Armament established a six frigate navy.
91 The Bashaw of Tripoli reneged on his original treaty with the US in expectation that it would buy
him off again. The US would not accept this, hence the slogan “Millions for defense, but not one cent
for tribute”, and “the shores of Tripoli” in the US Marine Corps hymn.
92 John Keay, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company (London:
HarperCollins, 1991) p. 259.
93
Ibid., p. 262.
94
Ibid, pp. 264-70.
16

number of Qasimi attacks on British, or British protected shipping (27 in all) 95
generated a punitive response 96 . In 1809 a British naval attack on the Qawasim
stronghold of Ras al-Khaima and associated ports destroyed much of the Qasimi
shipping 97 . Despite British attempts to restrict Qasimi access to timber their maritime
activity began to pick up from 1812-14 98 , with a return to the plundering of ships
under the protection of the East India Company. The deployment of a further Royal
Navy force to the Gulf in response led the Qasimi to try to reopen negotiations.
However, the continuation of raiding led to the British destruction in 1819 of the
fortifications of Ras al-Khaima and other Qawasim ports, and of virtually all Qasimi
shipping 99 . But unlike in India the British did not then impose direct rule. Rather it
imposed a lower-cost alternative in the General Treaty of 1820, under which the Gulf
Sheikhdoms gave up piracy and engaged in free trade, policed by the Royal Navy 100 .
Finally, as the British expanded into South East Asia and China (in Singapore,
Sarawak and Hong Kong) they faced a further piracy challenge around the coasts of
Malaya, Borneo and South China. Piracy had always been endemic in these waters,
but appears to have peaked around the time of the British arrival 101 . It focused on the
native trade (European ships were by then too large and well defended to represent
attractive targets), and although the impact on trade is not clear, it was strong enough
for the Singapore merchant community to complain increasingly strongly to the
governor in the mid 1830s 102 . Ultimately the problem was resolved by periodic British
(and Dutch) expeditions to destroy pirate fleets and destroy pirate strongholds 103 , on
the basis, as set out by Rajah James Brooke of Sarawak, that: ‘when these
communities lose more than they gain by piracy….then, and only then, will they
95 Davies, Op. Cit, p. 134.
96 Ibid., pp. 180-88, 235-40, 242-51. Qasimi attacks arose from the combination of wider Saudi-
Wahhabi political conflict with Oman and a fall-off in trade requiring other income from the ships and
men no longer employed. This looked like piracy to the British.
97
Ibid., p. 190.
98
Ibid., p. 191.
99 Simultaneously an Egyptian army drove the Wahhabi Sauds out of the Hejaz, Mecca and Medina.
Together with British actions in the Gulf this confined the Saudis to their heartland in the Najd until the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century later enabled them to reassert their authority over what is
now Saudi Arabia.
100 Davies, Op. Cit, pp. 203-212.
101 J.L.Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas 1750-1850: Some Economic Implications, in Starkey et
al., Op Cit, p. 93.
102
Ibid, pp. 94-96.
103 Greatly helped by the development of European weapon and steam technology.
17

