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How Blue is Your Ocean? - Michigan Credit Union League

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<strong>How</strong> <strong>Blue</strong> Is <strong>Your</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong>?<br />

Value Innovation and <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

Strategy Development<br />

ROCH PARAYRE, PhD, SENIOR FELLOW, MACK CENTER FOR<br />

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, THE WHARTON SCHOOL,<br />

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,<br />

DECISION STRATEGIES INTERNATIONAL


<strong>How</strong> <strong>Blue</strong> Is <strong>Your</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong>?<br />

Value Innovation and <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

Strategy Development<br />

ROCH PARAYRE, PhD, SENIOR FELLOW, MACK CENTER FOR<br />

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, THE WHARTON SCHOOL,<br />

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,<br />

DECISION STRATEGIES INTERNATIONAL


Th<strong>is</strong> publication, in whole or in part, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or<br />

transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherw<strong>is</strong>e) without<br />

the prior written perm<strong>is</strong>sion of Dec<strong>is</strong>ion Strategies International, Inc., and Filene Research Institute. Requests for<br />

perm<strong>is</strong>sion should be directed to info@thinkdsi.com, or mailed to Dec<strong>is</strong>ion Strategies International, Inc., 100 Four<br />

Falls Corporate Center, Suite 604, 1001 Conshohocken State Road, Conshohocken, Pennsylvania 19428-2970.<br />

Th<strong>is</strong> value innovation report <strong>is</strong> based on the surveys and sessions conducted by Dec<strong>is</strong>ion Strategies International,<br />

Inc., and Filene Research Institute. The value innovation methodology was developed by W. Chan Kim and Renée<br />

Mauborgne. More information and research can be found in their book, <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy: <strong>How</strong> to Create<br />

Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant, publ<strong>is</strong>hed by Harvard Business School Press.<br />

Dec<strong>is</strong>ion Strategies International, Inc.<br />

Filene Research Institute<br />

One West First Avenue<br />

5910 Mineral Point Road<br />

Suite 300 P.O. Box 2998<br />

Conshohocken, PA 19428 Mad<strong>is</strong>on, WI 53701-2998<br />

610.717.1000 608.231.8550<br />

www.thinkdsi.com<br />

www.filene.org<br />

Copyright © 2006 by Dec<strong>is</strong>ion Strategies International, Inc. (DSI) and Filene Research Institute.<br />

Publ<strong>is</strong>hed by Filene Research Institute<br />

ISBN 1-932795-06-5<br />

All rights reserved.<br />

Printed in U.S.A.


Filene<br />

Research<br />

Institute<br />

The Filene Research Institute, <strong>is</strong> a 501(c)(3), non-profit organization<br />

dedicated to scientific and thoughtful analys<strong>is</strong> about <strong>is</strong>sues affecting<br />

the future of consumer finance and credit unions. We support research<br />

efforts that will ultimately enhance the well-being of consumers and<br />

ass<strong>is</strong>t credit unions in adapting to rapidly changing economic, legal,<br />

and social environments.<br />

Deeply imbedded in the credit union tradition <strong>is</strong> an ongoing search<br />

for better ways to understand and serve credit union members and the<br />

general public. <strong>Credit</strong> unions, like other democratic institutions, make<br />

great progress when they welcome and carefully consider high-quality<br />

research, new perspectives, and innovative, sometimes controversial,<br />

proposals. Open inquiry, the free flow of ideas, and debate are<br />

essential parts of the true democratic process. In th<strong>is</strong> spirit, the Filene<br />

Research Institute grants researchers considerable latitude in their<br />

studies of high-priority consumer finance <strong>is</strong>sues and encourages them<br />

to communicate their findings and recommendations.<br />

The Filene Research Institute <strong>is</strong> governed by an admin<strong>is</strong>trative<br />

board compr<strong>is</strong>ed of the credit union industry’s top leaders. Research<br />

topics and priorities are set by a select group of credit union CEOs<br />

called the Research Council. Additional research input <strong>is</strong> furn<strong>is</strong>hed<br />

by the Filene Research Fellows, a blue ribbon panel of academic and<br />

industry experts.<br />

The name of the institute honors Edward A. Filene, the “father of the<br />

U.S. credit union movement.” Filene was an innovative leader who<br />

relied on insightful research and analys<strong>is</strong> when encouraging credit<br />

union development.<br />

Since its founding in 1989, the Filene Research Institute has worked<br />

with over one hundred academic institutions and publ<strong>is</strong>hed over 150<br />

research studies.<br />

Please v<strong>is</strong>it our web site at www.filene.org to peruse our research<br />

library and learn more about the Filene Research Institute’s past,<br />

present and future.<br />

Progress <strong>is</strong> the constant replacing of the best there <strong>is</strong> with something<br />

still better!<br />

— Edward A. Filene<br />

i


Acknowledgements<br />

We would like to give special thanks to the following individuals who<br />

were instrumental in the publication of th<strong>is</strong> document: Franck<br />

Schuurmans, Ph.D., Samantha <strong>How</strong>land and Franklin Shen from<br />

Dec<strong>is</strong>ion Strategies International, Inc. (DSI). An extra note of<br />

recognition <strong>is</strong> extended to Jocelyn Wills, an important contributor in<br />

the writing and editing of th<strong>is</strong> document.<br />

We also thank the following organizations and individuals without<br />

whom the execution of th<strong>is</strong> exciting research project would not have<br />

been possible:<br />

• F<strong>is</strong>erv, Inc., for its generous financial support of the Filene Research<br />

Institute’s research on credit union growth <strong>is</strong>sues;<br />

• The <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> Executives Society (CUES), under the able leadership<br />

of Fred Johnson, for introducing the author of th<strong>is</strong> study to the credit<br />

union world;<br />

• Members of the Filene Research Council and i 3 group, for agreeing to<br />

be interviewed for th<strong>is</strong> research project; and<br />

• The 75 credit union executives who spent two days with us in the<br />

Philadelphia area.<br />

Th<strong>is</strong> book <strong>is</strong> dedicated to Mike Osborne of First Tech <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong>, who<br />

joined us in Philadelphia for the Value Innovation workshop, and passed<br />

away shortly thereafter.<br />

iii


Table of<br />

Contents<br />

Executive Summar y and Commentar y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1<br />

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5<br />

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<br />

STEP 1:<br />

STEP 2:<br />

STEP 3:<br />

The <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Pioneer-Migrator-Settler<br />

(PMS) Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15<br />

V<strong>is</strong>ualizing Current Strategy:<br />

The “As Is” Strategy Canvas . . . . . . . . . . 23<br />

Understanding the Customers’<br />

Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31<br />

STEP 4: Learning from Noncustomers . . . . . . . . . 39<br />

STEP 5:<br />

The <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong>: Six Paths Toward<br />

Future Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49<br />

Exploring Across Industries . . . . . . . 5 1<br />

Exploring Across Strategic Groups . . 53<br />

Exploring Across the Chain of Buyers 55<br />

Exploring Across<br />

Complementar y Offerings . . . . . . . . 57<br />

Exploring Across Functional and<br />

Emotional Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59<br />

Exploring Across Time and Trends . . . 62<br />

Conclusion: Conceiving New Market Space . . . . . . . . 65<br />

Appendix A: Inter view Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73<br />

Appendix B: Workshop Attendees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75<br />

v


Executive<br />

Summar y and<br />

Commentar y<br />

by George A. Hofheimer,<br />

Chief Research Officer<br />

Stagnant credit union growth and undifferentiated strategies magnify<br />

the need for credit unions to innovate. <strong>How</strong>ever, we cannot simply<br />

point to the trends occurring in the credit union industry and say,<br />

“Go innovate.” The Filene Research Institute’s role as a “think-anddo<br />

tank” <strong>is</strong> to provide you with the tools and venues to understand<br />

innovation and growth. For example, the i 3 initiative <strong>is</strong> an exciting<br />

field-research project that tasks the movement’s next generation<br />

leaders with designing tomorrow’s credit union innovation pipeline.<br />

i 3 operates under an open innovation model whereby we heartily<br />

encourage credit unions, credit union organizations, and credit union<br />

vendors to take i 3 ideas as their own and implement in the marketplace.<br />

Since 2004, the i 3 initiative has introduced close to 30 specific credit<br />

union innovations, ranging from process improvement to new market/<br />

product development. i 3 <strong>is</strong> just one tool available for credit union<br />

innovation. Th<strong>is</strong> research project similarly aims to provide you with<br />

the inspiration and the tools to “go innovate” in a deliberate and<br />

creative manner.<br />

Several months ago, a number of credit union leaders, academics, and<br />

industry watchers alerted us to the book <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy: <strong>How</strong> to<br />

Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant<br />

by W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne. 1 The innovation processes<br />

reviewed in the book (commonly termed “value innovation”) are<br />

appealing concepts that could be successfully applied to credit unions.<br />

The authors introduce a framework whereby organizations can explore<br />

the creation of uncontested market space by pushing for a quantum<br />

leap in consumer value concomitant with decreasing industry cost<br />

structures. Does th<strong>is</strong> sound too good to be true? Kim and Mauborgne<br />

contend that th<strong>is</strong> deceptively simple idea boils down to four questions<br />

organizations rarely examine:<br />

• What elements should we eliminate that our industry takes for<br />

granted?<br />

• What elements should we reduce well below the industry<br />

standard?<br />

• What elements should we ra<strong>is</strong>e well above the industry standard?<br />

• What elements should we create that the industry has never<br />

offered?<br />

1<br />

W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy: <strong>How</strong> to Create<br />

Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant (Boston: Harvard<br />

Business School Press, 2005).<br />

1


Aided by the expert<strong>is</strong>e of Roch Parayre, Ph.D., senior fellow at the<br />

Wharton School and close academic colleague of Kim and Mauborgne,<br />

th<strong>is</strong> report puts credit unions under the “value innovation” lens of<br />

analys<strong>is</strong>. To ensure that we created a real<strong>is</strong>tic and useful framework,<br />

the research team conducted in-depth interviews with industry leaders<br />

in fall 2005, and hosted a two-day workshop with 75 credit union<br />

senior executives from around the United States in January 2006. The<br />

resulting insights of th<strong>is</strong> research are set forth on the pages that follow.<br />

Specifically, th<strong>is</strong> report will:<br />

• Introduce the value innovation framework and its applicability to<br />

credit unions;<br />

• Furn<strong>is</strong>h examples of value innovation at work in the financial<br />

services marketplace; and<br />

• Provide a set of tools that can be used to revitalize credit unions’<br />

strategy development.<br />

WHAT IS VALUE INNOVATION?<br />

Value innovation offers a unique framework for organizations to<br />

develop new uncontested market opportunities, or, in the words of<br />

Kim and Mauborgne, a “blue ocean” strategy. Like most competitive<br />

industries, the retail financial services marketplace can be portrayed<br />

as a “red ocean,” or competitive landscape that <strong>is</strong> “bloodied” by<br />

fiercely competitive rivals vying for the same share of the consumer’s<br />

financial services needs. In th<strong>is</strong> “red ocean,” competitors exhibit<br />

undifferentiated strategies in a crowded marketplace, which drives<br />

down profits, creates commodification and turns the waters “bloody.”<br />

Value innovation generates “blue ocean” strategies through the<br />

simultaneous pursuit of lower cost and differentiation.<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> unions, like other players in the retail finance sector, recognize<br />

that sustainable growth <strong>is</strong> critical to the long-term survival of<br />

individual organizations. Growth strategies come in many shapes and<br />

sizes, both organic and through acqu<strong>is</strong>ition. Yet other than focusing<br />

on the fundamentals of service, operating efficiencies, top-line growth,<br />

channel management, and market research, innovation at credit<br />

unions <strong>is</strong> too often the ugly stepchild of growth strategy considered the<br />

privilege of large corporations such as 3M and Google—which have<br />

the resources to create tomorrow’s killer application. Another group<br />

<strong>is</strong> the small, highly entrepreneurial start-up with a strong appetite for<br />

2


<strong>is</strong>k and the backing of venture capital<strong>is</strong>ts. Ordinary smaller players<br />

should mind the store, stick to their knitting, and be fast followers at<br />

best, not r<strong>is</strong>king the firm with large bets. We certainly agree that large<br />

and r<strong>is</strong>ky bets are to be avoided, but we believe that innovation seen<br />

through th<strong>is</strong> pr<strong>is</strong>m limits smaller organizations such as credit unions.<br />

In essence, innovation <strong>is</strong> about reframing a problem or an <strong>is</strong>sue; it <strong>is</strong><br />

about reorganizing the same information in a different way. Innovation<br />

<strong>is</strong> not about vast resources or technological breakthroughs. As John<br />

Scully of PepsiCo and Apple once famously observed, “If you think<br />

like your competitor you are not thinking at all.” Th<strong>is</strong> report <strong>is</strong> an<br />

inspiration to an industry that <strong>is</strong> not burdened by the demands of<br />

stock market returns to think big through thinking differently. <strong>Credit</strong><br />

unions, more than any other segment of the financial services industry,<br />

have the opportunity to innovate, in part because their customers are<br />

their owners. <strong>Credit</strong> unions should be able to co-opt members and<br />

engage them in improving their experience, hence strengthening the<br />

credit union value proposition. Others have done it, why not us?<br />

Reframing the old and the familiar, seeing and creating opportunities<br />

where others do not, positioning the organization to think in different<br />

terms—these and more are the purposes of innovation. By th<strong>is</strong><br />

definition, innovation <strong>is</strong> neither expensive nor technology-driven,<br />

per se. Within th<strong>is</strong> framework, innovation will be one of those “but<br />

of course!” occasions. Let us make sure that credit unions get there<br />

first, for the benefit of credit union members and the future viability<br />

of credit unions. To begin th<strong>is</strong> innovation journey, we take flight<br />

across the Atlantic <strong>Ocean</strong> to examine a Brit<strong>is</strong>h company that applies<br />

these principals.<br />

3


About the<br />

Author<br />

Roch Parayre, Ph.D., <strong>is</strong> the managing director of executive development<br />

for Dec<strong>is</strong>ion Strategies International (DSI). Dr. Parayre teaches<br />

executive education courses in dec<strong>is</strong>ion making, scenario planning,<br />

creativity, and strategy at CEDEP in France, for the Institute for<br />

Management Studies, at Southern Method<strong>is</strong>t University’s Cox School<br />

of Business, and at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.<br />

He <strong>is</strong> a senior fellow in the William and Phyll<strong>is</strong> Mack Center for<br />

Technological Innovation at the Wharton School. As a DSI scenarioplanning<br />

expert, Dr. Parayre guides client corporations through the<br />

scenario planning process. In addition to many credit unions, h<strong>is</strong> client<br />

l<strong>is</strong>t includes 3Com, American Airlines, American Re-Insurance, BASF,<br />

Cargill, Chubb, Citgo, Coca-Cola, The Conservation Fund, D<strong>is</strong>ney,<br />

Knight Ridder, Lucent Technologies, Marathon Oil, MCI, Merrill<br />

Lynch, Microsoft, New York Life, PNC Bank, Progress Software, and<br />

Texas Instruments, among others. Dr. Parayre has publ<strong>is</strong>hed papers<br />

in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, the Journal of<br />

Banking and Finance, and Managerial and Dec<strong>is</strong>ion Economics. Most<br />

recently, he coauthored a chapter on technology assessment in Wharton<br />

on Managing Emerging Technologies. He earned a Ph.D. in business<br />

strategy from the University of Brit<strong>is</strong>h Columbia.<br />

parayre@thinkdsi.com<br />

5


Introduction<br />

A CRACK IN THE FOUNDATION<br />

On March 7, 2005, few people noticed the tremor making a small<br />

crack in the foundation of the financial services world. Originating<br />

in England, and quickly spreading across the Atlantic, the little<br />

earthquake known as “Zopa ” (“Zone of Possible Agreement”) broke<br />

away from traditional banking competitors and moved into a new<br />

market space, where the philosophies and practices of eBay and credit<br />

unions could meet. Perceiving that banks have for a very long time<br />

failed to understand the r<strong>is</strong>ing tide of mobile professional workers<br />

with “lumpy” incomes, Zopa founders decided to exploit the large gap<br />

between the rate at which people borrow money and the rate at which<br />

they can save. By offering itself up as a cheap personal loan provider<br />

capable of creating a secure, user-friendly, eBay-style loan exchange<br />

for people seeking to transact business with like-minded others, the<br />

Zopa team developed a strategy to eliminate the financial institution as<br />

middleman and to reduce the costs of personal borrowing and lending.<br />

They additionally worked to ra<strong>is</strong>e the profile of person-to-person<br />

banking and the credit union’s concept of democratic cooperation,<br />

complete with a member-specific community, where participants could<br />

control the destiny of the financial institution to which they belonged.<br />

To profit from these ideas, Zopa’s strateg<strong>is</strong>ts also moved to create a<br />

lending platform, where credit-worthy people earning money in new<br />

ways (for example, through the peak-and-valley incomes that flow<br />

from self-employment, consulting, and microbusiness ownership) could<br />

borrow from like-minded individuals—albeit ones who happen to have<br />

money in reserve. 2<br />

Tapping into the “30-something” mentality that also resonates across<br />

generational divides, the Zopa team hopes to capitalize on the new<br />

professional workers’ perception that banks have become greedy and<br />

unethical, as well as old-fashioned, and their increasing desire to move<br />

out of corporate life and receive better rates of return on both their<br />

human and financial capital, as well as on th<strong>is</strong> segment’s expanding<br />

