social protection for inclusive development - European Report on ...

Chapter 1
The 2010 <strong>European</strong> <strong>Report</strong> on Development
the DAC than within it. Furthermore, total private assistance already exceeds aid through the multi-lateral system, and may very well
overtake bilateral aid. 108 “Traditional” donors (i.e. OECD-DAC members and affiliates) have thus lost their monopoly on international
assistance, and operate in a significantly changed aid market. While DAC donors’ budgets are under strain, new players such as China,
India or some private actors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation play an increasingly important role in providing funds.
The revolution in the <strong>development</strong> landscape goes beyond money. Emerging donors have begun to change the rules of the game
by increasing their aid and giving on terms of their own choosing. 109 Indeed, new players operate in substantially different ways,
at the margins of the hard-fought DAC ‘soft law’ and ODA reporting norms. 110 On the one hand, this adds to the complexity and
lack of accountability of an already unmanageable aid governance system characterised by an ever-growing proliferation of actors
and fragmentation of interventions. On the other hand, the newfound variety in <strong>development</strong> assistance provides SSA and other
developing countries with increased policy-space, as well as new <strong>development</strong> prospects and opportunities. Emerging donors
offer a South-South alternative - stressing economic co-operation, political solidarity and non-interference - to the North-South
so-called impasse. 111
This is of particular relevance in the case of support to <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong>. Southern donors - or other ‘partners’ - have grown explicitly
interested in assisting fellow developing countries in <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong>, not least as many of them, such as India, Brazil and China
have themselves been leaders in developing <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> in the developing world. IBSA countries increasingly put emphasis
on sharing their own experiences through international co-operation. 112 In fact, Brazil has already actively engaged in South-South
learning, <strong>for</strong> example through the “Africa-Brazil Cooperation Programme on Social Development”. 113 Others, such as Mexico and
Chile, have also gotten involved. As their momentum is growing, the approaches, models and experiences of these “emerging”
Southern donors might be considered most relevant by their “developing” counterparts, particularly in SSA.
1.6.3 SUPPORTING SOCIAL PROTECTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: IDENTIFYING A ROLE FOR THE EU
Though these new rules call <strong>for</strong> some adjustments, they also provide new opportunities. The EU has already embarked on the path
to establishing “trilateral” partnerships <strong>for</strong> <strong>development</strong> 114 and has taken the lead on innovative finance. 115 Most importantly, the
Africa-EU relationship is now underpinned by a “strategic partnership” aimed at transitioning from a donor-beneficiary type of a
relation to a truly equal partnership. 116 Though still in the early stages, these initiatives lay the foundations <strong>for</strong> a reinvigorated EU
approach to <strong>development</strong> co-operation.
On these new bases, the EU ought to (re)define its value added in <strong>development</strong> by making the most of its strengths. For instance,
making <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> an integral part of its <strong>development</strong> policy fits with the EU’s commitment to the Social Dimension of
Globalisation (meant to “promote an <strong>inclusive</strong> globalisation that benefits the poor through adequate <strong>social</strong> policies”), 117 while
capitalising on the “contribution which the <strong>European</strong> model can make…to provide sustainable <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> systems”. 118
Yet thus far the EU’s external <strong>social</strong> dimension has mostly translated into the promotion of decent international labour standards,
while <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> does not seem to have been given real prominence. 119
A shift is nonetheless perceptible, as the EU and its Member States grow increasingly aware that supporting <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> is a
rewarding investment in <strong>inclusive</strong> <strong>development</strong> and pro-poor growth. References to <strong>social</strong> <strong>protection</strong> have appeared in a number
of EU policy documents, whether in relation to specific issues (employment, health, food security, taxation) or to the broader
pursuit of the MDGs.
108
Bader et al. 2010, p.10.
109
Woods 2008, p. 1205.
110
For example, they tend to “demand few of the human rights, governance or environmental conditions preferred by Western donors. Instead (they) may
impose conditions on procurement” [Fengler and Kharas 2010, p.10].
111
Deacon 2007.
112
IBSA 2010, IPC-IG 2010.
113
See Chapter 6 section 6.1.2.3.
114
Especially with China (<strong>European</strong> Commission, 2008) and Brazil (Brazil-EU Joint Action Plan 2008).
115
<strong>European</strong> Commission 2010b, pp.26-28.
116
African Union-<strong>European</strong> Union 2007; <strong>European</strong> Commission 2005; <strong>European</strong> Commission 2010f.
117
<strong>European</strong> Commission 2009, p.101.
118
<strong>European</strong> Commission 2004 p.7.
119
See Orbie and Tortell 2008; Eichhorst et al. 2010. The EU has <strong>for</strong> example promoted core labour standards through bilateral and multi-lateral agreements,
such as the GSP+, which links preferential trade agreements to the ratification of key international conventions.
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