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The Trial of General Lekwot The special tribunals were widely criticized for lacking basic due process guarantees. General Lekwot was first charged with unlawful assembly, disturbing the peace, and rioting. In August 1992, after the prosecution had closed its case and the defense had called nine witnesses, the prosecution withdrew all charges. General Lekwot was immediately rearrested and charged again. The new charges were identical to the first charges but added culpable homicide. 289 Lekwot’s lawyers appealed, arguing that the new charges violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial. But before the Supreme Court could hear the appeal, the military government handed down Decree No. 55, which stripped the courts of their jurisdiction to hear appeals of any decision or judgment of the tribunals, leaving only the military’s supreme council to confirm the tribunals’ judgments. 290 The defense team withdrew from the tribunal in protest. 291 The tribunal continued the trial of General Lekwot and his co-accused, without legal representation, and in February 1993 General Lekwot and five co-accused were convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to death by hanging. 292 A Lagos-based human rights group brought a case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on behalf of seven of the men sentenced to death by the Okadigbo Tribunal. In October 1994, the commission declared, based on the written submissions, that the defendants had been deprived or their “right to defence” and their “right to an appeal to competent national organs.” 293 The commission furthermore declared that the government of Nigeria had violated its duty to “guarantee the independence of the Courts” by establishing a tribunal which “may be composed of persons belonging largely to the executive branch of the government.” 294 The commission recommended that Nigeria’s government “free the complainants.” 295 In the end, General Babangida commuted the sentences of those on death row to five-year prison terms, and they were released after time served. 296 289 See “Addendum to the Kataf Community Memorandum of 30 th July, 1999, on the 1992 Zango Kataf Riots Trial, To the Human Rights Violations Investigation Panel, FCT, Abuja,” pp. 9-10; “Withdrawal of Professional Services,” Letter to Maj. Gen. Zamani Lewot from G.O.K. Ajayi & Co, January 4, 1993. Copy of file with Human Rights Watch. 290 Decree No. 55 revived the power of the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Act, Part IV, Sec. 8(1), which provided that: “The validity of any decision, sentence, judgment, … or order given or made, … or any other thing whatsoever done under this Act shall not be inquired into in any court of law.” See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, decision, “87/93 Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lewot and 6 Others/Nigeria,” October 1994, para. 22; “Withdrawal of Professional Services,” Letter to Maj. Gen. Zamani Lewot, January 4, 1993; “Nigeria: Military Injustice,” News from Africa Watch, March 30, 1993, pp. 4-5. 291 The defense lawyers stated that following Decree No. 55, the tribunal “ceased to qualify” as a type of tribunal where they could offer professional legal services. See “Withdrawal of Professional Services,” Letter to Maj. Gen. Zamani Lewot, January 4, 1993. 292 The Okadigbo Tribunal acquitted one of General Lekwot’s co-accused. See National Defence and Security Council, “Confirmation of the Judgements of the Judicial Tribunals on Civil and Communal Disturbances at Zango-Kataf,” Kaduna State, June 14, 1993. 293 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, decision, “87/93 Constitutional Rights Project,” October 1994, paras. 28-29. 294 Ibid., paras. 30-33. The Civil Disturbance (Special Tribunal) Act, Part II, Sec. 2(2) provided that the members of the tribunals shall be appointed by the “Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces” and consist of at least one member belonging to the armed forces. See ibid., para. 30. 295 Ibid. 296 Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Gen. Zamani Lekwot, Kaduna, November 14, 2011. “LEAVE EVERYTHING TO GOD” 86
2000 “Sharia Riots” In February and May 2000, at least 2,000 people, and possibly many more, were killed in sectarian and inter-ethnic violence sparked by Christian protests over the proposed adoption of Sharia law in Kaduna State. 297 On February 21, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) organized a protest march in the state capital in reaction to proposals to introduce Sharia in Kaduna State. 298 Muslim youth allegedly stoned some of the Christian protesters, sparking clashes between Muslim and Christian youth. 299 The violence spread to other neighborhoods in the city and soon spiraled out of control, leading to widespread killings by roving mobs. On both sides of the religious divide entire city blocks were reduced to rubble. 300 Soldiers were deployed and eventually brought rioting in the city to an end, but violence also spread to other towns and rural areas in the state. 301 An accurate death toll for the riots has never been fully ascertained. A commission of inquiry, set up by the state government, reported that at least 1,295 people had been killed, while many others were buried unidentified or declared missing. 302 When bodies of Igbo victims killed in Kaduna State began arriving home in southeast Nigeria, mobs of Igbo took revenge on Hausa-Fulani residents. According to media reports, in the city of Aba, mobs massacred several hundred Hausa-Fulani on February 28 and 29. 303 President 297 See Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: The “Miss World Riots”: Continued Impunity for Killings in Kaduna, July 2003, p. 4. 298 The protest followed pro-Sharia demonstrations by Muslims in Kaduna State. See Rotgaki I. Gofwen, Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria and Nation Building, 2004, pp. 114-15. 