discontinue it’. 104 This evolved into control of the territory from where the pirates
operated, in Borneo through a series of campaigns from 1841-62 to enforce the
authority of the Rajah of Sarawak within progressively extended borders 105 , and in
Malaya through the policy of ‘paramountcy’ in 1874 106 . Since annexation of territory
was not an option in China, the British focused around Hong Kong on the destruction
of Chinese pirate fleets 107 and enforcing severe penalties on anyone in Hong Kong
found to have any dealings with pirates. 108 This did not eliminate the problem – that
could only be achieved through co-operation with the Chinese authorities, for whom
piracy was rarely a priority 109 – but it kept it within acceptable limits.
By the early eighteenth century Britain had more to gain than lose from
protecting a growing maritime trade increasingly dominated by its own shipping. The
parallel growth of the Royal Navy gave it the capacity to do so. But how it sought to
do so differed according to whether or not the threat came from within its own
jurisdiction. In suppressing American piracy it was able to make creative use of
British law, and did so ruthlessly. This was probably the most successful anti-piracy
programme in history. Achieving it required sustained determination, a
comprehensive approach comprising a range of complementary and mutually
reinforcing military and civil measures, and the investment of significant naval
resources.
In suppressing attacks on British and British-protected shipping elsewhere in
the world Britain tended to be highly pragmatic in its approach. Once it had
established that it had the capacity and will to use force to protect its interests, Britain
104
Ibid, p. 97, citing John C. Templer (ed.): The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke KCB, Rajah of
Sarawak, Narrating the Events of his Life from 1838 to the Present Time Vol II (London, 1853) p.110.
105 See Steven Runciman, The White Rajahs: A History of Sarawak from 1841 to 1946 (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 69-149.
106 J.L.Anderson, Op Cit, p 97.
107 Large fleets of up to several thousand junks were characteristic of Chinese piracy, but made them
particularly vulnerable to European warships by the middle of the nineteenth century.
108 J.L.Anderson, Op Cit, p 102.
109 The imperial Chinese government rarely attached much importance to trade, the sea, or those who
made their livings from them. Consequently at various times it tried out some exquisitely logical and
highly arbitrary way to suppress piracy. These included prohibition of all maritime activity and
depopulation of coastal provinces (if there were no trade, fishing or people there could be no pirates).
It is fair to say that these were not an unqualified success. It also co-opted one set of pirates to fight
another. Chinese merchants tended to pay protection and/or arm their ships; as early as the fourteenth
century Ibn Battutah commented on how heavily armed were Chinese trading junks. Tim Mackintosh
Smith (ed.), The Travels of Ibn Battutah (London: Picador 2003) pp. 223-24.
18

settled into a mutually beneficial treaty and subsidy relationship with the Barbary
states that worked well for over a century. In Asian waters Britain’s preference not to
take on administrative responsibilities meant that it preferred to deter attacks on
shipping through periodic use of overwhelming force against particular targets, such
as the Qasimi strongholds and Chinese pirate fleets, with no great sensitivity to local
sovereignty or law. But where this did not suit local conditions, as in Sarawak, or
where other interests also argued for taking direct control of the territory pirates
operated from, as in India and, eventually, Malaya, it was prepared to do so.
Technological advances helped. The development of steam power, steel, gunnery
improvements and communications networks as the nineteenth century progressed all
gave the Royal Navy an overwhelming advantage. But the scale of effort involved
should not be ignored. Between 1792 and 1848 the number of British warships on
foreign stations grew from 54 to 129 110 . This represented a global maritime Pax
Britannica comparable only to the Mediterranean Pax Romana. And at core it relied
on the same two principles: a predominance of naval force and denial of bases to
potential pirates and raiders.
Analysis
These three case studies are not a comprehensive overview. If space permitted
adequate source material exists to review a wide range of others 111 . But they are
varied enough in time and space to provide a reasonable baseline for preliminary
analysis. So what lessons can be drawn
• Trying to eliminate piracy is both expensive and time consuming. From
its first operations in 102BC to Augustus’ establishment of the Pax
Romana was not far short of a century. Clearing the pirates from the
Caribbean took several decades. Each required the commitment of
considerable resources and the long-term maintenance of substantial
naval forces thereafter. Spain’s unsuccessful efforts to clear the
Barbary coast lasted for about 80 years;
110 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery ( London: Macmillan, 3 rd edition, 1991)
pp. 201-02. In 1848 this comprised Mediterranean 31, East Indies and China 25, anti-Slavery patrols
27, the Cape 10, the West Indies 10, South America 14, and the Pacific 12.
111 Such as the pre and post-Roman Mediterranean (Classical and Hellenistic Greece, Byzantium, and
Venice); the far east (China and Japan); and Northern Europe (the British Isles, North Sea and Baltic),
19

