Disincentivising overbidding for toll road concessions
Disincentivising overbidding for toll road concessions
Disincentivising overbidding for toll road concessions
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DISINCENTIVISING OVERBIDDING FOR TOLL ROAD CONCESSIONS<br />
Figure 5.1 Potential causes of <strong>overbidding</strong><br />
Renegotiation<br />
Winner’s curse<br />
Optimism bias<br />
Technical error<br />
Strategic<br />
misrepresentation<br />
by private sector<br />
Scarce resource<br />
Strategic<br />
misrepresentation<br />
by public sector<br />
Overbidding<br />
Bid consortia<br />
structures<br />
Source: Oxera analysis.<br />
Targeting these causes may not necessarily result in accurate <strong>toll</strong> <strong>road</strong> traffic and revenue projections. Indeed,<br />
limitations in the predictive capability of state-of-the-practice <strong>for</strong>ecasting—especially <strong>for</strong> greenfield projects—suggest<br />
that errors will not be eliminated entirely. Consequently, <strong>for</strong>ecasting realism (rather than accuracy) should be the<br />
policy goal, with the elimination of clearly biased bid submissions as the core objective.<br />
At the very least, the public sector should look to introduce measures which ensure that the downside to providing<br />
unrealistic <strong>for</strong>ecasts is comparable to the large upside <strong>for</strong> providing high numbers.<br />
Equally, an over-emphasis on <strong>for</strong>ecasting accuracy may not be particularly desirable from a concession grantor’s<br />
perspective. There may be some strategic reasons <strong>for</strong> <strong>overbidding</strong> that the state can benefit from, which should<br />
not necessarily be discouraged as they represent normal commercial and competitive business practices (eg,<br />
undertaking an investment project to stimulate further work opportunities).<br />
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