Internet and “do-it-yourself” skills. To meet the escalating demands<br />

of technologically savvy investors and borrowers seeking socially<br />

responsible and “modern” venues for their financial transactions, Zopa<br />

executives pioneered a Web-based business to manage the collection<br />

of monthly repayments for member participants. The firm earns<br />

money through borrower exchange fees (usually 1% of the opening<br />

2<br />

BBC News, “If the World Was Run Like eBay” (October 3, 2005).<br />

7


offer), repayment protection insurance on loans, and comm<strong>is</strong>sions<br />

from insurance providers. Company representatives are also proud of<br />

the fact that Zopa does not “charge lenders a bean.” To reduce lender<br />

r<strong>is</strong>k, Zopa has an “offer-matching system” that divides lenders’ offers<br />

into small amounts, which are then d<strong>is</strong>tributed among at least fifty<br />

potential borrowers who have posted requests and meet credit reporting<br />

standards. Moreover, Zopa’s Web site stipulates that no loan seeker can<br />

borrow from the same person twice. By l<strong>is</strong>tening to a segment of the<br />

borrowing and investing community, the Zopa team was able to retool<br />

the standards of the tradition-bound financial industry to create value<br />

for the company and its customers. Zopa has eliminated and reduced<br />

those features of financial transaction that its niche consumers claim<br />

to desp<strong>is</strong>e (namely the bank, along with its costly and impersonal<br />

structures), and ra<strong>is</strong>ed the level of simplicity, transparency, security,<br />

and confidentiality banking customers crave. Zopa’s Web site l<strong>is</strong>ts—in<br />

language anyone can understand—the rules of the game, including the<br />

firm’s m<strong>is</strong>sion, practices, the names and biographical profiles of its<br />

principals and partners, and what news services have to say about its<br />

products and services. By inviting members and v<strong>is</strong>itors to read and to<br />

participate in the Zopa blog, and to join a community of like-minded<br />

spirits, the firm’s founders have also made lending and borrowing<br />

fun—no small feat in an industry known for inducing anxiety. 3<br />

By the end of its first year, Zopa’s focus on mobile professional<br />

workers, as well as on global trends in technology and culture, garnered<br />

the attention of consumers and reporters as well as business strateg<strong>is</strong>ts<br />

and competitors. Now boasting more than 100,000 reg<strong>is</strong>tered members<br />

in the United Kingdom, the firm has expanded across sea and land.<br />

It recently opened an office in San Franc<strong>is</strong>co, and entered the North<br />

American market to compete with other innovators focused on Webbased,<br />

person-to-person lending (such as Prosper.com), as well as<br />

more traditional purveyors of financial services. With more searchers<br />

flocking to its site each day, Zopa has also joined a small but expanding<br />

number of firms challenging long-standing assumptions and business<br />

models in financial services, including those centered on a reluctance to<br />

change the rules of a mature industry. 4<br />

3<br />

See http://www.zopa.com/ZopaWeb/ for a more detailed description of Zopa and<br />

its clientele. See also “Peer-to-Peer Lending: Back to the Future,” Filene Research<br />

Institute, 2006.<br />

4<br />

Bob Tedeschi, “It’s Like Lending to a Friend, Except You’ll Get Interest,”<br />

E-Commerce Report, New York Times (February 13, 2006).<br />

8


With a few exceptions, the financial services sector does not encourage<br />

innovative thinking, a tendency on which Zopa and other creative<br />

person-to-person financial service providers hope to capitalize by<br />

shifting the industry’s paradigm. Understanding the past as a socially<br />

constructed process, Zopa’s founders recognized the cultural, economic,<br />

political, and technological realities and trends, allowing them to<br />

env<strong>is</strong>ion a new kind of future. These insights then inspired them to<br />

challenge a prevailing w<strong>is</strong>dom based upon what many technologically<br />

savvy consumers perceive as increasingly inappropriate and irrelevant<br />

assumptions and practices grounded in maintaining the status quo.<br />

As practitioners of “value innovation” (that <strong>is</strong>, people who<br />

simultaneously push for a quantum leap in buyer value and a sharp<br />

drop in the industry’s cost structure), Zopa’s founders argue that<br />

they moved into th<strong>is</strong> offering prec<strong>is</strong>ely because “we live in an age<br />

when opting out <strong>is</strong> the new opting in…when everyday entrepreneurs<br />

[demand that they] be encouraged and pra<strong>is</strong>ed, not d<strong>is</strong>m<strong>is</strong>sed…<br />

when creditworthy people frequently have unpredictable income<br />

streams…when 9–5 <strong>is</strong>n’t the be-all and end-all, but banks still think<br />

it <strong>is</strong>.” Thus, with other industry experts and practitioners suffering<br />

from complacency and myopia, Zopa easily moved into uncharted<br />

waters and launched their business to an “unsuspecting world.” In the<br />

process, they created a new market space for themselves as well as for<br />

those anxious to cash in on the future that Zopa and other person-toperson<br />

banking upstarts hope to engineer.<br />

Similarly, ING Direct capitalized on the same sorts of insights. By<br />

creating an online business where customers do their banking remotely,<br />

ING Direct reduced overhead and eliminated the high operational<br />

costs associated with physical locations. Passing those savings on<br />

to customers, ING Direct not only simplified its infrastructure and<br />

product offering, it also ra<strong>is</strong>ed interest rates for consumer deposits and<br />

created new value for its burgeoning customer base.<br />

9


THE BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY CONCEPT<br />

Along with ING Direct’s successful model, Zopa’s recent launch has<br />

coincided with, and now exemplifies, another se<strong>is</strong>mic wave in the<br />

business world—the 2005 publication of W. Chan Kim’s and Renée<br />

Mauborgne’s runaway best-seller, <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy. Professors at<br />

INSEAD (France’s prestigious business school) studied 150 successful<br />

strategic moves—which they called “value innovation”—among 30<br />

industries over a 100-year period. With <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy confirming<br />

what their previous consulting work had shown, Kim and Mauborgne<br />

argue that neither companies nor industries remain permanently<br />

excellent. Instead, value flows not from technological innovation<br />

but rather from the “value innovation” that unlocks new demand by<br />

radically increasing the appeal of a good or service. According to Kim<br />

and Mauborgne, “value innovation” surfaces among the few successful<br />

entrepreneurs, firms, and industries that depart from the traditional<br />

strategic business models that have guided business planners since the<br />

nineteenth century.<br />

Perceiving “strategy” as “exploration,” value innovators leapfrog the<br />

competition by focusing on the simultaneous pursuit of superior<br />

value creation and cost reduction (both for themselves and their<br />

customers, as well as for society at large). The business v<strong>is</strong>ionaries<br />

Kim and Mauborgne have thus avoided the battles that turn industries<br />

and the marketplace into what they describe as “bloody red oceans”<br />

of competition. Focusing instead on increases in buyer value, price<br />

accessibility, and the creation of new aggregate demand, “blue ocean”<br />

strateg<strong>is</strong>ts unlock new possibilities as well as render their competition<br />

irrelevant (at least for a time). Recognizing the difficulties inherent<br />

in finding and creating “blue oceans,” strateg<strong>is</strong>ts argue that business<br />

planners can succeed only if they ask the right questions, particularly<br />

the following four:<br />

• What elements should we eliminate that our industry takes for granted?<br />

• What elements should we reduce well below the industry standard?<br />

• What elements should we ra<strong>is</strong>e well above the industry standard?<br />

• What elements should we create that the industry has never<br />

offered? 5<br />

5<br />

Kim and Mauborgne, <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy. For conc<strong>is</strong>e elaborations of <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong><br />

Strategy, see Rudy Mezzetta, “Sailing Away from the Competition,” Investment<br />

Executive (September 2005), and Roch Parayre, “<strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy: Getting<br />

a Competitive Edge through Value Innovation,” DSI Quarterly 2:3 (Fall 2005),<br />

http://www.thinkdsi.com.<br />

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As they weeded through the myriad examples of long-term business<br />

successes, failures, and combinations of the two, Kim and Mauborgne<br />

d<strong>is</strong>covered that while most firms have fought for competitive advantage,<br />

battled over a shrinking market share, and struggled to differentiate<br />

themselves from competitors who share their basic competitive profile,<br />

only a few v<strong>is</strong>ionaries have understood that the creation of profitable<br />

futures resides elsewhere, beyond prevailing business strategies and<br />

industry practices.<br />

Driven by the strategic moves of competitors, industries pursue a<br />

relentless march toward commoditization. Under hypercompetition,<br />

imitation becomes increasingly fast and furious, and players aim to stem<br />

the tide of commoditization, or at least delay its arrival. Ultimately,<br />

however, th<strong>is</strong> leads to that “red ocean” of bloody competition, where<br />

business planners not only follow the same battlefield principles and<br />

obsessively benchmark their competitors, but also do little more than<br />

divide the ex<strong>is</strong>ting (and dimin<strong>is</strong>hing) market share into smaller and<br />

smaller pieces.<br />

True innovation involves eliminating some aspects of a company’s<br />

offerings in order to create others, in order to free the resources<br />

required to pursue higher-value added components to your business<br />

model. Moreover, Kim and Mauborgne argue, the “blue ocean”<br />

strategy provides the critical framework and tools to effect such a shift.<br />

Looking not at the supply side of the equation but rather at demand,<br />

the authors have created a number of analytical tools to “v<strong>is</strong>ualize” the<br />

big picture.<br />

Th<strong>is</strong> image graphically represents the “blue ocean” strategy concept.<br />

At the heart of the concept <strong>is</strong> the search for an area of “value<br />

innovation,” whereby companies simultaneously drop their cost<br />

structure and increase value to consumers. While th<strong>is</strong> concept may<br />

sound counterintuitive, th<strong>is</strong> report introduces the process by which<br />

credit unions can systematically pursue th<strong>is</strong> line of thinking.<br />

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Figure 1: Tools for <strong>Your</strong> <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy<br />

Tool<br />

Pioneer-Migrator-Settler (PMS) Map<br />

“As Is” Strategy Canvas<br />

Buyer Utility Map<br />

Six Paths Framework<br />

Four Actions Framework<br />

“To Be” Strategy Canvas<br />

Description<br />

Diagnostic tool to describe an<br />

organization’s portfolio of offerings.<br />

V<strong>is</strong>ual cue describing the strategic<br />

landscape of business today.<br />

Tool that describes how consumers<br />

experience an organization’s specific<br />

offerings.<br />

Structure that provides planners a variety<br />

of “paths” to “value innovation.”<br />

Structure that encourages planners to<br />

reduce the cost structure of the industry<br />

and increase buyer value by asking four<br />

questions about their business.<br />

V<strong>is</strong>ual cue describing the strategic<br />

landscape of business tomorrow.<br />

Ultimately, planners need to think outside their current mental<br />

frameworks, just as Zopa’s founders searched beyond self-imposed<br />

industry realities and perceived ex<strong>is</strong>ting demands. Can we learn from<br />

the Zopa experience and the “blue ocean” strategies Zopa employed,<br />

blending features from the contemporary eBay craze with the traditions<br />

of the cooperative movement to move beyond traditional market<br />

boundaries? Can credit unions profit by employing th<strong>is</strong> suggested<br />

frameworks and tools? After all, utilities and telecommunications firms<br />

have moved from safe-haven environments and their original fields of<br />

membership to the dynamic world of global telecommunication. The<br />

concepts behind “value innovation” thus offer an additional way for<br />

credit unions to explore market opportunities for sustainable growth.<br />

THE RESEARCH PROCESS<br />

Because strategic planning <strong>is</strong> a process, not an event, we set upon a<br />

journey to answer the following questions:<br />

• What will we d<strong>is</strong>cover if we put credit unions under the value<br />

innovation lens of analys<strong>is</strong>?<br />

• What <strong>is</strong> the current competitive nature of financial services players?<br />

• <strong>How</strong> do credit union strategies compare to those of large banks,<br />

nontraditional players, and other key competitors in the financial<br />

services industry?<br />

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• What are the uncontested market spaces credit unions can pursue?<br />

• What strategies can credit unions implement to pursue these<br />

uncontested market spaces?<br />

• Are there examples of credit unions pursuing “blue ocean” strategies?<br />

The Filene Research Institute held a two-day “<strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy:<br />

Value Innovation” workshop in Philadelphia in early January 2006.<br />

Additionally, we interviewed a dozen credit union leaders to seek<br />

additional insight into our research questions. Ultimately, we hoped<br />

to create the context for a better understanding of “value innovation”<br />

principles and practices, so that credit unions could better create and<br />

nurture cultures of innovation.<br />

Through the following sections, we illustrate each step of the value<br />

innovation process, along with industry cases and workshop examples<br />

to enhance ongoing planning at credit unions.<br />

• Step 1 involves mapping the current business portfolio of your<br />

organization (using the PMS Map).<br />

• Step 2 involves v<strong>is</strong>ualizing the current strategy through the<br />

creation of an “As Is” Strategy Canvas.<br />

• Step 3 moves into understanding the customers’ experience<br />

through the “Buyer Experience Cycle” tool.<br />

• Step 4 pushes beyond the boundaries of the industry and<br />

definitions of the business by learning from noncustomers.<br />

• Step 5 involves employing the “Six Paths Framework” to explore<br />

possible “blue oceans” across a variety of unique pathways that<br />

will eventually lead to a future—or “To Be”—Strategy Canvas.<br />

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Figure 2: <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy Process<br />

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Ultimately, we hope these steps will help to create new “blue ocean”<br />

strategies on which credit unions can build. Although “red oceans” will<br />

always ex<strong>is</strong>t in any competitive landscape, the “blue ocean” strategy<br />

offers an additional tool to help credit unions adapt to changing<br />

conditions. That process of adaptation begins with mapping the current<br />

state of play in one’s business environment on the PMS Map.<br />

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STEP 1:<br />

The <strong>Blue</strong><br />

<strong>Ocean</strong> Pioneer-<br />

Migrator-Settler<br />

(PMS) Map<br />

WHAT IS THE TOOL?<br />

The first value innovation tool <strong>is</strong> the PMS Map. Th<strong>is</strong> map helps credit<br />

unions analyze the “innovativeness” of their current portfolio of<br />

products/services and assess where profitable opportunities ex<strong>is</strong>t. To<br />

understand how to utilize th<strong>is</strong> map you must first understand what<br />

“pioneers,” “migrators,” and “settlers” are:<br />

1. Pioneers operate in true “blue oceans,” where they offer highly<br />

divergent products and/or services with mass-market appeal.<br />

2. Migrators are in limbo between “red” and “blue” oceans;<br />

they offer “more-for-less” products and services but do not<br />

change the shape of the industry nor change the rules of the<br />

competitive game.<br />

3. Settlers are mired in a “red ocean,” where they offer “me-too”<br />

products and services that conform to the industry and generate<br />

little in the way of long-term growth potential.<br />

A sample PMS Map may look like the below after analyzing a portfolio<br />

of products and services:<br />

Figure 3: Pioneer-Migrator-Settler Map<br />

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© Kim and Mauborgne 2005<br />

*Size of circle reflects the level of revenue generated by products or services.<br />

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Placing current products and services on the PMS Map can quickly,<br />

clearly, and forcefully drive home the current state of play in one’s<br />

business environment. The v<strong>is</strong>ual image also reveals that PMS mapping<br />

can help to challenge assumptions about current business portfolios,<br />

because it identifies and articulates the industry landscape. Since the<br />

sizes of the circles on the PMS Map reflect the relative level of revenue<br />

generated by a product or service, such an exerc<strong>is</strong>e ultimately forces<br />

dec<strong>is</strong>ion makers to examine the overall strategic health of the business<br />

and, more importantly, to identify future areas for potential growth.<br />

Long-term strateg<strong>is</strong>ts should seek to push more of their business<br />

upward, from “settlers” and “migrators” to “pioneers.”<br />

RESEARCH FINDINGS<br />

When we asked workshop participants to identify credit union products/<br />

services in each of the three categories, one senior executive declared,<br />

“I can’t think of a credit union anywhere that has things outside of<br />

the ‘settler’ category!” Although an extreme response, the statement<br />

was revealing and pointed to common cognitive biases influencing<br />

most credit unions’ abilities to develop sustainable growth strategies.<br />

Suggesting that participants think of the PMS Map as both a diagnostic<br />

and a strategic positioning and educational tool, we divided workshop<br />

participants into eight groups (of between eight and nine people each)<br />

to test the extreme response. We soon found that the initial declaration<br />

did not stray very far from credit union strategy development realities.<br />

To illustrate the point, when asked to l<strong>is</strong>t the ex<strong>is</strong>ting products and<br />

services offered by their businesses and to position those offerings into<br />

“settlers,” “migrators,” and “pioneers,” all the groups identified most<br />

credit unions’ tendency to focus on transaction products (checks, credit,<br />

and debit); auto, home, and unsecured loans; money market, and CD<br />

deposits; wealth management centered on retirement and annuities;<br />

and basic online services. Thus, most participants had to admit that<br />

their own business, as well as the industry as a whole, resides within<br />

the “settlers’” “red ocean.” With several small strokes, the process<br />

identified the general need for further strategic d<strong>is</strong>cussion and further<br />

planning, and the suitability of the “value innovation” model for credit<br />

union development.<br />

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Figure 4: Workshop PMS Map<br />

