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Chapter 6 The 2010 <strong>European</strong> <strong>Report</strong> on Development coherent policymaking. Coherence is all the more threatened when donors not only implement different programmes but also promote competing visions and instruments, possibly undermining the national ef<strong>for</strong>t towards expanding <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong>. 454 6.3.2.3 HARMONISATION AND OWNERSHIP: THE NEED FOR BALANCE Both harmonisation and ownership are among the main objectives of the Paris Declaration, but the first can be detrimental to the second. On the one hand, “partner countries expect harmonisation to be led by themselves, and to follow and support alignment to their systems”. 455 On the other hand, the donor community has its own incentives to harmonise, and might engage in too much harmonisation too soon, with little involvement from partner countries, themselves unevenly invested in the process. In such a scenario, “giving excessive priority to harmonisation among donors is seen as running counter to ownership”. 456 Furthermore, too much harmonisation might awaken fears of donors ‘ganging up’ to impose their views on what should be done and how: when donor agencies commit to the same policy line, SSA policymakers can find themselves in a cold place arguing the case against the prevailing - and not always appropriate - <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> discourse. 457 Finding the right balance between harmonisation and ownership is thus not easy: from the donor standpoint, it implies aligning behind a collection of domestic policies not all of which may be a priority, instead of piloting and promoting their different organisations’ interests. 458 Furthermore, while supporting home-grown domestically legitimate strategies should be the preferred option, the challenge of fragility often calls <strong>for</strong> alternative solutions. 6.3.3 SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN SITUATION OF FRAGILITY 6.3.3.1 FRAGILE DONOR ENGAGEMENT As chapter 3 highlighted, many of the challenges in delivering <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> in countries in situation of fragility are similar to the challenges in low-income countries - but magnified. This is also true of donor intervention: while providing support is always challenging, it is all the more difficult to find the right balance and approach in countries in situation of fragility, where “international actors can affect outcomes in both positive and negative ways”. 459 In view of “maximising the positive impact of engagement and minimising unintentional harm”, OECD donors have agreed on 10 principles <strong>for</strong> good international engagement in fragile states. 460 There is, however, diversity in fragility. While international partners tend to predominantly support <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> in states falling into the “gradual improvement” and “post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations” categories, more difficult environments of “prolonged crisis or impasse” and “deteriorating governance” benefit from less assistance. 461 The focus here is thus mostly on these two latter categories, assessing the possible modalities of support to <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> and attempting to learn from the significant range of solutions already implemented. 6.3.3.2 THE SCOPE OF SUPPORT TO SOCIAL PROTECTION IN COUNTRIES IN SITUATION OF FRAGILITY In countries in situation of fragility - especially those in the midst or aftermath of a conflict - “applying the concept of <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> requires some adaptation of normal usage”. 462 Indeed, the very scope of <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> is broadened, while the array of intervention possibilities is somewhat constrained. International partners may there<strong>for</strong>e need to deviate from their traditional understandings, adapting their instruments and approaches accordingly. For instance, the third principle <strong>for</strong> good international engagement in fragile countries is to “focus on state-building as the central objective”. But in some cases of conflict or deteriorating governance, the state may very well be part or even the source of the problem, party to the conflict or discriminating against some of its own citizens. So while working with and through the state is usually the preferred solution to promote ownership and rein<strong>for</strong>ce the <strong>social</strong> contract, international actors may be unwilling to 454 This paragraph draws on Adesina 2010. 455 Woods et al. 2008, p.20-21. 456 Ibid, p.20-21. 457 Adesina 2010. 458 As in Rwanda (ERD questionnaire). 459 OECD 2007. 460 (1) Take context as the starting point; (2) Do no harm; (3) Focus on state-building as the central objective; (4) Prioritise prevention; (5) Recognise the links between political, security and <strong>development</strong> objectives, (6) Promote non-discrimination as the basis <strong>for</strong> <strong>inclusive</strong> and stable societies; (7) Align with local priorities in different ways and different contexts; (8) Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between actors; (9) Act fast…but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance; (10) Avoid pockets of exclusion. [OECD 2010a]. 461 These are the four OECD categories of fragile states. 462 Darcy 2004. 103