• In every successful instance, the forces required were massively
disproportionate to the pirates’ strength. Spain was never able to mount
such an overwhelming force;
• Success required depriving the pirates of operating bases, either by dint
of physical occupation (such as in India) or by dissuading the local
community from providing the faculties they needed to operate
successfully (such as in the Gulf). Where this was not possible (as with
Rome in the North Sea or Spain in the Americas or the Mediterranean)
the best that could be achieved was palliative local defence;
• Clearing the seas of pirates was not always necessary to States to
achieve their strategic goals. In the case of the Barbary states Britain
found bribery much cheaper and more effective over time, when
backed up with a credible – and demonstrated – threat of punitive
force. A variation on this was to regulate or reduce the problem to
manageable levels by use of pardons – a tactic used by the Romans,
Chinese and British with some success over the centuries – which
amounted to buying successful pirates out of the business;
• Only very rarely did piracy get so bad as to have strategic
consequences (such as interrupting the Roman grain supply, or forcing
Venice out of the Mediterranean carrying trade); Mostly it remained at
the level of an irritant or embarrassment (although where those most
affected had political weight, as with the British pirates in the
Caribbean, or the costs of action were relatively low, as in the Gulf,
that could be enough to produce an effective reaction);
• Where piracy need not or could not be eliminated, measures could be
taken to reduce its impact, Spain’s use of convoys to protect the annual
treasure fleets were strikingly successful over a very prolonged period.
Arming of merchant ships was also widely adopted. Both of course
increased the costs of trade. Technological advantage (as in the far east
in the second half of the nineteenth century) was also a benefit;
• The use of law as an anti-piracy tool carries with it additional
requirements to be effective, in particular the need for local,
empowered courts able to hear and resolve cases expeditiously and
20

with a minimum of due process. The penalties also need to be heavy
enough to be seen as a significant deterrent;
• Resettlement of pirates, and the local communities they relied on for
support, could be effective an effective tool. Both the Romans and
Chinese made some use of this.
At core, these issues can all be reduced down to finding ways to make the risks and
costs of piracy greater than benefits. And it is this essentially business-like nature of
piracy that explains the otherwise counter-intuitive correlation between high levels of
piracy and of economic growth. There is evidence of this in the Mediterranean in both
the Classical and Hellenistic periods 112 and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 113 ,
in the Spanish Americas in the sixteenth century 114 and in the British Americas from
the end of the seventeenth century 115 .
Lessons for today
The main piracy challenge today is from Somalia. Since 2004 the number of
ships attacked off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has risen steadily 116 to the point
where it threatens to disrupt international trade. The absence of any functioning
government over most of the country, a long coastline with plenty of fast small boats
available, and the presence of poor, armed and desperate men used to fighting and
with little to lose, all in close proximity to a major international trade route, has
created an environment well suited to piracy. In short, the relative risks of piracy are
low. And the pay-off for success is high – the ransom for a cargo ship and its crew
can run into millions of dollars 117 . The pirates have been successfully increasing the
range and sophistication of their attacks. In response maritime task forces from the
EU, the US, and ships from other states including Russia, China, India and Japan, are
now or have been engaged in anti-piracy operations under mandates from the UN
Security Council, and escorting World Food Programme ships carrying relief supplies
into Mogadishu. Kenya has agreed to try alleged pirates in its courts, and some
consideration has been given to handling the complexities of the current international
112 de Souza, Op. Cit, pp. 197-99
113 Fernand Braudel, Op. Cit, pp 470-76, citing Sir Godfrey Fisher, Op. Cit
114 J.H.Parry,, Op. Cit, p. 247-48
115 Julian Hoppitt, A Land of Liberty England 1689-1729 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp.
318-20
116 Roger Middleton, Chatham House briefing paper, Piracy in Somalia, October 2008, p. 3
117
Ibid., p. 5
21