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When pressed to come up with “migrators” within the industry,<br />

workshop participants realized that they could name many credit<br />

unions that had tweaked their offerings in ways that give customers<br />

more value for less money. Participants quickly identified many<br />

“migrator” examples among a host of credit unions, including changes<br />

focused on affordable payday lending, debit cards, flexible accounts,<br />

e-banking add-ons, health savings accounts, packaging for different<br />

cultural/ethnic groups, indirect lending, shared branches, and some of<br />

Filene Research Institute’s new i 3 initiatives.<br />

MIGRATING AWAY FROM “ME-TOO”<br />

North Carolina <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> <strong>League</strong>’s (NCCUL) “Seeing Double” campaign can lay claim to “migrator” status. At first blush, “Seeing<br />

Double” appears to qualify as a value innovator. To solve the widely perceived industry problem that Americans simply do not seem<br />

to save money anymore, NCCUL’s marketing department created an imaginary employee in a fictional “Deposits Department” who<br />

accidentally doubled member deposits, either through incompetence or apathy. As part of a larger promotional campaign, the<br />

imaginary employee doubled deductions, direct deposits, down-payments, and check orders in order to give members who participated<br />

in the hoax a three-way chance to win up to $500. With th<strong>is</strong> variation on other innovative savings incentive experiments that combine<br />

banking with lotteries, NCCUL hoped to make banking fun and entice members into saving more. But did the credit union really<br />

“value innovate?” When forced to examine the scheme in greater detail, one must conclude that the promotional campaign merely<br />

offered a one-time chance to receive a little bit more of what credit unions already offer; and, moreover, it merely followed in the<br />

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path of “pioneer” value innovators such as the Latin and South American banks (respectively) Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBVA) and Banco<br />

Rio, which offer lottery-linked deposit accounts (LLDAs) that combine savings with a lottery. At BBVA and Banco Rio, each depositor<br />

typically receives one lottery chance per month for a certain amount of dollars deposited into a savings account. The depositor pays for<br />

th<strong>is</strong> chance to win by forgoing interest. Thus, these banks have eliminated interest for lottery playing depositors, and ra<strong>is</strong>ed customer<br />

expectations about receiving a substantial return if they win the lottery, including daily prizes such as cars or $22,000 in cash, and<br />

monthly prizes of more than $200,000. Although the odds of winning either remain astronomically low (approximately .000032%),<br />

depositors have flocked to such governmental and privately run financial institutions around the globe—from Mexico, Venezuela, and<br />

Columbia to the United Kingdom, Kenya, and Japan. Banco Rio alone reports an average of about 3,000,000 chances (tickets) per<br />

month, suggesting that deposits exceed $600,000,000. Despite a long and rich h<strong>is</strong>tory in lottery-linked products, no such initiative<br />

has taken place in the United States. With more research, there resides, perhaps, an opportunity for value innovation, particularly<br />

when one considers the American propensity to gamble on dreams of lottery largesse.<br />

Figure 5: Workshop L<strong>is</strong>ting of Potential Pioneers,<br />

Migrators and Settlers<br />

Potential Pioneers<br />

Potential Migrators<br />

Potential Settlers<br />

UPost<br />

Closed/Tight Field of Memberships<br />

Peer-to-Peer Lending<br />

Home Loan Payment Relief (HLPR) Mortgages<br />

Free Financial Education<br />

Gift Cards<br />

E-mail Alerts<br />

Health Savings Accounts<br />

Payday Loans / Check-Cashing<br />

Portable Mortgages<br />

Matrimoney TM<br />

Lifestyle Lending<br />

Rounded Transactions<br />

(Bank of America’s “Keep the Change”)<br />

Shared Branching<br />

All Traditional Products<br />

(almost all loan and deposit products)<br />

Online Services<br />

Business Services<br />

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Although workshop participants proposed several examples of<br />

“pioneer”-type initiatives, few examples held up under scrutiny. The<br />

UPost initiative remains one of the few exceptions, although it<br />

has quickly began moving into the status of “migrator” as more<br />

and more credit unions adopt and apply the service. Originally<br />

developed by Pennsylvania State Employee <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong>’s (PSECU)<br />

eCU Technologies, UPost allows members to enter deposits online via<br />

home banking before providing the credit union with an actual check.<br />

UPost emerged to foster credit union loyalty, particularly among<br />

members living at a d<strong>is</strong>tance from actual branches. UPost provides<br />

credit union members with in-house and service-bureau home banking<br />

solutions, e-statements, on-line lending services, kiosk machines, and<br />

report generator consulting services. It allowed PSECU to eliminate the<br />

waiting time members had to endure before they could access funds, and<br />

it also wiped out overdraft r<strong>is</strong>ks by making funds available immediately.<br />

It reduced maintenance in terms of the staffing levels required to check<br />

on member deposits. It ra<strong>is</strong>ed the profile of home banking. And it<br />

also created an automatic member qualification system, including file<br />

maintenance programs to run and track member accounts, qualifying<br />

members based on their credit h<strong>is</strong>tory. Moreover, UPost appears to<br />

have increased member loyalty.<br />

Ultimately, credit union strateg<strong>is</strong>ts will want to push more businesses<br />

toward becoming “pioneers,” all the while recognizing that “settlers”<br />

frequently continue to generate the cash flow to fund ongoing strategy<br />

development. As Kim and Mauborgne argue, balancing between<br />

profitable expansion and cash flow may help dec<strong>is</strong>ion makers to<br />

overcome the limitations of strategic planning. In the end, the PMS<br />

Map helps to shift the focus from number-crunching exerc<strong>is</strong>es that lead<br />

to little more than incrementally higher returns to building a bigger<br />

picture of possibilities for future expansion.<br />

Mapping in th<strong>is</strong> way not only identifies current strategies among<br />

credit unions (including cost structures, differentiation, and focus), it<br />

can also ass<strong>is</strong>t credit union managers to v<strong>is</strong>ualize opportunities for<br />

“migrators” and “pioneers,” all the while linking those opportunities<br />

to required capabilities and resources. Additionally, the exerc<strong>is</strong>e can<br />

dramatically illustrate the day-to-day experiences of credit union<br />

managers that currently elude board members and staff. As credit union<br />

executives already know, retail banking has become an extremely bloody<br />

proposition, particularly when one considers the seemingly inevitable<br />

entry of Wal-Mart and other mega-entrants into the financial services<br />

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industry. Creating ever more turbulent “red ocean” waters, these trends<br />

signal the pressing need for credit union innovation.<br />

Following the PMS mapping exerc<strong>is</strong>e, the next step involves seeking<br />

a point of differentiation—that obvious candidate product or service<br />

for value innovation. A well-establ<strong>is</strong>hed “settler” often makes a good<br />

candidate. Once workshop participants had identified all the key<br />

offerings, mapping and labeling each one as a circle on a blank PMS<br />

Map (with circle size indicating the relative size of the products/services),<br />

we asked our credit union executives to review their assumptions and to<br />

identify the processes by which they developed each offering’s strategy.<br />

Planning experience reveals that typical processes often start with<br />

cognitive biases that ultimately lead to the following four results:<br />

• Muddled strategies and “me-too” approaches<br />

• Internal rather than consumer focus<br />

• Divergence between top-down strategy and bottom-up<br />

budgeting<br />

• Bulky documents read by no one<br />

Significantly, all that work often leads to naught. Indeed, line managers,<br />

rank-and-file staff members, and members tend to res<strong>is</strong>t unfocused<br />

directives to change direction. Conversely, “blue ocean” strateg<strong>is</strong>ts<br />

achieve a high degree of successful buy-in to their business plans<br />

because they adhere to three qualities necessary for a strong and<br />

profitable strategy:<br />

• Focus<br />

• Divergence<br />

• Compelling tag line<br />

With these ideas and caveats in mind, we asked our credit union<br />

workshop participants to select an obvious candidate product or<br />

service for value innovation.<br />

Armed with PMS Maps and the rules for the focus-divergencecompelling-tag-line<br />

litmus test, our credit union executives regrouped<br />

to d<strong>is</strong>cuss how their current portfolios should evolve over time to<br />

create growth for their businesses and the industry. Effective planning<br />

requires qualitative teamwork (validated by quantitative data where<br />

possible and necessary) and v<strong>is</strong>ual exploration of the world created by<br />

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such tools as PMS Maps. It also relies on d<strong>is</strong>cussions about possibilities<br />

for value innovation; follow-up field research on customers, users,<br />

nonusers, lost customers, alternatives, and the like; further litmus test<br />

d<strong>is</strong>cussions on futures; refinements on creating a true “blue ocean”<br />

strategy of value innovation; and ongoing communication to effect<br />

smooth implementation. We had a beginning, and once each group<br />

of participants had identified candidates for innovation, we were able<br />

to move on to the next step in the process: v<strong>is</strong>ualizing current strategy<br />

by drawing the world we already knew, and using the “As Is” Strategy<br />

Canvas to create the value curves on which credit unions currently<br />

conduct their business.<br />

TRY IT OUT YOURSELF<br />

Developing the PMS Map: Principles<br />

L<strong>is</strong>t the ex<strong>is</strong>ting products and services offered by your credit union, and<br />

position them into the three following categories:<br />

• Pioneers: highly divergent offerings with mass-market appeal<br />

• Migrators: offerings that fall between “pioneers” and “settlers,”<br />

offering value improvements but not changing the rules of the<br />

competitive game<br />

• Settlers: “me-too” types of products/services<br />

Figure 6: Pioneer-Migrator-Settler Products and Services<br />

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DRAWING YOUR PMS MAP<br />

1. Choose a representative sample of products and services that reflect<br />

the current strategic portfolio of your business unit (choose between<br />

five and 10 offerings to post on your PMS Map).<br />

2. Using the standard template provided, represent each of the selected<br />

products and services offered as a colored circle on the PMS<br />

template.<br />

3. The size of the circle should reflect the relative level of revenues<br />

generated by the product or service<br />

Figure 7: Pioneer-Migrator-Settler Map<br />

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On the bas<strong>is</strong> of your PMS Map, please review the assumptions<br />

underlying the business’s strategy. D<strong>is</strong>cuss how the current portfolio<br />

should evolve over time in order to create growth for the credit union.<br />

Choose your d<strong>is</strong>cussion by selecting an obvious product or service<br />

for innovation (a well establ<strong>is</strong>hed “settler” usually makes a good<br />

candidate).<br />

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STEP 2:<br />

V<strong>is</strong>ualizing<br />

Current Strategy:<br />

The “As Is”<br />

Strategy Canvas<br />

WHAT IS THE TOOL?<br />

Having reviewed your portfolio with the PMS Map, the next step<br />

<strong>is</strong> to draw up your “As Is” Strategy Canvas. The “As Is” Strategy<br />

Canvas focuses attention on the current state of play at the businessoffering<br />

level, and helps attain a common perception of reality. The<br />

canvas captures the four key elements of strategy: the key factors of<br />

competition; the levels of offering buyers receive; the industry-cost<br />

drivers; and the company’s and its competitors’ comparative strategic<br />

profiles. It illustrates how a given business competes, whom it competes<br />

with, and where its strategy diverges (if at all) from its competition’s.<br />

Lastly, it allows for d<strong>is</strong>cussion of whether the current strategy meets<br />

the three criteria that define a good strategy: focus, divergence, and a<br />

compelling tag line that speaks to the market.<br />

Figure 8: As Is Strategy Canvas<br />

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There are two components to a value curve:<br />

• Key elements consumers consider when choosing a<br />

financial institution<br />

• Offering level of each element<br />

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1. The first step cons<strong>is</strong>ts of identifying/selecting the relevant key<br />

elements. Most probably appear in your value proposition. Key<br />

elements can be related to the product, service, and delivery content<br />

of the offering. They are not a l<strong>is</strong>t of internal-offering features;<br />

however, price <strong>is</strong> always a key element. The maximum number of key<br />

elements should be 10.<br />

2. The second step cons<strong>is</strong>ts of scoring the offering levels of each<br />

key element on a 1-5 scale, 1 being a low level and 5 being an<br />

excellent level.<br />

RESEARCH FINDINGS<br />

We asked our workshop participants to choose one business line within<br />

their organization and one customer type or segment to focus on.<br />

They then had to consider the following questions: “Is my business a<br />

‘pioneer’? If not, what components make my business a ‘migrator’ or<br />

a ‘settler’?”<br />

The “As Is” Strategy Canvas not only illustrates how one business<br />

competes, it also depicts where each player’s strategy diverges from<br />

others in the field. Moreover, it allows for a more nuanced dialogue<br />

about the business’s cultural lens and dominant course, and whether<br />

current strategies meet or optimize those all-important tests for value<br />

innovation: focus, divergence, and a compelling tag line.<br />

But where do those “As Is” value curves come from? They derive from<br />

answers to critical questions about the current state of the business,<br />

as well as its current customers and competitors. Past research 6<br />

determined that the following factors influence consumer choice in<br />

financial services:<br />

6<br />

“Building Trust and Long-Term Relationships with Generation X, Generation<br />

Y, and Baby Boomers” (Filene Research Institute, 2006); and “Consumer<br />

Relationships with Financial Institutions” (Filene Research Institute, 1993).<br />

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Figure 9: Factors Which Influence Consumer Choice<br />

in Financial Services<br />

Competitive Loan Rates<br />

Trust in FI<br />

Reputation of FI<br />

Having a Past H<strong>is</strong>tory with FI<br />

Trust in Loan Officer<br />

Family/Friend Recommendation<br />

Quality of Service<br />

D<strong>is</strong>tance from Residence<br />

Convenient Hours<br />

Convenient Location<br />

Service Charges/Fees<br />

Safety of Institution<br />

Clarity of Statements<br />

Accuracy of Statements<br />

Friendly, Courteous Staff<br />

Low Rates on Loans<br />

Loan Approval Time<br />

Knowledge of Loan Officer<br />

Recommendation from Friend or Family<br />

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In line with ex<strong>is</strong>ting research, workshop participants identified eight<br />

critical or key elements that matter to consumers of financial services:<br />

convenience, low rates, trustworthiness, reliability, security, image,<br />

speed, and fun. (Of course, price always emerges as a key element on<br />

any strategy canvas, and has meaning only when it appears as the most<br />

important consideration on which consumers make trade-offs). With<br />

key factors identified by the customer, our participants then answered<br />

questions centered on each element’s level of offering, including, “What<br />

does the customer currently want or expect from the industry?” and<br />

“What do industry players currently compete on and for in th<strong>is</strong> market?”<br />

Making a l<strong>is</strong>t of key factors of competition—as customers would talk<br />

about them—our participants filled out the following template:<br />

Figure 10: L<strong>is</strong>ting the Key Factors of Competition<br />

Level of Offering (0 to 5)<br />

You<br />

Competition/<br />

Best Alternative<br />

Price (Rate)<br />

Convenience<br />

Trustworthiness<br />

Reliability<br />

Security<br />

Image<br />

Speed<br />

Fun<br />

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First, they assessed their own relative level of offering in the “You”<br />

column, with three representing the industry average and five the<br />

highest-level offering. Repeating the assessment in the column<br />

“Competition/Best Alternative” for one or more competitors available<br />

to current customers.<br />

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Placing price (always) as the first element, our participants then ranked<br />

the remainder of their key elements, ordering them from the lowest<br />

to the highest value. For each element, participants also ranked the<br />

level of offering for competitors such as Bank of America and local<br />

community banks. The result <strong>is</strong> the following retail financial servicesspecific<br />

Strategy Canvas, complete with three “different” value curves.<br />

Figure 11: “As Is” Value Curve, Retail Financial Services<br />

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Together with the PMS Map, the “As Is” Strategy Canvas confirms that<br />

simple pictures can often reveal much more than any stat<strong>is</strong>tical table or<br />

lengthy report that produce quantitative evidence about an industry, its<br />

customers, and its competition. Drawing value curves forces dec<strong>is</strong>ion<br />

makers and planners to ask, among other things, questions about<br />

levels of industry convergence, divergence, and maturity, where current<br />

competitors place most emphas<strong>is</strong> on whether or not their own business<br />

strategies diverge from other industry players, and, most importantly,<br />

where spaces for immediate divergence already ex<strong>is</strong>t. Ultimately, th<strong>is</strong><br />

powerful v<strong>is</strong>ual tool prompts strateg<strong>is</strong>ts to ask, “What should we<br />

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change in the way that we do things?” Again, credit union executives<br />

can use the strategy canvas and its “As Is” curve exerc<strong>is</strong>es for a host of<br />

planning activities, including diagnostics, education (among executives,<br />

board members, and staff), and as a means of identifying a host of<br />

concerns. It would appear that credit unions have many opportunities<br />

for change—at present they do nothing more than parallel the value<br />

curves of megabanks and community banks. Th<strong>is</strong> sentiment was<br />

recently reinforced by Harvard Business School strategy guru Michael<br />

Porter, during h<strong>is</strong> 2005 address to the Bank Admin<strong>is</strong>tration Institute:<br />

