14.02.2015 Views

Europeanization and Democratization - CIRES

Europeanization and Democratization - CIRES

Europeanization and Democratization - CIRES

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

154<br />

“twinners” played negligible roles in this process. Still, it would be<br />

inaccurate to claim that the EU was irrelevant to the process of civil service<br />

reform. Though the particular bargains affecting the shape of the civil<br />

service were struck by domestic actors without the EU’s substantive input,<br />

domestic bargaining was conducted under the shadow of the EU’s<br />

persistent criticisms of reform timing. Pavel Telička, the chief Czech EU<br />

accession negotiator, noted after the publication of the 2001 Regular<br />

Report that “the Commission is certainly not mistaken in one regard: the<br />

civil service law is the alpha <strong>and</strong> omega of everything.” 19 In other words,<br />

failure to pass a civil service law would significantly hinder the Czech<br />

Republic’s pre-accession st<strong>and</strong>ing. ČSSD, Christian Democratic, <strong>and</strong><br />

Freedom Union deputies reach a similar conclusion; given that all three<br />

parties were solidly pro-EU, further political wrangling over the bill would be<br />

too risky. EU pressure did encourage compromise; it was a persistent<br />

reminder to domestic decision makers that timely accession <strong>and</strong> the good<br />

graces of EU actors required this particular institutional reform.<br />

Civil service reform in Slovakia<br />

Like the Czech Republic, Slovakia delayed comprehensive civil<br />

service reform throughout the 1990s. The same variables that explain the<br />

Czech delays—particularly the lack of reform tradition <strong>and</strong> uncertainties<br />

arising from stateness questions—help to explain the Slovak delays. As in<br />

the Czech case, though, the most important explanatory factor has to do<br />

with the preferences of governing party leaders. Although their ideological<br />

predilections <strong>and</strong> personal styles differed dramatically, both Czech Prime<br />

Minister Klaus <strong>and</strong> Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar saw real<br />

advantages in their inherited systems of personnel administration. Mečiar,<br />

whose Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) dominated the<br />

coalition cabinet that ruled Slovakia between 1994 <strong>and</strong> 1998, also preferred<br />

to use state positions for patronage purposes <strong>and</strong> failed to pursue civil<br />

service reforms that might restrict his power over the bureaucracy.<br />

Again as in the Czech Republic, elections in 1998 affected the<br />

domestic political balance <strong>and</strong> the context within which EU pressure played<br />

out. A broad coalition of organizationally underdeveloped anti-Mečiar<br />

parties emerged victorious in the September 1998 elections. Before the<br />

elections, leaders of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Party of<br />

19 Radio Praha, “Pavel Telička: Přijetí zákona o státní službĕ je zásadní otázka,”<br />

November 13, 2001.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!