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cases of violence has therefore undermined the message that the government is serious about ending the cycle of violence. Failure to Prosecute the Organizers of Violence Human Rights Watch asked the police commissioner in Plateau State whether they had investigated those who may have planned or organized the violence. “The sponsors—well, that one is difficult,” he responded. “Those sponsors, they are faceless. We don’t know them.” 539 A review of the case files by Human Rights Watch, however, reveals that the authorities might have more information on alleged sponsors than they may want to let on. In the March 2010 Dogo Nahawa massacre, for example, the Federal High Court convicted two Fulani men for conspiracy and terrorism, sentencing them to 21 years in prison, based on their confessional statements to the police. 540 The two men—who were illiterate and never attended school—gave the names of the people who contacted and paid them to carry out the attack. 541 Human Rights Watch asked the police in Jos and Abuja, as well at the head of federal prosecutions at the attorney general’s office in Abuja, whether any of the named sponsors of the Dogo Nahawa attack have been investigated or arrested, but none of the officials interviewed was able to provide any information on the case. 542 One of the lawyers representing the accused persons in the Dogo Nahawa cases told Human Rights Watch that none of the cases involved any alleged sponsors of the attack. 543 Similarly, in other communities where massacres took place, such as Kuru Karama, the evidence suggests that the attacks were not spontaneous clashes but organized assaults, yet no one who organized or planned the violence has been arrested or prosecuted. 544 The numerous known suspects who could be investigated, and who likely have information on who organized and planned the violence, remain free. 539 Human Rights Watch interview with Emmanuel Ayeni, Plateau State police commission, Jos, March 12, 2012. 540 Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Dauda Abubakar & Anor, Federal High Court of Nigeria, Jos Judicial Division, Judgment, FHC/J/14C/2010, February 14, 2011, p. 10. 541 See ibid., pp. 12-13. 542 The head of State CID in Plateau State said he had no information on the case because Force CID in Abuja had taken over the case of the Dogo Nahawa investigation and “you cannot take the case and bring it back.” He added: “Once they have taken the case they are supposed to follow the case to its logical conclusion.” Human Rights Watch interview with Ibrahim Umar, Jos, March 12, 2012. Human Rights Watch also met with a police commissioner at the Force CID in Abuja, but he had no information on the case at that time, stating that the police officers heading the investigation had been transferred. Human Rights Watch interview with Jonathan Johnson, commissioner of police in charge of Administration, Force Criminal Investigation Department, Abuja, March 2012. The chief prosecutor at the Federal Attorney General’s Office told Human Rights Watch that she was not aware of any prosecutions of sponsors of the Dogo Nahawa attack. “The Ministry of Justice does not investigate—we prosecute,” she said. Human Rights Watch interview with O.O. Fatunde, director of public prosecutions of the federation, Federal Ministry of Justice, Abuja, March 16, 2012. 543 Human Rights Watch interview with a defense lawyer in Jos, January 30, 2012. 544 The chief prosecutor at the federal Ministry of Justice told Human Rights Watch, “I’m not aware of any federal prosecutions for the Kuru Karam incident.” Human Rights Watch interview with O.O. Fatunde, Abuja, March 16, 2012. “LEAVE EVERYTHING TO GOD” 138
Plateau State Attorney General Edward Pwajok argued that the failure to thoroughly investigate the organizers of the violence is one of the reasons the violence continues. Even if the police arrest those who carry out the crimes, he explained, the sponsors can always find other “handy youths as mercenaries.” 545 Similarly a judge in Kaduna State pointed out that “there are definitely people behind” the violence. “You don’t just wake up one morning and have a riot,” the judge said. “Until the day they start really prosecuting the kingpins … they won’t see an end to it, because at the end of the day they [the kingpins] are going scot free.” 546 Commissions of Inquiry or Political Solutions Instead of Criminal Prosecutions Instead of investigating and prosecuting those who have organized or carried out these crimes— including mass murder—political leaders defer responsibility by setting up independent commissions of inquiry. They also often succumb to pressure by community and religious leaders to seek political compromises that protect the perpetrators. Commissions of Inquiry: “An Exercise in Buying Time” The most common response to mass violence is for the political leaders—the state governors or the president—to set up a commission of inquiry or an administrative panel to investigate the causes of the violence and identify those responsible. These commissions are often headed by serving or retired judges and include civil society representation. 547 While in theory they can serve an important role in establishing responsibility for violence that has polarized the community, they have in practice further reinforced impunity. Federal and state authorities, including at times law enforcement officials, use these commissions and panels to defer responsibility for investigating and prosecuting those responsible. For example, a civil servant from Matsirga who witnessed people murdered during the April 2011 violence went to the police in Kafanchan to file a formal report, but the area commander told him to wait until a commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the violence. 548 Many of the victims and witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Plateau and Kaduna said they provided information to their community leaders who submitted reports to the various commissions of inquiry. These reports often include names of perpetrators, victims, and witnesses. 545 Human Rights Watch interview with Edward Pwajok, Jos, March 12, 2012. 546 Human Rights Watch interview with a judge in Kaduna State (name withheld), August 2011. 547 These include commissions of inquiry set up after the 1992 Zangon Kataf violence, 2001 Jos violence, and 2011 Kaduna violence. 548 Human Rights Watch interview with a civil servant from Matsirga, Kafanchan, May 2, 2011. 139 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | DECEMBER 2013
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H U M A N R I G H T S W A T C H “
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Copyright © 2013 Human Rights Watc
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Renewed Violence in Kaduna State, 2
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“Leave Everything to God” Accou
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On a sunny day in January 2010, in
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A mosque burned by mobs on April 18
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(above) A man stands in the rubble
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Photograph allegedly taken of a mob
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A mass grave for the victims of the
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT O
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PLATEAU STAT
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financial incentives or promise any
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Non-indigenes are often denied acce
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“peculiar attitudes” and will
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The conflict over indigene rights h
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II. Inter-Communal Violence in Plat
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curfew, which was widely ignored, a
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speech to the Nigerian Senate in Oc
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the police to investigate them. 78
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In the pre-dawn hours of January 19
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Satellite image of Kuru Karama 21 m
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communities. 102 When the Muslim le
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didn’t want to see the children [
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ut “[s]he was not able to reach m
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On January 20, some of the Muslim r
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Sabon Gidan Kanar Witnesses said th
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eeders association in Plateau State
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The March 2010 Dogo Nahawa Massacre
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mass grave: 16 men, 16 women, and 3
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man who survived the attack told Hu
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finish.” He continued, “Fightin
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IV. Impunity for the 2010-2013 Viol
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charge them with. Federal prosecuto
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moving about freely. One of the wit
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know us. They are still there in th
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provided Human Rights Watch with in
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Kafanchan Special Judicial Tribunal
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News of the Zango massacre sparked
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Page 89 and 90: men divided the Muslim men and wome
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Page 93 and 94: Violence in Kafanchan The town of K
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Page 107 and 108: VIII. The Legal Framework Internati
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Page 113 and 114: IX. The Anatomy of Impunity The fai
Page 115 and 116: arrest those they find at the scene
Page 117 and 118: advice, they refused to do that; [w
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Page 121 and 122: justice. For example, a Hausa woman
Page 123 and 124: villages in Plateau State, and from
Page 125 and 126: emaining cases. 523 The federal tri
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Page 131 and 132: violence to book,” he told Human
Page 133 and 134: Political Compromises That Reinforc
Page 135 and 136: who set their homes on fire, those
Page 137: Plateau and Kaduna—two states in
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