“Most banks don’t have a clear strategy. The banking industry<br />

<strong>is</strong> basically riddled with ‘me-too’ competition. That works<br />

fine when tides are r<strong>is</strong>ing, but not forever. Banks have been<br />

protected a lot by inertia and ‘stickiness’ on the customer<br />

side. But the pressure will grow as the era of consolidation<br />

and restructuring abates. We’re entering a period of strategic<br />

positioning. Increasingly, banks will have to be able to deliver<br />

something d<strong>is</strong>tinctive to their customers. Very few banks have<br />

the courage to have a d<strong>is</strong>tinctive value proposition from their<br />

competitors. You must have clarity of purpose.”<br />

At th<strong>is</strong> point in our research, we establ<strong>is</strong>hed that credit unions firmly<br />

reside in a “red ocean.” To imagine a different set of strategies and an<br />

alternative future, credit unions need to go beyond recognition of the<br />

problem and delve into one of the most important factors in value<br />

innovation: the consumer experience. Exploring “blue ocean” strategies<br />

requires that credit unions deconstruct the consumer experience from a<br />

variety of angles and perspectives.<br />

TRY IT OUT YOURSELF<br />

1. Choose one business line within your organization.<br />

2. Choose one customer type or segment on which to focus.<br />

3. Try to answer such questions as: What does the customer want/expect<br />

today from the industry? What do current players in the industry<br />

compete with today? Make a l<strong>is</strong>t of the key factors of competition as<br />

members might describe them.<br />

4. In the “You” column, assess your relative level of offering (a level of<br />

three represents the industry’s average).<br />

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5. In the “Competition/ Best Alternative” column, repeat the assessment<br />

for one of your competitors available to your customer.<br />

6. Calculate the difference: Difference=You minus Competition/Best<br />

Alternative.<br />

7. In the “Rank Order” column, order the key factors of competition<br />

from the lowest to the highest value of D (remember that price <strong>is</strong><br />

always #1 and comes first on the left side of the value curve).<br />

8. Map the key elements for you and the Competition/Best Alternative<br />

on the strategy canvas in Figure 13.<br />

Figure 12: L<strong>is</strong>ting the Key Factors of You and <strong>Your</strong> Competitor<br />

Level of Offering (0 to 5)<br />

You<br />

Competition/<br />

Best Alternative<br />

Difference<br />

(Y-C)<br />

Rank<br />

Order<br />

Price (Rate) 1<br />

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Figure 13: “As Is” Strategy Canvas<br />

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Consider the following general leading questions to help you interpret<br />

the key messages and questions your “As Is” Strategy Canvas <strong>is</strong><br />

ra<strong>is</strong>ing:<br />

1. What <strong>is</strong> the level of convergence or divergence with the overall<br />

industry?<br />

2. <strong>How</strong> mature <strong>is</strong> the industry?<br />

3. Where does the current competition put most of its emphas<strong>is</strong>?<br />

4. <strong>How</strong> divergent <strong>is</strong> your offering from the competition?<br />

5. Where do you see space for immediate divergence?<br />

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STEP 3:<br />

Understanding<br />

The Customers’<br />

Experience<br />

WHAT IS THE TOOL?<br />

A customer’s experience can usually be broken down into a cycle of<br />

d<strong>is</strong>tinct stages, running more or less sequentially from need to d<strong>is</strong>posal.<br />

You may find it necessary to rename some of these stages to fit the<br />

specifications of credit unions.<br />

Each stage encompasses a wide variety of specific experiences that may<br />

translate for the customer into a sense of sat<strong>is</strong>faction, d<strong>is</strong>sat<strong>is</strong>faction,<br />

frustration, or even pain. Some of these experiences may leave the<br />

customer indifferent, while others may stimulate unconscious (and<br />

unserved) needs or desires.<br />

The buyer experience cycle will uncover which assumptions increase<br />

costs without significantly ra<strong>is</strong>ing customer utility. By seeing the<br />

detractions from value and removing these roadblocks to buyer utility,<br />

and by reducing costs not associated with utility creation, initial<br />

opportunities to “value innovate” begin to emerge.<br />

Figure 14: The Buyer Experience Cycle<br />

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© Kim and Mauborgne 2005<br />

Maximizing member sat<strong>is</strong>faction, loyalty, and value requires an indepth<br />

understanding of how consumers experience products and<br />

services. Many technology-driven firms have d<strong>is</strong>covered, much to<br />

their shareholders’ consternation, that customers do not necessarily<br />

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eat a path to the better mousetrap’s door, no matter how elegant<br />

its construction. Customers care about a whole lot more than the<br />

mousetrap itself—they want ease of purchase, hassle-free delivery and<br />

maintenance, and relatively painless buy-in, use, and d<strong>is</strong>posal options.<br />

Defining and optimizing the buyer’s experiences with product and<br />

service offerings can help to identify and prioritize opportunities to<br />

develop not just better mousetraps, but deeper and more sat<strong>is</strong>fying<br />

relationships with customers.<br />

Many customers’ soon-to-be ex-suppliers of products and services<br />

create their own problems by failing to pose critical questions about<br />

buyer utility. <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy reminds us that while robust business<br />

models depend upon the proper blending of buyer utility, price, cost,<br />

and adoption of products and services (without the former none of the<br />

latter elements matter at all), if we cannot come up with compelling<br />

reasons why the critical mass of people should buy our product or<br />

services we have only two choices: either to “park the idea,” or to<br />

rethink it until we can say, “Yes, without a doubt, there <strong>is</strong> exceptional<br />

buyer utility in th<strong>is</strong> product or service idea.” 7<br />

RESEARCH FINDINGS<br />

Most consumers go through a six-stage experience when buying a<br />

product or service:<br />

• Initial purchase<br />

• Delivery<br />

• Use<br />

• Supplemental purchases<br />

• Maintenance<br />

• D<strong>is</strong>posal<br />

Within each of these stages, consumers also experience a variety of<br />

benefits or frustrations. For example, the elements of optimal price,<br />

convenience, reliability, fun, etc., are identified as “utility levers.”<br />

7<br />

Kim and Mauborgne, <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy, 118.<br />

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We asked our workshop participants to consider their members’<br />

experience in light of the following diagram:<br />

Figure 15: The Buyer Experience Cycle<br />

Purchase Delivery Use Supplement Maintenance D<strong>is</strong>posal<br />

Customer<br />

Productivity<br />

Simplicity<br />

Convenience<br />

R<strong>is</strong>k<br />

Fun &<br />

Image<br />

With PMS Maps and strategy canvases in hand, our workshop<br />

participants began to d<strong>is</strong>assemble their members’ experiences.<br />

Rethinking the series of d<strong>is</strong>crete stages (running more or less<br />

sequentially from need and want to ultimate d<strong>is</strong>posal), credit union<br />

executives quickly saw that each stage in the buyers’ cycle actually<br />

encompasses the possibility for a wide range of experiences, not all<br />

of them weighted equally. By placing themselves in their members’<br />

shoes, our workshop participants began to identify those experiences.<br />

In addition, they gained a better appreciation of the experiences<br />

that could induce d<strong>is</strong>sat<strong>is</strong>faction, frustration, and even pain. More<br />

important, they began to grasp better ways in which to stimulate<br />

unconscious (and underserved) needs and desires among consumers<br />

shopping for financial services. Together, these realizations helped<br />

to prompt d<strong>is</strong>cussions about how to unlock value for both members<br />

and credit unions. For example, most consumers care about how long<br />

it takes to find the product or service they need, yet few companies<br />

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think about th<strong>is</strong> when planning future strategies. Moreover, while<br />

some consumers care little about the attractiveness of the financial<br />

institutions they v<strong>is</strong>it, they may well resent an inaccessible one,<br />

particularly if it costs a great deal of both time and money to access<br />

it. Additionally, some consumers enjoy unpacking and installing new<br />

products and receiving training to use them, but most do not. And<br />

costs involved with supplements, maintenance, and d<strong>is</strong>posal matter to<br />

most consumers, as well.<br />

Working on a Buyer Experience Cycle exerc<strong>is</strong>e can thus serve at least<br />

two objectives: it can provide initial insight into the unquestioned<br />

(but reversible) assumptions industry participants share that may<br />

detract from the value of a service or product, and it can uncover<br />

the overconfidence, tunnel v<strong>is</strong>ion, and rationalizations that increase<br />

costs without significantly ra<strong>is</strong>ing customer utility. By perceiving value<br />

detractors, removing roadblocks to buyer utility, and reducing costs<br />

not associated with utility creation and enhancement, opportunities to<br />

“value innovate” begin to emerge.<br />

To illustrate the usefulness of testing for exceptional buyer utility,<br />

our credit union workshop participants examined the specific avenues<br />

through which consumers obtain automobile loans. Placing our<br />

workshop attendees into three groups, we asked each group to identify<br />

the Buyer Experience Cycles for the entire automobile-purchasing<br />

process. D<strong>is</strong>playing their findings on the following Buyer Utility Maps,<br />

our mapmakers gave specific names to the stages of their buyers’<br />

experience cycle on the horizontal ax<strong>is</strong>. They also named the “utility<br />

levers” on the vertical ax<strong>is</strong> to fit current perceptions about the reality<br />

of member-credit union interactions. Finally, they identified perceived<br />

“blocks” to customer utility, placing “pain points” (signified by “*”)<br />

inside those boxes where the industry seems to add costs without<br />

significantly increasing customer sat<strong>is</strong>faction.<br />

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Figure 16: Buyer Utility Maps<br />

Buyers Experience Levers<br />

Group 1<br />

Research<br />

Apply<br />

Offer/<br />

Accept<br />

Cross-<br />

Selling<br />

Fulfillment<br />

Price<br />

Utility Levers<br />

Convenience<br />

*<br />

Usability<br />

* *<br />

Choice<br />

*<br />

Speed<br />

R<strong>is</strong>k<br />

*<br />

Group 2<br />

Decide<br />

Buyers Experience Levers<br />

Select<br />

Vehicle<br />

Simplicity<br />

* * *<br />

Finance Close Repay<br />

Utility Levers<br />

Convenience<br />

* * *<br />

Time<br />

*<br />

Experience<br />

* *<br />

Confidence<br />

* *<br />

Buyers Experience Levers<br />

Group 3<br />

Buy Deliver Use Supplements Maintenance D<strong>is</strong>posal<br />

Simplicity<br />

* *<br />

Utility Levers<br />

Convenience<br />

* *<br />

Price<br />

R<strong>is</strong>k<br />

*<br />

Fun<br />

* * * * * *<br />

* Indicates pain points in process.<br />

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Although each of our three Buyer Utility Maps differs, some common<br />

elements emerged from the process. All credit union participants<br />

perceived convenience as a utility lever. Indeed, not only does finding a<br />

convenient loan on which to finance an automobile purchase matter to<br />

buyers, but, all other things being equal, they will also cons<strong>is</strong>tently seek<br />

a lending source that makes life easier, no matter what the cost. At the<br />

same time, however, the v<strong>is</strong>ual exerc<strong>is</strong>e forced our executives to admit<br />

that credit unions create pain points all along the “Convenience” row,<br />

suggesting that someone could unlock exceptional utility for consumers<br />

if they offered handier products and services. Simplicity and price<br />

emerged as significant on two of the three maps as well, suggesting<br />

further opportunities for improvement. Significantly, only one map<br />

identified “fun” as a utility lever; however, when asked to think about<br />

“blocks” and “pain points,” our workshop participants reg<strong>is</strong>tered them<br />

all along the “Fun” row. Zopa and other on-line financial services<br />

providers have tapped into all of these pain points, and their experience<br />

reveals that credit unions might do well to think about convenience,<br />

simplicity, and fun as pain point opportunities for value innovation.<br />

Along with PMS Maps and strategy canvases, Buyer Utility Maps can<br />

unearth new opportunities for credit unions, not only in terms of new<br />

offerings but also in order to eliminate some of those pain points that<br />

stand between the member and exceptional value.<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> union executives have much work to do if they hope to capture<br />

some of the open space that prom<strong>is</strong>es to generate sustainable growth<br />

for themselves and their membership. In addition, they have much to<br />

learn from all of those noncustomers with whom they might build a<br />

more robust future. In fact, understanding what noncustomers want<br />

and need plays a pivotal role in unleashing exceptional value while<br />

simultaneously driving down costs. Although credit unions currently<br />

serve nearly 87 million members, long-term viability centers on<br />

reaching those other 200 million and counting noncustomers. We turn<br />

to them next.<br />

TRY IT OUT YOURSELF<br />

1. First, identify a typical credit union Buyer Experience Cycle, such as<br />

a mortgage or an auto loan.<br />

2. Next, identify the blocks to utility. Ask “What spaces does our<br />

industry currently occupy? Where <strong>is</strong> the industry blocking customer<br />

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utility across the 36 spaces?” Place astericks in the spaces that you<br />

perceive as roadblocks.<br />

3. Identify the cost components that do not add utility. Ask “On what<br />

spaces does our industry focus its costs? Where <strong>is</strong> the industry<br />

adding costs while not significantly adding to customer utility<br />

across the 36 spaces?”<br />

4. Map your findings on the Buyer Utility Map.<br />

Note: these negatives today are positives for strategy tomorrow.<br />

Figure 17: Buyer Utility Map<br />

The Six Stages of the Buyer Experience Cycle<br />

Purchase Delivery Use Supplements Maintenance D<strong>is</strong>posal<br />

Customer<br />

Productivity<br />

Simplicity<br />

The Six Utility Levers<br />

Convenience<br />

R<strong>is</strong>k<br />

Fun &<br />

Image<br />

Eco-<br />

Friendliness<br />

© Kim and Mauborgne 2005<br />

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STEP 4:<br />

Learning from<br />

Noncustomers<br />

WHAT IS THE TOOL?<br />

To develop a new value curve (one that <strong>is</strong> different from the “As Is”<br />

curve d<strong>is</strong>cussed earlier), it <strong>is</strong> important to look beyond the conventional<br />

boundaries of the industry. Insights come from a better understanding<br />

of the customers’ experience, but also from explicitly challenging the<br />

conventional w<strong>is</strong>dom of what the industry has “trained” customers to<br />

expect. We have observed that breakthrough ideas are likely to come<br />

through learning from noncustomers.<br />

In most industries, businesses tend to limit their strategic v<strong>is</strong>ion to the<br />

conventional boundaries defined by competitive strategy. Noncustomers<br />

uncover new elements of value that can be introduced into a business’s<br />

new value curve. Th<strong>is</strong> <strong>is</strong> an analys<strong>is</strong> that encourages systematic<br />

“thinking outside of industry norms.” It questions, one by one, the<br />

conventional assumptions and rules of the game of the current “red<br />

ocean” strategy of retail financial services.<br />

We examine three tiers of noncustomers—“soon-to-be” noncustomers,<br />

“refusers,” and the “unexplored”—and gain insight into why they do<br />

not consume a given product or service.<br />

RESEARCH FINDINGS<br />

According to the Annie E. Casey Foundation (AECF), some 22,000<br />

payday loan stores extended approximately $40 billion worth of highinterest<br />

credit to Americans during 2004. Although opportun<strong>is</strong>tic,<br />

and even predatory, payday lenders and many other alternative<br />

financial-service (AFS) providers (such as check-cashing stores,<br />

pawnbrokers, rent-to-own outlets, and most sub-prime mortgage<br />

houses) meet a consumer demand, particularly among the 20 to 30<br />

million low-income and low-asset Americans currently underserved<br />

by traditional financial institutions. Low-income, low-asset families<br />

seem to make choices that betray their own interests; however, as<br />

Filene Research Institute’s director of field projects, Lo<strong>is</strong> I. Kitsch,<br />

has argued, “the alternative financial industry serves a useful yet<br />

costly function.” Moreover, whether right or wrong, America’s poor<br />

opt for the alternative financial industry because it stands as one of<br />

the few outlets currently available to them. Filene’s “REAL Solutions”<br />

(to build Relevance, Effectiveness, Assets, and Loyalty among the<br />

underserved) further reveals that if credit unions provided a better,<br />

low-cost/high-value alternative to th<strong>is</strong> underserved and exploited<br />

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segment of the American population, member-strateg<strong>is</strong>ts might<br />

d<strong>is</strong>cover a tributary leading to another “blue ocean.” 8<br />

Case Study: ASI Federal <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

ASI Federal <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> of Lou<strong>is</strong>iana <strong>is</strong> a case in point. By following the path toward the underserved, ASI reached beyond current<br />

demand to create value for members and for the institution itself, further suggesting that credit union executives still have much to<br />

learn from current members as well as from those nonmembers just beyond their immediate reach. Originally the Avondale Shipyard<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong>, ASI has long faced the challenge of serving the working poor (currently 65% of the institution’s membership). Most of<br />

