Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

Senior Leader Perspective
Effects Felt Around the World:
The Growing Complexities of the Interaction
Between Geographic and Functional
Combatant Commanders
Brig Gen Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, USAF
Commander, 57 th Wing
Nellis AFB, Nevada
Lt Col Baron V. Greenhouse, USAF
Chief, Special Technical Operations
613 th Air and Space Operations Center
Hickam AFB, Hawaii
Lt Col Kurt M. Schendzielos, USAF
Director, Commander’s Action Group, 13 th Air Force
Hickam AFB, Hawaii
The geographic combatant commander (GCC) in US Pacific
Command (USPACOM), like other GCCs, faces a
variety of challenges. The Pacific Theater is immense, encompassing
nearly half of the Earth’s surface divided by 13 time
zones. The boundaries extend to both poles, involve over half
the world’s population and are the locale of over 40 percent
of the world’s gross domestic product. The actors within the
designated area of responsibility (AOR) range from fledgling
democracies to entrenched dictatorships, constitutional monarchies
to theocratic republics, altruistic non-government organizations
to state-sponsored violent extremist organizations.
Potential adversaries range from near-peer/peer competitors to
techno-peasants, from the financially sound to the economically
destitute. The terrain is challenging, including glaciers, caveridden
mountains, expansive deserts, triple-canopy jungle, and
open oceans spanning thousands of square miles.
These challenges complicate the way in which USPACOM
operates, whether it is providing active deterrence to potential
conflagrations; maintaining a stable presence to provide trust
and confidence in allies and coalition partners; or responding
to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, in preparation
of, during, and recovering from natural disasters or unforeseen
events.
As little as two decades ago, we relied primarily on airborne,
maritime, and terrestrial capabilities to provide the lion’s share
of information and support structure to expeditionary activities.
The US gained a greater appreciation of the value of space
capabilities and services during Operation Desert Storm, and
more recently is gaining the same appreciation concerning cyberspace.
These services and capabilities provide significant
advantages in most of the challenge areas that combatant commands
(COCOM) face.
In Schriever Wargame 2010 (SW 10), we were afforded a
valuable opportunity to represent the theater perspective in the
role of the GCC with a joint team comprised of USPACOM,
Pacific Air Forces, and Thirteenth Air Force representatives
with the wargame’s charter to:
• Investigate space and cyberspace alternative concepts,
capabilities, and force postures for future requirements;
• Consider space and cyberspace contributions to deterrent
strategies; and
• Explore a whole of nations approach to planning in order
to protect and execute space and cyberspace operations.
To put that in context, the space and cyberspace community
requested Pacific-warfighters provide theater-specific, joint
and operational perspectives to an Air Force Space Command
sponsored wargame focused on using current technological,
cultural, economic, and political trends to inform future strategic/operational
planning and programming decisions championed
by organizations responsible for space/cyber capabilities
and services.
Conducting and synchronizing missions across the Pacific
necessitates a heavy reliance upon space and cyberspace enablers.
American combat forces are accustomed to space and
cyber enablers ‘being there,’ and often take for granted the myriad
of space and cyberspace capabilities that are relied upon
on a regular basis. For many years, US space and cyberspace
capabilities enjoyed a seemingly unassailable sanctuary—so
much so, that few of our follow-on capabilities were built to
withstand the array of non-kinetic weapons that are emerging
and proliferating throughout the world. Based on a perceived
minimal threat, our acquisition process consistently accepted
risk decisions trading protection for increased capability—
American combat forces are accustomed to space and cyber enablers ‘being there,’ and
often take for granted the myriad of space and cyberspace capabilities that are relied upon
on a regular basis.
High Frontier 30