Wu Sino US Inadvertent Escalation - Program on Strategic Stability ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

! DF-31/DF-31A 7200/11200 Nuclear, solid Land-mobile DF-11 DF-15 DF-16? Conventional, solid Conventional, solid Conventional, solid Land-mobile Land-mobile Land-mobile DH-10 Source: main site Cruise missile forward site forward site forward site launch site launch site launch site launch site launch site launch site launch site launch site launch site Figure 3 Chinese mobile missiles’ deployment pattern 27 The command and control (C2) systems of Chinese missile units. At issue are two points: 1) overlap of conventional and nuclear C2 infrastructure; 2) U.S. CPGS and precision guided munitions. 1995/1996-like scenario carries no escalatory risk. In limited missile campaign, China’s strategic purpose is limited, so U.S. response would probably also moderate. A tit-for-tat U.S. counterstrike strategy is to seek and hunt Chinese transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). Locating mobile missiles is a challenging job. 28 A frequently mentioned case is that during the 1991 Gulf War, while the allies conducted 1,460 strikes against Iraqi Scud missiles, there ! 27 Xie Tao, Wang Minle, Zhong Jianqiang, Fang Qin, “Changgui daodan zhendi peizhi youhua yanjiu” [Research on Optimal Deployment of Conventional Missile Positions], Xitong fangzhen xuebao, Vol. 21 No. 6 (March, 2009), pp. 1535-1537. Wang Minle, Gao Xiaoguang, “Zhanlue daodan jidong zhendi bushu youhua yanjiu sheji” [Optimal design of deployment of strategic missile mobile positions], Xitong gongcheng lilun yu shijian, No. 10 (1999), pp. 94-98. ! 28 ! 8
was no evidence demonstrating that any Scud TEL was destroyed. 29 But we cannot conclude that the United States cannot find China’s mobile missiles. The U.S. intelligence system puts much more effort on China’s missiles than Iraq’s in peacetime, so in wartime the United States would have a much better performance against China. The Second Artillery is trained to deploy concealment and camouflage measures to TELs, which could be good enough to be invisible to the naked eye. 30 So it is difficult for U.S. intelligence to find Chinese TELs, and must be more difficult to identify the located one is conventional or nuclear. So there is a possibility that the U.S. military attacks Chinese nuclear missiles inadvertently. Since both sides’ purposes are limited, and the U.S. military is likely to select targets carefully in order to avoid attacking Chinese nuclear weapons, the risk of inadvertent escalation is low. If large-scale missile war occurs, the United States would try to neutralize China’s missile war capability, including missile TELs, missile sites, and command and control systems. In order to neutralize a missile site, U.S. military need to first locate and then destroy or disable the site. A missile site could be ground or underground facility. For ground facilities, detectability depends on the performance of the concealment and camouflage measures they take. If detected, it would be destroyed. For UGFs, U.S. military need to not only locate the site, but also characterize it: physical layout, size, geology, depth, and hardness. To build an UGF is time-consuming, making it relatively easy to detect. 31 A variety of methods for locating and characterizing UGFs were developed: gravity/magnetic field mapping, ground penetrating radar, seismic, electromagnetic, electrical conductivity, and radioactive. 32 Of significant practical importance are gravity field mapping (passive) and seismic (active) approaches. U.S. day-to-day surveillance on Chinese missile sites and military activities around helps to tell whether the specific facility is for nuclear or conventional purposes. Two issues make the situation more complicated. First, China’s DF-21 missile has both conventional and nuclear versions, which are difficult to discriminate. Second, China deploys concealment and camouflage measures on missile sites to cover their real purposes. The better the concealment and camouflage measures, the more difficult to identify a site’s purpose, and the higher inadvertent escalatory risk. Attacking command and control systems. ! 29 Mark E. Kipphut, Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: Lessons from History (Maxwell Air Force Base, ALA: Air Univ. 2003), pp. 17-18. ! 30 Zhao Xianfeng, Bi Yongjun and <strong>Wu</strong> Xudong, “Rexue lijian ren: Gao Jin” [A hot- blooded swordsman: Gao Jin], Jiangfangjun bao, November 20, 2000, p. 1. Li Yongfei, Wang Yongxiao and Xia Hongqing, “Tiantian yu jiangjun tongxing: di’er paobing moujidi guanbing xuexi jicheng yangyegong ‘sizhong jingshen’ jishi” [Follow with the general everyday: real record of the study of Yang Yegong’s “four spirits” in a base of the Second Artillery], Jiefangjun bao, August 17, 2006, p. 3. ! 31 For example, a declassified U.S. intelligence report shows that in 1980 a big UGF in central China was detected. Probably this facility is an alternative national military command center. U.S. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Possible Alternative National Military Command Center, <strong>Wu</strong>han Military Region, China,” November 1980. ! Eric M. Sepp, “Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations,” Occasional Paper No. 14, 32 Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, May 2000. ! 9
Page 1 and 2: Program on Strateg
Page 3 and 4: Taiwan scenarios, reducing the pros
Page 5 and 6: In this section, we will discuss th
Page 7: involved into a conflict because of
Page 11 and 12: and several small VLF stations alon
Page 13 and 14: China reportedly lacked PALs in 198
Page 15: use of sea within the first island

Wu Sino US Inadvertent Escalation - Program on Strategic Stability ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?