Defining and Assessing Safety Culture in High Reliability Systems
Defining and Assessing Safety Culture in High Reliability Systems
Defining and Assessing Safety Culture in High Reliability Systems
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Anderson, N., & West, M. A. (1996). The team climate <strong>in</strong>ventory: Development of the TCI<br />
<strong>and</strong> its applications <strong>in</strong> teambuild<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>in</strong>novativeness. European Journal of Work &<br />
Organizational Psychology, 5(1), 53-66.<br />
The Team Climate Inventory (TCI) describes the development <strong>and</strong> application of a facet-specific<br />
measure of group processes <strong>and</strong> climate for <strong>in</strong>novation. TCI is a 44-item scale, composed of 15<br />
subscales, <strong>and</strong> five superord<strong>in</strong>ate scales:<br />
(1) Participative safety,<br />
(2) Support for <strong>in</strong>novation,<br />
(3) Vision,<br />
(4) Task orientation, <strong>and</strong><br />
(5) Social desirability.<br />
All scales <strong>and</strong> subscales revealed acceptable reliability <strong>and</strong> were shown to predict subsequent<br />
levels of team <strong>in</strong>novation. Two case studies of the use of the TCI with senior management teams<br />
<strong>in</strong> the UK are described to illustrate the use of the measure as a tool for teambuild<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
period of organizational change.<br />
Bailey, L. L., Peterson, L. M., Williams, K. W., & Thompson, R. C. (2000). Controlled<br />
flight <strong>in</strong>to terra<strong>in</strong>: A study of pilot perspectives <strong>in</strong> Alaska (DOT/FAA/AM-00/28).<br />
Based on the “Swiss Cheese” Model of Accident Causation <strong>and</strong> the Human Factors Analysis <strong>and</strong><br />
Classification System (HFACS), a 103-item questionnaire was developed cover<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
doma<strong>in</strong>s:<br />
(1) Organizational <strong>in</strong>fluences,<br />
(2) Unsafe supervision,<br />
(3) Preconditions for unsafe pilot acts, <strong>and</strong><br />
(4) Unsafe pilot acts.<br />
This questionnaire was used to identify pilot <strong>and</strong> organizational risk factors for a Controlled<br />
Flight Into Terra<strong>in</strong> (CFIT) accident <strong>in</strong> Alaska. The survey successfully dist<strong>in</strong>guished the<br />
perceptions of pilots of not-CFIT <strong>and</strong> CFIT companies <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g areas: organizational<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluences, preconditions for unsafe acts, <strong>and</strong> unsafe supervision. The survey revealed that pilots<br />
who worked for companies who had a CFIT accident rated their company’s safety climate <strong>and</strong><br />
practices significantly lower than pilots who worked for CFIT-free companies. Based on the<br />
results, several recommendations were developed to reduce the number of CFIT accidents <strong>in</strong><br />
Alaska, which <strong>in</strong>clude: <strong>in</strong>crease pilot awareness of CFIT safety-related issues, improve company<br />
safety culture, improve pilot tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the environment <strong>in</strong> which they commonly fly, improve<br />
weather brief<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ate pressure to complete a flight.<br />
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