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WESTMINSTER CONSULTING<br />

“Professor Pigskin” <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Investment</strong> <strong>Manager</strong> <strong>Due</strong> <strong>Diligence</strong><br />

Gabriel Potter, AIF®<br />

Senior <strong>Investment</strong> Research Associate<br />

April 2012


Westminster Consulting<br />

<strong>Investment</strong> <strong>Manager</strong> <strong>Due</strong> <strong>Diligence</strong><br />

As a fiduciary, the process of vetting, selecting <strong>and</strong> monitoring an investment manager is critically<br />

important. But how do professional investment consultants go about this process? When<br />

confronted by complex, deeply-technical questions posed by industry professionals, I usually turn to<br />

The Simpsons for guidance.<br />

Wait, did you say The Simpsons?<br />

I’m going to assume that most readers of this newsletter are familiar with the long-running animated<br />

series “The Simpsons”. There is the gullible patriarch - Homer Simpson, <strong>and</strong> his more perceptive<br />

daughter - Lisa. In this scene, Homer <strong>and</strong> Lisa are watching football on television, <strong>and</strong> Homer is<br />

holding a mail-pamphlet that says “Professor Pigskin”:<br />

Homer: “Doh! The Broncos won! Why didn’t I bet on them like Professor Pigskin told me to?”<br />

Lisa: “Who’s Professor Pigskin?"<br />

Homer: "He’s a pig who can predict football winners in advance."<br />

Lisa: "How is that possible?"<br />

Homer: "Because he’s got something no gambler’s ever had. A System! I’ve got this pamphlet<br />

four weeks in a row <strong>and</strong> every time the pick of the week has been right on the money."<br />

Lisa: "Ohhh. I get it. Every week they send out two pamphlets, half picking one team <strong>and</strong> half<br />

picking the other. Eventually, there’s a small group of people who only receive the correct<br />

predictions <strong>and</strong> think Professor Pigskin is always right. That’s when they ask for your money."<br />

It is too late by this point: Homer is already sending his credit card information to “Professor<br />

Pigskin” for insight into next week’s football game. Of course, Professor Pigskin is a scam, the pick<br />

Homer gets is wrong, <strong>and</strong> he loses a pile of money on a bad bet.<br />

I often consider the example of Professor Pigskin when conducting due diligence on investment<br />

managers. An investment manager typically uses a system to put together their portfolio. It can be<br />

a sound system, based on earnings quality, relative valuation, balance sheet strength, price<br />

momentum or any of a thous<strong>and</strong> – completely valid - reasons. But success, as we see from the<br />

example of Professor Pigskin, can easily come from an arbitrary system as well.<br />

Imagine for a moment that every investment manager operates on luck alone. Imagine their stock<br />

selection “process” is to simply throw darts at the Wall Street Journal <strong>and</strong> buy equal amounts of any<br />

stock hit by a dart. By luck, some managers are bound to outperform their peers. By definition, half<br />

of the investment managers are going to perform better than their peer group in any given time<br />

period. Given a large enough sample, some managers are assuredly going to outperform the index.


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The point is performance data is insufficient to determine if a manager is good or bad. So, given<br />

this, how do you separate luck <strong>and</strong> r<strong>and</strong>om chance from good decision making? How do you know<br />

if you’re getting a “good” investment manager?<br />

Key to <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>Manager</strong> <strong>Due</strong> <strong>Diligence</strong>: Continuous monitoring of many attributes<br />

Again, just looking at the performance numbers is insufficient. The best managers periodically<br />

underperform <strong>and</strong> overperform their index. The “batting average” – the percentage of time that a<br />

manager outperforms their benchmark - for the best investment managers is only around 60%. In<br />

other words, the very best managers have historically underperformed their benchmark 40% of the<br />

time, often for a number of years. In addition, the timing of the investment manager screening can<br />

have a large impact on the final selection.<br />

Example: The ABC fund is an aggressive, high-risk, high-conviction mutual fund that makes large<br />

bets on individual stocks <strong>and</strong> sectors. Sometimes, the large bets pay off h<strong>and</strong>somely. Sometimes,<br />

the large bets are completely misplaced <strong>and</strong> the fund drastically underperforms. When measured last<br />

quarter, the volatility of the fund was high, <strong>and</strong> long term relative performance was below both<br />