The 2010 <strong>European</strong> <strong>Report</strong> on Development Supporting <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> in Sub-Saharan Africa do so when the state is perceived as lacking legitimacy. In other cases the state may not be a viable partner, as it may be too weak (even ‘collapsed’) or have lost control over some or most of its territory. There<strong>for</strong>e, when engaging with the state is impossible or undesirable, alternative bypass solutions need to be devised. Other international and local actors might become the go-to partners to deliver <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong>. In this context, “taking context as a starting point” (the first principle <strong>for</strong> good international engagement) appears fundamental. Paying attention to local perceptions of legitimacy is crucial when deciding whom to work with in fragile situations (the state at centralised or decentralised levels, more unorthodox political arrangements such as local patrons, communities, private sector, local and international NGOs, UN agencies). 463 A deeply rooted understanding of the local context is also needed when deciding which instruments are most appropriate. 464 It has been argued that despite concerns (<strong>for</strong> example, on the feasibility and appropriateness of cash transfers), “there is nothing inherent in the fragility of the state that should lead some instruments to being routinely excluded … rather than restricting the range of instruments available the focus should be on adapting them to contexts of fragility”. 465 The wider range of risks and difficult conditions indeed call <strong>for</strong> an even broader palette of <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> instruments, embedded in a continuum from humanitarian to security interventions. First and <strong>for</strong>emost, humanitarian aid is often the primary mechanism <strong>for</strong> providing <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong>. Relief in the <strong>for</strong>m of food aid or school feedings might, <strong>for</strong> example, be among the most appropriate and feasible instruments. Pushing the envelope further, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration packages might be construed as a <strong>for</strong>m of <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong>, which provide vulnerable populations with transitional safety nets. As evidenced by the attention paid to ex-combatants and survivors of the genocide in the Rwandan <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> system and strategy, crises and conflicts produce new categories of vulnerable citizens in need of <strong>protection</strong>, and whose inclusion is crucial to post-conflict reconstruction. 466 In sum, supporting <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> in situations of fragility is a daunting challenge, with the problems magnified and the solutions rarefied. External intervention, if not carefully prepared and tailored to the context, might offset fragile balances. But such constraints should not deter donors from providing support in fragile states. 6.3.3.3 DELIVERING SOCIAL PROTECTION IN COUNTRIES IN SITUATION OF FRAGILITY In SSA and elsewhere an array of donor-supported schemes has been implemented. While experiences cannot be merely replicated, these solutions can shed light on the (non-exhaustive) range of possibilities. Further to the examples showcased here, there is certainly much to learn from the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) support to <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong>, which puts emphasis on fragile states. 467 Box 6.4: Supporting and delivering <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> despite fragility Joint programmes bypassing the state The Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) in Zimbabwe and Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) in the Palestinian Territories provide examples of joint support to <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> where the state is not deemed a viable partner. Launched in 2004 by the Department <strong>for</strong> International Development, the PRP combines humanitarian assistance with longer term livelihoods support through a toolkit of instruments (agricultural support, <strong>social</strong> transfers, community-based care, access to water and sanitation). A multi-donor venture in its second phase (2008-2013), 468 it is implemented by 21 international and local nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), with support from technical partners and UN agencies. 469 Bypassing central government structures, the PRP is estimated to benefit about two million people, 15-20% of the Zimbabwean population. 463 OECD 2010b. 464 See ERD 2009. 465 Harvey et al. 2007, p.19. Concerns about cash transfers include difficulties in targeting and possible discriminatory effects, risks of corruption and inflation, lack of functioning markets and government capacity, safety threats during delivery, creation of dependency and expectations of long-term support. 466 The already established Fonds d’Aide aux Rescapés du Genocide and disability payments <strong>for</strong> ex-combatants will figure among the building blocks of the <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> floor (Government of Rwanda, MINALOC 2010). 467 “The [Human and Social Development] Department contributes to the reconstruction of socio-economic infrastructure in post conflict settings, with an emphasis on labour-based public works, skills building and employment/income generation. The Bank also works in close collaboration with other <strong>development</strong> partners in contributing to selected demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration ef<strong>for</strong>ts to create opportunities <strong>for</strong> those most affected by conflict“ (http://www.afdb.org/). 468 Further to the £54.8 million provided by DFID, Australia, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, the EU and the World Bank will contribute £24million <strong>for</strong> 2008-13 (House of Commons 2010). 469 Official PRP website: http://www.prpzim.info/. While ‘incremental re-engagement’ is envisaged, no DFID money goes through Zimbabwean government systems at present (House of Commons 2010). 104
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