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Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

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The more our space systems can be integrated with those of our allies and the more they<br />

can be integrated into the fabric of global commerce, the harder they will be politically to<br />

attack in all but the most extreme of conflicts.<br />

be rapidly upgraded—all platforms and sensors would be individually<br />

addressable, essentially a giant iPhone in space.<br />

A mission in this model is essentially an application (app)<br />

that addresses a set of the available platforms/capabilities.<br />

“Anchor” apps are the traditional mission areas (PNT, communications,<br />

missile warning, etc.) but just like the iPhone which<br />

began with four anchor apps (telephone, text, email, and calendar)<br />

and now has over 250,000 available, most never imagined<br />

by the iPhone creators, the space constellation would be opened<br />

up to a network of space application designers across the national<br />

security community who could pick and choose what<br />

space capabilities to include in their applications and how to interface<br />

them to data sources and capabilities in other mediums.<br />

What an explosion of never-dreamed-of capability this could<br />

produce! The space medium, with robotic platforms in predictable<br />

locations, is uniquely suited to this model of distributed<br />

development. Anchor apps could undergo rigid requirements<br />

processes while simultaneously the network could be set loose,<br />

innovating a host of unanticipated capabilities.<br />

Finally, the iPhone offers an example of how this model can<br />

actually increase robustness. While the device generally uses<br />

GPS to develop position, it also searches out signals of opportunity<br />

from cell phone towers and local Wi-Fi networks for a<br />

robust solution which degrades gracefully. Exiting the Metro<br />

at Crystal City in Arlington, a 16 year old can use her iPhone<br />

to navigate the tunnels where no GPS receiver will work—not<br />

as accurately as but better than nothing. Opening a distributed,<br />

open, holistic space infrastructure to the vast network of developers<br />

will yield similarly-innovative solutions to many space<br />

missions rendering them more robust than current purposebuilt<br />

single point of failure systems.<br />

International – A Case for Foreign Entanglements<br />

Would you rather declare war against one nation or against<br />

10 Multi-national satellite systems are safer from attack than<br />

those owned by a single nation.<br />

Would you burn down the local Costco if your wife was the<br />

primary breadwinner in the family and she worked there Dual-use<br />

satellite systems that benefit all nations are safer from attack<br />

than those that benefit only DoD. GPS, upon which global<br />

commerce and so much more depend, is much harder to attack<br />

than a classified spy satellite.<br />

The more our space systems can be integrated with those of<br />

our allies and the more they can be integrated into the fabric of<br />

global commerce, the harder they will be politically to attack in<br />

all but the most extreme of conflicts. This integration should be<br />

a stated goal and benefits all parties, not to mention the peoples<br />

of the world.<br />

<strong>Space</strong> and Time – Think Navy<br />

During combat, the US <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> usually will define a certain<br />

portion of airspace above the conflict zone and attempt to<br />

control it—controlling it generally means trying to track every<br />

object flying through it.<br />

The Navy’s task is quite different. Even in peacetime, the<br />

Navy is attempting to maintain some influence over the vastness<br />

of the world’s oceans. Since there is no <strong>Air</strong>borne Warning and<br />

Control System/Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System<br />

equivalent for the entire ocean, this task generally entails a deep<br />

understanding of the medium, where its choke points are (i.e.,<br />

Straits of Malacca), what types of systems are operating in it<br />

(i.e., Exocet missile), and the directions from which attacks can<br />

come (i.e., submarine firing depth). In this way, space is more<br />

like the sea than the air. Relative to the maritime domain, space<br />

control is complicated by its greater vastness but is simplified<br />

by the laws of Kepler.<br />

Transitioning from a sanctuary to a contested environment<br />

mindset will require a much deeper understanding of the medium<br />

of space. How do antisatellite weapons approach their<br />

targets in low Earth orbit/medium Earth orbit/highly elliptical<br />

orbit/GEO given the laws of Kepler What is the equivalent<br />

of an aircraft carrier’s keep-out zone given the laws of Kepler<br />

Are there choke points like geosynchronous transfer orbit or<br />

GEO Which orbits are safer Which are not All space operators,<br />

designers, decision-makers, acquisition professionals,<br />

and policy makers need to be able to answer these types of<br />

questions as a matter of basic training. Yet many of the answers<br />

to these questions are not well understood today by anybody.<br />

Satellite Communications Industry – Tell Them What<br />

You Want and You Will Get It<br />

Western companies are now the largest operators of spacecraft<br />

on orbit. SES, Intelsat, and Eutelsat alone have over 100<br />

operating GEO spacecraft and 20 more on order. 3 Commercial<br />

operators have become critical to national security operations<br />

as varied as flying remotely piloted vehicles and Pacific naval<br />

maneuvers. Industry benefits from economies of scale and a<br />

dramatically more efficient acquisition system—satellite operators<br />

can acquire systems at lower cost and on much more<br />

rapid timelines.<br />

DoD’s approach to the space industry assumes a benign environment<br />

and a glut of supply, which is basically what we have<br />

seen the past 10 years for a number of reasons, none of which<br />

are likely to repeat themselves. Most capacity is purchased on<br />

the spot market at high cost, although there have been moves<br />

recently to purchase more capacity in bulk to obtain larger discounts.<br />

51 High Frontier

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