legal regime in this regard 118 . There has been a substantial amount of diplomatic
activity, focused in particular on efforts to restore a functioning government, and a
number of groups have recommended various courses of action 119 . It is, however, fair
to say that the net effect has so far been limited.
What do the lessons from history tell us about the options to address Somali
piracy today Some of the means used in the past are not viable today. Depopulation
of the coastal provinces would be neither practicable, nor legal, nor moral. It seems
unlikely that the UN Security Council would authorise punitive bombardment of the
main ports and the destruction of their shipping, leaving aside issues of legality (it
would be impossible to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty). Moreover,
history suggests that in the absence of a political deal that stabilises Somali politics,
this would not solve the problem, but simply suspend it for the time it took to replace
the boats – and given the size of ransoms being paid there would be plenty of money
for this. While there is a regional legal process by which pirates can be tried and
convicted, it is neither comprehensive nor rapid enough to represent a credible
deterrent. In short, in the absence of the restoration of a functioning government
capable and willing to enforce the rule of law in Puntland and Southern Somalia (such
a Government already exists in Somaliland, where there is no piracy problem) 120 , it is
not going to be possible to eliminate the problem. Unless the international community
is prepared to sanction imposition of international control, and a powerful enough
nation (which in practice almost certainly means the US with wider support) is willing
to implement this, and again neither seems credible at present, this means the
domestic restoration of civil order in Somalia. Put another way, it means a lasting end
to the Somali civil war, through military victory or a viable political settlement. This
does not look an imminent prospect.
If this logic is accurate, then it seems very unlikely that the international
community will in practice take the measures necessary to eliminate piracy unless the
costs of living with it become considerably higher than they are at present. This
118 Roger Middleton, Chatham House Briefing Note, Pirates and How to Deal With Them, April 2009.
119 Recent reports include the UN-convened International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somalia
Coast, Chatham House, and the US Naval War College (see bibliography).
120 President Dahir Rayale Kahn of Somaliland, Somaliland’s Role in the Stability of the Horn of Africa
(Chatham House Transcript ,March 2009), pp. 6-7
22

seems a long way off. As a proportion of the 16,000 ships passing through the Gulf of
Aden every year 121 , the current level of 100 or so attacks a year (not all of which
succeed) does not seem an unacceptable risk. That maritime insurance rates, while
increasing, remain well below the levels which States have found unbearable in the
past 122 suggests that the shipping community agrees. Only the event of a 9-11 style
event directly linked to Somali piracy or instability would seem to have the potential
to change the equation to make the costs of direct intervention in Somalia less than
the perceived disadvantages.
That being so, it would seem sensible to consider whether there are other ways
to help shift the cost-benefit balance away from attacks on shipping until or unless
other efforts to bring stability and government to Somalia bear fruit. One might be the
Barbary State approach of buying them off (possibly in the guise of development
assistance and/or payments for licences). Another could be improving the capacity of
merchant shipping to resist attacks. This could be done directly by improving their
self-defence capability (which would require bigger crews with the right equipment
and training). It could be done indirectly by providing military protection (the classic
means for doing so being convoys, which for 40 or so ships a day should not be
beyond the bounds of possibility). A purely pragmatic approach would suggest the
adoption of whichever variation is likely to be most effective at least cost. Whatever
course of action is taken, all past examples of piracy suggest that now it is firmly
established in the local environment its elimination will be a process that takes
decades. We should therefore expect to be dealing with this problem for some time to
come.
121 Roger Middleton, Op. Cit, p. 3
122 International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast Piracy off the Somali Coast: Final
Report (Workshop commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to
Somalia: Nairobi, November 2008) p.30
23

