social protection for inclusive development - European Report on ...

Chapter 1
The 2010 <strong>European</strong> <strong>Report</strong> on Development
of monetary poverty and an increase in hunger, in Burkina Faso by a reduction in schooling and increase in child labour and in
Cameroon by all dimensions equally. 56
Finally, there is some evidence suggesting a link between the crises and increased <strong>social</strong> tensions and violence in some SSA countries,
such as riots and other tension linked to rising commodity prices during 2008, especially in countries with weak governance. 57
Bakrania and Lucas report in<strong>for</strong>mation from Amnesty International showing demonstrations against the rising living costs in Benin,
Mozambique, Senegal and Zimbabwe. 58
1.3.3 PUBLIC RESPONSES TO THE CRISES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The recent crises were different from many previous ones afflicting SSA. Recent strong growth, generally better macroeconomic
management and debt relief opened some fiscal space <strong>for</strong> countercyclical measures. Furthermore, domestic policy was not at the
root of these crises. To avoid the negative effects of the recent crises, many SSA countries have shown a renewed interest in <strong>social</strong>
policies. The result has been that <strong>social</strong> spending such as on health and education has been broadly protected, while various <strong>social</strong>
<strong>protection</strong> programmes have been expanded and strengthened. 59 Some countries actually expanded their <strong>social</strong> spending and
<strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> programmes as part of fiscal stimulus packages.
For example, South Africa has devoted 56% of its stimulus package to <strong>social</strong> programmes, including improvements in health
and education, <strong>social</strong> grants, public works, nutrition and HIV prevention. 60 Similarly, 39% of Kenya’s stimulus package has been
distributed among <strong>social</strong> programmes, especially in the health and education sectors. The Tanzanian government increased <strong>social</strong>
expenditures up to 28.5% of GDP in 2009, increasing the number of people enrolled in the national employment creation scheme
and launching several infrastructure programmes (amounting to 2.5% of national GDP), with a positive impact on employment,
including in the rural areas. 61 In Nigeria, large infrastructure programmes (36.4% of the total stimulus) created job opportunities
all over the country. 62 In Ethiopia, the productive safety net programme, established in 2005, was expanded to provide assistance
to an additional 4.4 million people. 63 But having stretched their budgets with short-term measures, it is likely that governments
will find it difficult to sustain these <strong>social</strong> expenditures in the long run. 64
In summary, most SSA countries may have weathered the financial crisis storm rather well. But the effects of the food and fuel
crises, as well as reduced growth prospects associated with the aftermath of the global financial crisis, may undermine human
<strong>development</strong> and poverty reduction in the medium term. The recent expansion of various safety net programmes represents an
opportunity to improve <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> systems and sustain them during the return to growth, as a means of making this growth
more <strong>inclusive</strong>, but with budgetary and administrative flexibility.
1.4 THE CASE FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
This report will demonstrate that, while not a panacea, <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> provides a much needed missing piece of the <strong>development</strong>
puzzle. It is a critical part of every <strong>social</strong> sector, which complements and leverages other interventions in support of <strong>inclusive</strong>
<strong>development</strong>.
It would be wrong to start any discussion on the scope and nature of policy responses without first considering the way individuals,
families and communities actively try to reduce their vulnerability to persistent poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Not passively waiting
<strong>for</strong> outside support, they often try to limit the consequences of poverty and risk through their livelihoods and the networks and
communities they belong to. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of these responses offers leads on how to design and
organise public policy responses. Some of them will be discussed in chapter 2. But the discussion here shows that existing coping
mechanisms are not enough to protect the poor and vulnerable. A clear role remains <strong>for</strong> a proactive and specific public policy to
reduce vulnerability and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa.
56
Bibi et al. 2010.
57
See von Braun 2008 and Ardnt et al. 2008.
58
Bakrania and Lucas 2009. The African Economic Outlook (AfdB, OECD, UNECA 2010) reports that demonstrations remained strong also in 2009, leading to a
(small) increase in the number of episodes of violence, but the intensity was smaller on average than in previous years.
59
World Bank and IMF 2010.
60
Zhang et al. 2009.
61
ILO 2010b.
62
ILO 2010b.
63
World Bank and IMF 2010.
64
Based on data from past crises collected <strong>for</strong> 11 SSA countries (Burundi, Liberia, Madagascar, Togo, Zimbabwe, Congo Republic, Lesotho, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania
and Zambia), Prasad and Gerecke (2010) suggest that many countries tend to reduce their specific <strong>social</strong> security expenditures during crises and increase
them after one. Indeed, according to recent in<strong>for</strong>mation published by Oxfam, <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> expenditures in Africa are expected to fall from 0.94% of GDP
in 2008 to 0.61% in 2010; it remains to be seen if they will now increase (Oxfam 2010).
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