McTaggart, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic

12/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
of the Logic. In this, speaking of that finite activity of thought which he
calls Vorstellung, Hegel says that it has the contradictions as part of its
content, but is not conscious of this, because it does not contain “das
Uebergehen, welches das Wesentliche ist, und den Wilderspruch
enthält.” 6 Now all that this implies seems to be that the contradictions
first become manifest in the movement, which is not at all identical with
the assertion that they are caused by it, and is quite compatible with the
counter-assertion that it is caused by them.
Moreover, Hartmann also gives the same account of the origin of
the contradictions which I have suggested above. He says “Der (im
Hegel’schen Geiste) tiefer liegende Grund der Erscheihung ist abet
die Flüssigkeit des Begriffes selbsts.” 7 Flüssigkeit is certainly not equivalent
to movement, and may fairly be translated instability. There is then
no inconsistency. It is quite possible that the instability of the notion
may be the cause of the contradictions, and that the contradictions again
may be the cause of the actual motion. Hartmann does not, apparently,
see that there is any change in his position when he gives first instability
and then motion as the cause of the contradictions, and it is this confusion
on his own part which causes him to accuse Hegel of inconsistency.
He endeavours to account for Hegel’s supposed error by saying that
the contradictions were given as the cause of the dialectic movement
when Hegel desired to show the subjective action of the individual mind,
while the dialectic movement was given as the cause of the contradictions
when he wished to represent the process as objective. If, as I have
endeavoured to show, there is no reason for supposing that Hegel ever
did hold the dialectic movement to be the cause of the contradictions,
there will be no further necessity for this theory. But it may be well to
remark that it involves a false conception of the meaning in which it is
possible to apply the term objective to the dialectic at all.
6. There is a sense of the word objective in which it may be correctly
said that the dependence of the contradictions on the instability of
the notion is more objective than the dependence of the dialectic movement
on the contradictions. For the former is present in all thought,
which is not the case with the latter. A contradiction can be said to be
present in thought, when it is implied in it, even though it is not clearly
seen. But it can only cause the dialectic movement, when it is clearly
seen. Whenever a finite category is used it is abstract, and consequently
unstable, and, implicitly at least, involves its contrary, though this may
not be perceived, and, indeed, in ordinary thought is not perceived. On