McTaggart, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic

18/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
in this manner. It might, he admits, be possible to do so, if the Notion
were changed by us, but it is represented as changing itself. The human
thinker is thus only “the fifth wheel to the cart,” and quite unable to
arrest a process which is entirely independent of him.
Now in one sense of the words it is perfectly true, that, if the Notion
changes at all, the change is caused by its own nature, and not by us. If
the arguments of the dialectic are true, they must appeal with irresistible
force to every one who looks into the question with sufficient ability and
attention, and thus the process may be said to be due to the Notion, and
not to the thinker. But this is no more than may be said of every argument.
If it is valid, it is not in the power of any man who has examined
it, to deny its validity. But when there is no logical alternative there may
be a psychological one. No intelligent man, who carefully examines the
proofs, can doubt that the earth goes round the sun. But any person who
will not examine them, or cannot understand them, may remain convinced
all his life that the sun goes round the earth. And any one, however
clearly he understands the truth, can, by diverting his attention
from comparatively remote astronomical arguments, and fixing it on the
familiar and daily appearances, speak of and picture the movement as
that of the sun, as most men, I suppose, generally do.
So with the dialectic. The arguments are, if Hegel is right, such as
to leave the man who examines them no option. But for those who have
no time, inclination, or ability to examine them, the categories will continue
to be quite separate and independent, while the contradictions which
this view will produce in experience will either be treated as ultimate,
or, more probably, will not be noticed at all. And even for the student of
philosophy, the arguments remain so comparatively abstruse and unfamiliar
that he finds no difficulty, when practical life requires it, in assuming
for a time the point of view of the Understanding, and regarding
each category as unchanging and self-supporting. This he does merely
by diverting his attention from the arguments by which their instability
is proved.
Although therefore the change in the Notion is due to its nature, it
does not follow that it cannot be stopped by peculiarities in the nature of
the thinker, or by his arbitrary choice. The positive element in the change
lies wholly in the Notion, but that it should take place at all in any
particular case requires certain conditions in the individual mind in question,
and by changing these conditions we can at will arrest the process
of the categories, and use any one of them as fixed and unchanging.