Bibliography
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of 1684 (New York: Cosimo, 2007)
Johnson, Captain Charles [Daniel Defoe]. A General History of the Robberies and
Murders of the Most Notorious Pirates 1724/28 (London: Conway Maritime Press,
2002)
Mackintosh Smith, Tim (ed.), The Travels of Ibn Battutah (London: Picador 2003)
General
Gosse, Peter, The History of Piracy (New York: Dover, 1932, republished 2007)
Konstam, Angus, Piracy: The Complete History (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008)
Rome
de la Bedoyere, Guy, Roman Towns in Britain (London: Batsford, 1992)
Galsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of the West (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 2009)
Haywood, John, Dark Age Naval Power (Thetford: Anglo-Saxon Books, 1999)
Lazenby¸ J.F., The First Punic War, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996)
Ormerod, Henry, Piracy in the Ancient World, (London: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1997 reprint of 1924 original)
Rauh, Nicholas, Merchants, Sailors and Pirates in the Roman World (Stroud:
Tempus, 2003)
Salwey, Peter, Roman Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981),
de Souza, Philip, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999),
Byzantium
Bartusis, Mark C., The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992)
Birkenmeier, John W., The Development of the Komnenian Army 1081-1180 (Leiden:
Brill, 2002)
Haldon, John, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204 (London:
UCL Press, 1999)
Lock, Peter, The Franks in the Aegean 1204-1500 (London: Longman, 1995)
Magdalino, Paul, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos 1143-1180 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993)
Norwich, John Julius, Byzantium: The Apogee (London: Viking, 1991)
Treadgold, Warren, The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1988)
Spain and the Mediterranean
Bradford, Ernle, The Sultan’s Admiral: Barbarossa – Pirate and Empire-Builder
(London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2009)
Braudel, Fernand, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of
Philip II, (translation of second Revised edition 1972/73, London: The Folio Society,
2000)
Capponi, Niccolo, Victory of the West, (London: Macmillan, 2006)
Crowley, Roger, Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean 1521-
1580 (London: Faber & Faber, 2008)
24

Guilmartin, John F. Jr, Galleons and Galleys (London: Cassell & Co, 2002)
Pierson, Peter, Philip II of Span, (London: Thames & Hudson, 1975)
Sire, H.J.A., The Knights of Malta (London: Yale University Press, 1994)
Tenenti, Alberto, Piracy and the Decline of Venice 1580-1615, (English translation
Oxford: Longmans, 1967)
Usherwood, Stephen, The Great Enterprise (London: The Folio Society, 1978)
Spain and the New World
Lane, Kris, Blood and Silver: A History of Piracy in the Caribbean and Central
America (Oxford: Signal Books, 1999)
Parry, J.H., The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Oxford: University of California Press,
1966)
Britain and The Barbary Corsairs
Fisher, Sir Godfrey, Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415-
1830, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957)
Milton, Giles, White Gold (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 2005)
Osler, Dr. Edward, The Life of Admiral Viscount Exmouth, (London: Smith, Elder &
Co, 1835)
Toll, Ian, Six Frigates (London: Michael Joseph, 2006)
Walton, Gary & Shepherd, James, The economic rise of early America (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979)
Britain and the ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy
Baer, Joel, Pirates of the British Isles (Stroud:Tempus, 2005)
Bradlee, Francis B.C., Piracy in the West Indies and its Suppression (Glorieta: The
Rio Grande Press Inc, 1923)
Bromley, J.S., Corsairs and Navies 1660-1760 (London: The Hambledon Press,
1987)
Earle, Peter, The Pirate Wars (London: Methuen, 2004)
Hoppitt, Julian, A Land of Liberty England 1689-1729 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000)
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 3 rd
edition, 1991)
Padfield, Peter, Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind (London:
John Murray, 1999)
Pope, Dudley, Harry Morgan’s Way (London: Secker & Warburg, 1977)
Rediker, Markus, Hydrarchy and Libertalia: The Utopian Dimensions of Atlantic
Piracy in the Early Eighteenth Century, from Starkey, van Eyck van Heslinga and de
Moor (ed), Pirates and Privateers, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997)
Rediker, Markus, Villains of all Nations (London: Verso Books, 2004)
Ritchie, Robert, Government Measures against Piracy and Privateering in the
Atlantic Area, 1750-1850, from Starkey, van Eyck van Heslinga and de Moor (ed),
Pirates and Privateers, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997)
Rodger, N.A.M., The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660-1649
(London: HarperCollins, 1997)
Rodger, N.A.M., The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815
(London: Allen Lane, 2004)
25

