Wu Sino US Inadvertent Escalation - Program on Strategic Stability ...

escalation by threatening or destroying strategic nuclear forces.”
5
Bruce Blair
discussed the logic of accidental nuclear war caused by the vulnerability of nuclear
command and control systems.
6
From of an organization theory perspective, Scott
Sagan analyzed nuclear safety and accidental nuclear war.
7
Richard Ned Lebow
pointed out three mechanisms resulting in nuclear escalation: pre-emption, loss of
control of brinkmanship, and miscalculated escalation.
8
Based on the analysis of
nuclear escalation, analysts had summarized the principles of Soviet-U.S. crisis
management.
9
The risk of nuclear escalation in current <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. case is much higher than that
of Soviet-U.S. case during the Cold War.
10
First, the Soviet Union maintained assured
destruction capability against the United States for much of the Cold War, but Chinese
nuclear arsenal is small and vulnerable, and can only maintain uncertain retaliation
against the United States.
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Therefore, Chinese leaders will face higher “use-it-orlose-it”
pressure. Second, during the Cold War, Soviet and American leaders had
clear understanding on the divide of Europe, avoiding direct clash of superpowers.
But China has territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea with U.S. allies,
and so China and the United States might involve into a direct conventional conflict.
Third, the Soviet Union and the United States developed a set of basic tacit “rules of
prudence” for crisis management, and worked out cooperative arrangements in many
domains. China and the United States lack such experience.
<strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. nuclear escalation is a hot topic in the debate regarding the security
relationship between China and the United States, but there is no systematic work on
the mechanisms of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalation. Christopher Twomey argued that
U.S. “escalation dominance at every single step of an escalatory ladder in possible
! 5 Barry R. Posen, “<strong>Inadvertent</strong> Nuclear War? <strong>Escalation</strong> and NATO's Northern Flank,” International Security, Vol.
7, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 28-54. See also Barry Posen, <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>: Conventional War and
Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
! 6 Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of AccidentaL Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993).
! 7 Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
! 8 Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1987), pp. 23-28.
! 9 A. L. George, P. J. Farley, and A. Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Graham T. Allison, “Primitive Rules of Prudence: Foundation of
Peaceful Competition,” in G. T. Allison and W. L. Ury with B. J. Allyn, eds., Windows of Opportunity: From Cold
War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1989), pp. 9-27. John Lewis
Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security, Vol.
10, No. 4 (Spring, 1986), pp. 99-142. Alexander L. George, “Is Research on Crisis Management Needed?” in
Alexander L. George ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991),
pp. 3-6. Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring
1985), pp. 99-139.
! 10 Actually, Posen did mention, “the problems outlined herein will loom especially large for small and mediumsized
nuclear powers.” See Barry Posen, <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 2.
! <strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Strategic
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Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July/August 2013), pp. 579-614.
! 2