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Does Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Matter in China ...

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Table 6: The effect <strong>of</strong> IP rights enforcement on patent output<br />

The dependent variable is the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>novation patents. For a detailed description <strong>of</strong> all variables, see Appendix 3. All<br />

regressions <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong>dustry dummies as control variables. All <strong>in</strong>dependent variables are lagged by one year. The reported<br />

coefficients <strong>in</strong> Column (1), (2), (4) and (5) are Poisson regressions. Column (3) and (6) present results obta<strong>in</strong>ed from the IV<br />

regressions, with the <strong>in</strong>struments be<strong>in</strong>g the prov<strong>in</strong>cial number <strong>of</strong> Christian colleges by 1920 (Christian Colleges) and the dummy<br />

which equals 1 when a prov<strong>in</strong>ce had a British concession dur<strong>in</strong>g the late Q<strong>in</strong>g Dynasty (British Settlement). Other covariates <strong>in</strong> the<br />

first-stage regression are omitted for presentational convenience. The numbers <strong>in</strong> the parentheses are z-stat (t-stat) based on<br />

standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and the potential cluster<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the residual at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level. ***, **, * <strong>in</strong>dicate<br />

the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.<br />

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)<br />

Model Poisson Poisson<br />

IV-Second<br />

IV-Second<br />

Poisson Poisson<br />

stage: Poisson<br />

stage: Poisson<br />

Dependent variables Patent Patent Patent Patent Patent Patent<br />

IPP1 9.550 4.530 9.748<br />

(1.73)* (2.50)** (2.64)***<br />

IPP2 0.339 0.310 0.373<br />

(2.69)*** (6.17)*** (3.30)***<br />

Corruption Control -0.076 -0.071 -0.203 -0.286<br />

(-0.96) (-0.98) (-1.13) (-1.03)<br />

Bank<strong>in</strong>g Development -0.110 -0.403 0.009 -0.104<br />

(-1.11) (-2.16)** (0.09) (-0.71)<br />

GDP Growth 4.521 6.151 3.355 5.181<br />

(2.30)** (2.27)** (1.74)* (1.80)*<br />

University -0.032 -0.049 -0.008 -0.011<br />

(-1.11) (-1.64) (-1.01) (-1.21)<br />

Metropolis 0.727 1.398 0.581 1.104<br />

(1.96)** (2.83)*** (1.33) (1.89)*<br />

Log(R&D Stock) 0.903 0.949 0.955 0.906 0.896 0.907<br />

(7.08)*** (6.78)*** (6.38)*** (4.65)*** (7.81)*** (7.30)***<br />

Log(Assets) 0.180 0.097 0.100 0.106 0.152 0.135<br />

(1.65)* (1.10) (1.21) (1.54) (1.84)* (1.60)<br />

Log(Firm Age) -0.069 -0.120 -0.036 -0.104 -0.209 -0.133<br />

(-0.32) (-0.57) (0.18) (0.46) (1.07) (-0.63)<br />

Constant -20.269 -13.687 -16.205 -14.573 -13.769 -13.995<br />

(-3.21)*** (-4.89)*** (-4.68)*** (-5.09)*** (-7.63)*** (-7.55)***<br />

Observations 14,374 14,374 14,374 13,316 13,316 13,316<br />

Wald chi2 (Prob>chi2) 14538.37<br />

(P=0.00)<br />

23648.82<br />

(P=0.00)<br />

26924.07<br />

(P=0.00)<br />

19120.57<br />

(P=0.00)<br />

62345.51<br />

(P=0.00)<br />

54320.06<br />

(P=0.00)<br />

First Stage:<br />

OLS<br />

First Stage:<br />

OLS<br />

Dependent variables IPP1 IPP2<br />

Christian Colleges 0.024 1.005<br />

(16.31)*** (14.87)***<br />

British Settlement 0.020 6.034<br />

(7.28)*** (47.86)***<br />

Observations 14,347 13,316<br />

R-squared 18.97% 58.52%<br />

Partial F-test <strong>of</strong> IVs 319.92 (p=0.00) 2670.00 (p=0.00)<br />

42

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