299 See Kaduna State of Nigeria, “White Paper on the Report of Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Kaduna State Religious Disturbances of February 2000” (Government Printer, April 2001), p. 8 (“2000 White Paper”). The Kaduna State police commissioner, on the other hand, alleged that “Christian youths moved to the streets and started throwing stones at the shops of Muslims.” See Rotgaki I. Gofwen, Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria and Nation Building, 2004, pp. 116-17. 300 See Tim Sullivan, “A Nigerian neighborhood, emptied of life, is left to the corpses,” Associated Press, February 28, 2000; Hussaini Abdu, Clash of Identities, 2010, pp. 172-73. 301 The worst affected area was Kachia town in southern Kaduna State, where mobs of Christians killed Hausa-Fulani residents and burned their property. See ibid., p. 173; “Kaduna violence spreads to nearby towns where death toll reaches 90,” The Guardian (Lagos), February 28, 2000. In northern Kaduna State, Hausa-Fulani mobs also attacked Christians and burned their property in Birnin Gwari and Zaria. See Kaduna State of Nigeria, “2000 White Paper,” pp. 10-11. 302 See ibid. The police, on the other hand, recorded 609 deaths. See Rotgaki I. Gofwen, Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria and Nation Building, 2004, p. 119. Civil society leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch believed that the number of people killed far exceeded the figure of 2,000. See Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: The “Miss World Riots,” July 2003, pp. 4-5. The police also reported that 1,944 houses and commercial buildings, 123 churches, and 55 mosques were burned or destroyed. See Rotgaki I. Gofwen, Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria and Nation Building, 2004, p. 119. 303 See, for example, Mike Oduniyi, “Over 400 killed in eastern Nigeria riots,” Reuters, March 1, 2000; Peter Cunliffe-Jones, “Military sources say 450 slain in south Nigeria clashes,” Agence France-Presse, March 1, 2000. Northern Muslims were also attacked in other southwest cities, including Umuahia. 87 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | DECEMBER 2013
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H U M A N R I G H T S W A T C H “
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Copyright © 2013 Human Rights Watc
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Renewed Violence in Kaduna State, 2
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“Leave Everything to God” Accou
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On a sunny day in January 2010, in
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A mosque burned by mobs on April 18
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(above) A man stands in the rubble
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Photograph allegedly taken of a mob
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A mass grave for the victims of the
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT O
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PLATEAU STAT
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financial incentives or promise any
Page 25 and 26: Non-indigenes are often denied acce
Page 27 and 28: “peculiar attitudes” and will
Page 29 and 30: The conflict over indigene rights h
Page 31 and 32: II. Inter-Communal Violence in Plat
Page 33 and 34: curfew, which was widely ignored, a
Page 35 and 36: speech to the Nigerian Senate in Oc
Page 37 and 38: the police to investigate them. 78
Page 39 and 40: In the pre-dawn hours of January 19
Page 41 and 42: Satellite image of Kuru Karama 21 m
Page 43 and 44: communities. 102 When the Muslim le
Page 45 and 46: didn’t want to see the children [
Page 47 and 48: ut “[s]he was not able to reach m
Page 49 and 50: On January 20, some of the Muslim r
Page 51 and 52: Sabon Gidan Kanar Witnesses said th
Page 53 and 54: eeders association in Plateau State
Page 55 and 56: The March 2010 Dogo Nahawa Massacre
Page 57 and 58: mass grave: 16 men, 16 women, and 3
Page 59 and 60: man who survived the attack told Hu
Page 61 and 62: finish.” He continued, “Fightin
Page 63 and 64: IV. Impunity for the 2010-2013 Viol
Page 65 and 66: charge them with. Federal prosecuto
Page 67 and 68: moving about freely. One of the wit
Page 69 and 70: know us. They are still there in th
Page 71 and 72: provided Human Rights Watch with in
Page 73 and 74: Kafanchan Special Judicial Tribunal
Page 75: News of the Zango massacre sparked
Page 79 and 80: killed scores of people before even
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Page 85 and 86: cutlasses, and sticks, and they cam
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Page 89 and 90: men divided the Muslim men and wome
Page 91 and 92: Another Muslim man, whose 19-year-o
Page 93 and 94: Violence in Kafanchan The town of K
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Page 97 and 98: The man said he later went back to
Page 99 and 100: the house. There were 10 men and 12
Page 101 and 102: free.” 405 Communal bloodletting
Page 103 and 104: identified. The team arrested a num
Page 105 and 106: about living their normal lives,”
Page 107 and 108: VIII. The Legal Framework Internati
Page 109 and 110: houses, shops, or places of worship
Page 111 and 112: The Nigeria Police Force has also b
Page 113 and 114: IX. The Anatomy of Impunity The fai
Page 115 and 116: arrest those they find at the scene
Page 117 and 118: advice, they refused to do that; [w
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Page 121 and 122: justice. For example, a Hausa woman
Page 123 and 124: villages in Plateau State, and from
Page 125 and 126: emaining cases. 523 The federal tri
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We asked the people who have been a
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Plateau State Attorney General Edwa
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violence to book,” he told Human
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Political Compromises That Reinforc
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who set their homes on fire, those
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Plateau and Kaduna—two states in
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