peers <strong>and</strong> the index. <strong>Manager</strong> ABC has suffered tremendous fund outflows <strong>and</strong> has decided on a<br />

desperate <strong>and</strong> risky bet towards a h<strong>and</strong>ful of high-risk stocks. They got lucky <strong>and</strong>, this quarter, their<br />

bet paid off. The few stocks selected by ABC sharply outperformed the market. In fact,<br />

outperformance was so high in this concentrated portfolio that the product’s long term annualized<br />

averages now outpaces peers <strong>and</strong> the benchmark.<br />

An unsophisticated investor – looking at long term risk <strong>and</strong> long term reward numbers alone – may<br />

have an inaccurate assessment of the fund. The unsophisticated investor acknowledges that the<br />

fund has high risk, but haven’t long term investors been compensated by advantageous long term<br />

returns?<br />

This example supports the case for a broad variety of screening criteria. For instance, an industry<br />

leading mutual fund screening tool sorts funds against a variety of quantitative attributes (long term<br />

performance relative to peers, risk relative to peers, <strong>and</strong> so on). In this case, the ABC fund may<br />

have high risk <strong>and</strong> return, but the risk-adjusted return metrics may still be poor relative to peers.<br />

This tool may also register the change to the portfolio (proportion of allowable assets, consistency<br />

of peer group / category). Looking at the fund’s net inflows will verify if enough long term<br />

investors really have been compensated for the risk, or if the fund’s small size implies a lack of<br />

stability. Furthermore, this example suggests the value of continuous screening over time. This tool<br />

makes these measurements continuously (every quarter, in this instance). The ABC fund may get a<br />

better score from the tool, due to the tremendous outperformance, for this quarter. However, the<br />

database keeps track of the previous quarters where the timing was not favorable to the ABC fund.<br />

By using long-term averages in scoring methodology, a consultant can get a better sense of the<br />

consistency of relative performance.


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Key to <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>Manager</strong> <strong>Due</strong> <strong>Diligence</strong>: Underst<strong>and</strong>ing Style<br />

Another example: Imagine that you are a 401(k) plan sponsor during the 2008 financial crisis. The<br />

stock markets are being sorely damaged by the financial crisis, <strong>and</strong> your current investment manager<br />

– Mutual fund AGG - cannot even keep up with the very low benchmark. You decide to get a<br />

replacement. You conduct an investment manager search <strong>and</strong> find Mutual Fund DEF has had<br />

fantastic relative performance in both the short term <strong>and</strong> long term. You hire <strong>Manager</strong> DEF in<br />

early 2009 <strong>and</strong> hope for the best. The markets start to improve, but <strong>Manager</strong> DEF continually<br />

underperforms the market for several years. What happened?<br />

In this case, the plan sponsor simply may not realize that <strong>Manager</strong> DEF is following a defensive<br />

strategy: a strategy that tends to protect money in down markets, but fall behind the market in<br />

optimistic, upward moving markets. Worse, you may have left mutual fund AGG – an aggressive<br />

high-beta fund – at precisely the wrong time. As a high-beta fund, Mutual Fund AGG started to<br />

significantly outperform once the markets improved.<br />

This sort of thing happens all the time. A manager is hired because his style is in favor, but when<br />

the market favors a different style, relative performance suffers. The adage used in finance circles is:<br />

“don’t chase the hot dot”. In other words, do not select investments – a manager, an investment<br />

style, or even an asset class - solely because it is the greatest outperformer at the moment.<br />

Again, we are looking for a “good” investment manager, but that means different things to different<br />

clients. For instance, Mutual fund DEF will tend to outperform the market in down years <strong>and</strong><br />

underperform the market in up years. Despite the current underperformance, that style of manager<br />

may be very attractive for conservative investors. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, a different client may prefer<br />

an all-weather fund with roughly constant opportunity to outperform, or underperform, in any<br />

market. The ultimate goal is to match the underlying style of manager to the preferences of the<br />

client. Underst<strong>and</strong>ing the manager’s style, <strong>and</strong> your client’s preferences, is clearly required.<br />

Key to <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>Manager</strong> <strong>Due</strong> <strong>Diligence</strong>: Qualitative Assessment<br />