ASI’s working-poor members also struggle with insufficient education, limited employment opportunities, and shaky credit ratings,<br />

resulting in the lack of a safety net when things go from bad to worse. ASI’s low-income, low-asset members have always wanted<br />

to make regular payments on their loans but they have often gone through periods when they simply could not do so (a situation<br />

made all the more precarious after Hurricane Katrina). But hurricanes and other d<strong>is</strong>asters merely confirmed what Audrey Cer<strong>is</strong>e, ASI’s<br />

president and CEO, has always known—poor people have great integrity and will work with those who pledge to work with them.<br />

Reporting on the credit union’s portfolio in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Cer<strong>is</strong>e claimed that, despite mounting troubles, ASI’s poorer<br />

members had marched into the credit union ins<strong>is</strong>ting that they would pay off their loans even if they no longer had the items they<br />

had purchased. Cer<strong>is</strong>e knows that credit unions can serve the poor successfully and profitably despite the challenges. ASI <strong>is</strong> a case in<br />

point: by observing the ways in which other institutions—such as Habitat for Humanity—created products and services with safety nets<br />

built into them, and by looking for creative ways to do what credit unions do best—loan money without charging usurious interest<br />

rates—ASI found creative and profitable ways to service the underserved. 9<br />

At ASI, value innovation flows from dealing with the realities that shape the lives of the credit union’s membership. Believing that poor<br />

working people need a safety net, ASI’s loan officers developed a system to evaluate requests not only with respect to the ability to pay<br />

but also with respect to the assumption that members will go through periods when they simply cannot make payments. Developing a<br />

loan offering that also contains a saving component, ASI’s members can make extra, rainy day payments in advance. Advance payments<br />

help to lower the r<strong>is</strong>k of nonpayment when members run into Katrina-like dilemmas, but ASI also promotes a comprehensive financial<br />

education that bolsters members’ desires to save. Borrowing ideas from their affiliations with Habitat for Humanity, Girls Hope Boys<br />

Hope, and Rebuilding Together (formerly the Chr<strong>is</strong>tmas in April project), and building on their deep knowledge of the region ASI<br />

serves, Cer<strong>is</strong>e and her staff created flexible products, ra<strong>is</strong>ed the profile of financial education services, and reduced or eliminated<br />

everything else. When asked if she deems ASI’s lean, large, and profitable operation exceptional, Cer<strong>is</strong>e cons<strong>is</strong>tently responds, “No. We<br />

simply do what credit unions are supposed to do.” With all due respect to Cer<strong>is</strong>e, we d<strong>is</strong>agree. Given the underserved millions in the<br />

United States and elsewhere, we believe Cer<strong>is</strong>e has long been a guiding light for innovative institutions.<br />

8<br />

REAL Solutions: Solving the Financial Service Needs of America’s Working<br />

Families (Filene Research Institute, 2006).<br />

9<br />

Interview with Audrey D. Cer<strong>is</strong>e, March 2006. See also http://www.asifcu.org<br />

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Of course, low-income, low-asset members of society have plentiful<br />

company among consumers in other segments of the population;<br />

indeed, consumers tend to make trade-offs among their available<br />

choices (that <strong>is</strong>, until a better alternative surfaces). Managers too<br />

often focus on industry perceptions and competition rather than on<br />

the more valuable, and hence more profitable, exploratory ocean of<br />

both customers and noncustomers (those multitudes who continue to<br />

consume beyond our purview because they do not perceive us a better<br />

alternative to the product or service they currently use). On the face<br />

of it, th<strong>is</strong> seems obvious, but as we saw in Step 3, surpr<strong>is</strong>ingly few<br />

people involved in business development keep the buyers’ experience<br />

in mind when formulating strategy. Victims of tunnel v<strong>is</strong>ion and<br />

overconfidence, most business planners cling to conventional beliefs,<br />

inadvertently handicap the design of compelling value, and assume that<br />

their products or services will (continue to) sell themselves. Failing to<br />

imagine new ideas, they also tend to d<strong>is</strong>m<strong>is</strong>s the regular cries of current<br />

customers, soon-to-be noncustomers, and the never-were and neverintend-to-be<br />

customers, all of whom cons<strong>is</strong>tently vote with their feet,<br />

finding outlets for their needs and desires in places that give them, for<br />

better or worse, what they want. 10<br />

Th<strong>is</strong> sort of cognitive d<strong>is</strong>sonance between sellers and buyers points to<br />

one of the other guiding principles of “value innovation”: the need to<br />

know what noncustomers want, including all those racial and ethnic<br />

minorities, younger generations, and poorer populations whom credit<br />

unions and banks cons<strong>is</strong>tently underserve. Value innovation only takes<br />

place when entrepreneurs, firms, and industries reach beyond ex<strong>is</strong>ting<br />

demand into the three tiers of noncustomers:<br />

• The “soon-to-be” noncustomers, just waiting for a reason or<br />

chance to go somewhere else;<br />

• The “refusers,” who long ago made a conscious choice to avoid<br />

certain markets; and<br />

• The “unexplored,” those noncustomers who have typically delved<br />

into d<strong>is</strong>tant markets to find what they want.<br />

Of course, looking at noncustomers defies common practice; indeed,<br />

company planners who consider customers at all usually focus on<br />

10<br />

For a comprehensive guide to current thinking on Leon Festinger’s influential<br />

theory of cognitive d<strong>is</strong>sonance (introduced in 1954), see Eddie Harmon-Jones and<br />

Judson Mills, eds., Cognitive D<strong>is</strong>sonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social<br />

Psychology (American Psychological Association, 1999).<br />

41


the ex<strong>is</strong>ting ones. Fixing their gaze there, they thus promote further<br />

segmentation to meet the needs of increasingly diverse audiences<br />

within known market space. Thus, most businesses get stuck in “red<br />

oceans,” where they divide up smaller and smaller pieces of the market<br />

until someone else jumps on the opportunities they m<strong>is</strong>sed. Savvy<br />

“blue ocean” strateg<strong>is</strong>ts take a longer view, plunging into the deep<br />

unknown: the harder-to-d<strong>is</strong>cover but more deeply rewarding world<br />

of noncustomers. 11<br />

To develop a new, divergent value curve, we asked our credit union<br />

workshop participants to search beyond the conventional boundaries<br />

of the industry. Recognizing from past exerc<strong>is</strong>es that insights not<br />

only emerge from a better understanding of customer experience but<br />

also from explicitly challenging the conventional w<strong>is</strong>dom of what<br />

the industry has “trained” customers to expect, our executives soon<br />

observed that breakthrough ideas often flow from what planners can<br />

learn from noncustomers and the underserved.<br />

Thus, with respect to that first tier of noncustomers, our workshop<br />

participants had to ask themselves why some people ins<strong>is</strong>t upon<br />

sitting on the edge of credit unions, only joining one if they can<br />

find no better alternative. Th<strong>is</strong> proved a difficult exerc<strong>is</strong>e, and most<br />

participants conceded that they needed further reflection to come up<br />

with “blue ocean” ideas. We were not surpr<strong>is</strong>ed to learn th<strong>is</strong>. To reach<br />

(and retain) noncustomers, we must first focus not on the differences<br />

between those ready to jump ship but rather on what our “soon-to-be”<br />

noncustomers have in common. What do they want that credit unions<br />

do not currently offer? Perhaps some niche group members want what<br />

Zopa provides—both the feel of a credit union as well as a greater<br />

understanding of members’ needs and desires as working professionals<br />

with lumpy incomes, Internet know-how, and virtual sociabilities. As<br />

Zopa reveals, we should be looking beyond just the financial services<br />

to see what customers want, including what matters to them as human<br />

beings and consumers of goods and services outside the financial<br />

services industry.<br />

Take, for example, the instance of first-tier noncustomers—the “soonto-be”<br />

noncustomers—sharing common concerns about both the<br />

inconveniences and the difficulties of financing automobile loans<br />

through credit unions. UPost could solve the former problem but might<br />

not necessarily be able to help with the latter one. Solving the common<br />

11<br />

Kim and Mauborgne, <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy, 101-115.<br />

42


problems that automobile loan seekers face might convince those soonto-be<br />

noncustomers that they have a better future on the credit union<br />

side of the financial services industry fence.<br />

Figure 18: Common Reasons First-Tier Noncustomers,<br />

Soon-To-Be Nonusers, Don’t Use <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong>s<br />

Didn’t turn account into relationship<br />

(fast money in CD, single loan, etc.)<br />

Poor experience<br />

Better rate/product elsewhere<br />

Angry about loan dec<strong>is</strong>ion<br />

Death<br />

Lack of product depth<br />

Convenience of branch/ATM<br />

Moved<br />

Consolidation of accounts<br />

Not convenient<br />

Turned down for a loan<br />

Single service member<br />

Dormant account/phased out<br />

Bad experience/wrong product<br />

Restriction on services<br />

Lack of products/service<br />

Poor rates<br />

Fired from company (sponsor)<br />

“Refusers,” the next noncustomer tier, usually avoid a product or<br />

service because they find its performance unacceptable or its price<br />

beyond their means. Again, we need to ask why these second-tier<br />

noncustomers refuse to join credit unions or to seek a fuller range of<br />

the services and products we offer them. Looking across commonalities,<br />

we may find, for example, that current “refusers” deem credit unions no<br />

more acceptable than banks or other financial institutions in terms<br />

of social responsibility—and even less acceptable in terms of service<br />

and convenience. By examining noncustomer needs and desires, we<br />

might learn that people with moral qualms about doing business with<br />

megaplayers such as the Bank of America (or the ever-encroaching<br />

43


Wal-Mart) transact business with those institutions anyway because<br />

they see no better alternative in credit unions. Indeed, large-scale<br />

entities offer convenient and cheap services that differentiate them from<br />

the pack. What would happen if credit unions tapped into a segment of<br />

those “refusing” noncustomers who actually crave something different<br />

from the current financial service offerings?<br />

Figure 19: Common Reasons Second-Tier Noncustomers,”Refusers”,<br />

Don’t Use <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong>s<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> union <strong>is</strong> not soph<strong>is</strong>ticated<br />

Staff not knowledgeable<br />

Customer not knowledgeable<br />

Not comprehensive<br />

Not convenient<br />

Poor rates<br />

Friendlier staff elsewhere<br />

Referred by friend/family elsewhere<br />

Not eligible for membership<br />

Staff not available<br />

Unappealing/lack of marketing materials<br />

Fear of rejection<br />

Inadequate features/functionality<br />

Staff apathy/not proactive<br />

Negative connotations (the word “union”)<br />

Lack of member/staff incentives<br />

SEGs’ diluted affinity for single sponsors<br />

Brand awareness<br />

44


Case Study: Great Britain Co-operative Bank<br />

Great Britain’s Co-operative Bank, following the voice of “refusers,” soon opened an ocean of opportunity, not only for its current<br />

members but also for a larger public clamoring for ethical change. Following deregulation in the 1980s, with the consequent<br />

privatization of mutuals and cooperatives, the Co-operative Bank had choices to make. Its executives realized that they could not<br />

hope to compete with either the “big four” high street banks or with the small regional banks serving a loyal local customer base.<br />

L<strong>is</strong>tening to the increasingly angry buzz over banking scandals, however, they knew they could reach back into the traditions of the<br />

cooperative movement on which credit unions had long built their reputations for fair dealing. Although they struggled to overcome<br />

the “old-fashioned” stigma that credit unions had incurred, the Co-operative Bank moved beyond its competition by ra<strong>is</strong>ing the<br />

profile of the ethical posture that had made early cooperatives such a success. Incorporating “Tomorrow’s Company” and corporate<br />

social responsibility (CSR) models into its “Inclusive Partnership Approach” initiative, the bank focused on those movements—human<br />

rights, pro-environment, anti-tobacco, and anti-armaments—that both members and nonmembers had begun to support in earnest.<br />

The Co-operative Bank not only ra<strong>is</strong>ed the profile of the Rochdale Principles—“quality and excellence, participation, freedom of<br />

association, education and training, cooperation, quality of life, retention of funds and integrity”—but also, during 1992, it created<br />

both an “ethical policy” and a high-profile department to support the policy. Executives reached out to members and nonmembers<br />

alike, seeking both advice on and approval for its ethical policy statement. Once members had approved the policy, along with the<br />

causes they wanted to support, the Co-operative then eliminated from its portfolio any service, institution, or individual with views<br />

antithetical to the credit union’s focus on social justice. Human rights activ<strong>is</strong>ts and others who had formerly “refused” to bank at<br />

the Co-operative flocked in droves; and, moreover, the bank lost nothing by refusing to do business with individuals and firms not<br />

sharing the credit union’s v<strong>is</strong>ion. In addition, the Co-operative managed to surmount the difficulties inherent in launching a major<br />

advert<strong>is</strong>ing campaign to promote its interests and the interests of its members. Initially met with skeptic<strong>is</strong>m outside the Co-operative,<br />

members well understood and endorsed the platform that had suggested the need for a major marketing campaign. By keeping<br />

their lines of communication open—not only with their members but also with the wider public—the Co-operative has continued to<br />

thrive on its core values of cooperation and good corporate citizenship. As a result, its members have found acceptable ways to work<br />

within capital<strong>is</strong>m, and the Co-operative has profited in ways that resonate with the traditions of the credit union and with the goals<br />

of its expanding membership.<br />

Focusing on the commonalities among “refusers” rather than the<br />

differences between them, credit unions might unlock oceans of<br />

untapped demand. Th<strong>is</strong> strategy applies equally well to the third tier of<br />

noncustomers, the “unexplored,” who have never even considered credit<br />

union membership. Neither targeted nor even considered potential<br />

customers by anyone in the industry, these noncustomers’ needs—and<br />

the business opportunities associated with them—seem to belong to<br />

other markets. But they too provide opportunities for “catchment”—<br />

evidenced by the success Toledo Area Community <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

(TACCU) and other lifestyle lenders have recently enjoyed.<br />

45


Figure 20: Common Reasons Third-Tier Noncustomers,<br />

“Unexplored”, Don’t Use <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong>s<br />

Don’t know what a credit union <strong>is</strong><br />

Doubt ability to join the CU<br />

Bad word of mouth<br />

Perception of lack of competence<br />

Perception of lack of services/offerings<br />

Term “credit union” connotes closed membership<br />

Case Study: Toledo Area Community <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> (TACCU)<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> unions (and other financial institutions, for that matter) have always assumed that people who seek cosmetic surgery will<br />

only do so through their health care providers. With prom<strong>is</strong>es of confidentiality, dent<strong>is</strong>ts and doctors have long appeared the only<br />

appropriate payment plan providers for such surgery, whether through insurance or unsecured financing. Nevertheless, TACCU and<br />

others found that their members desired more affordable alternatives. As the stigma of cosmetic surgery declined and health care costs<br />

spiraled during the 1990s, consumers increasingly began to approach cosmetic surgery as a retail dec<strong>is</strong>ion rather than a health care<br />

<strong>is</strong>sue. As a result, more than 8.3 million cosmetic procedures took place in the United States during 2003. TACCU soon d<strong>is</strong>covered a<br />

“blue ocean” of opportunity in serving baby boomers seeking cosmetic dent<strong>is</strong>try as well as liposuction, eyelid surgery, nose reshaping,<br />

hair transplants, and breast reduction or augmentation. Tapping into the cosmetic surgery trend, TACCU and other financial institutions<br />

not only increased member loyalty but also unleashed the demand for more lifestyle lending. Th<strong>is</strong> new offering not only prom<strong>is</strong>es<br />

to create new membership among people seeking financial solutions to their lifestyle borrowing needs, it also prom<strong>is</strong>es to ra<strong>is</strong>e the<br />

profile of credit unions while helping to reduce people’s anxieties about paying for cosmetic surgery and other lifestyle changes. In<br />

addition, the program helps to eliminate the stigma of seeking to effect such changes.<br />

46


In most industries, businesses tend to limit strategic v<strong>is</strong>ions to the<br />

conventional boundaries defined by current strategy. Learning from<br />

noncustomers can help to free credit union executives from the grip<br />

of the “red ocean.” The next tool in the “value innovation” tool kit<br />

promotes six unique paths that organizations can take to reach their<br />

very own “blue oceans,” by d<strong>is</strong>covering ways to reach the untapped<br />

needs and desires of noncustomers.<br />

TRY IT OUT YOURSELF<br />

Consider your credit union and the three types of noncustomers<br />

• Soon-to-be noncustomers<br />

• Refusers<br />

• Unexplored<br />

Why don’t they use your institution? Did you d<strong>is</strong>cover any common<br />

elements among these groups?<br />

47


STEP 5:<br />

The <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong>:<br />

Six Paths Toward<br />

Future Value<br />

WHAT IS THE TOOL?<br />

Typically, experts and practitioners alike define their industry,<br />

positioning, and source of competitive advantage along the six<br />

following dimensions:<br />

• Boundaries of the industry and definition of the business<br />

(for example, who are the key competitors, suppliers, buyers,<br />

substitutes, and complements)<br />

• Current market segmentation and definition of strategic groups<br />

• Definition of the industry target-buyer groups<br />

• Current positioning of the products and services, and definition<br />

of the scope of activities<br />

• Current definition of the products’ and services’ primary source<br />

of appeal<br />

• Environmental factors affecting the business over time<br />

“<strong>Blue</strong> ocean” strateg<strong>is</strong>ts must know where to turn, looking everywhere<br />

they have not looked before, including those parenthetical places<br />

that help to amplify and explain strategic planning. The “Six Paths<br />

Framework,” paths:<br />

• Boundaries of the industry, beyond current definitions of the<br />

business (and into key competitors, suppliers, buyers, substitutes,<br />

and complements);<br />

• Current market segmentation, beyond definitions of strategic<br />

groups (and into ways in which price and performance dec<strong>is</strong>ions<br />

determine whether or not buyers will trade up or down from one<br />

group to another);<br />

• The chain of buyers, beyond currently held industry assumptions<br />

about appropriate target buyer groups (and into who actually uses<br />

the product or service, whether the purchaser or someone else);<br />

• Complementary offerings, outside current assumptions about<br />

the scope of the industry’s activities (and into the total solution<br />

buyers seek when they choose a product or service);<br />

• Functional and emotional appeal, beyond current definitions<br />

of what constitutes the primary attractiveness of products and<br />

services (and into shifting or blending those products and services<br />

to find out what causes customers anxiety); and<br />

49


• Time and trends, backward to cultural, social, demographic,<br />

macroeconomic, political, technological, and environmental<br />

changes (and into the forces that will change customer values<br />

and experiences).<br />

Figure 21: Six Paths Framework<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

