Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

Book Review
National Security Space Strategy Considerations
National Security Space Strategy Considerations. By Robert E.
“Rick” Larned, Cathy W. Swan, and Peter A. Swan. Raleigh, North
Carolina: Lulu.com, 2010. Graphics. Appendices. Bibliography.
Pp. viii, 100. $9.95 Paperback ISBN: 978-0-557-31774-5
Looking backward more than half a century, US space strategy
has been based on two fundamental, guiding principles set forth
by President Dwight Eisenhower. “Freedom of space” and “space for
peaceful purposes” remain the foundational goals for US space strategy
generally and US national security space (NSS) strategy specifically,
even though civil and military leaders perhaps have neglected to enunciate
adequately the details of either one. Now, three retired Air Force
officers—Brig Gen Rick Larned, Col Cathy Swan, and Lt Col Peter
Swan—insist the country needs a forward-looking, clear, comprehensive,
and stronger NSS strategy, one that considers in equal measure
all three parts of a space system’s lifetime—acquisition, operation, and
sustainment. The nation needs a new strategy, they argue in National
Security Space Strategy Considerations, because today’s leaders face
far different, less predictable challenges compared to what their predecessors
confronted in the mid-twentieth century, and because NSS
strategy has not kept pace with increasing demand for, dependence on,
and threats to NSS operations.
Larned and the Swans structure their monograph around a conceptual
approach that, depicted linearly, begins with mission, which
is driven or informed by policy and doctrine and is related directly to
a perceived threat. They contend that policy should be more explicit,
and doctrine needs a fresh look. The threat, which “is getting more
real every day,” demands an answer to the question of whether to move
defensive or offensive weapons into space. How a mission will be accomplished
is embodied in a concept of operations (CONOPS), which
the authors describe as the backbone of any strategy.
Once a CONOPS is established, supporting units must organize and
train for the mission. The authors outline certain organizing principles
that have withstood the test of time and measures of effectiveness
that “provide constructive, definitive indicators of performance” for
acquisition, operations, and sustainment organizations, respectively.
“Because organizational changes are relatively easy to make,” they
observe, “they are an attractive option for giving the appearance of
‘progress’ or ‘improvement’” (p. 37). Although they believe now is
the time to consider whether the United
States is organized properly for a real
space war, the authors caution that “no
organization is so imperfect that good
people can’t make it work.” Training
makes the difference between success
and failure, and the treatise defines several
areas where space training needs
more attention.
The conceptual model in National
Security Space Strategy Considerations
leads one from organization and
training into three supporting strategies
or elements of a new NSS strategy,
each with its own catch phrase. First,
“lead better, follow well, buy smart”
with respect to acquisition. To explain
the meaning of this phrase, the authors
cite six successful leaders—Col Lee Battle, defense secretary David
Packard, deputy NRO director Dr. Robert Naka, undersecretary of defense
Dr. Paul Kaminiski, and Maj Gen Tom Taverney and Col Jim
Rendleman—whose recommendations for improving acquisition are
historically consistent. Second, “protect and serve” in the operational
realm. Determining the best mix of space, air, and surface capabilities
to support a particular mission should start with focusing on the
mission; focusing on mission durability instead of constellation durability—knowing
when not to turn to space forces—can save money
and improve operational effectiveness. Third, “strengthen for the future”
regarding sustainment. Together, these elements can infuse NSS
strategy with vitality and robustness. This involves recognizing certain
‘inescapable aspects” of today’s space forces in order to maximize the
residual value of existing constellations while preparing for an efficient
transition to next-generation systems. An effective NSS strategy
depends on carefully identifying US government needs and deriving
industry opportunities from those needs; balancing needs and opportunities
can create an “effective partnership for progress.” Ultimately, a
successful strategy depends on its implementation being an “extended,
continuing process” focused on staying relevant as operational demands
change.
In reaching the “bottom line” of their short study, Larned and the
Swans summarize “nine red herrings” or falsehoods they think have inhibited
development of an improved NSS strategy. Undoubtedly, these
purported untruths include points that might raise the hackles of some
civilian and military NSS experts: (1) we have no national space strategy;
(2) ORS will make space more operationally responsive; (3) we
need weapons in space to protect our satellites; (4) space support is not
there for us when needed; (5) the space acquisition process is broken;
(6) one-of-a-kind platforms—NSS core or “Big Space” satellites—are
unworkable; (7) launch is not sufficiently responsive for war fighting;
(8) there must be a separate military space service; and (9) the aerospace
industry cannot get the people it needs to do the job. Certainly,
ample room for disagreement exists.
While the content of National Security Space Strategy Considerations
should generate valuable discussion, even sterling debate, this
slender volume is not without blemish. Some readers might question
how accurately the authors depict the connections and relationships
among their collection of strategy considerations. A linear diagram,
like the one used in the book, could be best or might have limitations.
At one point, for example, the authors’ reasoning seems too circular for
representation by a linear model. They write, “Other aspects of Space
Strategy, e.g., concept of operations, organizational considerations,
training requirements, etc., flow from the Strategy” (p. 28). Perhaps
a depiction that includes feedback loops or matrices might be a more
suitable graphic. Any criticism or confusion aside, Larned and the
Swans have given us abundant material on which to reflect.
Reviewed by Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, deputy command historian, HQ Air
Force Space Command.
High Frontier 54