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Does Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Matter in China ...

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Table 4: The effect <strong>of</strong> IP rights enforcement on <strong>in</strong>formal f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

The dependent variable is the proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formal f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g (debt m<strong>in</strong>us bank loan and trade credit) <strong>in</strong> the newly raised debt.<br />

Only firms that raised new debt exceed<strong>in</strong>g 5% <strong>of</strong> their total assets <strong>in</strong> 2004 and 2005 enter the regressions, because the data on bank<br />

loan is available only <strong>in</strong> these two years. For a description <strong>of</strong> all the other variables, see Appendix 3. All regressions <strong>in</strong>clude<br />

<strong>in</strong>dustry dummies as part <strong>of</strong> the control variables. All the <strong>in</strong>dependent variables are lagged by one year. The coefficients reported<br />

<strong>in</strong> Column (1), (2), (4) and (5) are from OLS regressions. Column (3) and (6) present results obta<strong>in</strong>ed from 2SLS regressions, with<br />

the <strong>in</strong>struments be<strong>in</strong>g the prov<strong>in</strong>cial number <strong>of</strong> Christian colleges till 1920 (Christian Colleges) and the dummy which equals 1<br />

when a prov<strong>in</strong>ce had a British concession dur<strong>in</strong>g the late Q<strong>in</strong>g Dynasty (British Settlement). Other covariates <strong>in</strong> the first-stage<br />

regression are omitted for presentational convenience. The numbers <strong>in</strong> the parentheses are t-stat based on standard errors adjusted<br />

for heteroskedasticity and the potential cluster<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the residual at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level. ***, **, * <strong>in</strong>dicate the coefficient is<br />

statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.<br />

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)<br />

2SLS: Second<br />

2SLS: Second<br />

Model OLS OLS<br />

OLS OLS<br />

stage<br />

stage<br />

Dependent variables<br />

Informal<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ratio<br />

Informal<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ratio<br />

Informal<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ratio<br />

Informal<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ratio<br />

Informal<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ratio<br />

Informal<br />

f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ratio<br />

IPP1 0.220 0.187 1.099<br />

(2.27)** (1.80)* (2.69)***<br />

IPP2 0.020 0.021 0.013<br />

(15.15)*** (10.20)*** (3.18)***<br />

Corruption Control 0.065 0.076 0.031 0.044<br />

(7.56)*** (7.56)*** (3.26)*** (4.03)***<br />

Bank<strong>in</strong>g Development -0.034 -0.074 -0.046 -0.040<br />

(-2.91)*** (-3.57)*** (-4.07)*** (-3.55)***<br />

GDP Growth 1.265 1.414 2.774 2.224<br />

(5.20)*** (5.42)*** (9.01)*** (5.73)***<br />

University 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005<br />

(7.38)*** (5.11)*** (3.64)*** (4.14)***<br />

Metropolis -0.062 -0.029 -0.006 -0.030<br />

(-4.80)*** (-1.40) (-0.40) (-1.65)*<br />

Patent Dummy -0.018 -0.019 -0.008 -0.022 -0.022 -0.025<br />

(-0.81) (0.88) (-0.39) (-1.03) (-1.06) (1.17)<br />

R&D Intensity 0.091 0.061 0.090 0.086 0.096 0.095<br />

(1.40) (0.94) (1.36) (1.35) (1.51) (1.49)<br />

Sales Growth 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002<br />

(2.68)*** (1.76)* (1.33) (1.26) (1.12) (1.41)<br />

Intangible/TA -0.165 -0.215 -0.217 -0.162 -0.206 -0.205<br />

(-2.78)*** (-3.69)*** (-3.74)*** (-2.88)*** (-3.68)*** (-3.65)***<br />

ROA 0.011 0.022 0.018 0.043 0.023 0.019<br />

(0.19) (0.40) (0.33) (0.76) (0.41) (0.35)<br />

Leverage -0.141 -0.134 -0.133 -0.122 -0.135 -0.134<br />

(-4.61)*** (-4.47)*** (-4.41)*** (-4.07)*** (-4.50)*** (-4.48)***<br />

Log(assets) -0.075 -0.072 -0.069 -0.064 -0.064 -0.066<br />

(-9.79)*** (-9.56)*** (-9.03)*** (-8.52)*** (-8.58)*** (-8.75)***<br />

Log(age) 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.021 0.012 0.010<br />

(0.12) (0.17) (0.83) (1.60) (0.94) (0.74)<br />

Constant 1.080 0.180 -0.349 0.882 0.264 0.260<br />

(7.35)*** (1.19) (1.24) (6.84)*** (1.81)* (1.77)*<br />

Observations 6,487 6,487 6,487 6,125 6,125 6,125<br />

R-squared 6.60% 11.13% 9.56% 9.71% 13.06% 12.82%<br />

First Stage<br />

Regression<br />

First Stage<br />

Regression<br />

Dependent variables IPP1 IPP2<br />

Christian Colleges 0.011 0.619<br />

(5.94)*** (6.21)***<br />

British Settlement 0.060 6.998<br />

(17.32)*** (31.14)***<br />

Observations 6,487 6,125<br />

R-squared 26.67% 73.14%<br />

Partial F-test <strong>of</strong> IVs 202.75 (p=0.00) 1,124.34 (p=0.00)<br />

J stat. from<br />

overidentification test<br />

1.284 (p=0.257) 2.717 (p=0.100)<br />

39

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