© Kim and Mauborgne 2005<br />

We can call good strategy any number of things, but if the strategy<br />

canvas serves as the “hardware” of “value innovation,” it runs on the<br />

“Six Paths Framework” “software.” Together, these tools prom<strong>is</strong>e to<br />

ass<strong>is</strong>t credit union executives in their quest to draw better “To Be”—or<br />

future—value curves.<br />

• What elements should we eliminate that our industry takes for<br />

granted?<br />

• What elements should we reduce well below the industry standard?<br />

• What elements should we ra<strong>is</strong>e well above the industry standard?<br />

• What elements should we create that the industry has never offered?<br />

RESEARCH FINDINGS<br />

In the section that follows, we explore six unique paths that credit<br />

unions can explore to break out of today’s “red oceans.” We present the<br />

logic of each path and then d<strong>is</strong>cuss examples of credit unions engaging<br />

in such activities on the bas<strong>is</strong> of our research and workshop findings.<br />

50


Exploring Across Industries<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> unions compete not only with other credit unions but also<br />

with other financial services providers, who offer alternative products<br />

and services with different functions and forms but essentially serve<br />

the same purpose. Most business planners start with a definition<br />

of their own business offering, then stop. But a good strateg<strong>is</strong>t will<br />

move beyond to explore the obvious trade-offs customers make when<br />

choosing their industry or other alternative ways to fulfill the same<br />

need. We asked our workshop participants to consider neighboring<br />

industries from which credit unions could learn, to sketch value curves<br />

for these alternatives, and to identify what other needs these alternatives<br />

serve among their key customers. They explored how best to create a<br />

credit union focused on concerns—for example, fertility treatment,<br />

adoption services, LASIK eye surgery, and cosmetic dental work—that<br />

The Logic: A company does not only compete within its industry, but also with<br />

companies in industries that produce alternative products or services. In making<br />

dec<strong>is</strong>ions, buyers often implicitly weigh alternatives and make trade-offs. Going into<br />

town for dinner, a movie, the circus; drive, take the train, get a taxi? The thought<br />

process <strong>is</strong> intuitive for customers.<br />

1. Taking your business offering definition as a departure, examine the obvious tradeoffs<br />

customers make when choosing your industry or alternative ways to fulfill the<br />

same need.<br />

2. Sketch the value curves for these alternatives and identify what other needs they may<br />

serve for their key customers.<br />

3. Identify products or services among these alternatives that may potentially be<br />

substitutes for your offering in the future.<br />

4. What are the fundamental needs fulfilled by your product and service?<br />

5. What alternative approaches or substitute concepts may serve the same needs?<br />

6. Sketch the value curve for the alternatives you identified.<br />

Figure 22: Exploring Across Industries<br />

7. A product or service can be seen as an assembly of processes and activities. Why <strong>is</strong><br />

yours designed the way that it <strong>is</strong>? Are there alternative ways to reorganize or redesign<br />

parts of the assembly and create value for noncustomers?<br />

8. <strong>How</strong> does your product and service interact with other businesses in the general<br />

ecosystem? Can value be created at the interfaces?<br />

Tips: As a guide you may explore industry hierarchies used in search engines such as<br />

Yahoo!, and venture up and down your industry layers.<br />

Consumers trade-off between a credit union and peer-to-peer payment systems,<br />

borrowing money from friends/family, payday lending outlets, credit card companies,<br />

not banking at all, cash in their mattress, point of sale financing, etc.<br />

51


eflect certain life stages. Positioning the credit union as an integrated<br />

retailer of financial services, our workshop participants suggested a<br />

variety of possibilities—from purchasing a car dealership to blending<br />

mortgages with home improvement concierge services to using the<br />

FTD model to network credit unions to deliver cash to members’<br />

homes or workplaces.<br />

Whether our executives will build on any of the particular ideas<br />

they identified matters less than that the exerc<strong>is</strong>e forced them to<br />

v<strong>is</strong>ualize what they would need to eliminate, reduce, ra<strong>is</strong>e, and create<br />

for a strategic move into alternative market spaces. We also suggest<br />

that planners explore additional questions. For instance, among<br />

alternatives, what products or services could be substituted for your<br />

own? What fundamental needs do such products and services fulfill?<br />

What alternative approaches or substitute concepts may serve the same<br />

needs? If you can v<strong>is</strong>ualize your product or service as an assembly,<br />

a process, or a set of activities, why did you design it the way that<br />

you did? Can you think of ways to redesign or reorganize elements<br />

of your product or service to create value for both customers and<br />

noncustomers? And how do your products/services interact with other<br />

businesses in general? Can you add value at interfaces?<br />

In the Filene Research Institute’s i 3 Moneyworks example, credit union<br />

executives addressed the possibility of exploring across the boundaries<br />

of the industry to profit from earlier strategic moves by establ<strong>is</strong>hed<br />

direct sellers Avon ® and Tupperware ® , as well as the more recent value<br />

innovator, Pampered Chef ® . Capitalizing upon buyer networks and<br />

multilevel marketing, home-party business founders managed to find<br />

advocates to help them pursue radically superior value and radically<br />

reduced cost structures that benefited both the business as well as<br />

advocates and nonadvocate consumers alike. Building on that model,<br />

several credit unions have tapped into the possibility of partnering with<br />

churches and schools to create value for credit union member advocates,<br />

as well as for the religious and educational institutions that they represent.<br />

Generating the potential for a grass roots movement, Moneyworks<br />

prom<strong>is</strong>es to create employment for independent contractors in much<br />

the same way that Tupperware ® created opportunities for housewives<br />

to earn extra money while promoting products that made their own<br />

lives easier. Additionally, the plan has the potential to reach potential<br />

members who are anxious to access the kinds of financial services credit<br />

unions can provide. <strong>Credit</strong> unions would benefit as well. By building<br />

upon the basic Moneyworks concept, credit unions might significantly<br />

ra<strong>is</strong>e their membership numbers, create flexible, customizable solutions<br />

52


for member-specific concerns, and obtain valuable new businesstracking<br />

and evaluation information. Additionally, the concept holds<br />

the prom<strong>is</strong>e to create new delivery channels and to enhance brand<br />

recognition while simultaneously providing new opportunities to serve<br />

the underserved and to reduce overhead costs.<br />

Figure 23: Exploring Across Strategic Groups<br />

The Logic: The term “strategic group” refers to a cluster of companies within an<br />

industry that <strong>is</strong> pursuing a similar strategy. Strategic groups can generally be ranked in<br />

a hierarchical order built on two dimensions: price and performance. Most companies<br />

focus on improving their position within their strategic group. The key to “value<br />

innovation” <strong>is</strong> understanding which factors determine buyers’ dec<strong>is</strong>ions to trade up or<br />

down from one group to another.<br />

1. Identify the various strategic groups within your industry that offer similar products<br />

and services. What would their value curve look like from the point of view of their<br />

core customers? <strong>How</strong> would it compare with your own value curve from the point<br />

of view of your core customers? What trade-offs are your and their core customers<br />

making when they choose across strategic groups? What can you learn from each<br />

strategic group and borrow for your “To Be” value curve?<br />

2. Examine the other strategic groups’ inherent cost structures (including in your<br />

analys<strong>is</strong> their suppliers and d<strong>is</strong>tributors). What would the implications be if you<br />

were to further integrate or separate your activities from those of your suppliers and<br />

partners? Could you reduce your cost structure and create superior value, thereby<br />

attracting a mass of core customers away from the other strategic groups?<br />

Tips: Sketch and compare the value curves of companies operating within your industry<br />

but competing in a different strategic group (for example, low-end versus high-end<br />

providers). What are the implicit trade-offs buyers make?<br />

Examine the “Value Chain” for your business and search for possibilities to reduce or<br />

eliminate cost drivers.<br />

Examine the “Value Chain” and cost drivers for companies in the other strategic<br />

groups. Strategic groups in financial services range from high net-worth services to<br />

transaction product providers. Within each of these groups there <strong>is</strong> a tremendous<br />

amount of variety and value/cost trade-offs.<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> unions also compete with strategic groups inside the industry—<br />

those companies offering similar products and services and employing<br />

similar development strategies, but at different prices and performance<br />

levels. We can usually rank strategic groups hierarchically—based<br />

on those pricing and performance strategies. Again, customers and<br />

noncustomers make trade-off dec<strong>is</strong>ions. For example, in deciding on<br />

where to hold a wedding reception, couples make dec<strong>is</strong>ions about<br />

trading up or down: trading cost for elegance here, and glitz for<br />

frugality there. By sketching and comparing value curves of companies<br />

operating within the financial services industry but competing in<br />

a different strategic group (for example, low-end versus high-end<br />

providers), one can see the sorts of implicit trade-offs buyers make. The<br />

53


v<strong>is</strong>ualization should also lead to additional questions focused on how<br />

best to reduce or eliminate cost drivers within that “Value Chain.”<br />

By identifying the various strategic groups offering similar products<br />

and services within a particular industry, we can see what their<br />

“Value Chains” might look like from the customer’s perspective.<br />

Additionally, by examining other strategic groups’ cost structures<br />

(including those associated with suppliers and d<strong>is</strong>tributors), we can<br />

also learn a number of other important things. What would happen,<br />

for example, if you integrated or further separated your activities<br />

from those of your suppliers and partners? Could you reduce your<br />

cost structure and create superior value, thereby attracting a mass<br />

of core customers away from other strategic groups? Together, our<br />

workshop participants concluded that such explorations could lead<br />

to partnerships with a variety of firms, pushing credit unions into the<br />

realm of financial superstores. Among those entertained as potential<br />

partners, our executive participants perceived the best futures in<br />

firms offering services in tax planning, trusts, titles, investment, real<br />

estate, insurance, appra<strong>is</strong>al, automobile brokerage, and child care.<br />

But one need not stop there.<br />

FORUM <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> of Indianapol<strong>is</strong>, Indiana, provides us with<br />

another example of the ways in which a credit union can blossom<br />

into a leading middle-market organization, complete with not-forprofit<br />

and for-profit subsidiaries. Organized by employees of Indiana<br />

Bell Telephone Company, FORUM’s members began to demand<br />

greater online services. By 2000, their demands led to the spin-off of<br />

a wholly owned subsidiary called “ FORUM Solutions”—a service<br />

that develops and supports tailor-made software solutions as well as<br />

consulting services for credit unions seeking technological solutions to<br />

improve their cost structures.<br />

Looking at software solutions firms that serve both banks and<br />

credit unions, FORUM executives realized that they could provide<br />

a lower-cost offering by focusing exclusively on credit union loans.<br />

Deep knowledge of the industry gave FORUM Solutions immediate<br />

credibility among other credit unions; it also allowed the software<br />

development subsidiary to employ its own credit union parent as a<br />

feedback loop and laboratory to develop a suite of software products<br />

and services focused on one dimension of the business. A lean<br />

organization centered on a cost-conscious niche market, FORUM<br />

Solutions allowed the credit union to move upstream into vending;<br />

and, moreover, it provided a platform for FORUM to emerge<br />

among the first credit unions to offer online share drafts, ATM<br />

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access, and Windows-based home banking products. With FORUM<br />

Solutions expanding year after year, the credit union then extended<br />

its philosophy and its reach into a for-profit subsidiary, Financial<br />

Information Management, Inc. (FIMI), which now provides financial<br />

management and brokerage, auto purchase, mortgage lending, and tax<br />

preparation services. By eliminating the notion that credit unions need<br />

to do everything in-house, FORUM credit union managed to ra<strong>is</strong>e the<br />

quality of its financial service offerings and to create value for members<br />

and other credit unions alike. The credit union simultaneously reduced<br />

costs, member inconvenience, and the likelihood that its customers<br />

would seek solutions from other financial services providers as well.<br />

Figure 24: Exploring Across The Chain Of Buyers<br />

The Logic: In most industries, competition converges around a common definition of<br />

who the target customer <strong>is</strong>, when in reality there <strong>is</strong> a chain of customers who are directly<br />

or indirectly involved. The purchasers who pay for the product or service might actually<br />

differ from the actual user, and in some cases there are important “influencers” as well.<br />

While these three groups may overlap, they often differ. When they do overlap, they<br />

frequently hold different definitions of value.<br />

1. Sketch the chain of buyers in your industry. Who are the different actors who might<br />

play a role or influence the customers’ buying dec<strong>is</strong>ion? What level of power do they<br />

each have in a customer’s dec<strong>is</strong>ion to purchase your offering or an alternative?<br />

2. Redraw your value curve, but th<strong>is</strong> time from the perspective of each of these different<br />

actors in the buying dec<strong>is</strong>ion. What can you learn from these value curves?<br />

3. Which actor in the chain of buyers <strong>is</strong> your industry currently serving? What are the<br />

opportunities to create a new market space or enhance the ex<strong>is</strong>ting market to focus on<br />

other actors in the chain of buyers?<br />

4. Can you identify new potential players in the buying dec<strong>is</strong>ion? What would your value<br />

curve look like from their perspective?<br />

Tips: Map the chain of buyers for your key customers and identify the role, attributes,<br />

underlying needs, and inherent definition of value for each type of buyer.<br />

Explore whether some new actors can potentially become influential in the buying<br />

dec<strong>is</strong>ion. What would their needs be?<br />

When considering different chains of buyers, the indirect lending channel are a prime<br />

financial services example. Other examples to consider include the influence of a parent<br />

helping their child purchase their first automobile or house. Some credit unions are<br />

innovating around th<strong>is</strong> concept by providing indirect financing channels through<br />

surgeons who conduct elective (or uninsurable) procedures.<br />

Returning to our earlier example of cosmetic surgery and lifestyle<br />

lending as a means of creating “blue oceans,” credit unions have<br />

the opportunity to reach beyond their target customers and into<br />

opportunities to become “finance machines” for doctors, automobile<br />

dealers, and any number of other individuals and firms currently<br />

providing financial ass<strong>is</strong>tance to end-users. In most industries,<br />

competitors zoom in on commonly held assumptions about who<br />

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constitutes the target customer. In reality, competition actually takes<br />

place along a chain of direct and indirect customers—the purchasers<br />

who pay for the product or service, the people who actually use the<br />

product or service, and those who influence purchasers and users.<br />

Sometimes customers contain elements of all three: for example, a<br />

purchaser might influence the end-user, the end-user might influence<br />

dec<strong>is</strong>ions made by the purchasers, or the purchaser might also be the<br />

end-user. In the case of cosmetic surgery, while doctors/“influencers”<br />

play an extremely important role in shaping the end-user’s dec<strong>is</strong>ion,<br />

they need not provide the financing for their services.<br />

Indeed, purchasers, users, and those who influence them share a<br />

number of commonalities; however, when they diverge from one<br />

another, they frequently hold very different views on value. By mapping<br />

the chain of buyers for key customers, and identifying each type of<br />

buyer’s role, attributes, underlying needs, and inherent definitions of<br />

value, credit unions can unleash new opportunities. And, as Filene<br />

Reasearch Institute’s Mark Meyer argues in h<strong>is</strong> investigative report<br />

on lifestyle lending, “<strong>Credit</strong> unions have advantages that other lenders<br />

lack—a direct relationship with members, being located within the<br />

community they serve, and their not-for-profit status. The latter gives<br />

credit unions the opportunity to offer competitive prices and terms for<br />

loans.” Moreover, credit unions have the opportunity to remove several<br />

obstacles from the doctor’s office: doctors want to practice medicine,<br />

not finance, and would therefore welcome a credit union as a thirdparty<br />

partner; while both patients and doctors seek a quick and easy<br />

financial solution to the problems they want to solve.<br />

What if credit unions targeted a different group from the one(s) they<br />

currently serve? Answering th<strong>is</strong> question requires a deeper knowledge<br />

about the chain of buyers. We asked our workshop participants to<br />

think about the different actors involved in customer buying dec<strong>is</strong>ions,<br />

including each one’s relative level of power over dec<strong>is</strong>ions to purchase<br />

credit union or alternative offerings. Redrawing value curves from the<br />

perspective of different actors in the buying dec<strong>is</strong>ion chain forced our<br />

participants to confront the many customers served by the financial<br />

services industry, and to examine the untapped opportunities that<br />

might create new market space, enhance the ex<strong>is</strong>ting market, or help<br />

to identify additional players involved in the dec<strong>is</strong>ion-making process.<br />

