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The police official at Force CID in Abuja who managed the investigations into the 2008 Jos violence<br />

told Human Rights Watch, in February 2009, that they went through most of the cases of individuals<br />

arrested but could not find any link between the individuals and any offense, so there was no<br />

reason to continue to detain them. 488 Similarly, the Kaduna State director of public prosecutions<br />

said he reviewed the case diaries from the April 2011 violence—200 suspects lumped into five case<br />

diaries—and recommended that charges should be dropped against all but 18 of the suspects. The<br />

police had not done a “proper investigation,” he found, adding that there was no evidence that<br />

could stand in court to warrant prosecution of the cases. 489 “The problem is generally not the<br />

political will to prosecute,” he argued, “the problem is the quality of evidence.” 490<br />

Failure to Investigate: The Weak Link<br />

The failure of the police to investigate crimes, by proactively investigating incidents of violence,<br />

pursuing credible leads, and following through on criminal investigations, is one of the major<br />

impediments in securing accountability for these serious crimes.<br />

The Anonymity of the Mob<br />

Mass violence, which is often carried out by large groups or mobs, is particularly difficult to<br />

prosecute, given the challenges of linking evidence to individual suspects. In some incidents<br />

documented in this report, for example, members of mobs covered or painted their faces, or the<br />

perpetrators carried out the violence at night, making it more difficult for witnesses to identify<br />

individual perpetrators. 491 This problem is especially relevant in urban areas such as Kaduna and<br />

Jos, where, following years of violence, neighborhoods have become increasingly segregated<br />

along religious and ethnic lines, making it less likely that people personally know each other<br />

across those divides.<br />

But Human Rights Watch found that in many cases people had witnessed crimes and could<br />

identify who, for example, burned their house or killed their neighbors or family members. This<br />

was more likely if the violence took place in a small community or rural area—where people are<br />

488 Human Rights Watch interview with Abiola Odion, police commissioner in charge of general investigations, Criminal Investigation<br />

Department, Force Headquarters, Abuja, February 23 2009.<br />

489 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Bayero Dari, Kaduna State director of public prosecutions, Kaduna, November 22, 2013.<br />

490 Human Rights Watch interview with Bayero Dari, then Kaduna State deputy director of public prosecutions, Kaduna, August 18, 2011.<br />

491 For example, Human Rights Watch conducted a group interview with more than 20 Christian victims in Kafanchan. All of the victims<br />

had homes, shops, or vehicles burned, but none of them was able to identify individual perpetrators, noting that much of the violence<br />

took place at night and many of them fled when the violence started. See also sections above on the March 2010 Dogo Nahawa<br />

massacre or the April 2011 attack on the Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic in Zaria.<br />

“LEAVE EVERYTHING TO GOD” 128

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