Wu Sino US Inadvertent Escalation - Program on Strategic Stability ...

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escalation by threatening or destroying strategic nuclear forces.” 5 Bruce Blair discussed the logic of accidental nuclear war caused by the vulnerability of nuclear command and control systems. 6 From of an organization theory perspective, Scott Sagan analyzed nuclear safety and accidental nuclear war. 7 Richard Ned Lebow pointed out three mechanisms resulting in nuclear escalation: pre-emption, loss of control of brinkmanship, and miscalculated escalation. 8 Based on the analysis of nuclear escalation, analysts had summarized the principles of Soviet-U.S. crisis management. 9 The risk of nuclear escalation in current <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. case is much higher than that of Soviet-U.S. case during the Cold War. 10 First, the Soviet Union maintained assured destruction capability against the United States for much of the Cold War, but Chinese nuclear arsenal is small and vulnerable, and can only maintain uncertain retaliation against the United States. 11 Therefore, Chinese leaders will face higher “use-it-orlose-it” pressure. Second, during the Cold War, Soviet and American leaders had clear understanding on the divide of Europe, avoiding direct clash of superpowers. But China has territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea with U.S. allies, and so China and the United States might involve into a direct conventional conflict. Third, the Soviet Union and the United States developed a set of basic tacit “rules of prudence” for crisis management, and worked out cooperative arrangements in many domains. China and the United States lack such experience. <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. nuclear escalation is a hot topic in the debate regarding the security relationship between China and the United States, but there is no systematic work on the mechanisms of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalation. Christopher Twomey argued that U.S. “escalation dominance at every single step of an escalatory ladder in possible ! 5 Barry R. Posen, “<strong>Inadvertent</strong> Nuclear War? <strong>Escalation</strong> and NATO's Northern Flank,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 28-54. See also Barry Posen, <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). ! 6 Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of AccidentaL Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). ! 7 Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). ! 8 Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 23-28. ! 9 A. L. George, P. J. Farley, and A. Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Graham T. Allison, “Primitive Rules of Prudence: Foundation of Peaceful Competition,” in G. T. Allison and W. L. Ury with B. J. Allyn, eds., Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1989), pp. 9-27. John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring, 1986), pp. 99-142. Alexander L. George, “Is Research on Crisis Management Needed?” in Alexander L. George ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 3-6. Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 99-139. ! 10 Actually, Posen did mention, “the problems outlined herein will loom especially large for small and mediumsized nuclear powers.” See Barry Posen, <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 2. ! <strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Strategic 11 Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July/August 2013), pp. 579-614. ! 2
Taiwan scenarios, reducing the prospect of inadvertent escalation,” and Chinese military modernization will cause dangerous uncertainty. 12 Thomas Christensen contended that because of the overlap of China’s conventional and nuclear weapons, U.S. conventional attack could inadvertently “appear in Beijing as aimed at reducing, over time, China’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike.” 13 The escalatory risk of the Air-Sea Battle concept was also discussed, emphasizing its provocative indepth strike on China mainland. 14 15 This article will provide an analysis of the mechanisms of China-U.S. inadvertent nuclear escalation, discuss specific hypothetical scenarios, and give recommendations on crisis management. Specifically, the research questions of this article are: how could <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalations happen? And how to avoid <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalation? It is assumed that China and the United States have already involved in a conventional conflict. This article defines nuclear escalation as a situation in which nuclear element is introduced into a conventional conflict, including using or threating to use nuclear weapons. There are three types of nuclear escalation: deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation, and accidental/unauthorized escalation. Accidental/ unauthorized escalation refers to nuclear escalation that occurs as a result of actions not properly authorized by either side. On the contrary, deliberate escalation refers to nuclear escalation that is authorized by both sides. In inadvertent escalation scenario, one side attacks the other side’s nuclear weapons unintentionally, but the other side conceives the attack as disarming strike and decides to escalate. Table 1 shows all three types of escalation. Table 1 Three types of escalation 16 ! 12 Christopher Twomey, “Dangers and Prospects in <strong>Sino</strong>-American Strategic Nuclear Relations,” in Christopher Twomey ed., Perspectives on <strong>Sino</strong>-American Strategic Nuclear Issues (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 3-12. ! 13 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and <strong>US</strong>- China Security Relations,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, August 2012, pp. 447–487. A critic of this article, see <strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang, “Issues in <strong>Sino</strong>-<strong>US</strong> Nuclear Relations: Survivability, Coercion and <strong>Escalation</strong>,” UK- China Strategic Communication Initiative, 21 June 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/issues-insino-us-nuclear-relations-survivability-coercion-and-escalation. ! 14 Eleni Ekmektsioglou, “AirSea Battle and <strong>Escalation</strong>,” The Diplomat, July 28, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/ new-leaders-forum/2011/07/28/airsea-battle-and-escalation/. T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic Forum, No. 278, June 2012. Raoul Heinrichs, “America’s Dangerous Battle Plan,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/2011/08/17/america’s-dangerous-battle-plan/. Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp. 35-40. Joshua Rovner, “AirSea Battle and <strong>Escalation</strong> Risks,” Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia Policy Brief 12, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, January 2012. On the contrary, Elbridge Colby argues, “An AirSea Battle-style approach in a war with China—if conducted with due concern for managing escalation—would not be likely to lead to nuclear war.” Elbridge Colby, “Don't Sweat AirSea Battle,” National Interest, July 31, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airseabattle-8804. ! 15 Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89. ! 16 The author thanks Robert Pape for pointing out this. ! 3
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