In many ways, ASI Federal <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> in Lou<strong>is</strong>iana also followed<br />

the chain of buyers when it made a commitment to focus on the<br />

underserved. Thinking about life stages and buyer dec<strong>is</strong>ions can help<br />

credit unions to focus on the needs and desires of the memberships<br />

they serve.<br />

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Figure 25: Exploring Across Complementary Offerings<br />

The Logic: Few products or services are used in a vacuum; in most cases, other products<br />

or services affect their value. But in most industries, rivals converge within the<br />

conventional bounds of their industry’s product or service offering. The key to “value<br />

innovation” <strong>is</strong> to define the total solution buyers seek when they chose a product or<br />

service. A simple way to do so <strong>is</strong> to think about what happens before, during, and after<br />

your product or service <strong>is</strong> used.<br />

1. What are the processes or circumstances that may trigger the need or desire for your<br />

product or service? Reexamine your Buyer Experience Cycle and identify how you<br />

could redesign your scope of offering so as to eliminate critical pain points or sat<strong>is</strong>fy<br />

unserved customers’ w<strong>is</strong>hes.<br />

2. Who are the key internal or external actors who would be part of the redesigned<br />

scope of offering? What would it take to co-opt them into your new offering?<br />

3. What would be the required assets and resources? With whom should you consider<br />

establ<strong>is</strong>hing partnerships and strategic alliances to ensure that the new scope<br />

of offering creates superior value, attracts a mass of new customers, and <strong>is</strong> highly<br />

cost efficient.<br />

Tips: Identify the pain points from the customers’ perspective as they were expressed in<br />

the Buyer Experience Cycle exploration.<br />

Examine each of the different stages, their mutual interfaces, and their interaction with<br />

other members of the larger business ecosystem.<br />

When a consumer obtains a loan from a credit union, the purpose of the loan <strong>is</strong> to<br />

purchase tangible items such as a house, automobile, RV, etc., or they can be intangible<br />

items such as a college education, etc. Regardless of the purpose, the member needs<br />

many complementary offerings to go along with the loan. The concept here would<br />

involve going “horizontal” with the members needs.<br />

Few consumers use products or services in a vacuum; indeed, in most<br />

cases, their value <strong>is</strong> enhanced or detracted from by other products and<br />

services. But, as we now know, most competitors converge on products<br />

and services that remain within the conventional boundaries of the<br />

industry’s traditional offerings. Value innovation moves beyond these<br />

boundaries when strateg<strong>is</strong>ts seek to provide the total solution that<br />

buyers seek from the products and services they consume. For instance,<br />

by thinking about what happens to couples before, during, and after<br />

they purchase products and services with which to build a life together,<br />

opportunities ex<strong>is</strong>t to create “blue ocean” market space, in much the<br />

same way that Barnes and Noble revolutionized the book-buying<br />

business by blending the pleasure of drinking coffee and reading books<br />

into a megastore where customers can purchase Starbucks coffee and<br />

test drive Barnes and Noble’s book-related offerings.<br />

Identifying pain points, as expressed from the customers’ perspective in<br />

the Buyer Experience Cycle exerc<strong>is</strong>e, can lead to important insights. We<br />

asked our workshop participants to reexamine the pain points they had<br />

identified. Th<strong>is</strong> time, though, we suggested that they also think about<br />

the processes or circumstances that might trigger needs or desires for<br />

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their products and services, and how they might redesign the scope of<br />

their offerings to eliminate critical pain points or to sat<strong>is</strong>fy unserved<br />

customers’ w<strong>is</strong>hes. We then moved into the realm of external actors,<br />

and asked our participants to imagine with whom they might form<br />

strategic alliances or partnerships; what assets and resources they<br />

would need; what it would take to convince different actors to buy<br />

into the new offering; and how all of these elements would both create<br />

superior value as well as keep costs down.<br />

Integration of services and life-stage loans emerged as the framework<br />

on which all suggestions hung. Using indirect opportunities as<br />

a platform, participants explored complementary offerings that<br />

prompted partnership ideas centered on big purchases, including<br />

university education, nursing homes, vacations, and, of course,<br />

weddings. In addition, they suggested concepts focused on “for life”<br />

options—for instance, an integrated portable mortgage with onetime<br />

application but lifetime servicing for the homeowner in ways<br />

that connect credit union members through a national CUSO mutual<br />

fund. Our participants also env<strong>is</strong>ioned a “Financial Advice for<br />

Life” partnership with education providers. Other examples include<br />

building on Filene Research Institute’s Lifetime Auto Loan and<br />

Flex.One Account programs.<br />

Filene’s research has already revealed that consumers sift between<br />

rate, speed, access, and convenience when seeking automobile loans.<br />

While credit unions can offer highly competitive rates for their nearly<br />

90 million members, the industry continued to hold only 18.7% of the<br />

auto lending market in June 2005, and th<strong>is</strong> trend continues. Building on<br />

the offering of an open-end credit agreement for multiple automobile<br />

loan advances, credit unions have the opportunity to rethink strategies<br />

for offering members additional services that also address different<br />

life stages. Imagine credit unions better reflecting member desires for<br />

financial education, convenience, flexibility, and bargaining power<br />

while simultaneously strengthening the institution’s abilities to crosssell<br />

services, to differentiate their offerings in the market, and to<br />

enhance the credit union’s reputation as a trusted adv<strong>is</strong>or.<br />

Filene’s Flex.One Account, designed to pool all of the members’ savings,<br />

loans, mortgages, checking, and credit cards into one convenient and<br />

cost-saving account offers similar opportunities to rethink current<br />

strategies. Although Flex.One potentially taps into the needs of<br />

multiple segments—from the “financial hobby<strong>is</strong>t” member who likes<br />

to manage her own finances to the “convenience-driven” member who<br />

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understands the financial benefits of the service but wants less active<br />

involvement in managing h<strong>is</strong> daily finances—credit unions can build<br />

upon th<strong>is</strong> basic idea to offer greater simplicity and convenience as well<br />

as better rates on loans and savings. By coming up with ways to pool<br />

accounts into “sticky” products, credit unions have the opportunity to<br />

lower their cost structures, acquire more intimate knowledge of their<br />

members, increase their yields, gain competitive advantage over banks,<br />

and maintain long-lasting relationships with community members<br />

while also expanding membership. What other incentives might credit<br />

unions build into their offerings so that members more quickly build<br />

equity, pay down mortgages and other debts, and link their futures to<br />

the institution’s guiding philosophies?<br />

Figure 26: Exploring Across Functional And Emotional Appeals<br />

The Logic: Competition in an industry tends to converge not only around an accepted<br />

notion of the scope of its products and services but also one of the two bases of possible<br />

appeal. Some industries compete principally on price and function, based largely on<br />

calculation of utility; their appeal <strong>is</strong> rational. Other industries compete on feelings;<br />

their appeal <strong>is</strong> emotional. New market space can be created by shifting a product and<br />

service from one appeal to the other or by blending the sources of appeal.<br />

1. What are the processes or circumstances that may trigger the need or desire for your<br />

product or service? Reexamine your Buyer Experience Cycle and identify how you<br />

could redesign your scope of offering so as to eliminate critical pain points or sat<strong>is</strong>fy<br />

unserved customers’ w<strong>is</strong>hes.<br />

2. Who are the key internal or external actors who would be part of the redesigned<br />

scope of offering? What would it take to co-opt them into your new offering?<br />

3. What would be the required assets and resources? With whom should you consider<br />

establ<strong>is</strong>hing partnerships and strategic alliances to ensure that the new scope<br />

of offering creates superior value, attracts a mass of new customers, and <strong>is</strong> highly<br />

cost efficient.<br />

Tips: Examine the findings during the V<strong>is</strong>ual Exploration Process and seek to uncover<br />

the main bas<strong>is</strong> of appeal in your industry.<br />

Considering your customers and noncustomers, explore whether shifting or<br />

complementing the main bas<strong>is</strong> of appeal would capture new customers. Sketch the new<br />

value curve with the inverted or hybrid source of appeal.<br />

Financial services tend to be a functional perspective: speed, convenience, trust,<br />

accuracy, etc. are the main messages to consumers. Is there an opportunity to make the<br />

credit union more emotionally appealing and thereby shifting the dominant logic in<br />

financial services?<br />

Competitors not only tend to pivot on accepted notions about the<br />

scope of product and service offerings, but also between two axes of<br />

possible appeal, choosing between rather than shifting or blending<br />

functional and emotional elements. Some industries or firms compete<br />

solely on price and function. Basing their dec<strong>is</strong>ions largely upon utility<br />

calculations, these industries and firms tend to sell products and<br />

services on “rational” appeal. Conversely, other industries and firms<br />

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compete on emotional appeal, marketing their products and services<br />

on the feelings they engender in customers. Very rarely do competitors<br />

embark on cross-fertilization between function and emotion. But one<br />

can create new market space by shifting products and services from<br />

one appeal to the other or by blending sources of appeal. We asked<br />

our participants to arrange l<strong>is</strong>ts in two columns—one for those <strong>is</strong>sues<br />

reflecting functional concerns, the other for emotional ones. Waving<br />

imaginary magic wands to shift (or complement) these main sources of<br />

appeal, they then drew new value curves.<br />

When credit union executives shifted or complemented functional<br />

and emotional offerings in different ways, they came up with some<br />

interesting ideas. Most of the participants focused on changing<br />

credit unions into “dream machines” that linked members’ long-term<br />

plans with possibilities for financing their hopes and dreams. Others<br />

suggested that in some instances credit unions could profit more<br />

by streamlining operations to create “plain vanilla” offerings that<br />

downplayed the emotional appeal of credit union membership and<br />

played up to members’ desires for fewer frills.<br />

We have found several industry experiences that illustrate such thinking,<br />

including our earlier example of Great Britain’s Co-operative Bank.<br />

Deeply committed to the values and principles of cooperatives,<br />

determined to employ those values as part of its long-term strategy,<br />

and responding to a small but significant survey response that cited<br />

ethics as an important reason members had joined the Co-operative<br />

Bank, the bank’s executives developed an ethical governance policy.<br />

They then approached and gained enthusiastic endorsements from<br />

partner charities and NGOs such as Amnesty International, the <strong>League</strong><br />

Against Cruel Sports, and Chr<strong>is</strong>tian Aid, all of which helped them to<br />

write a legally acceptable document. They then passed the document on<br />

to each and every one of their 30,000 members, from whom they sought<br />

a line-by-line endorsement vote on their 12 platforms. The appeal to<br />

membership feelings about human and animal rights, environmental<br />

stewardship, and armaments control worked like a charm and helped<br />

the Co-operative to surmount the hurdles and attacks they would<br />

face from critics when they launched their large-scale advert<strong>is</strong>ing<br />

campaign. While there were those who questioned the purity and ethics<br />

of advert<strong>is</strong>ing, the Co-operative had already won untold allies among<br />

activ<strong>is</strong>ts and members, all of whom supported the idea of “responsible<br />

sourcing and d<strong>is</strong>tribution of funds” to like-minded people. Moreover,<br />

it pioneered character-driven advert<strong>is</strong>ing among other private and<br />

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public entities seeking to blend capital<strong>is</strong>m with core values and good<br />

corporate citizenship.<br />

The Navy Federal <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> (NFCU) has similarly appealed to the<br />

Navy “family” from its inception, never straying from the single-sponsor<br />

concept on which credit unions have long prospered. No matter its profit<br />

margins, the NFCU serves members from cradle to grave wherever<br />

they find themselves stationed around the world. Th<strong>is</strong> service to Navy<br />

men and women throughout the stages of their lives has reinforced<br />

strong emotional attachments between Navy personnel and the credit<br />

union. At the same time, affiliations with government contracting,<br />

research, and development has allowed the NFCU to implement the<br />

latest cost-saving technologies that make access to its services less<br />

complicated for members who move from sea to sea and across the<br />

globe. Navy personnel augment these two mutually reinforcing benefits.<br />

Members run the credit union, spouses and children work for it, and all<br />

participants actively govern the NFCU. In these ways, the credit union<br />

has managed both to tap into the emotional appeal of single-sponsor<br />

membership as well as to meet the functional needs of its constituency,<br />

providing basic, low-cost services to its far-flung membership. As a<br />

result, the NFCU’s original, single-sponsor “blue ocean” strategy has<br />

pers<strong>is</strong>ted despite changing trends, fads, and fashions.<br />

Whitef<strong>is</strong>h <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> (WCU), Montana, provides an additional<br />

example. Recognizing that its membership values basic, low-cost<br />

solutions and that community involvement reduces the need for<br />

advert<strong>is</strong>ing, WCU executives have produced $740 million in assets on<br />

a “plain vanilla” plan. WCU has no checking accounts or credit cards,<br />

and offers only four basic services: share accounts, free check-cashing<br />

services, debit cards, and bill pay. Focusing on these core competencies,<br />

WCU’s membership has expanded from its original focus on railroad<br />

and lumberyard workers into a community-wide membership of<br />

49,000. With a community charter to serve Whitef<strong>is</strong>h and communities<br />

within a 50-mile radius of one of Montana’s most famous ski-resort<br />

towns, WCU members have found that operating as a traditional credit<br />

union has allowed them to remain competitive. Moreover, the WCU<br />

focus allows executives to meet their members’ requests for additional<br />

community services. For example, when members asked for better<br />

money management education for their children, the credit union<br />

recruited 29 volunteers with diverse backgrounds to serve on the board,<br />

and its president, Charles Abell, WCU’s CEO, now freed up from<br />

some of h<strong>is</strong> responsibilities, embarked on a campaign to speak at local<br />

high schools about the role credit unions play in helping students to<br />

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manage their money. Other members have helped to launch additional<br />

programs cons<strong>is</strong>tent with membership desires, including information<br />

on Montana vacations, bicycle adventures, and “watchable” wildlife.<br />

Figure 27: Exploring Across Time And Trends<br />

The Logic: All industries are subject to external trends that affect their business over<br />

time. Think of the r<strong>is</strong>e of the Internet or the global movement toward protecting the<br />

environment. Looking at these trends from the right perspective can unlock innovation<br />

that creates new market space. But key insights into new market spaces rarely come from<br />

projecting the trend itself. Instead they ar<strong>is</strong>e from business insights into how the trend<br />

will change value to the customer.<br />

1. L<strong>is</strong>t three to five trends that affect your industry most directly and are likely to affect<br />

the future of your business. Most dramatic changes in your sector can be traced back<br />

to profound social, demographic, macroeconomic, political, technological, and<br />

environmental changes.<br />

2. L<strong>is</strong>t the implications of these trends on your industry, and explore which ones you<br />

could possibly capitalize on.<br />

3. What would your new value curve look like?<br />

4. Similarly, what are the critical trends affecting industries that produce alternative<br />

products or services (refer to the “Exploring across Industries” path)? What can you<br />

learn from these anticipated changes? <strong>How</strong> would these changes affect your new “To<br />

Be” value curve?<br />

Tips: “Exploring across Time and Trends” <strong>is</strong> a difficult path to explore. Consider using<br />

industry scenarios as a tool.<br />

What are some undeniable trends occurring in the world today? An aging population,<br />

the influx of new immigrants, shifting from a manufacturing to a service economy, a<br />

bifurcation of small and large credit unions, shrinking net interest margins, etc. Take<br />

the most relevant trends to their most logical conclusion…what would a credit union<br />

need to do to leverage these trends<br />

As the cases in th<strong>is</strong> report have revealed, external trends affect all<br />

industries and businesses over time. But looking at such trends as the r<strong>is</strong>e<br />

of the Internet, mounting concerns about ethical behavior in business,<br />

and the global movement toward protecting the environment from a<br />

new perspective can unlock value and new market space. Key insights<br />

into new market spaces rarely occur when executives merely project<br />

trends forward, however; instead, they ar<strong>is</strong>e from business insights into<br />

how trends will increase value to customers and lower the cost of doing<br />

business. Looking across time and trends <strong>is</strong> difficult—it takes courage<br />

and a lot of work. As the above examples suggest, an organization’s<br />

greatest strengths reside in its leaders’ abilities to think clearly about<br />

the past, to anticipate the future, and to use tools to explore new<br />

ideas. To ass<strong>is</strong>t with th<strong>is</strong> final step in the “value innovation” process,<br />