The Gulf
al-Qasimi, Sultan Mohammad, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf (London:
Routledge, 1986)
Belgrave, Sir Charles, The Pirate Coast, (London: G Bell & Sons Ltd, 1966)
Davies, Charles E., The Blood-Red Arab Flag: An investigation into Qasimi Piracy
1797-1820 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997)
India and South East Asia
Anderson, J.L., Piracy in the Eastern Seas 1750-1850: Some Economic Implications,
from Starkey, van Eyck van Heslinga and de Moor (ed), Pirates and Privateers,
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997)
Course, Captain A.G., Pirates of the Eastern Seas (London: Cox & Wyman, 1966)
Grey, Charles, Pirates of the Eastern Seas (London: Sampson Low Marston & Co,
1933)
Keay, John, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company
(London: HarperCollins, 1991)
Runciman, Steven The White Rajahs: A History of Sarawak from 1841 to 1946
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960)
Young, Adam, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in South East Asia, (Singapore:
Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2007)
China
Antony, Robert, Like Froth Floating on the Sea, (Berkeley: University of California,
2003)
Clements, Jonathan, Coxinga and the Fall of the Ming Dynasty (Stroud: Sutton
Publishing, 2004)
Gernet, Jacques, (translated by J.R. Foster and Charles Hartman 1996) A History of
Chinese Civlisation (London: The Folio Society, 2002)
Murray, Dian, Living and Working Conditions in Chinese Pirate Communities, 1750-
1850, from Starkey, van Eyck van Heslinga and de Moor (ed), Pirates and Privateers,
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997)
Shapinsky, Peter D., Japanese Pirates and Sea Tenure in the Sixteenth Century Seto
Inland Sea: A Case Study of the Murakami kaizoku (The History Cooperative
conference proceedings: Seascapes, Littoral Cultures, and Trans-Oceanic Exchanges
2003 http://www.historycooperative.org/proceedings/seascapes/shapinsky.html,
downloaded 4 June 2009)
So, Kwan-wai, Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the 16 th Century (Michigan
State University Press, 1975)
Turnbull, Stephen, Pirates of the Far East 811-1639 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2007)
Modern Piracy
Burnett, John S., Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas
(London: Plume, 2003)
House of Commons Transport Committee, Piracy: Eighth Report of Session 2005-06,
HC1026, The Stationery Office Limited London 2006
House of Commons Transport Committee, Piracy: Government Response to the
Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, HC1690, The Stationery Office
Limited London 2006
26

International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, Piracy off the Somali
Coast: Final Report (Workshop commissioned by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the UN to Somalia: Nairobi, November 2008)
Kahn, President Dahir Rayale, Somaliland’s Role in the Stability of the Horn of Africa
(Chatham House Transcript, March 2009)
Kraska, James, Countering Maritime Piracy: The Report on the US Naval War
College Workshop on Somali Piracy (International Law Department, US Naval War
College, April 2009)
Kraska, James and Wilson, Brian, The Co-operative Strategy and the Pirates of the
Gulf of Aden (The RUSI Journal, April 2009)
Middleton, Roger, Chatham House briefing paper, Piracy in Somalia, October 2008
Middleton, Roger, Chatham House Briefing Note, Pirates and How to Deal With
Them, April 2009
Murphy, Martin N., Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism (IISS Adelphi
Paper 388, July 2007)
Ong-Webb, Graham Gerard (ed), Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the
Malacca Straits (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006)
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, December 1982)
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm
Villar, Roger, Piracy Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea since 1980 (London:
Conway Maritime Press, 1985)
Young, Gavin, Slow Boats to China (London: Penguin, 1981)
Fiction
Barrie, J.M., Peter Pan and Wendy (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911)
Fraser, George MacDonald, The Pyrates (London: William Collins & Son, 1983)
Larsson, Björn, Long John Silver (London: The Harvill Press, 1999)
Stevenson, Robert Louis, Treasure Island (Norwalk: The Easton Press, 1994)
27