Much of the conversation has focused on the measureable quantitative results. Savvy investment<br />

consultants should also ask the investment manager: How did you make those decisions? Who are<br />

the people making those decisions? What process did you use to make that selection? What’s the<br />

overall philosophy of the product? In other words, underst<strong>and</strong>ing a product requires qualitative<br />

research.<br />

Why is this important? Obviously, it will help an investment manager create an entire set of<br />

investments that complement each other. For instance, an endowment client may prefer to invest in<br />

a combination of passively managed <strong>and</strong> actively managed funds to reduce fees, hedge manager risk<br />

<strong>and</strong> maintain the possibility of alpha (risk adjusted returns in excess of the benchmark).<br />

Alternatively, a change in the underlying process can signal an improvement, or a genuine<br />

shortcoming in the product. For example: Fund XYZ is a stalwart institutional fund that credits its


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long term track record on their deep fundamental research on each underlying stock selection. Let’s<br />

say that the manager recently made an investment in Stock Q. Unfortunately, Stock Q has just been<br />

accused of misreporting their financial data. As a result, Stock Q takes a beating in the market, <strong>and</strong><br />

the manager underperforms. Again – even the best managers will underperform the markets<br />

periodically. Good research can minimize errors <strong>and</strong> possibly catch frauds, but even the best<br />

investment managers make mistakes (or simply get unlucky).<br />

The key to assessing the investment manager is their reaction to this sc<strong>and</strong>al. <strong>Manager</strong> XYZ, in light<br />

of the allegedly fraudulent data, would be expected to increase their scrutiny of Stock Q, dive deeper<br />

into their financial records, ask questions, <strong>and</strong> double-check their presumptions. <strong>Manager</strong> XYZ did<br />

none of these things. Instead, <strong>Manager</strong> XYZ st<strong>and</strong>s on its previous analysis – based on potentially<br />

flawed data. In fact, <strong>Manager</strong> XYZ buys even more of Stock Q in an attempt to buy a stock that is<br />

out-of-favor <strong>and</strong> potentially a bargain. <strong>Manager</strong> XYZ reasons that the market is overreacting to the<br />

sc<strong>and</strong>al, <strong>and</strong> notes that similar accounting sc<strong>and</strong>als resulted, initially, in deep setbacks for a stock,<br />

but that strong recoveries happened once the extent of the fraud was clarified <strong>and</strong> accounted for.<br />

Let’s be clear: <strong>Manager</strong> XYZ’s analysis may be completely correct. The market might be<br />

overreacting. Stock Q might be a bargain now. The “double-down” on Stock Q might being an<br />

extremely profitable decision. However, the decision was made without any of the fundamental<br />

research that the manager is recognized for. The re-buy decision was an educated guess, <strong>and</strong> that is<br />

not how their stock selection process has been advertised to investors.<br />

This example – except for the names - is essentially true. In real-life, Stock Q’s troubles went deeper<br />

than previously assumed. Several members of the board were accused of misleading investors.<br />

Stock Q trading has been suspended for months as regulators try to sift through the information <strong>and</strong><br />

determine the truth. Without a market, the price of Stock Q has plummeted. In real-life, <strong>Manager</strong><br />

XYZ experienced high outflows, due in part to poor performance but also due – we suspect - to the<br />

disappointment of investors who expected a level of due diligence from the manager that they did<br />

not receive. In a separate, but related, story, a large hedge fund has recently been sued for owning a<br />

substantial amount of Stock Q. The suit charges “reckless indifference” <strong>and</strong> “failure to conduct the<br />

required proper due diligence [...] amounts to gross negligence <strong>and</strong> breach of the defendant’s<br />

fiduciary duties.”<br />

In Conclusion<br />

There are no guarantees in investments. However, making well-reasoned, prudent decisions based<br />

on good data is something every investor should strive for. Moreover, as a fiduciary, it is a<br />

responsibility to have a manager selection process <strong>and</strong> to document it. A clear underst<strong>and</strong>ing of<br />

your investment managers <strong>and</strong> an expectation of how they operate in different market environments<br />

will improve the chances of selecting a manager that best meets your needs. In the long term, this<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing should promote the better outcomes.


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prepared solely for informative purposes. It is made available on an "as is" basis. Westminster<br />

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WESTMINSTER CONSULTING, LLC<br />

A Registered <strong>Investment</strong> Advisory firm<br />

11 Centre Park, Suite 303<br />

Rochester, New York 14614-1115<br />

585.246.3750<br />

800.237.0076

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