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we encourage you to think about the h<strong>is</strong>tory that guided credit union<br />

success, and to find three to five trends that currently influence and<br />

will continue to affect your customers’ lives and your business. We can<br />

trace most dramatic changes to social, demographic, macroeconomic,<br />

political, technological, and environmental transformations. By l<strong>is</strong>ting<br />

the implications of past and current trends, consider those you could<br />

capitalize on to encourage value innovation. What would your new<br />

value curve look like? Similarly, what critical trends will influence the<br />

industries that produce alternative products and services? What can you<br />

learn from these anticipated changes? And how would those changes<br />

affect you and your “To Be” value curves? Answers to these questions<br />

should influence all of your future strategy sessions, no matter<br />

which tools you employ. Indeed, thinking beyond the boundaries of<br />

conventional w<strong>is</strong>dom has the power to unlock a better future for the<br />

consumers on whom you depend.<br />

TRY IT OUT YOURSELF<br />

Figure 28: Where do sources of value innovation<br />

lie in your credit union?<br />

Path<br />

Noncustomer Space<br />

New Element<br />

of Value<br />

Across Industries<br />

Across Strategic Groups<br />

Across Chain of Buyers<br />

Across Complementary<br />

Offerings<br />

Across Functional and/or<br />

Emotional Appeal<br />

Across Time and Trends<br />

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Figure 29: In order to explore th<strong>is</strong> new path, what elements of your value offering will you:<br />

Eliminate<br />

Reduce<br />

Ra<strong>is</strong>e<br />

Create<br />

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CONCLUSION:<br />

Conceiving New<br />

Market Space<br />

OUR JOURNEY<br />

Th<strong>is</strong> research study attempts to put credit unions under the “value<br />

innovation” lens. We have introduced the concept of value innovation<br />

and furn<strong>is</strong>hed examples of how to apply th<strong>is</strong> process to your institution.<br />

The next step <strong>is</strong> to put all the pieces together into a cohesive “To Be”<br />

Strategy Canvas. The figure below reminds us of the steps we’ve taken<br />

thus far.<br />

Figure 30: <strong>Blue</strong> <strong>Ocean</strong> Strategy Process<br />

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© Kim and Mauborgne 2005<br />

PMS Map:<br />

• Th<strong>is</strong> map catalogues the “innovativeness” of your organization’s<br />

current product portfolio.<br />

• We d<strong>is</strong>covered that most credit unions reside in the “settler” area<br />

of the map, with very few examples of products/services in the<br />

“migrator” or “pioneer” category.<br />

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“As Is” Strategy Canvas:<br />

• Th<strong>is</strong> chart lays out the strategic landscape of you and your<br />

competitors by evaluating the relative level of value you offer<br />

consumers. The resulting value curve provides a clear v<strong>is</strong>ual cue<br />

about the level of differentiation in your industry.<br />

• We d<strong>is</strong>covered that credit unions and banks have nearly identical<br />

value curves from the consumer’s point of view.<br />

Buyer Utility Map:<br />

• Th<strong>is</strong> exerc<strong>is</strong>e explores the “pain points” consumers exhibit<br />

when purchasing a product/service from your organization, and<br />

provides clues to areas of your business that are ripe for value<br />

innovation.<br />

• We d<strong>is</strong>covered several consumer pain points in a variety of<br />

consumer interactions with credit unions. These pain points<br />

should encourage you to ask which components of your offerings<br />

you can “eliminate, reduce, ra<strong>is</strong>e, or create” to develop future<br />

“blue ocean” strategies.<br />

Learning from Noncustomers:<br />

• In addition to looking at current customer experience cycles, we<br />

examined three different types of noncustomers: “soon-to-be”<br />

noncustomers, “refusers,” and “unexplored.” Th<strong>is</strong> exerc<strong>is</strong>e pushes<br />

organizations to look beyond the conventional boundaries of<br />

their business.<br />

• We d<strong>is</strong>covered a variety of common elements within each<br />

credit union’s noncustomer group, which again may furn<strong>is</strong>h<br />

opportunities for value innovation in your credit union.<br />

The Six Paths Framework:<br />

Th<strong>is</strong> framework encourages organizations to “value innovate” by<br />

examining six unique paths to a “blue ocean” strategy. We d<strong>is</strong>covered<br />

a variety of examples within the credit union industry across each of<br />

these six paths.<br />

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“To Be” Value Curve:<br />

<br />

After going through the steps above, credit unions now have the<br />

raw materials to imagine a comprehensive “blue ocean” strategy<br />

by redrawing the “As Is” value curve introduced earlier on in th<strong>is</strong><br />

document.<br />

Figure 31: “As Is” Value Curve, Retail Financial Services<br />

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On th<strong>is</strong> new strategy canvas credit unions will eliminate, reduce and<br />

ra<strong>is</strong>e ex<strong>is</strong>ting value elements and create new value elements, which<br />

should create a compelling and divergent “blue ocean” strategy. The<br />

“To Be” value curve <strong>is</strong> an exerc<strong>is</strong>e in creativity, collaboration, and hard<br />

work. The figure that follows <strong>is</strong> an example of how a recast value, or<br />

“To Be” curve would look:<br />

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Figure 32: “To Be” Value Curve, Retail Financial Services<br />

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In th<strong>is</strong> example, the credit union, having gone through the value<br />

innovation process, d<strong>is</strong>covers a “blue ocean” of opportunity as the<br />

“finance machine” for local car dealers. In th<strong>is</strong> fictional example, the<br />

credit union decides to recast its business as the on-site consumer<br />

finance arm of every local car dealer in its field of membership. The<br />

credit union gives up the “red ocean” of having to “win” consumer<br />

loans and transaction services in the retail marketplace. Instead, the<br />

credit union will develop a narrow expert<strong>is</strong>e in serving the point-ofsale<br />

financing needs for automobile purchasers, and will likely move<br />

on to other big-ticket, point-of-sale finance opportunities in the future<br />

(for example, manufactured home sales, home improvement, cosmetic<br />

surgery, etc.) with local vendors. Walking through th<strong>is</strong> “To Be” value<br />

curve, you will notice that the fictional credit union makes a variety of<br />

difficult trade-offs:<br />

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• The credit union “ra<strong>is</strong>es” the attractiveness of pricing to the<br />

consumer by focusing exclusively on one niche of the retail<br />

finance market.<br />

• The credit union “reduces” the consumer’s perception of<br />

convenience by “eliminating” its costly branch structure, and<br />

instead co-locates at every car dealer in its field of membership.<br />

• The credit union challenges the conventional w<strong>is</strong>dom that credit<br />

unions need to convey trustworthiness, reliability, and security in<br />

all interactions. Instead, by working in the background of bigticket<br />

financial transactions, the credit union no longer needs to<br />

convey th<strong>is</strong> costly set of values to consumers at multiple touch<br />

points, only with its new car dealer “customers.”<br />

• The credit union “reduces” the need to deliver image messages<br />

to consumers through direct mail, TV, radio, etc. Th<strong>is</strong> onus <strong>is</strong><br />

now on the auto dealer to get consumers into their shops to make<br />

the purchase while the credit union patiently waits to finance<br />

the deal.<br />

• By reducing the often costly structures of running a typical<br />

retail financial institution, the credit union <strong>is</strong> now able to focus<br />

exclusively on one type of transaction, so it will be able to “ra<strong>is</strong>e”<br />

the speed of the transaction from the consumers’ point of view.<br />

• The automobile <strong>is</strong> embedded in the psyche of most Americans.<br />

Buying an automobile <strong>is</strong> an exciting experience that should be<br />

celebrated. In th<strong>is</strong> example, the credit union will “ra<strong>is</strong>e” the fun<br />

factor of buying an automobile by developing ways to celebrate<br />

the consumer’s purchase (for example, sending the consumer a<br />

pair of sunglasses if purchasing a sports car, or a gift certificate<br />

for a free night of babysitting if purchasing a minivan).<br />

• Finally, the credit union “creates” a unique point-of-sale<br />

“financing machine” for consumers that, until th<strong>is</strong> point, has<br />

been inhabited by a confusing mix of indirect and captive<br />

finance options.<br />

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Kim and Mauborgne claim that the ultimate test of such “blue ocean”<br />

strategies <strong>is</strong> to be able to give positive answers to the following questions:<br />

• Is th<strong>is</strong> strategy focused?<br />

• Is th<strong>is</strong> strategy divergent from the competition?<br />

• Does th<strong>is</strong> strategy have a compelling tag line?<br />

The above example <strong>is</strong> simply one way that credit unions can conceive<br />

a “blue ocean” strategy. During the course of our research, we did not<br />

d<strong>is</strong>cover the ultimate “blue ocean” strategy for credit unions to pursue.<br />

In fact, the concept of the ultimate “blue ocean” strategy <strong>is</strong> counter to<br />

the whole concept of value innovation. Instead, there are many creative<br />

paths toward your particular credit union’s “blue ocean.”<br />

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS<br />

True value innovation flows from the simultaneous push for a quantum<br />

leap in buyer value and sharp drop in cost structures. The ideas these<br />

strategies present can enhance your ability to navigate both “blue” and<br />

“red” oceans in the future. More important, the concepts behind value<br />

innovation need not lead to a complete revolution in your offerings.<br />

More modest applications of value innovation can lead to more<br />

incremental yet significant improvements in business performance. The<br />

basic idea <strong>is</strong> to enhance value, to reduce costs, and to avoid head-on and<br />

often futile competition, when feasible.<br />

Even “blue ocean” strateg<strong>is</strong>ts have to swim in “red oceans.” In a world<br />

where information flows rapidly and imitators come at one quickly, even<br />

the bluest of strategies will ultimately get imitated and start to bloody<br />

the waters, driving the need for the next round of value innovation.<br />

Yet, as some of our previous examples suggest, reaching “blue” waters<br />

can lead to long-lived advantages for those with a unique proposition<br />

for its members. Long-term work on strategy can also help to create an<br />

organizational structure optimally positioned for the future, no matter<br />

what that future brings.<br />

Ultimately, the courage it takes to pursue a “blue ocean” strategy<br />

may emerge as the highest entry barrier to finding new market space.<br />

Organizational inertia, r<strong>is</strong>k aversion, fear of cannibalization, and other<br />

forms of inflexibility often delay imitation just long enough to create<br />

significant d<strong>is</strong>tance from rivals. In a world where the need for strategic<br />

reinvention has now become commonplace, those firms that employ<br />

70


a structured and d<strong>is</strong>ciplined approach to innovation will have greater<br />

success in finding a “blue ocean.” And as executives gain experience<br />

in using the process, they increase the probability of locating other<br />

uncontested market spaces as well. Th<strong>is</strong> skill can become a longlasting<br />

and sustainable organizational competency. We encourage you<br />

to continue to look beyond the boundaries of current thinking and<br />

explore the “blue oceans” in your marketplace.<br />

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APPENDIX A:<br />

Inter view<br />

Protocol<br />

Question Set<br />

What <strong>is</strong> the market that you serve? Who are your members?<br />

1. Who are the members of your institution? What <strong>is</strong> their profile<br />

and makeup?<br />

2. Why are they your members? What caused them to become members?<br />

3. What products and services do they buy?<br />

4. <strong>How</strong> do you measure their loyalty?<br />

5. What don’t they buy from you? Why?<br />

6. When do you lose members? Where do they go? What can they get<br />

elsewhere that they can’t get from you? Who are your nonmembers?<br />

Who <strong>is</strong> in your field of membership that you have never tapped into,<br />

and why?<br />

7. Who are your most profitable members? Who are the others?<br />

<strong>How</strong> do you compete in the broader context of the financial<br />

services industry?<br />

1. Who do you compete with on the broadest terms, both inside and<br />

outside of your industry?<br />

2. What are the factors the credit union industry specifically compete<br />

with? (The factors of competition are the key elements of your<br />

product, service, or delivery.)<br />

3. What does the customer want/expect today from a financial<br />

institution?<br />

4. What are the key factors of competition as the customer would describe<br />

them. Think in terms of product, service, and delivery elements.<br />

5. Let’s take each of these individually and d<strong>is</strong>cuss the relative level<br />

(value) of your offering compared with the other providers, on a<br />

scale of 1–5, with 5 being the highest value provider and 1 being<br />

the lowest.<br />

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What do you provide to them?<br />

1. Can you l<strong>is</strong>t any components of your products or services that help<br />

differentiate your product/service? Are there offerings you provide<br />

that turn your members into fans?<br />

2. What are the products/services that are requirements in the industry<br />

to compete? These are essentially commodities.<br />

Are there products or services that are improving the value you<br />

provide to your members? Do they offer marginally better value than<br />

your competition?<br />

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APPENDIX B:<br />

Workshop<br />

Attendees<br />

First Name Last Name Title<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong>/<br />

Organization<br />

Joe Antellocy President AFTECH<br />

Linda Armyn VP Bus. Dev./Bus Serv Bethpage FCU<br />

Randy Baldwin President/CEO Tucson Old Pueblo CU<br />

T.L. Barnes President/CEO First American CU<br />

Jill Bechard SVP Planning/Strag Serv<br />

Arizona State Savings<br />

& CU<br />

Peggy Bosma President/CEO Patriot FCU<br />

Musette Bracher VP-Marketing<br />

Government Employees<br />

CU<br />

Debra Bridwell VP-Operations Eastman <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

David Brock President/CEO Community Educators CU<br />

Linda Brown EVP Service 1st FCU<br />

Scott Burditt VP R & D US Central<br />

Vincent Cerasuolo President/CEO Century Heritage FCU<br />

Fred Coffroth VP Internal Audit Services PSECU<br />

Jim Craig VP Marketing 1st Advantage FCU<br />

Ray Cromer, Jr. President/CEO Env<strong>is</strong>ion CU<br />

William DeMare President/CEO Bay Gulf <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

Frank Dougherty CEO Main Line Health EFCU<br />

John Dwyer President/CEO New England FCU<br />

Doug Fecher CEO Wright-Patt CU<br />

Den<strong>is</strong>e Gabel VP-Strategic Direction Spokane Teachers CU<br />

Mel<strong>is</strong>sa Garcell Marketing & HR Manager Service 1st FCU<br />

Laida Garcia EVP Florida Central CU<br />

Tim Haegelin President/CEO San Antonio City EFCU<br />

Elizabeth Hayes Chief Rel Officer/SVP Affinity Plus FCU<br />

Pamela Heald VP-Branch Develop. WCTA Federal CU<br />

John Hirabayashi CEO/President<br />

Community First CU of<br />

FL<br />

James Holt President MidAmerican CU<br />

Mary Ann Hughes Butts VP Information Systems Commonwealth One FCU<br />

Andrew Jaeger President/CEO<br />

<strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong> of New<br />

Jersey<br />

Brett Johnson Home Financing Adv<strong>is</strong>or Service 1st FCU<br />

Larry Kelly President/CEO Apple FCU<br />

David Larson VP Branch Serv. Affinity Plus FCU<br />

Mike L’Ecuyer President/CEO<br />

Bellwether Community<br />

CU<br />

Bob Lestina CEO Heritage <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

Donna<br />

LoStocco<br />

VP Member Dev. &<br />

Political Affairs<br />

Affinity Federal CU<br />

Keith Malbrue CIO Affinity Plus FCU<br />

Renee Manning Vice President Peoples Trust FCU<br />

Kyle Markland President/CEO Affinity Plus FCU<br />

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Sarah Mason VP Relationship Mgr. Affinity Plus FCU<br />

Heather McLachlin VP Marketing The CUMIS Group<br />

Mike Murphy EVP/COO Motorola ECU<br />

Mike Osborne EVP/CFO First Tech CU<br />

Vincent Paolini CEO Riverfront FCU<br />

Steven Post CEO Vermont State ECU<br />

L<strong>is</strong>a Renner CEO<br />

Mazuma <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

CUSO<br />

Thomas Ruback VP, Card Services PA State Employees CU<br />

Rhonda Rumbaugh Planning Consultant<br />

Jeff Russell CIO/VP Strategic Dev.<br />

PA <strong>Credit</strong> <strong>Union</strong><br />

Association<br />

Iowa Corporate CU/The<br />

Members Group<br />

John Schooler President USERS Incorporated<br />

Robb Scott CEO Deer Valley CU<br />

Gerri Sexsion President/CEO JAX Federal CU<br />

Susan Siegel SVP Mktg./Branch Oper Sunmark Federal CU<br />

Phil Smith VP Lending Strategies Affinity Plus FCU<br />

Greg Smith President Pennsylvania State ECU<br />

David<br />

Snodgrass<br />

SVP Strategy & Bus.<br />

Development<br />

Mark Spenny Executive VP CEFCU<br />

Affinity Federal CU<br />

Kim Sponem President/CEO Great W<strong>is</strong>consin CU<br />

Al Strawn General Manager Matanuska Valley FCU<br />

Tom Swierzy President/CEO SB1 Federal CU<br />

Rich Syme Sr. Vice President America First CU<br />

Jill Tomalin SVP CUNA & Affiliates<br />

Doug True SVP Lending & Technology FORUM CU<br />

Joni Walker Senior VP M<strong>is</strong>soula FCU<br />

Cindy Walker EVP Tampa Bay Federal CU<br />

Caroline<br />

Willard<br />

VP Marketing Strategic<br />

Plan<br />

American First CU<br />

Larry Wilson President/CEO Coastal Federal CU<br />

Laura Wood Director Human Resources Spokane Teachers CU<br />

Ralph Yeatts SVP Planning Navy Federal CU<br />

Sean Yokley VP Corporate Affairs CommunityAmerica CU<br />

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P.0. Box 2998<br />

Mad<strong>is</strong>on, WI 53701-2998<br />

Phone (608) 231-8550<br />

www.fi lene.org<br />

1752-125 (11/06) ISBN 1-932795-06-5

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